3 1 Thus and in like strain, with flashing eyes and in fierce tones that he might be more widely heard (for the centurions and some of the common soldiers had made their way into the council) did he pour forth his words so that he moved even men of caution and foresight, while the general throng, and after them the rest, scorning the cowardly inaction of the other officers, extolled him as the one man and the one leader. This reputation Primus had won in that assembly from the moment in his harangue when, after reading out the letter of Vespasian, he did not talk in equivocal terms, ready to put this or that interpretation on Vespasian’s words to his own advantage, as the others had done; but he seemed to have openly joined Vespasian’s cause; therefore he carried the greater weight with the soldiers, for he was now an accomplice in their fault or a partner in their glory.
4 1 After Primus the procurator Cornelius Fuscus had the greatest influence. He also had been in the habit of assailing Vitellius violently and so had left himself no hope in case of failure. Tampius Flavianus, whose nature and years had made him more hesitant, roused the suspicions of the soldiers; they thought that he still remembered the family ties that bound him to Vitellius. Furthermore, since he had fled at the first movement of the legions and then had come back of his own accord, the troops believed that he had treacherous designs. There was some basis for this suspicion, since Flavianus had abandoned Pannonia and withdrawn to Italy, where he was not involved in the crisis; but later his desire for a revolution had impelled him to resume his title of governor and to bear a hand in civil war. Cornelius Fuscus urged him to take this present step, not because he needed the assistance of Flavianus, but because he wished to display a consular name to give credit and prestige to his party which was just then rising to view.
5 1 But in order to be able to enter Italy without danger and with advantage, word was sent Aponius Saturninus to hurry with the army then in Moesia. To avoid exposing the provinces in their unprotected condition to barbarous nations, the ruling chiefs of the Sarmatian Iazuges were called into service with the army. These chiefs offered their people also and their force of cavalry, which constitutes their sole effective strength; but this offer was declined for fear that in the midst of civil troubles they might undertake some hostile enterprise, or that, if a larger reward should be offered by the other side, they might abandon all sense of right and justice. Vespasian’s officers further drew to their side Sido and Italicus, princes of the Suebi, who had long been loyal to the Romans and whose people were more inclined to remain faithful to Rome than to take orders from others. They protected their flank with auxiliary troops, for Raetia was hostile to Vespasian’s party, its procurator Porcius Septiminus being unshaken in his loyalty to Vitellius. This was the reason that Sextilius Felix with the Aurian squadron of horse and eight cohorts of infantry was dispatched to occupy the bank of the river Inn, which flows between Raetia and Noricum. Neither side wished to test the fortunes of battle, and the fate of the parties was decided elsewhere.
6 1 As Antonius hurried forward some detachments from the cohorts and part of the cavalry to invade Italy, he was accompanied by Arrius Varus, a vigorous fighter, whose fame had been increased by his service under Corbulo and by his successes in Armenia. This same Varus, according to common report, had in secret conference with Nero brought serious charges against Corbulo’s good character; by this means he had won, as a reward of shame, the rank of chief centurion, and this ill gain, which delighted him at the time, later proved to be his ruin. However, Antonius and Varus occupied Aquileia, and then advancing through the adjacent districts were received with joy at Opitergium and Altinum. A force was left at Altinum to block any attempt on the part of the fleet at Ravenna, of whose defection they had not yet heard. Next they drew Padua and Ateste to their side. At Ateste they heard that three cohorts of Vitellian forces and the squadron of cavalry called Sebosian had occupied Forum Alieni and built a bridge over the stream there. Primus and Varus decided that this was a good opportunity to attack the Vitellians, who were wholly off their guard; for this fact also had been reported. At daybreak they cut down many of them quite unarmed. They had been advised that if they killed a few, they could force the rest by fear to change their allegiance; and there were some who surrendered at once. The larger part, however, broke down the bridge and so, by cutting off the road, blocked their foes’ advance. The opening of the campaign was favourable to Vespasian’s side.
7 1 When the news of the victory was noised abroad, two legions, the Seventh Galliana and the Tenth Gemina, marched with all speed to Padua under their commander Vedius Aquila. There they rested for a few days during which Minicius Justus, prefect of the camp of the Seventh legion, whose discipline had been somewhat too strict for civil war, was withdrawn from the soldiers’ resentment by being sent to Vespasian. An act long desired was now received with delight and given a flattering interpretation beyond its deserts, when Antonius gave orders that in all the towns Galba’s statues, which had been thrown down in the disorders of the times, should again be honoured. His real motive was that he believed that it would dignify Vespasian’s cause if this were accounted an approval of Galba’s principate and a revival of his party.
8 1 Then Vespasian’s commanders considered what place they should select as the seat of war. They decided on Verona because there are open plains about it suited to the operations of cavalry, in which their chief strength lay; and at the same time to take away from Vitellius so strong a colony seemed likely to contribute to their own cause and reputation. As they advanced they seized Vicetia. This was no great thing in itself, for the town had but moderate resources, yet its capture had great significance in the minds of those who considered that it was Caecina’s birthplace and that the enemy’s general had seen his native town snatched from him. But Verona was a real gain: the example and resources of its inhabitants were helpful, and the army’s position between Raetia and the Julian Alps blocked the entrance at that point of the forces from Germany. All these operations were unknown to Vespasian or had been forbidden by him. He had directed that his forces should not carry their operations beyond Aquileia, but should wait there for Mucianus; and he had also given the reasons for his orders, pointing out that since they held Egypt, controlled the grain supply of Italy, and possessed the revenues of the richest provinces, the army of Vitellius could be forced to surrender by lack of pay and food. Mucianus wrote frequent warnings to the same effect, giving as his reason his desire for a victory which would cost no blood or sorrow; in reality he was ambitious for personal fame and wished to keep for himself all the glory of the war. However, the distances were so great that the advice arrived after the events.
9 1 So then Antonius suddenly attacked the enemy’s posts; but after testing his foe’s courage in a trifling skirmish, he withdrew his troops with no advantage to either side. Presently Caecina established his camp between Hostilia, a village in the district of the Veronese, and the marshes of the river Tartarus. Here he was protected by the situation itself, his rear being covered by the river and his flanks by the marshes. If he had only been loyal to Vitellius, with the combined forces of the Vitellians he might have crushed the two legions at Verona, for the troops from Moesia had not yet joined them; or at least he could have driven them back and made them abandon Italy in disgraceful flight. But as it was, by various delays he betrayed to his opponents the first advantages of the campaign, spending his time in writing letters, reproving those whom he might easily have routed with his arms, until he could through messengers conclude the terms of his own treason. In the meantime Aponius Saturninus arrived with the Seventh or Claudian legion. This legion was commanded by the tribune Vipstanus Messala, a man of eminent family and of personal distinction; indeed he was the only one who had brought with him to the war some honourable pursuits. To these forces, which were by no means a match for those of Vitellius, since thus far only three legions had concentrated at Verona, Caecina now wrote, reproving them for their rashness in taking up arms after defeat. At
the same time he praised the valour of the German army, but made only slight and casual reference to Vitellius, with no derogatory mention of Vespasian; and he said nothing that was calculated to win over or frighten his opponents. The chiefs of the Flavian party in reply made no apology for their past misfortunes, but they spoke out boldly for Vespasian; displaying confidence in their cause and faith in the security of their army, they assailed Vitellius as if they were his personal enemies, and gave the tribunes and centurions reason to hope that they might keep the indulgences that Vitellius had granted them. Caecina himself they urged in no ambiguous terms to come over to their side. This correspondence the Flavian leaders read to their soldiers in assembly and thereby inspired their troops with additional confidence; for Caecina had written in humble terms, as if afraid of offending Vespasian, while their generals had written in scorn and with the evident desire to insult Vitellius.
10 1 Then two other legions arrived, the Third in command of Dillius Aponianus, the Eighth under Numisius Lupus. The Flavian party now decided to show their strength and to surround Verona with a rampart. It happened that the Galbian legion was assigned to work on that part of the lines that faced the enemy; seeing in the distance some allied cavalry, they became panic-stricken, for they thought that the enemy was coming. They seized their arms, fearing that they had been betrayed. The soldiers’ wrath fell on Tampius Flavianus, of whose guilt there was not the slightest proof; but the troops already hated him and now in a whirlwind of rage demanded his death. They cried out that he was a kinsman of Vitellius, that he had betrayed Otho, and had diverted the donative intended for them. Flavianus had no opportunity to defend himself, although he raised his hands in supplication, grovelled repeatedly on the ground, tore his garments, while the tears ran down his face and his breast was convulsed with sobs. These very acts increased the rage of the soldiers, for they regarded his excessive terror as proof of his guilt. When Aponius began to speak, he was interrupted by the soldiers’ cries; they expressed their scorn of the other commanders by groans and howls. Antonius was the only one to whom they would lend an ear, for he was eloquent, had influence, and possessed the art of quieting a mob. When he saw that the mutiny was gaining strength and the soldiers were about to pass from reproaches and insults to armed force, he ordered Flavianus to be put in chains. But the troops saw through the ruse, thrust aside those who guarded the tribunal, and prepared to use extreme violence. Antonius drew his sword and pointed it at his breast, declaring that he would die by his soldiers’ hand or by his own; at the same time he called by name to his assistance every soldier in sight whom he knew or who had some military decoration. Presently he turned toward the standards and the gods of war, praying them to inspire rather the enemy’s force with this madness and this discord. At last the mutiny gradually spent itself, and as the day was now near its end, the soldiers slipped away, each to his quarters. The same night Flavianus set out from camp, but was met by a letter from Vespasian which saved him from danger.
11 1 Then the legions, as if smitten with a mad contagion, assailed Aponius Saturninus, the commander of the army from Moesia. They attacked him with the greater violence, for they were not as before tired by severe labour, but their anger blazed up suddenly in the middle of the day on the publication of some letters which Saturninus was believed to have written to Vitellius. While once the soldiers had vied with one another in bravery and good discipline, they now strove to excel in insolence and audacity, for they did not wish to be less violent in the demands for the punishment of Aponius than they had been for that of Flavianus. The legions from Moesia remembered that they had supported the troops from Pannonia in the vengeance that they had taken, and the latter, as if freed from guilt by the mutiny of others, found delight in repeating their fault. They hurried to the gardens where Saturninus had his quarters; and in spite of all their efforts, it was not so much Primus and Aponius and Messala who saved Saturninus as it was the obscurity of his hiding-place. He concealed himself in the furnace of a bath that happened to be unused. Presently he dismissed his lictors and fled to Padua. Now that the ex-consuls had gone, all power and authority over both armies fell into the hands of Antonius alone, for his fellow-officers gave way to him, and the soldiers had regard only for him. There were some who believed that he had treacherously fostered both mutinies that he alone might profit by the war.
12 1 Nor on the side of Vitellius were men’s minds at ease; their distress, however, arose from more fatal discord, due not to the suspicions of the common soldiers, but to the treachery of the commanders. Lucilius Bassus, prefect of the fleet at Ravenna, taking advantage of the irresolution of his forces caused by the fact that most of them came from the provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia, which were then in Vespasian’s hands, had won them to his side. Night was selected as the time to consummate the treason, in order that the accomplices might meet at headquarters alone without the knowledge of the rest. Bassus waited in his quarters, prompted by shame or by fear as to the outcome. The trierarchs with loud shouts attacked the statues of Vitellius; and after a few of those who resisted had been killed, the rest of the crowd, eager for a change, began to favour Vespasian. Then Lucilius appeared and showed himself openly as the ringleader. But the fleet chose Cornelius Fuscus as their prefect, who came to Ravenna with all speed. Bassus was taken to Adria with an escort of light vessels under an honourable guard. He was put in chains by the prefect of cavalry, Vibennius Rufinus, a freedman of Vespasian. Hormas also was counted among the leaders of the Flavian party.
13 1 But as soon as the revolt of the fleet was known, Caecina sent away most of his troops on various military duties, and then, taking advantage of the empty camp, called the leading centurions and a few of the common soldiers to headquarters. There he spoke in high terms of Vespasian’s courage and the strength of his party. “The fleet has revolted,” he said, “we are hard pressed for supplies, the Gallic and Spanish provinces are hostile, and no dependence can be put on Rome.” All that he had to say concerning Vitellius was derogatory to his cause. Then while the majority of those present were still dazed by this sudden turn of affairs, he administered to them the oath of allegiance to Vespasian, those who were privy to the plan being the first to take it. At the same time they tore down the statues of Vitellius and sent a committee to inform Antonius of what they had done. But when the news of the treason spread through the whole camp, the soldiers ran to headquarters, where they saw Vespasian’s name put up on the standards and the statues of Vitellius overthrown; at first there was utter silence, and then all their rage burst out. “Has the glory of the German troops sunk to this,” they cried, “that without a struggle and without a wound they will offer their hands to fetters and surrender their weapons to the foe? What are these legions that are opposed to us? Those we defeated! And yet the chief strength of Otho’s army, the First and Fourteenth legions, are not here; still those legions too we routed and overthrew on the same fields. Shall all these thousands of armed men be presented to that exile Antonius, as if they were a herd of slaves on the block? No doubt eight legions are to go over to one poor fleet! Bassus and Caecina have now decided, after having robbed the emperor of palaces, gardens, and treasure, to take away his soldiers also. Uninjured and with no mark of blood upon us, we shall be cheap in the eyes even of the Flavian party; and what shall we say to those who ask us about our successes and defeats?”
14 1 With such cries, now separately, now in a body, as indignation moved each, the Fifth legion taking the lead, they replaced the statues of Vitellius and threw Caecina into chains. They chose as their commanders Fabius Fabullus, legate of the Fifth legion, and Cassius Longus, prefect of the camp. Happening to meet the marines from three light galleys who had no knowledge or complicity in what had happened, they slew them. Leaving their camp, they broke down the bridge and hurried back to Hostilia, and then moved toward Cremona to join the two legions that Caecina had despatched with part of the cavalry to occupy the town. These were the First Italian and
the Twenty-first Rapax.
15 1 When Antonius heard of this, he decided to attack his opponents’ troops while they were still distracted in purpose and while their strength was divided, and not to give time for the leaders to recover their authority, the troops their spirit of obedience, and the legions the confidence that they would feel when once more united. For he suspected that Fabius Valens had already left Rome and would make all haste when he heard of Caecina’s treachery; and in fact Fabius was both faithful to Vitellius and not ignorant of war. At the same time Antonius feared a great invasion of Germans through Raetia. Moreover, Vitellius had summoned auxiliaries from Britain, Gaul, and Spain, who would indeed have been utter ruin to the war, if Antonius, fearing this very thing, had not precipitated an engagement and gained the victory before their arrival. He now moved in two days with his entire army from Verona to Bedriacum. The next day, keeping his legionaries to fortify his position, he sent his cohorts of auxiliaries into the district around Cremona to let the soldiers have a taste of the booty to be gained from civilians, although his pretext was to secure supply. Antonius himself with four thousand horse advanced eight miles beyond Bedriacum that they might pillage with greater freedom. His scouts, as usual, watched the country still further from camp.
Complete Works of Tacitus (Delphi Classics) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 24) Page 29
