III
A majority of the religious leaders I spoke to while researching this book remarked that the number of sadhus with an RSS background grew considerably in size by the end of the 1980s. Among the many consequences of this new phenomenon was the transformation of the very character of Kumbh Melas.
The VHP started making efforts to promote its Hindu supremacist ideology in the Kumbh Melas as early as in 1966 at the Allahabad Kumbh, where it organised the first World Hindu Conference. Held on 22 January that year, the conference was well attended by sadhus from various akharas.15 It was facilitated by Prabhudatt Brahmachari, a Vaishnava sadhu who had contested against Jawaharlal Nehru and lost by a huge margin in India’s first parliamentary election; he was the joint candidate backed by all the Hindu supremacist parties from the Phulpur seat.
Encouraged by the attendance at the World Hindu Conference—the first serious attempt to establish the VHP as a consistory of Hinduism—the VHP asserted itself, along with a host of other Hindu organisations, later that year on the prohibition of cow slaughter. This issue had been fiercely debated in 1948–49 in the constituent assembly between secularists like Nehru on the one hand and Congress traditionalists and Hindu revivalists on the other. The debate resulted in the incorporation of this issue as one of the Directive Principles of State Policies, which, instead of being legally enforceable, are broad guidelines in the Constitution that governments are expected to bear in mind while framing state-level policy. However, those in favour of the prohibition were far from satisfied and kept raking it up from time to time.
On 25 September 1966, the Sarvadaliya Goraksha Maha-abhiyan Samiti (SGMS) was founded and Prabhudatt Brahmachari was made its head. The steering group of the SGMS consisted not only of members from the VHP but also from the RSS, Hindu Mahasabha, Ram Rajya Parishad, Arya Samaj and the Hindu traditionalists from Congress—such as Gulzarilal Nanda, who was home minister in the Indira Gandhi government—and members from Bharat Sadhu Samaj, which had been founded under Nanda’s patronage.16 At the call of SGMS, over one lakh sadhus descended on Parliament Street on 7 November 1966 and went on to gherao Parliament House, demanding a prohibition on cow slaughter. Police had to resort to firing when repeated tear-gassing and lathi-charging failed to stop the violent mobs from trying to get inside ‘Parliament House and All India Radio and attacking buildings along the way and setting fire to over 100 cars and a dozen buses’.17 Seven persons were killed and about 140 injured in the police firing, till the army was called in the afternoon and curfew imposed.
The violence and arson by sadhus put many of those who had supported the prohibition of cow slaughter on the back foot. The three-hour mob rule—first of its kind by sadhus in the national capital—was seen as a well-planned attempt to discredit parliamentary democracy. Nanda, the union home minister, tried to extricate himself from the mess by telling Lok Sabha that ‘it was the highly inflammatory speech of Swami Rameshwaranand [shankaracharya of Puri] that had converted the till then comparatively peaceful assembly of sadhus and people campaigning for a ban on cow slaughter into a violent and destructive mob in Parliament Street’.18 Two days later, Indira Gandhi, who had remained firm all through the agitation, sacked him.
This was certainly not the outcome the sadhus might have expected from their unprecedented action. Never before had they so completely thrown their weight behind the Hindu revivalist bandwagon, despite their support to it in the past. They had been led to believe—as they came out of their ashrams to occupy Parliament Street—that they would be marching forth to change the destiny of the nation. The expectations that the VHP and its associated bodies had generated in them was vastly different from the outcome of their demonstration in the national capital. That they were made pawns in the game of politics was evident also from the fact that the demonstration had been organised merely months before the next general elections, scheduled in early 1967.
Indira Gandhi’s resolute stance left the sadhus high and dry. They were chased, caned, arrested and shot at. Even three hours of holding Parliament Street hostage had delivered absolutely nothing to them. If anything, it proved that the muscle power they had become used to wielding had little space in democratic India. Prabhudatt Brahmachari and the shankaracharya of Puri went on a public fast a few days later to force the government’s hand, but the majority of the sadhus, deciding not to waste their time in Delhi, returned home. Even those on the fast had to suspend it by the end of January 1967 having failed to move the government.19
The debacle of this anti-cow slaughter agitation left a large section of the sadhus disillusioned and they did not respond to the VHP’s calls at the next Kumbh Mela held in Allahabad in 1977. Even though the Kumbh took place in the aftermath of Indira Gandhi’s decision to withdraw Emergency and call for a general election, the VHP and the RSS, despite all their efforts, could not mobilise the sadhus using the anti-Congress sentiment. The second World Hindu Conference organised in 1979 was poorly attended and it seemed like the VHP had lost its relevance. Most sadhus had seen through the VHP’s plan to use them for the electoral gains of the Jayaprakash Narayan-led Janata Party, which was supported by the Sangh Parivar. Instead, the sadhus provided an overwhelming welcome to Indira Gandhi in a meeting to honour her at the 1977 Kumbh, organised by the shankaracharya of Jyotish peetha. Gandhi received benediction from ‘the holiest godmen ever assembled on a single dais’, the Times of India reported. The article further said:
Mrs Gandhi assured the religious leaders that the government would not interfere with sacred Hindu traditions and practices but at the same time requested them to banish ignorance, blind faith and superstition from the minds of the people. Though it was her first public speech since the announcement of the election decision, she strictly avoided politics.
The sadhus pledged their full support in propagating and implementing the 25-point programme [of the government].
Shri Shantanand Saraswati, the Shankaracharya of Badrikashram [Jyotish peetha] who is known as ‘Dharma Samrat’ sat behind a square solid silver table topped by a pair of ‘padukas’ symbolising the presence of the Adi Shankara, founder of the four peethas. The Shankaracharya carried the holy staff sheathed in saffron clothes to signify his religious authority. His forehead was smeared with sandalwood paste, superimposed by a king-sized kumkum tilak. Other sadhus wore triple horizontal yellow stripes (tripundra) on their brows to signify their Shaiva beliefs, while some others had double vertical lines of holy chalk with a vermilion stream in between (urdhava pundra) according to the Vaishnava tradition. […]
Mrs. Gandhi in her brief speech recalled the unique Hindu tradition of veneration of sadhus and sanyasis which set India apart from other nations. […]
She recalled that she had carefully explained the true meaning of secularism in her recent speech in Parliament and wished to declare from this holy dais that the government believed in ‘sarva dharma sama bhava’ (equal respect for all religions).20
Her call to secularism did not change the priorities of the sadhus; they were still attached to the idea of Hindu revivalism and were anxious to protect and promote their interests. Many had simply lost hope that the VHP and its sister organisations could actually deliver on their tall promises. A good number of sadhus stayed away from the VHP meetings in the 1977 Kumbh. The general anti-Congress wave, quite visible in most parts of northern India at that time, hardly touched the sadhus attending the Kumbh. This was a serious blow to the VHP, especially as it came at a time when the RSS outfit desperately required a boost to its sagging morale.
In the decade after the failed march of sadhus on Parliament Street, the VHP, despite all its efforts, was unable to regain the sadhus’ confidence. In fact, the Kumbh Mela of 1977 only accelerated the VHP’s free fall.
IV
Things might have not worked out in the VHP’s favour had a large number of swayamsevaks and pracharaks not infiltrated the ranks of sadhus. Although this infiltraton began in the early 1980s, it intensified towa
rds the end of the decade. This new class of sadhus, particularly in the Shaiva akharas, worked from within. Not only did they bolster the VHP’s efforts to use mass ritual actions and religious imageries for the political mobilisation of Hindus but also laid the foundation for what the RSS outfit had been longing for—transformation of the Kumbh Mela into a massive political opportunity. ‘The change was witnessed in the Allahabad Kumbh Mela of 1989, but this change started taking shape in 1986 with the help of the new class of sadhus when the VHP facilitated the formation of Akhil Bharatiya Sant Samiti [ABSS] by Swami Vamadev [a prominent Dasanami sanyasi of the time],’ said Swami Jitendranand Saraswati, a Varanasi-based dandi sadhu of the Shaiva sect, who had worked as an RSS pracharak between 1989 and 2004.21 ‘All sadhus with Sangh background as well as those active in the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, including Ramchandra Das Paramhansa, Nritya Gopal Das and Hansdevacharya, joined the new body, which was presented as an organisation independent of the VHP.’ The equivocation was meant to ensure that the VHP could attract even sadhus who wanted to stay away from the Sangh Parivar.
The ranks of the new body swelled as the number of sadhus with an RSS background increased. ‘By the time the Allahabad Kumbh Mela was held in 1989, the Sant Samiti was in a position to ensure limelight for the VHP’s efforts,’ said Jitendranand Saraswati, who has been the national general secretary of ABSS since 2016. A three-day Dharma Sansad was organised by the VHP in the last week of January 1989. The Dharma Sansad is a conclave of sadhus, unlike the World Hindu Conference, which is attended by ordinary supporters of the RSS as well as sadhus. Both continue to be conducted till this day, with the former being the bigger focus. The Dharma Sansad became notable for the large participation of sadhus as well as for its uber militant tone. A report that appeared in the Statesman said: ‘The Shankaracharya of Kanchi [Jayendra Saraswati] and most other heads of Hindu sects were present, thus ensuring a mammoth crowd of Kumbh Mela pilgrims.’22 Journalist Mark Tully describes the turnout thus:
The stage in the vast tented pavilion on Kumbhanagar’s main road was crowded with holy men wearing saffron, lemon-yellow, dark-red or white robes. Some were old and frail; some young, sleek-skinned and prosperous. Some were lean and intense, and some rather stout and somnolent. Thousands of people sat shoulder to shoulder on straw strewn on the floor of the pavilion, and thousands more stood outside listening to the speeches on loudspeakers.23
However, one sadhu’s presence on the VHP dais created much buzz and surprised many—that of Deoraha Baba’s, ‘the most revered hermit of Vrindavan, who agreed to speak from the VHP rostrum’.24 He had great influence among Vaishnava sadhus, who had till then largely stayed away from the VHP’s area of influence. Mark Tully records his appearance quite vividly:
The holy man was naked except for a deerskin he held loosely round his waist. His thighs were emaciated, his skin was blackened by the sun, his eyes were rheumy with age, his hair was matted; but, surprisingly, his beard was quite neatly trimmed. He sat down hurriedly and raised both his hands. […] A model of the temple of Ram which the Vishwa Hindu Parishad planned to build if it succeeded in getting that mosque [Babri masjid] destroyed was brought to the baba, who laid hands on it. The baba, still sitting, pulled himself to the edge of his platform, clasped a microphone and started speaking in a quiet but remarkably clear voice. He told the now silent crowd, ‘Protecting this temple of Ram is holy work. You protect your religion and it protects you. My platform from which I give my blessing every day is the platform of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. They have my blessings. I want everyone to cooperate with their work.’25
The media reported that Deoraha Baba’s disciples claimed this was the first time he graced a VHP rostrum. Closer scrutiny however, reveals that this Vaishnava sadhu and follower of Ramanuja had been closely associated with the RSS outfit right since its inception. He was, for example, present on the VHP dais during its first World Hindu Conference in 1966.26
In any case, Deoraha Baba’s views and outlook was shared by a large number of sadhus attending the Dharma Sansad during the 1989 Kumbh Mela. Of many resolutions that it passed, one that gave the VHP much traction was the building of a Ram temple at the disputed site in Ayodhya. In fact, the manner in which the Dharma Sansad was conducted, particularly on its last day, stopped short of calling for the demolition of the Babri masjid, as is clear from a report that appeared in the Statesman:
The temple in Ayodhya would be built with bricks that would be worshipped as ‘Ram Shilas’ in every village of the country before being brought to the site, it was decided today. This worship would start on September 30. Today, five bricks were worshipped symbolically as ‘Ram Shilas’ here and then placed on the dais.
There was a scramble to pay donations in front of the ‘Shilas’, though the organisers kept declaring they wanted only Rs 1.25 per head for construction of the temple. That would raise Rs 100 crores if all Hindus paid their share, they added.
Most of the clergy who spoke today took a strong anti-Muslim and anti-government tone. Mahant Avaidyanath of Gorakhpur pointed that the Quran prohibited Muslims from constructing mosques on the holy places of other religions. ‘And telling us to construct the temple in another place to avoid conflict is like telling Lord Rama to wed another Sita to avoid war with Ravana.’27
The effect of the VHP’s mega show was sensational. The Dharma Sansad ended on 31 January 1989, and the very next day it organised a mammoth public meeting in the Kumbh Mela area, which was attended by ascetics in large numbers. According to a report in the Statesman, the ‘Hindu power’ presented itself as even more aggressive and intolerant than in the Dharma Sansad. Much of what the sadhus said, the report claimed, ‘could not be reported’ for fear of libel or a riot. ‘The suggestion from the dais that only by standing for elections themselves would the sadhus be able to ensure that the government took the steps they wanted it to—ban on cow slaughter, declaration of a Hindu rashtra and abolishing special privileges to minority groups under the law, to mention a few—received a thunderous applause,’ the report added.28
These meetings, speeches and propaganda using the platform of the 1989 Allahabad Kumbh provided an unprecedented edge to Hindutva politics. In days to come, the VHP built on this momentum to mobilise sadhus as well as devout Hindus for its Ayodhya project. The series of events this Kumbh Mela set off—including Advani’s rath yatra in 1990—culminated in the demolition of the Babri masjid. A large number of the naga vairagis of Ayodhya, who had largely remained lukewarm to the VHP’s call until the Allahabad Kumbh, enthusiastically participated in what was, by far, the most serious assault on the Indian State, one that shook its basic character.
In the 1990s, after the demolition of the Babri masjid, prominent sadhus and akharas went back to focusing on their day-to-day activities, managing real estate properties and hobnobbing with politicians of all kinds, although it was clear that the BJP had greater penetration among them. This was also the time when sadhus belonging to Other Backward Castes (OBCs) started becoming more assertive in what was an upper-caste-dominated world. Politics in north India had been animated by this assertion too, since the beginning of the 1990s, when the Central government announced job reservations for OBCs based on the Mandal Commission Report. A substantial number of Dasanami and Ramanandi sadhus at that time were OBCs, and still are. It would have been difficult for this section of sadhus to remain untouched by the caste-based political upheavals. Thus, the rise of the Samajwadi Party (SP), which derived its core strength from the OBCs in Uttar Pradesh, was followed by the formation of Samajwadi Sant Sabha, a group of Ramanandi vairagis headed by Bhavanath Das of Ayodhya. Though the new body was never directly associated with the SP, it became a magnet for sadhus from the OBC communities, and for some time subordinated itself to Mandal politics. Mulayam Singh Yadav, the leader of this new politics in Uttar Pradesh, became a political patron of Bhavanath Das.
Yet, the impact of the OBC assertion among the sadhus was largely limited because the
large number of RSS-workers-turned-sadhus acted as sheet anchor, keeping the VHP’s support base stable. RSS members who opted to become sadhus mostly belonged to the upper castes and a majority of them were Brahmins by birth. In the aftermath of the Mandal Commission, they acted in unison to maintain the status quo among sadhus. In fact, it was partly to offset the disruption caused by OBC reservations that the VHP, firmly backed by the new class of sadhus, increased the pitch of its rhetoric during the subsequent Kumbh Mela held at Allahabad in 2001. At its Dharma Sansad organised in January in the Kumbh Mela area, the RSS outfit issued a diktat to the Central government, asking it to clear the way for construction of the Ram temple.29 The government could not have complied with the diktat since the case was subjudice in the Allahabad High Court. The VHP did not press the issue further, given that its sister organisation, the BJP, was leading the coalition government at the Centre at that time.
The VHP’s rhetoric became even shriller in the 2013 Allahabad Kumbh when it strongly urged ascetics to communicate to Hindus across the country that supporting the BJP and Narendra Modi in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections was a divine project. The political overtones of the religious fair attended by millions of Hindu devotees and thousands of sadhus was evident in the VHP’s politically charged slogan, which could be heard frequently in the meetings of ascetics organised by the VHP and seen in the hoardings it put up on the streets of the Kumbh Mela area—‘Jo Ram ki baat karega, wohi desh par raaj karega (Only those who talk of Lord Ram shall rule the country)’. Of the two major congregations of sadhus organised by the VHP, one was addressed by BJP leader Rajnath Singh and the other by RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat. What gave the 2013 Kumbh an extra frisson was the image creation of Narendra Modi—the chief minister of Gujarat during the anti-Muslim carnage of 2002, who seemed set to become the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate—as the best choice for political leadership in the country because he alone could ensure the success of the divine project of Hindus.
Ascetic Games Page 9
