Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming; especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.
I should like also to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.
We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people on Cuba. Under a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zootechnicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.
I should like you consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise. We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.
We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed, and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.
In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.
Respectfully yours,
(s) N. KHRUSHCHEV
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON
RECEIPT OF CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV’S LETTER
OCTOBER 28, 1962
I welcome Chairman Khrushchev’s statesmanlike decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union under United Nations verification. This is an important and constructive contribution to peace.
We shall be in touch with the Secretary General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure peace in the Caribbean area.
It is my earnest hope that the governments of the world can, with a solution of the Cuban crisis, turn their urgent attention to the compelling necessity for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions. This applies to the military confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries as well as to other situations in other parts of the world where tensions lead to the wasteful diversion of resources to weapons of war.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY TO CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV
OCTOBER 28, 1962
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight, even though the official text has not yet reached me, because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.
The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations, as your message says, so that the United States in turn will be able to remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.
You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air-sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.
Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.
I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.
(s) JOHN F. KENNEDY
ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY ON CUBA
NOVEMBER 2, 1962
My fellow citizens: I want to take this opportunity to report on the conclusions which this Government has reached on the basis of yesterday’s aerial photographs which will be made available tomorrow, as well as other indications, namely, that the Soviet missile bases in Cuba are being dismantled, their missiles and related equipment are being crated, and the fixed installations at these sites are being destroyed.
The United States intends to follow closely the completion of this work through a variety of means, including aerial surveillance, until such time as an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected.
While the quarantine remains in effect, we are hopeful that adequate procedures can be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in our view, would be an appropriate agent in this matter.
The continuation of these measures in air and sea, until the threat to peace posed by these offensive weapons is gone, is in keeping with our pledge to secure their withdrawal or elimination from this hemisphere. It is in keeping with the resolution of the Organization of American States, and it is in keeping with the exchange of letters with Chairman Khrushchev of October 27th and 28th.
Progress is now being made toward the restoration of peace in the Caribbean, and it is our firm hope and purpose that this progress shall go forward. We will continue to keep the American people informed on this vital matter.
PRESIDENT KENNEDY’S STATEMENT ON CUBA
NOVEMBER 20, 1962
I have today been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers now in Cuba will be withdrawn in thirty days. He also agrees that these planes can be observed and counted as they leave. Inasmuch as this goes a long way toward reducing the danger which faced this Hemisphere four weeks ago, I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine.
In view of this action I want to take this opportunity to bring the American people up to date on the Cuban crisis and to revi
ew the progress made thus far in fulfilling the understandings between Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and myself as set forth in our letters of October 27 and 28. Chairman Khrushchev, it will be recalled, agreed to remove from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive use, to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba, and to permit appropriate United Nations observation and supervision to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments. We on our part agreed that, once these adequate arrangements for verification had been established, we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurances against invasion of Cuba.
The evidence to date indicates that all known offensive missile sites in Cuba have been dismantled. The missiles and their associated equipment have been loaded on Soviet ships. And our inspection at sea of these departing ships has confirmed that the number of missiles reported by the Soviet Union as having been brought into Cuba, which closely corresponded to our own information, has now been removed. In addition the Soviet Government has stated that all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Cuba and no offensive weapons will be reintroduced.
Nevertheless, important parts of the understanding of October 27th and 28th remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba.
Consequently, if the Western Hemisphere is to continue to be protected against offensive weapons, this Government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by our identification in recent days of a number of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and will also be withdrawn in due course.
I repeat, we would like nothing better than adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba, and we are prepared to continue our efforts to achieve such arrangements. Until that is done, difficult problems remain. As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere.
We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic, and other efforts of this Hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.
In short, the record of recent weeks shows real progress, and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. The completion of the commitment on both sides and the achievement of a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis might well open the door to the solution of other outstanding problems.
May I add this final thought. In this week of Thanksgiving there is much for which we can be grateful as we look back to where we stood only four weeks ago—the unity of this Hemisphere, the support of our allies, and the calm determination of the American people. These qualities may be tested many more times in this decade, but we have increased reason to be confident that those qualities will continue to serve the cause of freedom with distinction in the years to come.
A Short Bibliography
In preparing the Afterword we have reviewed all the published material on the Cuban missile crisis. Thirteen Days stands alone, both in its authority as a primary source and in the extent to which its author conveys what it felt like to be there. But a number of other accounts offer supplementary perspectives and additional details.
Students interested in pursuing the missile crisis further are advised to start with Theodore Sorensen’s account in Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965). It is the most careful and complete version produced by a central participant. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965) contains additional detail by a professional historian who observed some of the events from a position on the White House staff. Roger Hilsman’s To Move a Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967) includes an account of the missile crisis from the perspective of a second-level actor in the Department of State. Elie Abel’s The Missile Crisis (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1966) offers a more comprehensive chronology of the events, based on extensive interviews with most of the participants, especially in the State Department.
For those who wish to go further, additional references include:
Acheson, Dean, “Homage to Plain Dumb Luck,” Esquire, February, 1969.
Allison, Graham, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
Horelick, Arnold, and Rush, Myron, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).
Larson, David, ed., The Cuban Crisis of 1962 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963).
Pachter, Henry, Collision Course (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).
Tatu, Michel, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press, 1969).
Taylor, Maxwell D., Swords and Ploughshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972).
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Preparedness Subcommittee, Interim Report on Cuban Military Build-up, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963.
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations, Hearings, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963.
Weintal, Edward, and Bartlett, Charles, Facing the Brink (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967).
Wohlstetter, Albert and Roberta, “Controlling the Risks in Cuba,” Adelphia Papers, No. 17, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1965.
Students interested in the Korean analogue may wish to read Glenn D. Paige’s The Korean Decision (New York: Free Press, 1968).
R. E. N. and G. A.
Index
Acheson, Dean
as advocate of military action
air strike advocated by
as member of Ex Comm
Aden
Adenauer, Konrad, support by
Africa
Agency for International Development (AID)
Air Force
crashing of U-2 of
deployment of
special hearing for
Air Force Reserve, activation of
Allison, Graham T., “Afterword” by
Anderson, Major Rudolf, Jr.
Anderson, Mrs. Rudolf, Jr.
Army
deployment of First Armored Division of
deployment of 101st Airborne Division of
Ball, George
decision on blockade and
Ex Comm meetings and
as member of Ex Comm
Bay of Pigs
decision-making apparatus for
fiasco of
J. F. Kennedy and
unanimity at time of
Berlin (Germany)
blockade of
possible threat to
preparations against blockade of
threat to (1961)
Bohlen, Charles (Chip)
Bucharest (tanker)
Bülow, Prince von
Bundy, McGeorge
air strike favored by
diplomatic approach favored by
J. F. Kennedy informed of crisis by
as member of Ex Comm
Cabinet, advised of blockade (Oct. 22)
Cambodia, invasion of
Capehart, Homer E.
Castro, Fidel
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
involvement in foreign affairs of
missile placement analysis of
Check and balance system
between Congress and Presidency
in Constitution
in Missile Age
proposed devices for “redressing the constitutional balance,”
Civil War
Cleveland, Grover
Congo
Congress
criticism by members of (Oct. 22)
isolationism in
role of
war making as prime-example of incompatibility between Presidency and, see also specific presidents
Constitution
checks and balances of
between congressional and presidential roles
proposed devices for “redressing the constitutional balance,”
distinctive features of
as product of eighteenth century
Defense Department
De Gaulle, Gen. Charles, see Gaulle, Gen. Charles de
Diefenbaker, John
Dillon, Douglas
as advocate of military action
as member of Ex Comm
Dobrynin, Anatoly
advised of blockade (Oct. 22)
military buildup and
October 23 meeting with
October 27 meeting with
“Doves,” coining of
Eisenhower, Dwight D.
Essex (carrier)
Ex Comm, see Executive Committee of the National Security Council
Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm)
alternatives considered by
blockade favored by
disbanding of
instructions to
invention of
J. F. Kennedy’s attendance at meetings of
members of
October 16 meeting of
October 24 meeting of
October 27 meeting of
officialdom and
spirit of lightness in (Oct. 23)
start of blockade and
uses and shortcomings of
as vehicle for satisfying needs of top officials
Export-Import Bank
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Thirteen Days Page 14
