That realization came rather late. When Rutskoi and the Speaker of parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, began calling the Union security ministers for help, they all refused, citing Gorbachev. On November 7, Yeltsin had signed a letter to Gorbachev merely informing the Soviet president of his decision to use force in Chechnia, with no request for advice or assistance. The letter also stated that Yeltsin would be informing the secretary-general of the United Nations of his decision. Yeltsin and those around him had clearly misjudged the degree of Russia’s independence from the Union. They could cut their financing of Gorbachev’s office and all-Union ministries, humiliate and ridicule him in the media, and make the Soviet presidency irrelevant in economic and social affairs, but Gorbachev still held a monopoly on the representation of Moscow’s international interests and controlled the Soviet armed forces, secret services, and, as it turned out, interior troops. With the security ministers unwilling to commit their troops to Yeltsin’s operation, Gorbachev afforded them a perfect cover to ignore Rutskoi’s commands.29
With the Chechnia operation in jeopardy, the presidium of the Russian parliament went into session to discuss the situation. On November 9 it issued two decrees. One instructed the Russian president to take full control of interior troops on the territory of the Russian Federation; the other blamed problems associated with the implementation of Yeltsin’s decree on the Union ministers. “To propose that the president of the RSFSR assess the actions of the heads of the executive agencies,” read the decree. In plain language, that meant firing the Union ministers. The problem was that Yeltsin had no authority over them. After demanding in vain that the presidium of the Russian parliament court-martial Viktor Barannikov, the Union interior minister, Rutskoi finally decided to call Gorbachev.
Anatolii Cherniaev, who was in Gorbachev’s office at the time, recorded in his diary that Gorbachev first listened to Rutskoi’s outburst but then laid the receiver aside for ten minutes and read the papers on his desk, allowing Rutskoi to vent his frustration. Then, according to Cherniaev, he told the Russian vice president, “Aleksandr, calm down, you are not at the front. To carry out a blockade starting from the mountains, surround and block them so that not one Chechen gets through, arrest Dudaev and isolate the others—what’s wrong with you? Don’t you see what will come of this? . . . I have information here that no one in Chechnia is supporting Yeltsin’s decree. They have all united against you. Don’t go off your rocker.” Gorbachev was back in the game and once more in his element.30
With no support from the center, the Russian authorities gave the order on November 10 for the withdrawal of interior troops already in Groznyi. The Russian parliament voted to annul Yeltsin’s decree proclaiming a state of emergency. Aleksandr Rutskoi, who had allegedly prepared the decree and was charged with its implementation, bore the blame for the debacle. Yeltsin ordered his press secretary, Pavel Voshchanov, to prepare a press release stating that the president had always supported a political solution to the Chechen problem. “You know, there are those among us who will crush Chechnia with tanks as easily as they bombed villages in Afghanistan!” the president told his press secretary. The reference was to Rutskoi, who, like his main adversary, General Dudaev, was an Afghanistan war veteran.31
Boris Yeltsin had spent the decisive days of the Chechnia crisis at Zavidovo, a hunting resort near Moscow. November 7 was October Revolution Day, lavishly celebrated by the Soviet elite. Yeltsin had been part and parcel of that elite too long not to develop a special regard for the holiday, which was still on the Soviet and Russian official calendars. His celebration of the event apparently lasted more than one day. On November 9, when Gorbachev wanted to convene a meeting with Yeltsin to discuss the Chechen crisis, he had to abandon the idea after reaching Yeltsin by telephone in Zavidovo: the Russian president was drunk. “As soon as I started talking to Boris Nikolaevich,” said Gorbachev to Cherniaev, “I grasped after a few seconds that talking was pointless: he was incoherent.” Gorbachev later told Khasbulatov, who had called to demand the restoration of order in Chechnia, that the meeting had to be postponed because Yeltsin was “not himself.”32
Yeltsin’s decision, whether conscious or unconscious, to isolate himself at the most crucial moment in the first Chechen crisis and leave the implementation of his decree to his assistants clearly had a major impact on its outcome. The man who had mobilized his forces to resist the proclamation of a state of emergency a few months earlier was nowhere to be found when it came time to carry out the same thing in one of the Russian territories. Only he could wrest the armed forces away from Gorbachev, but he refused or was incapable, for the moment, of doing so. Like Gorbachev in the Baltics earlier that year, Yeltsin in Chechnia was not willing to give full support to his hard-liners. In both cases, external factors played a role: Bush had stayed Gorbachev’s hand, and now Gorbachev had stayed Yeltsin’s.
The new Russia’s first show of force had ended in an embarrassing public display of the limits of Yeltsin’s power. Gorbachev, on the other hand, could relish his victory. According to Cherniaev, “Yeltsin’s fumble with the state of emergency for Chechnia ‘inspired’ him.” But Gorbachev was not prepared to exploit his opponent’s faux pas to the full. He told his advisers, “I will save him; that affair cannot be allowed to impair his authority.” Yeltsin’s cooperation was crucial to Gorbachev’s struggle for survival—his own and that of the Soviet Union. Without Yeltsin’s support, there would be no Union. In his memoirs, Gorbachev recalled what he told Yeltsin with regard to the events in Chechnia: “Remember, our state is held together by two rings. One is the USSR, the other is the Russian Federation. If the first is broken, problems for the other will follow.”33
THE NEW UNION TREATY was finally placed on the agenda of the State Council, which was scheduled to meet on November 14, a few days after the Chechnia debacle. On the eve of the meeting Gorbachev allowed his chief negotiator on the treaty, Georgii Shakhnazarov, to go to London to participate in a dialogue with former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger organized by the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun. It was a notable change of heart for Gorbachev, who only a few weeks earlier had refused Shakhnazarov’s request to visit the United States, claiming, “What’s wrong with you? What do you mean, the USA? We’ll sign the Union treaty, and you can go the day after that.” Shakhnazarov had protested that the treaty would not be signed before December. Gorbachev disagreed. But now he let his assistant go.34
In late October, on the day after Yeltsin’s economic reform speech in parliament, Shakhnazarov had given Gorbachev a memo that directly challenged the latter’s vision of the new Union as a single state with a strong center and a constitution binding on all. “At this moment it is practically impossible to revive the Union state,” wrote Shakhnazarov.
Except for Nazarbayev [[Kazakhstan]] and Niyazov [[Turkmenistan]], practically all the republics have irrevocably decided to prove to themselves and the whole world that they are independent. With his last statement Yeltsin, too, has crossed the Rubicon. And he is right, of course: Russia has no other way out. It should not grab its fleeing partners by the coattails, not plead with them or compel them but look after itself. Once Russia revives, they will come back, and if not all of them do, then let them go with God. It will suffice to hold on to the states contiguous with Russia in the zone of its political and economic influence.”
This was the program presented to Shakhnazarov by Gennadii Burbulis, Sergei Shakhrai, and the other Russian negotiators. It would eventually become the basis for Russian policy vis-à-vis the former Soviet republics.
Shakhnazarov also argued that it was futile to insist on the revival of a strong Union center and that Gorbachev would be better off focusing on the role allocated to him by Yeltsin and other republican leaders—that of commander in chief of the armed forces, chief negotiator on nuclear issues, coordinator of the republics’ international policy, and intermediary in disputes between the members of the new union. “Mikhail Sergeevich,” wrote Shakhna
zarov, “this is one of those fateful moments that may resound very heavily for the country and for you as the individual who brought about a historic change of course. Not to recognize the need at least temporarily to renounce excessive demands concerning the Union state would mean committing a tragic error.”35
Shakhnazarov not only set forth his disagreements with Gorbachev and proposed his solutions but also submitted his de facto resignation. “Conscience does not allow me to continue a line that I consider mistaken and fruitless,” he wrote in the memo. Gorbachev did not accept the resignation: instead, he let Shakhnazarov go debate with Kissinger. If an aide could not be counted on for complete support when the treaty came up for a crucial discussion at the State Council, then it was safer to send him off to London. The problem was that Shakhnazarov was not the only aide who had lost faith in Gorbachev’s strategy. On November 13, one day before the fateful council meeting at Gorbachev’s retreat at Novo-Ogarevo, Anatolii Cherniaev noted in his diary, “The union treaty that will be on the agenda in Novo-Ogarevo will not pass. I have read the new version! But Kravchuk will not come at all . . . And no one will come from Ukraine. Revenko [[Gorbachev’s chief of staff]] made long entreaties to all the presidents to show up. . . . And by evening it was still not clear whether they would do so. All this looks like a rearguard action on Gorbachev’s part.” Despite the open and secret defections of his most trusted aides, Gorbachev remained undeterred. He would fight to the end to have the State Council pass his version of the union treaty, which provided for a strong Union center.36
The discussion of the treaty by the State Council on November 14 initially confirmed Shakhnazarov’s worst fears. With the support of other republican leaders, Yeltsin protested against the creation of a union state with its own constitution. Even though Kravchuk had stopped attending State Council meetings back in October, Yeltsin had no problem in gaining the support of most leaders of the republics (they included Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan), who kept coming to Moscow. Gorbachev, who had officially agreed to conduct negotiations on the basis of the confederative idea, openly moved away from the federation/confederation dichotomy. “A union state,” he told the gathering. “I insist categorically. If we do not create a union state, my prognosis is trouble for you.”
Yeltsin would not yield: “We will create a union of states.”
Gorbachev went all out, threatening to leave the meeting. “If there is no state, then I will take no part in this process,” he told the gathering. “I can abandon it right now. This is my principled position. If there is not going to be a state, I consider my mission concluded. I cannot support something amorphous.”
Yeltsin and other members of the council tried to convince Gorbachev of the advantages of a confederative version of the treaty. In a confederation, they argued, the armed forces, transportation system, ecological and space programs would be controlled from the center. Gorbachev would not listen. He stood up and began collecting his papers as an indication that he was about to leave. The republican leaders panicked and called for a break. Yeltsin met privately with Gorbachev, and they reached a compromise: the Union of Sovereign States, as the new structure was to be called, would constitute a “democratic confederative state.” It would not have a constitution, but its president would be elected by the people of the entire union.
Despite all the shortcomings of the new draft, Gorbachev was extremely satisfied: he had not managed to obtain a constitution, but he had secured a provision on the election of the president. The republican leaders agreed to initial the new union treaty at the next meeting of the State Council. Boris Pankin, who was present at Novo-Ogarevo, noted a “restless but happy look on Gorbachev’s face.” As the members of the State Council headed for the exits, no one could say whether they would speak to the press or not, but Gorbachev’s press secretary arranged the reporters in such a way as to block the exits. The Soviet president brought the republican leaders to the microphone one by one to make statements in support of the union state. “We have agreed that there will be a Union—a democratic confederative state,” declared Yeltsin.37
Gorbachev could feel triumphant. He seemed to have achieved something that no one, including his closest advisers, had thought possible. His interpreter, Pavel Palazhchenko, watched the press conference on television. In his memoirs, he wrote, “To almost everyone’s surprise, Gorbachev did look like a winner in the late evening of November 14, as Yeltsin and others spoke into the microphones on live television, repeating the phrase, ‘The Union will exist. There will be a Union.’ Watching the live broadcast with my colleagues, I felt that they, like me, were surprised Gorbachev had pulled it off.”38
George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev at a press conference after signing the START1 agreement on the reduction of nuclear arsenals. Gorbachev managed to persuade his military to agree to unprecedented cuts in the Soviet nuclear arsenal despite the lack of funds from the West. Kremlin, Moscow, July 31, 1991. (Corbis)
Barbara Bush and Raisa Gorbacheva had an agenda of their own in Moscow. The two first ladies got along exceptionally well. They are shown here in June 1990 at Wellesley College (Wellesley, Massachusetts), where they took part in a commencement ceremony in the course of the Gorbachevs’ visit to the United States. (Corbis)
The party crasher. Boris Yeltsin tried to play host at a Kremlin reception in honor of George and Barbara Bush officially hosted by the Gorbachevs. Kremlin, Moscow, July 30, 1991. (ITAR-TASS Photo Agency)
President Bush greeting Chairman Kravchuk. “Look people in the eye and you can figure out right away whether they will vote for you,” Bush told the future president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk. Kravchuk took that advice to heart, winning the Ukrainian presidency and independence for his country in December 1991. Boryspil airport near Kyiv, August 1, 1991. (Corbis)
The rebel, Boris Yeltsin mounts a tank and declares the putsch unconstitutional. Bush was originally reluctant to support Yeltsin but, with Gorbachev detained by the plotters, had no choice but to throw his support behind the Russian president. Yeltsin’s chief bodyguard, Aleksandr Korzhakov, is to his left. Moscow, August 19, 1991. (Corbis)
The army refuses to shoot at fellow citizens. General Aleksandr Lebed speaks to defenders of the Russian White House, Yeltsin’s headquarters in downtown Moscow, on August 20, 1991. Privately he told Yeltsin that if he wanted the army on his side, he would have to declare himself commander in chief of the Russian armed forces. Yeltsin followed the general’s advice and won. (Corbis)
“Dear Mikhail,” wrote Bush on this photograph. “Here we are in Maine thinking about you in the Crimea. Thank God you and Raisa were safe and sound. Sincerely, George.” Bush is shown speaking with Gorbachev by telephone after his communication lines were restored on the afternoon of August 21, 1991. Walker’s Point, Kennebunkport, Maine, August 21, 1991. (Corbis)
“We are returning to a different country,” said Gorbachev on the flight to Moscow after his imprisonment in the Crimea. He did not know how right he was. In the next few days Boris Yeltsin would strip him of most of his powers. Gorbachev is shown returning to Moscow on the night of August 22, 1991. Behind him are Raisa, who suffered a stroke during the imprisonment, and one of Gorbachev’s granddaughters. (Corbis)
President Bush meeting with (right to left) Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Secretary of State James Baker, White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu, and National Security Adviser General Brent Scowcroft during the First Gulf War in early 1991. A few months later, Cheney clashed with the rest of the Bush team over American policy toward the crumbling Soviet Union. He wanted the USSR gone as soon as possible. (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum)
Time is up. Russian prime minister Ivan Silaev and future Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk check their watches as a worried Mikhail Gorbachev looks on. In the fall of 1991 Gorbachev found it increasingly difficult to deal with the two largest Soviet republics. Kremlin, Moscow, 1991. (ITAR-TASS Photo Agency)
With Russia and Ukrai
ne against him, Gorbachev courts the Kazakh leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Both men wanted to preserve the Soviet Union. Here a worried Yeltsin looks on as Gorbachev talks with Nazarbayev during the signing of the economic agreement in Moscow, October 18, 1991. (Corbis)
The Russian ark. Boris Yeltsin shakes hands with his economic guru, Yegor Gaidar. Russia will go its own way, at least when it comes to economic policy. The rest of the republics can follow or get out of the way. Russia would get them back once it saved itself, argued Yeltsin’s advisers. Moscow, 1991. (ITAR-TASS Photo Agency)
The survivor. Gorbachev’s last appearance on the international scene. Participants in the Middle East Peace Conference descend the stairs of the Royal Palace, Madrid, Spain, October 30, 1991. Behind Gorbachev is his short-lived foreign minister, Boris Pankin; behind Bush is the main architect of the conference, James Baker. In the center is Prime Minister Felipe González of Spain. He told Gorbachev that Bush and other Western leaders had written him off during the coup. (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum)
The Slavic trinity. The leaders of the three Slavic republics decide to dissolve the USSR, Belavezha Hunting Lodge, December 8, 1991. Left to right: the contented Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, the confused Stanislaŭ Shushkevich of Belarus, and the always decisive Boris Yeltsin of Russia. He is bracing himself for a stormy meeting with Gorbachev the next morning in Moscow. (ITAR-TASS Photo Agency)
Bush and Baker, friends and confidants, shown here in November 1990. In the fall of 1991 they decided to back Gorbachev no matter what. In December 1991 Baker traveled to Moscow, Kyiv, Minsk, Almaty, and Bishkek to find out what was actually going on in the Soviet Union. He reported back to Bush, recommending that he endorse the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. (George Bush Presidential Library and Museum)
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