Then there was the position of General Scowcroft. “An overall caution marked Scowcroft,” wrote the White House deputy press secretary, Roman Popadiuk. “Although sympathetic, he was reluctant to push the national cause of the individual Soviet republics too much to the front.” Popadiuk, who would become the first American ambassador to independent Ukraine, was somewhat critical of Scowcroft’s overcautious approach but also recognized the reasons behind it. “For one superpower to support the dismantlement of another could only create a backlash and lead to direct political conflict,” he wrote later.10
On November 25, the day on which Yeltsin and the leaders of the Soviet republics refused to initial Gorbachev’s new union treaty, the Washington Post ran an article titled “U.S. Officials Split over Response to an Independent Ukraine.” It brought the divisions in the administration into the open, characterizing Baker as opposed to the recognition of the soon-to-be independent country. Baker was furious, suspecting Cheney staffers of leaking information to the press. Although the article quoted both State Department and Department of Defense officials, the leak came from the Defense side. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a Pentagon insider told reporters that the time had come for the United States to “get on the ground floor” with nations that had already decided to recognize Ukraine. The decision had to be made ahead of the NATO Council meeting scheduled for the end of the week.11
The next day, proponents of early recognition of Ukrainian independence mobilized their supporters in Congress. A large group of congressmen from both sides of the aisle threw their weight behind Cheney. Their letter to President Bush, among whose signatories were such up-and-coming stars of American politics as Newt Gingrich, Nancy Pelosi, Leon Panetta, and Rick Santorum, read, “We know that you are now considering the advice of several members of your administration, including Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, that the US be among the first to recognize Ukrainian independence. Mr. President, this is wise counsel. It is vitally important that America side with the people of Ukraine, in favor of freedom and democracy, instead of helping to prop up a Kremlin still being run by barely reconstructed Communists.” The latter reference was to Gorbachev and his circle. “Those who argue that continued Kremlin control over military, economic and social policies in Ukraine somehow benefits the United States are wrong. America now has the opportunity to move quickly toward negotiations with an independent Russia and an independent Ukraine for wholesale destruction of nuclear weapons, as well as implementation of sweeping free-market reforms. Let us be in the vanguard of this movement, rather than clumsily trundling behind.” The congressmen urged Bush to show the resolve he had demonstrated in the Gulf War.12
For the proponents of Ukrainian independence in the administration and elsewhere, the timing of the letter was perfect. On November 26, when it was dispatched, the president conducted a decisive meeting with his foreign policy advisers. With a meeting of the North Atlantic Council to discuss the Ukrainian situation scheduled for the next day and political pressure for the recognition of Ukrainian independence growing at home, Bush and his advisers finally agreed on their strategy. They would recognize Ukraine, although the recognition would be not immediate but delayed a few weeks. The president would send a special emissary to Kyiv immediately after the referendum to assure the Ukrainian leadership of American support for their newfound freedom.
In his memoirs, Baker put the best possible spin on the compromise reached at the meeting, writing that those taking part had accepted the State Department proposal for “delayed recognition.” In his handwritten notes on the back of the photocopy of the Washington Post article about the split in the administration, Baker wrote, “Kozyrev says moderates in Russia support our approach—mistake to say ‘no’ or quickly ‘yes’—same for moderates in Ukraine.” He marked the following sentence with multiple asterisks: “Run a risk by rushing to recog[[nition]]—chaos + civil war—whereas wait for couple of weeks is no risk.”13
That day a cable with talking points for the North Atlantic Council meeting was sent to the American ambassador at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The authors of the cable predicted a solid pro-independence vote in the forthcoming Ukrainian referendum and expected the Ukrainian government to assert its independence immediately afterward. According to the cable, “The question for us is not whether to recognize Ukraine, but how and when.” Its authors argued against setting preliminary Western conditions for recognition. “We do not favor imposing conditions on Ukraine that it must meet before we are willing to grant recognition and diplomatic relations,” read the cable. “Instead, we believe NATO collectively and each of us individually should communicate certain factors to Ukraine which we will take into consideration making our individual decisions.”
The requirements put forward in the cable included maintaining the existing central command over nuclear forces located in Ukraine, the commitment of the country’s leadership to its proclaimed goal of becoming a nuclear-free state, and adherence to the international treaties signed by the USSR on arms control, as well as to the Helsinki Accords, with their provisions for the recognition of post–World War II borders and pledges to uphold and protect human rights. The drafters of the cable were well aware that the decision on Ukrainian independence would set a precedent for American and NATO policy toward other Soviet republics, including Georgia and Armenia.14
After the fateful November 26 meeting in the White House, George Bush could finally begin restoring ties with the Ukrainian community and, by extension, with other voters of East European background. The first step in that direction had been made a few days earlier by the newly appointed head of the CIA, Robert Gates. On November 17, a few weeks after taking office, Gates delivered the keynote address at a Ukrainian American community dinner at the New York Plaza Hotel. The occasion was the honoring of the highest-ranking Ukrainian American in the Bush administration, White House deputy spokesman Roman Popadiuk, with the “Ukrainian of the Year” award, bestowed on him by the New York–based Ukrainian Institute of America.
Judging by the public reaction, Gates’s speech was a success. Ralph Gordon Hoxie, a prominent New York educator and head of the Center for the Study of the Presidency, who attended the event, later congratulated Gates on an “outstanding” address that captivated him with its Jeffersonian contrast between democracies and tyrannies. Gates used the opportunity to bridge the gap between the administration and the Ukrainian American community. He also had a chat with Hennadii Udovenko, the head of the Ukrainian mission at the United Nations. Later US News & World Report attributed the Bush administration’s decision to recognize the results of the Ukrainian referendum to the position taken in internal debates by the new head of the CIA.15
The leaders of the Ukrainian American community were invited to the White House on the morning of November 27, the day after the administration decided to recognize Ukrainian independence. The group of fifteen met for half an hour with Bush, Scowcroft, Ed Hewett of the National Security Council, and other foreign policy advisers in the Roosevelt Room. It was led by Taras Szmagala, a Cleveland native, longtime Republican supporter who headed the Ukrainian National Association, and publisher of the Ukrainian Weekly, which had recently been so unfriendly to Bush. In 1988 Szmagala had chaired the American Ukrainians for Bush committee. In September 1991 he had been among the members of the US delegation led by Bush’s brother Jonathan to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Babyn Yar massacre.
Now Szmagala told the president that Ukrainian independence was inevitable and that US recognition of it was the Ukrainian American community’s “gut issue.” Bush was reminded of his support for Ukrainian national self-determination back in the 1970s and early 1980s, but, according to the Ukrainian Weekly report on the meeting, no mention was made of his “Chicken Kiev” gaffe. The Ukrainian American community leaders presented Bush with an appeal from the Rukh leadership in Ukraine to support their country’s drive toward independence and stop giving financial assistance to Gorbachev
, who was waging a media war against their cause—a war that, in the opinion of the Rukh leadership, could turn into open aggression. “Who will assume responsibility for possible aggression of Gorbachev against Ukraine?” asked the Rukh leaders.16
George Bush was happy to tell his long-suffering Ukrainian American supporters that his administration had decided to recognize Ukraine. His caveats that it would not be done immediately were lost on his audience, which heard what it most wanted to hear—there would be recognition after all. Finally, those in attendance had something definite to tell their friends in Ukraine and fellow community members who had been criticizing them for staunchly supporting the Republicans even as the Republican president purportedly built up Gorbachev and sold Ukraine down the river. Once they left the White House, the community leaders rushed to tell reporters of Bush’s pledge that the United States would “salute Ukrainian independence” and “move forward” with its recognition. “No timetable was mentioned,” reported the Washington Post.17
The news of Bush’s readiness to grant Ukraine recognition was soon confirmed by a White House official who mentioned, speaking off the record, that the decision had been made at a White House meeting the previous day. He presented the decision as a compromise between the positions advocated earlier by Cheney and Baker. James Baker, once again outmaneuvered on the issue of Ukrainian independence, blamed the leaders of the Ukrainian community and the press for ignoring “the nuances of our position.” In his memoirs, George Bush wrote with regret about the news being “leaked” to the press, but Robert Gates, who had earlier shared Baker’s cautious stand on the issue, simply recorded in his memoirs that “events and expediency overtook a principled approach.” He refused to blame the Ukrainian American community leaders for the leak.
Indeed, it could not have come as a surprise to Bush and his advisers that the leaders of the Ukrainian American community talked to the press after the meeting, and the media could hardly have been expected to engage in hairsplitting on the nuances of the administration’s position in light of the major change in the administration’s policy. With the Republicans losing a safe seat in Pennsylvania, Bush’s own popularity sliding in the polls, and voters of East European descent loudly voicing their discontent, the White House could ill afford to maintain its previous support for Gorbachev, now described by Scowcroft as little more than a “ghost of the center.” The change in course, personally unpleasant to George Bush but politically necessary, had to be made sooner or later. Gorbachev was going down, and the danger was that he might drag the American president into a political abyss along with him.
The “leak,” which the White House not only immediately confirmed but also elaborated on by providing additional details about the decision-making process, was a convenient way to tell the country and the world about a major shift in US foreign policy—the abandonment of Gorbachev and his Union project. In a breach of long-established tradition, Gorbachev was not consulted or warned of the announcement. Formally speaking, there was no announcement at all.18
ON NOVEMBER 30, three days after the White House leak and the day before the Ukrainian referendum, President Bush called Mikhail Gorbachev to explain the turn in American policy, of which Gorbachev was already aware. It was a conversation neither leader was looking forward to. When Gorbachev’s aide Anatolii Cherniaev told him that Bush had requested a telephone conversation, Gorbachev was not pleased. “What for?” he asked Cherniaev. “I won’t be here.” Only after some hesitation did he agree to take the call: “Let them put it through wherever I happen to be.” Gorbachev felt betrayed by his American counterpart. The leak from the White House undermined his ongoing campaign against Ukrainian independence, in which he had claimed the full support of George Bush and other Western leaders. Now the mirage of Western backing suddenly disappeared, exposed as a bluff and giving Ukrainians one more incentive to vote and then push for independence.19
Gorbachev’s interpreter, Pavel Palazhchenko, had first heard the news on CNN. “Whatever the details of the decision made by Bush,” he told Cherniaev, “this announcement is a real blow.” Cherniaev agreed. He drafted a public response on Gorbachev’s behalf, claiming that the news from Washington “arouses bewilderment.” The statement failed to achieve its goal even in Moscow, to say nothing of Washington. It was criticized on the front page of Izvestiia, which was normally loyal to Gorbachev. The author of the article maintained that while the Washington leak could indeed be treated as meddling in Soviet affairs on the eve of the referendum, Gorbachev’s public repudiation of the White House made little sense when the polls showed that more than 80 percent of Ukrainians supported independence. The Izvestiia article appeared next to a piece titled “Ukraine: One Day Before Freedom Achieved Through Suffering.” If anyone was out of step with reality, it was Gorbachev, not Bush. But Cherniaev was proud of his work, suspecting that Gorbachev’s statement had played its role in prompting Bush to call his abandoned ally on November 30.20
When the call finally went through, Bush told Gorbachev right away that he was calling on the issue of Ukraine and was concerned by statements coming recently from the Soviet side—a clear reference to Cherniaev’s declaration. “You know our tradition as a democratic nation. We must support the Ukrainian people,” said Bush. He tried to sweeten the pill: “It would seem to us that recognizing Ukrainian independence could well bring them back into the union treaty process.” After listening to Bush, Gorbachev went over to the attack. “I won’t hide that the leak from the White House saying that serious consideration was being given to recognizing the independence of the Ukraine by the U.S.—especially because that leak came on the eve of the referendum—that this was taken negatively,” he said to Bush. “It appears that the U.S. is not only trying to influence events but to interfere.”
Gorbachev continued by declaring that the Ukrainian vote for independence should not be treated as a vote for secession. He brought up events in Yugoslavia. “If someone in Ukraine says that they are seceding from the Union, and someone says they are supporting them,” said Gorbachev, alluding to Bush’s readiness to recognize Ukraine, “then it would mean that 12 million Russians and members of other peoples become citizens of a foreign country.” He indicated that Yeltsin’s claims to Ukrainian regions bordering on Russia and the situation of Russian minorities in the Crimea and the Donbas coal region of eastern Ukraine were potentially explosive issues. Gorbachev was following the recommendations given him on Ukrainian minorities by Georgii Shakhnazarov the previous month.
Anatolii Cherniaev, who was present during the conversation, summarized Gorbachev’s argument as follows: “Independence is not secession, and secession is Yugoslavia squared and raised to the tenth power!” Gorbachev asked Bush to take care not to embolden the separatists. “Every state of the U.S. is sovereign, but we deal with the United States as a strong state,” he said to Bush.
“Very true,” responded the American president, but he was not prepared to yield an inch. “The recognition of the aspirations of Ukrainians to be independent will pave the way to resolve these thorny issues standing in the way of political and economic reforms,” he said. Bush assured Gorbachev that he was not out to make things more complicated for him. “I’m under a little pressure at home,” said Bush, referring to his domestic Ukrainian problem. “I can’t understand what you have been through, but people are piling on me, so I can understand a little of what you’re experiencing.”
There was no dialogue: the conversation consisted of two monologues. Although the interlocutors avoided an open conflict, both knew that their positions were incompatible. The telephone call could do little to draw them closer. The political alliance between Bush and Gorbachev was now a thing of the past. Cherniaev regarded James Baker, who participated in the conversation on the American side, as more sympathetic than Bush to Gorbachev’s plight and the future of the Union. “Baker is freer in his judgments and less subject to pressure from all kinds of lobbyists, more frank!” wrote Cherniae
v in his diary later that day. After the conversation he sat down to draft a press release about it. Gorbachev was eager to use the fact of the call itself, if not its content, to his political advantage on the eve of the Ukrainian referendum. He tried to offset Bush’s indirect leak to the press a few days earlier with his own leak. The goal of the statement, according to Cherniaev’s diary, was “to put the squeeze on Kravchuk and Co.”21
FOR GORBACHEV, THE DIFFICULT conversation with Bush followed on the heels of a no less difficult meeting with Boris Yeltsin, whom he considered the source of most of his recent troubles. That morning Gorbachev had begged Yeltsin to save the Union from looming default: the Russians, who were now in control of oil and gas revenues, had stopped financing Union structures. The world’s second superpower was broke. Gorbachev still commanded the military and the diplomatic corps but had no money to pay either or even to cover the salaries of his own staff.
The Union coffers were empty. On the previous day, at a session of the Union parliament, Gorbachev had asked the deputies to approve his June decree ordering the Central Bank to issue 68 billion rubles in credits to state institutions and enterprises. He had also asked for approval of new credits in the amount of 90 billion rubles. This was, in effect, a request to print more money, and it did not sit well with many of the deputies. While one chamber of the Union parliament passed a resolution to issue the credits, parliament as a whole, under the influence of the Russian deputies, would not approve it. The Russian government, ready to launch a radical economic reform, wanted to avoid another round of inflation at all costs. The Gorbachev administration was bereft of funds. “Russia, in effect, blocked the acceptance of an extraordinary Union budget at the end of the year,” wrote Gorbachev’s economic adviser Vadim Medvedev in his diary. “This led to a mass nonpayment of salaries to institutions on the [[Union]] budget.”22
The Last Empire Page 33
