by Philip Kerr
Roosevelt beamed like a benevolent uncle and nodded happily as Hitler continued to speak.
“And now, let me come to the subject that commands all our attention: the second front. I shall not say that I do not believe in the possibility of a second front, for that would jeopardize the whole basis of my coming here. Instead, I shall merely say that German military precision and thoroughness already ensure that we are certainly prepared for such an eventuality. The fact remains that to attempt a landing on the coast of Europe would give any sane military strategist some considerable pause for thought. The reasons that forestalled my own invasion of England in 1940 are now the same reasons that haunt your generals. The difficulty of this landing cannot be overstated, and a bloodbath seems inevitable. My own generals estimate that at least half a million men will die—German and Allied combined. In 1940 I did not think England was worth the lives of so many German soldiers, and today I wonder if you will think that a beachhead in Holland, Belgium, or France is worth the lives of as many British and American soldiers. Doubtless Marshal Stalin, whose losses have been nothing short of heroic, is thinking the same thing.”
Hitler shrugged. “Oh, I won’t say that we can win the war. After the defeats at El Alamein in October ’42 and, more decisively, the defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, I know that victory is now beyond our capability. We cannot win this war. There, I say it openly—as you, Mr. President, have urged us all to be open. I will say it again. Germany cannot win this war. But, equally, Germany can still make it painfully difficult for you to win it yourselves.”
Roosevelt lit the cigarette in his holder and, removing the pince-nez once again, leaned forward to make a point. “I appreciate your candor, Herr Hitler. So let me be quite candid, too. The important strategic objective for the Allies is not a northern European landing, but rather to draw more German divisions away from the Soviet front. To this end, there are other operations available to us. A drive up through Italy, a thrust from the northeastern Adriatic, an operation in the Aegean Sea, even operations from Turkey. Any of these would oblige you to withdraw some of your forces from the eastern front. And yet, having said all that, there are many people in Britain and America who might think that the sacrifice of a quarter of a million men is a price worth paying for a free and democratic Europe.”
Hitler swept the forelock off his brow and shook his head slowly. “We all know that the Italian campaign is of value only in opening the Mediterranean to Allied shipping and is of no great importance as far as the defeat of Germany is concerned. Marshal Stalin will tell you as much himself when I am no longer in the room. At the risk of sounding pedantic, Mr. President, I must remind you of some European history with which Marshal Stalin is already doubtless familiar. In 1799, Marshal Suvorov discovered that the Alps presented an insuperable barrier to an invasion of Germany from Italy. And Turkey? Yes, that might open the way to an Allied invasion of the Balkans, but that is a very long way from the heart of Germany. No, gentlemen, no, Germany’s weakest spot is France, which, let’s face it, you and the British have had all year to invade. What is more, I do not see that you could even contemplate a French invasion until the summer of 1944, by which time it is my calculation that as many as a million more Red Army soldiers will be dead. Out of respect to Marshal Stalin, I do not say this lightly. The losses inherent in any European invasion are negligible to what he has lost already. And what he will lose. A million Red Army soldiers killed is four times as many losses as the quarter of a million British and American casualties that you and Mr. Churchill are hesitating about. Only after France has been secured will it make military sense to send more forces to Italy. In this way you will then be able to secure southern France and, after these two Allied armies have linked up, make your big push into Germany.” Hitler was speaking quickly, dismissively, as if considering Allied options off the top of his head. “But not Turkey. It would be a mistake for you to disperse your forces by sending two or three divisions to Turkey. Besides, Turkey is still a neutral country, and it is my understanding that she continues to reject Mr. Churchill’s attempts to persuade her to come into this war. Like Iran, perhaps, the Turks have a low opinion of British fair play after what happened at Versailles.”
Stalin had spent the last few minutes doodling wolf heads on a pad with a thick red pencil. He stopped now and, removing the pipe from his mouth, began to speak. “The Red Army,” he said quietly, hardly looking at either Hitler or Roosevelt, “has enjoyed a number of successes this year. But these have had more to do with simple numerical superiority. There are three hundred thirty Russian divisions opposing two hundred sixty Axis divisions. When all that remains of the German forces on the eastern front has been wiped out, there will still be seventy Russian divisions left. But this is the arithmetic of the madhouse. I would hope it does not ever come down to that. Besides, the Germans have achieved some unexpected victories. Nothing is certain save that, like the Germans, we, too, believe that the British and the Americans will be at their most effective by striking at the enemy in France, and nowhere else. From our point of view, the Führer’s assessment of the task facing the British and the Americans is entirely accurate. But surely the Führer has not come all this way to Teheran—and I must take the opportunity now to applaud his very great personal courage in doing so—merely to state that he intends to remain in those countries that he has invaded. Assuming that he is as anxious to put an end to this war as we are, what are his proposals regarding Germany’s occupied territories? Specifically, what are his proposals regarding those parts of Russia and the Ukraine that remain under his control? And then, also Hungary, Romania, the Balkans, Greece, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy? I should like to hear what he proposes as the basis for a peace that Germany might regard as honorable.”
Hitler nodded and took a deep breath. “My proposal is this, Marshal Stalin. A withdrawal of German troops to pre-1939 borders in the West, and the East. This would leave Russia as the dominant power in Eastern Europe. With a negotiated withdrawal—note, I do not use the word ‘surrender’—the war in Europe would be over by Christmas, perhaps even earlier, thereby permitting America and its allies to concentrate on the defeat of Japan, which I imagine America still sees as its own strategic priority. Under these circumstances, Mr. President, you can hardly fail to win next year’s election. For not only will you have saved two hundred and fifty thousand British and American men from certain death on Europe’s beachheads, but you will also have delivered the Jews of Hungary, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and France from their liquidation.”
Roosevelt looked beyond speech for a moment.
Hitler smiled thinly. “It was my understanding that we should talk frankly,” he said. “Of course, Mr. President, if you do not wish to talk about this particular subject, you do not have to do so. But it is my impression that the fate of three million European Jews would have enormous importance among a very vocal section of your own electorate.”
“Is it your intention to use Europe’s Jews as hostages?” Roosevelt spoke curtly, and for the first time, in German.
“Mr. President,” said Hitler. “My back is against the wall. The German people are facing nothing less than total destruction. You have offered us only unconditional surrender, at least in public. I am merely suggesting the existence of a factor that perhaps you had not considered.”
“As the Führer will recall,” Roosevelt said stiffly, “the use of the phrase ‘unconditional surrender’ was always intended to be only a means of bringing him to the negotiating table.”
“I am here,” said Hitler. “I am negotiating. And one of the chips on this card table, besides the fate of two hundred and fifty thousand Allied soldiers, is the fate of European Jewry. Marshal Stalin has some very similar chips to play himself, such as the fate of Europe’s Cossacks and those White Russians who preferred to fight for Germany rather than the Soviet Union.”
“We have always been in favor of a negotiat
ed surrender,” said Stalin, “and believed that the president’s notion of an unconditional surrender would serve only to unite the German people. But quite frankly, I don’t give a damn about the fate of Europe’s Jews.”
“Well, I sure as hell do,” insisted Roosevelt. “And by the way, I have a few conditions of my own. I might agree to Germany’s withdrawal to her pre-1939 borders if there was also a return to the pre- 1933 German constitution. That means free and fair elections and the Führer’s retirement from German politics.”
“I might concede this,” said Hitler, “if I had the right to nominate my successor as the leader of my party.”
“I don’t see how that would work,” objected Roosevelt.
Now Stalin was shaking his head. “Speaking for myself, I care even less about German elections than I do about Europe’s Jews. Frankly, I have no faith that the German people are capable of reform, and I really don’t see that an election would be enough to curb their militarism. As far as I can see, the only condition I would insist on would be the payment by Germany of war reparations to Russia. This would have a twofold effect. First, it would go a long way toward preventing the German Reich from ever making war again. And, second, it would only restore that which Germany’s aggressive war against Russia has destroyed.” Stalin waved his hand dismissively in the direction of Roosevelt. “Everything else is of little account to us, including the matter of the Führer’s retirement. Indeed, we should probably prefer to have one strong man in charge of the country rather than see it collapse into the anarchy that would surely follow on his retirement. At the very least, we should prefer him in semiretirement only, at the Berchtesgaden perhaps, with Reich Marshal Göring taking over the day-to-day running of the country.”
Roosevelt smiled uncomfortably. “I don’t see that I could ever sell that kind of deal to the American people,” he said.
“With all due respect to the president,” Stalin said, “Russia has had greater experience of making deals with Germany than the United States. There is no reason to suppose that a deal cannot be reached now. Still, I recognize your difficulties in this regard. Might I suggest that your best policy might be to present the American people with the fact that there existed a fait accompli between Germany and the Soviet Union and that there was very little you could do about said fait accompli except to recognize that fact and deal with it.”
I could already see the direction these negotiations were headed in, and how Stalin was determined to have a peace, albeit at the right price. And I remembered something that John Weitz had said to me back on the Iowa: that Stalin’s greatest fear was not the Germans, but that the Russian army might mutiny, as it had done back in 1917.
“I have two conditions,” said Hitler, holding up his hand almost imperiously. “My first is that the British should return the German deputy führer, Rudolf Hess.”
“I am opposed to the return of Hess,” said Stalin. “The British have held Hess in reserve in order that they might make a separate deal with Germany. But what is more offensive to us is that Hess went to the British to solicit their help as an ally in an attack on Russia. This we cannot forgive. We say that Hess must stay in prison.”
“Haven’t the Russians tried to make a separate peace with Germany themselves?” Roosevelt asked. “Has Marshal Stalin forgotten the negotiations in Stockholm between the Soviet ambassador, Madame de Kollontay, and Germany’s foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop? I don’t see how you can criticize the British for doing what you yourselves have done.”
“I did not criticize the British,” said Stalin. “Only Rudolf Hess. My objection was only to his repatriation. But since we are on the subject of negotiations for a separate peace, it did not escape the attention of our intelligence services that your own personal representative, Commander George Earle, and von Papen, the German ambassador in Turkey, also held a series of peace talks.”
There was long silence. Then Hitler, smiling now, a little gleefully it seemed to me, as if he had enjoyed this display of tension between Stalin and Roosevelt, spoke up: “My second condition,” he said, “is that Germany cannot afford to pay any war indemnities. All property removed from occupied territories will be returned, of course. But it only seems to us fair that each should bear his own costs. For Germany to pay war reparations to Russia would then open the way to other claims by Britain, France, Poland, and the rest. Where would it stop? And what would Russia say to paying war reparations to Poland? And what about Italy? Would they pay Abyssinia at the same time as they tried to make a claim on Germany? No, gentlemen, we must wipe the slate clean, or there can be no real peace. Need I remind you that it was the bill presented to Germany by the League of Nations, and more especially the French, after the Great War of 1914 to 1918, that left Germany with no alternative but to go to war again?”
“Speaking for myself,” Roosevelt said, deliberately echoing Stalin’s turn of phrase, “I care less about war reparations than I do about the return of Rudolf Hess. Neither of these matters is an issue for us.”
“That is because you have lost so little,” said Stalin, somewhat irritated. “I don’t see how we could ever meet our lend-lease payments without receiving German war reparations.”
“I think the Führer has made a good point, Marshal Stalin,” said Roosevelt. “If he pays you reparations, then what war reparations will you pay the Poles?”
Hitler, trying to contain his pleasure, now seemed intent on playing the peacemaker between Roosevelt and Stalin. “But is it possible,” he said, “to reach any kind of negotiated deal at all without the British? Am I to conclude by their absence that they will agree to nothing? Will Germany negotiate a peace with Russia and America only to find herself still at war with Britain?”
“Don’t worry about Britain,” Roosevelt said. “It’s the United States and the USSR that will decide things from here on. America certainly didn’t come into this war to restore the British Empire. Or the French. The United States is footing the bill in this war, and that gives us the right to pull rank. If we want peace, there will be no more war waged by the Western allies, I can assure the Führer of that much at least.”
At this, Stalin smiled broadly. I began to be concerned that the president had bitten off more than he could chew. It was bad enough for Roosevelt to try to deal with Stalin on his own, but to deal with Hitler as well was like trying to fend off a pair of hungry wolves, each attacking from a different side. For Roosevelt to have admitted to Stalin that Britain was almost irrelevant to the decision-making that lay ahead—that Russia and America would dominate the postwar world—was surely more than Stalin could ever have hoped for.
1030 HOURS
HIMMLER WAS congratulating himself, not just at having pulled off these secret talks but also at the way his Führer was handling things. Hitler actually seemed to be enjoying the conference. His grasp of affairs had suddenly improved and he had even stopped indulging in his two common mannerisms: the compulsive picking at the skin on the back of his neck and the biting of the cuticles around his thumbs and forefingers. Himmler wasn’t sure, but he thought it was even possible that Hitler had dispensed with his usual morning injection of cocaine. This was like seeing the old Hitler, the Hitler who had made the French and the British dance to his tune in 1938. What would have been hard to believe but was now quite obvious was just how divided the Allies were: Churchill’s refusal to negotiate, or even meet, with Hitler was understandable, but it seemed extraordinary to Himmler that Roosevelt and Stalin should not have agreed on a common position before sitting down with the Führer. This was more than he could reasonably have expected when, secretly, they had left Prussia and traveled to Teheran, leaving a stenographer named Heinrich Berger to impersonate Hitler at the Wolfschanze and Martin Bormann in effective control of the Greater German Reich.
The Russians had, he admitted, behaved with great hospitality. Von Ribbentrop said that Molotov and Stalin seemed no less friendly than when he had visited Russia in August 1939, in
pursuit of the nonaggression pact. And their control of security and secrecy had been predictably excellent. No one was better at keeping secrets and manipulating public perceptions than the Russians. Secrecy was, of course, the reason that Stalin had insisted on having the Big Three in Teheran. The peace talks could not have been arranged anywhere else, except perhaps in Russia itself. Just look what had happened to the secrecy of the Allied talks in Cairo, Himmler reflected. Even so, it had been Himmler’s idea to use General Schellenberg’s Operation Long Jump as a way of demonstrating German good faith to the Russians. Giving up those men to the NKVD had been regrettable, but it was made easier by the late discovery that most of Schellenberg’s team were not German at all but Ukrainian volunteers. Himmler cared nothing for these men, and as a result he had been able to denounce them to the NKVD without scruple. As for the handful of renegade German officers and NCOs, they would be on Schellenberg’s conscience, not his.
Of course, the warmth of the Russian reception had a lot to do with the secret payment of ten million dollars in gold from Swiss bank accounts held by Germany into those of the Soviet Union. How right the Führer had been about Russia: it was the very acme of the capitalist state headed by a man who would do anything, make any sacrifice, and take any bribe to pay for the realization of his idée fixe. And, despite what Hitler had said in front of Roosevelt, he was already reconciled to paying Stalin a fifty-million-dollar “bonus” if a peace could be negotiated at Teheran, for this was a drop in the ocean compared to the gold Germany had on reserve in its secret Swiss bank accounts.
