by James Jinks
A Joint Motor Life Study Co-ordination Group concluded that ‘unless a repair technique for the defect is developed and qualified the required number of motors cannot be maintained until 1994 without the purchase of substantial numbers of motors to replace those rejected. A conservative estimate indicates that at least 88 motors would be needed even if fall out from the additional motors was at a somewhat lower rate.’31 The Royal Navy was once again forced to turn to the United States and purchase a total of eighty-two new rocket motor sets, the product of a complex Polaris re-motoring programme.
The Polaris re-motoring programme and the Chevaline front end were both designed to ensure that the Polaris force remained effective and credible – able to penetrate Moscow – until about 1994, a date determined primarily by the hull and machinery life of the ‘Resolution’ class submarines.32 After that date it was expected to become increasingly difficult and costly to maintain the submarines, with longer and more frequent repair and refits required and the risk of a break in the cycle and the continuity of deployment rising markedly. Operationally the submarines would fall steadily further and further below likely future standards of quietness, and would thus be increasingly vulnerable. If the United Kingdom was to continue to operate a credible independent nuclear deterrent into the twenty-first century a new class of submarine and a new missile system were required.
TOWARDS TRIDENT
Ever since the creation of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in early 1958, and its brief capture of the Labour Party Conference in 1960–61, a particular politico-emotional equation has tingled in the air at every ministerial meeting on the Bomb during a Labour Government:
Nuclear Weapons = Political Neuralgia
The politico-emotional charge was especially pronounced when entirely new systems, as distinct from improvements to existing ones, were under consideration. For Labour governments, the sensitivities are particularly acute and for them the current and future nature of the Submarine Service has been intimately bound up with this politico-emotional calculus. The Royal Navy has continually been aware of this since the Nassau Agreement in December 1962, when the Labour leadership, as we have seen, made the Polaris programme a matter of party competition during the run-up to the 1964 general election. Naturally, when Labour governments have been in power, it has been difficult for submarine Britain to track the political mathematics as it was calibrated inside the tightest nuclear circles. The sensitivity was probably at its highest in the late 1970s, when a small group of ministers, under Callaghan’s chairmanship, moved through a series of meetings to consider the possibility of flouting Labour’s unambiguous October 1974 manifesto pledge not to commission a new generation of weapons, the technical choices if they did so and the public spending price tag that would be attached to each option. For historians of government, too, this patch of nuclear history has particular fascination, for Jim Callaghan broke with post-1945 precedent and kept the making of nuclear-weapons policy away even from the Cabinet Committee structure where it usually lay.33
It was the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John Hunt, who urged Callaghan to keep the top-secret ‘Nuclear Studies’ on options for Polaris replacement away from the full Cabinet – at least for the time being – in December 1977:
I hope … that you will allow me to say why I have considerable doubts about the wisdom of doing this at the present stage … For example, I do not think you could possibly tell the Cabinet that we are considering whether the Moscow Criterion [a capacity to penetrate the anti-ballistic-missile screen around the Soviet capital] is necessary. This is not however to say that a decision should be taken behind the backs of the Cabinet. We are however at least one or two years away from any decision and the need to know principle ought therefore to operate strictly in the meantime.
My second doubt is a political one. You have rightly directed that these studies are to be conducted by a very few people on a strictly in-house basis and without any political commitment whatever. If however the Cabinet are told the risk of a leak must be greater. This would not only alert the Russians to what is going on but could create a political problem for you within the Labour Party with both those in favour and those against us staying in the nuclear game exploiting the situation for their own purposes. And what if some members of the Cabinet refused to agree that the studies should go ahead?34
Callaghan concurred, partly to avoid embarrassing his number two, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, Lord President of the Council and convinced unilateral nuclear disarmer, Michael Foot, who was a member of the Cabinet’s Oversea and Defence Policy Committee but was kept away from Callaghan’s minimalist inner group on nuclear-weapons policy (minimalist in the sense of being confined to only those ministers who had to be there – the Prime Minister, plus the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, and the Defence Secretary, Fred Mulley).
Callaghan’s team gathered initially as simply ‘a Ministerial meeting’ in 1976–7 but, at the end of 1977, it mutated into what was described as the ‘Restricted Group’ on ‘Nuclear Defence Policy’. At Callaghan’s ‘meeting of ministers’ in No. 10 on the morning of Friday, 20 October 1977, the discussion of a successor system to Polaris – or not – flickered between Chevaline, the progress of talks on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II), and the prospects for Enhanced Radiation Warheads (popularly known as the ‘Neutron Bomb’).35 The minutes, taken by John Hunt, indicate that:
In discussion, there was general agreement on the desirability of maintaining an independent UK nuclear deterrent but the view was strongly expressed that the criterion on which the effectiveness of our existing deterrent was judged – namely its capacity to penetrate the ABM defences round Moscow and destroy 40 per cent of the Moscow region – should be re-examined. It was argued that only a small deterrent was needed to deter an enemy, although a larger one might be necessary to re-assure oneself and one’s friends.36
Minutes rarely attribute views, but one can hear the sceptical voice of David Owen in that section on the Moscow Criterion.
Polaris replacement came up in conclusion IV:
The Ministry of Defence should prepare for consideration by Ministers, proposals for the conduct of preliminary studies – to be carried out without any political commitment – of the options for a possible successor system to the Polaris force.37
Immediately, the political neuralgia is infecting the cold print of John Hunt’s minutes:
In discussion of these points, some opposition was expressed to conclusion (IV). It was argued that in allowing the Ministry of Defence to prepare proposals for the conduct of preliminary studies of a possible successor system to Polaris, an ineluctable process could be set in train which it would be difficult to control or conceal … If it were to become known – as it would as a result of any discussions involving the Americans – that consideration of a successor system was under way, there would be a major row within the Labour Party in view of the commitment in the Manifesto against a new generation of nuclear weapons … Even a general study of the future of the UK nuclear deterrent, not including a commitment to retain one, would cause political trouble if it were to leak. Was it really essential to initiate any sort of study at this stage?38
The road to Trident and the boat on patrol today begins five weeks later at the first meeting of what is now described in the paper trail as ‘CABINET NUCLEAR DEFENCE POLICY’, on Thursday, 1 December 1977. Callaghan summed up the discussion by saying:
That there could be no question of the Government taking a decision in favour of a successor generation during the lifetime of the present Parliament to which their Manifesto undertaking applied. They noted however that the Polaris system would cease to be effective in 17 years and that it would take about 15 years, at the maximum, to develop a successor system …
The majority felt … that a study should be undertaken now of a character which would enable the next government to reach decis
ions about whether a successor system should be developed, and if so, what system should be adopted. Such a study should be set against the background of the strategic problems we would face and should cover the various options, covering the political, financial and technical implications.39
This commission led to the production of what is remembered among the submariners and the guardians of the deterrent as the Duff–Mason Report, at the time one of the most sensitive pieces of paper in Whitehall and, to this day, a crucial artefact in both British submarine and nuclear history.
Circulated on a strict need-to-know basis in December 1978, its formal title was ‘Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent’ and it was divided into three parts:
Part I: The politico-military Requirement
Part II: Criteria for Deterrence
Part III: System Options and Their Implications
The Politico-Military work, Parts I and II, was led by Sir Antony Duff, the senior Foreign Office expert on nuclear and intelligence matters. The technical work, Part III, was led by Professor Sir Ronald Mason, Chief Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence – hence Duff–Mason Report.40
Helpfully for the ministers on Callaghan’s ‘Restricted Group’, the essentials of the Duff–Mason Report were presented in stripped-down summaries as well as in full, and, as instructed, give both the pros and cons of going to a new generation of nuclear weapons. Duff–Mason is one of the most important pieces of the history of the UK as a nuclear-weapons state, firstly because on Callaghan’s personal instructions in his last hours in office, it was given to Mrs Thatcher, thus breaking the normal convention that new governments do not see the papers of the previous administration; and secondly because it prepared the way for over thirty years of Trident patrols aboard ‘Vanguard’ class submarines.
Here are Duff–Mason’s own summaries:
Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent
Part I. The Politico-Military Requirement
Summary of Report
1. For deterrence to be achieved a potential aggressor must believe that his opponent has the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on him and there is a real possibility that this capability might be used. NATO’s deterrent strategy depends on the link between conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear forces being maintained and the Soviet Union being convinced that, in response to aggression, the Alliance would if necessary be prepared to escalate the conflict to a level at which the consequences to the Soviet Union would outweigh any possible gains (paragraphs 1–7).
2. As the gains to the Soviet Union from eliminating the United Kingdom would clearly be less than those from eliminating the United States, the United Kingdom can expect to deter aggression by posing a smaller deterrent threat than that posed by the United States. There can be no absolute certainty that, following a massive nuclear attack on the United Kingdom a Government would take a deliberate decision to order a retaliatory strike by the British deterrent. But the essential thing is that the Soviet Government should believe that there is a real possibility of their doing so. Provided our deterrent was perceived to have the capability, the Russians could not rule out this possibility. This is sufficient for deterrence (paragraphs 8–15).
3. Over the next 30–40 years, our planning need not be geared to any nuclear threat beyond the Soviet Union. We can assume that European links with the United States in the North Atlantic Alliance will continue though the credibility of American nuclear retaliation in defence of European interests could be weakened (paragraph 16).
4. The case for and against British strategic nuclear force can best be discussed in terms of the purpose which such a force would serve:
(i) A minimal contribution to NATO’s assigned nuclear forces. The British deterrent represents a significant proportion of NATO’s assigned nuclear forces. The importance of this should not be exaggerated since our deterrent represents only a very small proportion of the total nuclear forces of the Alliance, including American strategic forces (paragraphs 17–20)
(ii) A second centre of decision making. This is the distinctive nature of our contribution. It complicates Soviet calculations and means that not all nuclear decisions in the Alliance are left entirely to the United States President. Two situations are envisaged: First, a decline in the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe. A British nuclear force could provide, with the French, the nucleus of a European deterrent and thus reduce the risk that Germany might seek to develop a nuclear capability. Second, hesitation by the United States to use her nuclear weapons in support of NATO. Neither super power could exclude the possibility that, in this situation, a British Government might act to make good the weakness of American resolve. On the other hand, it might be argued that the existence of a second centre could imply lack of confidence in the American guarantee and thus undermine its credibility. Moreover the Russians might not believe that the United Kingdom would ever act independently of the United States, especially over an issue not directly affecting United Kingdom territory (paragraphs 21–7)
(iii) A capability for independent defence of national interests. The British deterrent provides an ultimate option for national defence should collective security fail, which would assist us to counter politico-military pressure or to deter aggression itself. The question is whether it is necessary or credible for us to seek to provide against such a contingency (paragraphs 28–9)
(iv) Political status and influence. To give up our status as a Nuclear Weapons State would be a momentous step in British history. It gives us access to and the possibility of influencing American thinking on defence and arms control policy and has enabled us to play a leading role in international arms control and non-proliferation negotiations. But a decision to embark on a new generation of the British deterrent might be seen by many Non Nuclear Weapon States as inconsistent with our declared arms control and non-proliferation aims and thus reduce our capacity to exercise influence in these fields (paragraphs 30–35).
5. The cost of a successor system would be high and funds spent on the deterrent would not be available for our conventional forces. But we would be buying a unique capability which could not be provided by our European allies. On the other hand, it could be argued that, from the Alliance point of view, conventional forces had a higher priority than the maintenance of the British deterrent as a measure of ensuring continuing American commitment to the defence of Europe.
Factors Relating to Further Consideration of the Future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent
Part II: Criteria for Deterrence
Summary of Report
1. Of the purposes discussed in Part I, the key ones are the second centre of decision making and a capability for independent defence of our national interests. We should need to deploy a capability which the Soviet Union would regard as being able to inflict unacceptable damage and to be used independently (paragraphs 1–5).
2. ‘Unacceptable damage’ is essentially a matter of judgement. It is suggested that it could be achieved either by the disruption of the main government organs of the Soviet State or by causing grave damage to a number of major cities involving destruction of buildings, heavy loss of life, general disruption and serious consequences for industrial and other assets. An attempt is made (in Annex A) to quantify this judgement (paragraphs 6–10).
3. Three options for creating unacceptable damage are identified:
(i) Destruction of the main Government centres (both the above and below ground) within the Moscow outer ring road and, outside it, a selected number of alternative bunker locations which are associated with the centralised system of command and control of the Soviet Union at national level.
(ii) Breakdown level damage to Moscow as a city and Leningrad and two other large cities.
(iii) Damage to a number of cities, but excluding Moscow. Two variants are suggested –
(
a) Breakdown level damage to Leningrad and about 9 other major cities;
(b) grave damage, not necessarily to breakdown level, to 30 major targets, including Leningrad and other large cities and possibly selected military targets.
Option (i) could inflict a greater penalty than the others and would therefore provide a greater certainty of deterrence. But it would be more difficult and expensive to achieve. Option (ii) has the advantage (over Option (iii)) of involving the destruction of Moscow as a city: on the other hand Option (iii) (either variant) might avoid the need to penetrate Moscow ABM defences. It is considered that any one of these options would constitute unacceptable damage, and that, if the United Kingdom capability fell short of meeting one of them or its equivalent, there would be room for significant doubt about its adequacy (paragraphs 11–14).
4. Other criteria include the retention of sole national control over the order to fire our nuclear weapons, ability of our deterrent to survive a pre-emptive attack, continuous deployment at early readiness to fire and a substantial probability that the damage threatened would be achieved. Moreover, if our strategic deterrent is to be credible, it should be seen as complementing other levels of defensive capabilities, i.e. there should not be any major gaps in our spectrum of response (paragraphs 15–17).
The Chiefs of Staff had considerable ‘reservations’ about criteria option 3b, which required thirty hits on thirty cities. This was inserted to appease the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, who argued that the nuclear capability able to inflict a million fatalities identified in the three options might still meet UK deterrent requirements.41 Owen favoured a scaled-down deterrent, using nuclear-armed cruise missiles based on board the Royal Navy’s SSNs.42
Reading the detail of Duff–Mason in its section on what would, for deterrent purposes, constitute unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union brings to mind, in terms of its near unimaginable human impact, Whitehall’s own assessment, in the Strath Report of 1955, which was only declassified in 2003, of what ten Russian 10-megaton hydrogen bombs would do to the United Kingdom.43
