by James Jinks
Although the development of Polaris was under the highest US security ‘NOFORN’ classification (Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals), Burke provided Mountbatten with a great deal of assistance and advice through letters carried between Washington and London by a senior Commander on Admiral Raborn’s staff. (For years the SPO’s copies of the correspondence were kept in what was affectionately known as the ‘Dear Dickie File’.)24 By May 1958, Mountbatten was requesting so much information about Polaris that Burke had to tell him: ‘for God’s sake Dickie stop pestering me, put one of your men in our Special Projects Office and he can tell you all you need to know’.25 In order to establish a more efficient means of channelling Polaris-related information, Burke suggested a direct liaison between the Admiralty and the SPO would facilitate the flow of general and technical information between the two navies.26
Whenever doubts were expressed about Polaris, Mountbatten sought out information to rebuff the claims.27 He also secured from Burke a commitment to supply the Navy with ‘Polaris missiles (less warhead) at production cost’ with all research and development costs paid for by the USN.28 However, both men were discussing something they had little power to deliver as ultimately only the President of the United States could permit the sale of Polaris to the UK. Burke did not expect there to be any ‘serious difficulty’ at the political level, but he could only give ‘the U.S. Navy position in this matter, with no guarantee that it will finally work out that way’.29 In these circumstances, the British Government unsurprisingly remained committed to developing Blue Streak. Mountbatten advised that ‘the arguments for deploying the UK contribution to the deterrent in submarines remain as strong as ever’ and continued to walk the line between discretion and advocacy.30
When Mountbatten stood down as First Sea Lord and became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in May 1959, Polaris lost one of its most important advocates. Mountbatten’s successor as First Sea Lord, Sir Charles Lambe, did not share his enthusiasm for the new weapon and immediately adopted a more sceptical approach. When asked by Selkirk for direction on Polaris, Lambe advised that it was ‘unwise to go into final battle’.31 He also sought to reduce the temperature of the ‘Polaris pot’ by tempering the plans Mountbatten and Burke had set in train. When Lambe accidentally opened a letter from Burke addressed to Mountbatten, he wrote back in a highly critical tone:
As this whole subject of the British contribution to the Deterrent is a pretty hot one politically, I am rather glad that your letter was intercepted in this way, as it could be unfortunate if anyone else in the Ministry of Defence became aware of how closely you and Dickie are working on this matter.32
Instead, Lambe counselled caution, writing to his senior Admiralty colleagues:
We in the Admiralty need a much clearer picture than we have at present of the probable repercussions of the Polaris programme on the rest of the Navy before we start any official pro-Polaris propaganda. Indeed, I doubt whether it is right for the Navy to undertake any such propaganda at all. I believe we would be in a far stronger position if we were (at any rate, apparently) pushed into the Polaris project rather than to push it ourselves. My advice for the present would thus be to let sleeping dogs lie, and in the meantime continue our own internal Admiralty examination of the Polaris project so that we are on the top line to answer any queries when they come – as, in my view, they undoubtedly will.33
When Blue Streak was cancelled in early 1960, due to its high cost and technical and strategic obsolescence (it was vulnerable to a pre-emptive Soviet strike), the government decided to purchase an American air-launched ballistic missile – Skybolt – after the RAF enthusiastically promoted it, backed by the United States Air Force and the British aircraft industry.34 Although the Cabinet’s Defence Committee discussed Polaris, moving the deterrent underwater was deeply unattractive politically, as over £500m had already been invested in the V-bombers which would carry Skybolt.35
Lambe believed that Mountbatten would use his new position as CDS to do ‘everything in his power to see that the merits of Polaris are brought to the notice of HM Government’.36 But Mountbatten wanted to avoid inter-service rivalry and any impression that the Admiralty was attempting to ‘take over’ the deterrent from the RAF, and, for once, ‘maintained the impartiality expected of a CDS’, supporting the Air Staff’s bid for Skybolt.37 But he knew that Skybolt was only a short-term solution to the UK’s deterrent problems. He was aware that there was ‘no absolute certainty’ that it would be successful, and that the US ‘would not develop it for our use alone’.38 Burke informed him in April 1960 that Skybolt was ‘a very expensive and vulnerable system’.39 Mountbatten could afford to ‘sit back and let the Americans establish that the air-to-surface missile was technically and economically impossible’ while continuing to subtly prepare the case for Polaris.40
When the US Navy approached the Admiralty about establishing a naval base in Scotland for US Polaris submarines, the government saw an opportunity to secure Polaris for the Royal Navy in exchange for the facilities and as an ‘insurance against the failure of Skybolt’.41 The Admiralty was eager to grant the US request: allowing US SSBNs access to British waters would further improve relations between the two navies and expand the Royal Navy’s ‘knowledge in the general field of nuclear submarine operating’.42 The Government also hoped to obtain two complete US Polaris submarines in exchange for the facilities.43 However, in August 1960, the Eisenhower administration made it clear that it was ‘not prepared at the present time to leave the impression that they were negotiating a purely bilateral arrangement for supplying’ the UK with Polaris.44 In September, the Cabinet agreed to allow the US to establish a Polaris base at Holy Loch in Scotland. Ministers also agreed to drop the request for Polaris submarines, noting that ‘Any requirement there might be would be more likely to be met through the close relations between the Royal Navy and the United States Navy and the willingness of the United States Government further to develop technical co-operation.’45 Carrington as First Lord was instructed to ‘develop as far as possible even closer technical cooperation with the US Navy, with a view to making it possible in due course for the UK to build its own missile submarines if it were decided to do so’.46 The Government was pushing the Admiralty towards Polaris.
Admiral Sir Peter Reid, the Controller, who felt that the transfer of responsibility for the strategic deterrent to the Navy was inevitable, had already commissioned an investigation by the former Director General Weapons and future First Sea Lord, Michael Le Fanu, into the possible organization that could manage the procurement of Polaris should the Government decide it wanted it.47 When Le Fanu presented his report to the Admiralty Board in July 1960 only Flag Officer Submarines, Rear Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, was supportive.48 The Naval Secretary, Sir John Lang, who was bitterly opposed to Polaris, was scathing. He did not believe ‘that the proposals had been fully thought out in detail’ and he outlined ‘the fundamental weakness’ of Le Fanu’s recommendations:
he seeks to put Polaris into a privileged position as against the rest of the Navy programme and yet the Board, however whole-heartedly they may put their backs into Polaris, cannot divorce themselves of their parallel responsibilities for the rest of the Navy. There is no escaping the fact that there will be frequent clashes, in all fields, between the interests of Polaris and the rest of the Navy, irrespective of whether money is no object or not.49
The Controller and the First Sea Lord agreed ‘broadly’ with Lang, while the rest of the Board were concerned about ‘wounding the fleet’.50 Le Fanu’s report was pigeonholed, filed away in case the need for it should ever arise.51 ‘It fell so flat,’ he later recalled, ‘that I wondered for a moment if I had been wrong.’52
Towards the end of 1960 a small Admiralty working party was established under the chairmanship of the Director General Ships, Sir Alfred Sims, to keep in touch with the US Polaris programme in anticipation of a future UK programme.53 There was some debate about whether, if the Govern
ment decided to purchase Polaris, the Royal Navy should purchase complete Polaris submarines from the US Navy or build them in the United Kingdom. After exploring the options the working party advised that if the Government wanted Polaris it should either purchase the submarines completed from America, or buy all the American components and assemble them in British shipyards. In November 1960, Burke offered what he felt ‘might well be a deciding factor in acquiring the British Polaris submarine’, the use of support facilities in both Holy Loch and the United States.54 He also allowed a small Admiralty team to visit the US to study in greater detail the implications of a Royal Navy Polaris programme and ‘how strong the case is … for buying or building Polaris submarines’.55 A small technical team under the Deputy Director of Naval Construction, Sidney Palmer, visited the US from 26 February to 11 March 1961 to ‘obtain sufficient facts to enable the Admiralty to advise the Government, should the occasion arise, of the cost in manpower, materiel and money of building Polaris submarines in the U.K., and of supporting them’.56 Palmer’s team concluded that there was only one logical answer: ‘To be sure of success from the very outset and to save time the only sensible thing to do is to buy the whole of the Polaris system from the U.S. as a “do it yourself” kit and fit it straight into British built submarines.’57
Palmer’s team identified the best means of constructing a British Polaris submarine, by following US practice and grafting the missile section onto an existing SSN design.58 When the US Navy started its Polaris programme it took an existing SSN, the USS Scorpion, cut it in half, lengthened the hull by 130 feet, and installed two rows of eight missile tubes in the middle to create the US Navy’s first SSBN, the USS George Washington.59 Palmer’s team ‘became convinced’ that the ‘British Polaris submarine should be basically to the SSN02 (Valiant) design with a Polaris midship section’ of sixteen missiles.60 However, Valiant was one foot wider in diameter than the George Washington. Valiant’s main machinery, shape, and spacing in the frames and the reactor compartment were also completely different from those in US submarines, and the hull was made out of a different type of steel. Moreover, to reduce vulnerability, US SSBNs were designed to operate at much greater depths than British submarines. If the operating depth of the British SSBN was to be changed, the Valiant’s hull, machinery and hull valves would all have to be redesigned at considerable time, cost and effort. Nevertheless, Palmer’s team believed they could work around the installation problems, and the Americans did not think the reduced vulnerability afforded by greater diving depths was sufficient to justify the extra cost.
Examinations of the Palmer Report continued throughout 1961 and into 1962. In July 1961, Sir Arthur Hezlet, the Flag Officer Submarines and a keen Polaris supporter, produced a report on the feasibility of constructing an underground base in Scotland to shelter a future Royal Navy Polaris fleet, either in Loch Glencoul in Sutherland, just south of Cape Wrath; in Loch Nevis, near Mallaig opposite the southern end of Skye; or in Loch Striven, in the Clyde Approaches.61 The plan envisioned submarines entering the base via a submerged entrance, being drawn inside by winches after settling on a smooth slipway.62 The facility would house a dry dock, engineering, electrical and periscope workshops, armament stores for the Polaris missiles, and torpedoes, spare-part stores and communication facilities.
Hezlet’s proposal found little support. ‘It would be absurd at the present stage to incur any expenditure at all with Polaris submarines in mind, since we have no idea whether there will even be any successor of any kind to the V-Bombers with Skybolt,’ noted one official.63 From 1960 onwards the Admiralty’s Polaris policy had aimed at ‘the limited object of advising the Ministry of Defence on the scale of effort and resources required’.64 By the end of 1961, with the detailed technical information from the Palmer Report, the Admiralty felt it had gone as far as it could. It was unprepared to fund any further studies without a firmer guarantee from the Government that Polaris would succeed the V-bombers. This whole question was debated in a special committee known as the British Nuclear Deterrent Study Group (BNDSG) or the ‘Benders’, under the Chairmanship of the MOD’s Permanent Secretary, Sir Robert Scott.65
However, by the end of 1961, after sitting for almost a year, the group had failed to reach any definite conclusions. Discussion had become polarized between the supporters of a submarine force and the advocates of a continued airborne deterrent. In an attempt to resolve the stalemate, Solly Zuckerman set up an independent group of experts which it was hoped would avoid the inter-service politics that dominated the discussions of the full BNDSG. However, the discussions of the technical subgroup also quickly deteriorated as Zuckerman attempted to steer its deliberations in favour of Polaris. After bitter debates with the supporters of the airborne option the group produced a report acknowledging the need for a mobile delivery system, but left open the decision on whether it should be delivered by a submarine or an aircraft. Zuckerman held up its circulation and then modified its conclusion, tilting it towards Polaris. This so angered the supporters of the airborne option that they produced a minority report which forced Zuckerman to back down and reinstate the original balanced conclusion.66 His manoeuvrings offer a possible explanation for a widely held belief in RAF circles that Zuckerman and Mountbatten conspired to wrest the nuclear deterrent from Bomber Command in order to restore the ‘image of a rapidly declining Navy’.67
In November 1961, frustrated at ‘seeing the merits of sea power undersold’ by the Air Ministry, and mindful that most of the BNDSG’s members ‘thought the Navy had the stronger case’ for the successor system, the Admiralty Board produced a paper for the Minister of Defence. It highlighted ‘the military advantages of an underwater vehicle for the next generation of the deterrent’, outlining a dual-purpose submarine capable of operating both as an SSN and as an SSBN, ‘as a satisfactory alternative to the single-purpose Polaris vessel’.68 The paper explained that ‘Admiralty studies had shown that the “hybrid” submarine itself was technically and operationally feasible and the proposed programme of construction realisable.’69 The Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, immediately expanded the work of the BNDSG to cover the hybrid, and the Admiralty set about preparing a more detailed analysis, which it intended to present to the BNDSG by October 1962.70
By October 1962, Whitehall was awash with reports that Skybolt was in trouble. After reviewing its development, the US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, and his group of Pentagon statisticians and management experts recommended the cancellation of the missile. If Skybolt were cancelled, Britain would be left without a new means of delivering its nuclear deterrent.71 The Admiralty was first asked to present its alternatives to Skybolt on 14 November 1962 at a meeting of the BNDSG. The Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff told the group that ‘if we are to continue to deploy an independent strategic deterrent, the only sensible possibility remaining would be a Polaris type submarine’. Over objections from the Air Ministry, the Admiralty was asked to consider how it could deliver a ‘crash’ Polaris programme.72
When the Admiralty reported under a month later on 4 December, three options were outlined: (1) purchasing four complete Polaris submarines from the US on 1 January 1966, 1967, 1968 and 1969; (2) hiring two complete Polaris submarines from the US on 1 January 1966 and 1967 and building a fleet of seven dual-purpose submarines in British shipyards, completing the first submarine by 1 April 1970; (3) hiring three submarines from the US on 1 January 1966, 1967 and 1968, followed by a fleet of seven UK-built dual-purpose submarines.73 These dual-purpose submarines met one of the Navy’s main concerns: that a Polaris programme must not deprive the fleet of conventional and nuclear attack submarines. It was also attractive because it would place the Admiralty and the government ‘in a much more flexible position in that if at any time in the next thirty years it should be decided to discontinue the UK deterrent, these submarines could without conversion be redeployed in a wholly anti-submarine role’.74 Significantly, it was not possible for the Admiralty
to deliver UK-built submarines by 1965, the projected in-service date for Skybolt and the estimated date beyond which it was estimated that the V-bombers would be unable to penetrate Russian airspace and target defences successfully. Unless swift measures were taken, there would be a gap in the deterrent.
Macmillan was initially reluctant to abandon Skybolt, but by early December, as news reached Whitehall that the Americans indeed intended to cancel the missile, he concluded that all efforts should be focused on securing Polaris and borrowing American Polaris submarines as an interim measure, while the Royal Navy built its own fleet of submarines.75 ‘It seems that we may find ourselves in the position in which the Government may say “you must operate a POLARIS deterrent for us” – always provided the Americans let us have it!’ wrote Admiral Sir Caspar John, who had succeeded Lambe as First Sea Lord in May 1960.76 But would Washington make Polaris available? Although there were strong elements in the Kennedy administration (which had come into office in January 1961), such as the US Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, who wanted to see an end to Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent, Kennedy, backed by the Defense Department, agreed in principle to make Polaris available to the British on the condition that when the submarines had been completed they were committed to ‘a multilateral or multinational force in NATO’.77
The complex negotiations between Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy that ultimately led to the purchase of Polaris took place at Nassau in the Bahamas in December 1962. The conference was one of the most significant and explosive encounters in the history of Anglo-American relations. Macmillan and the British delegation arrived in the Bahamas on 18 December deeply angry and suspicious, amid embarrassing press reports that the United States was attempting to force the United Kingdom out of the nuclear business. Macmillan desperately needed a replacement for Skybolt. ‘We would have been in a very, very nasty position politically,’ recalled the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Home. ‘I think that the government would probably have been beaten. It might well have been a case for an election’.78
