by Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions
Granted, there were qualifiers. The American battleships were not ready for battle, but the intellectual understanding that the battleships were in an unusually vulnerable condition would not overcome the emotional blow of the photographs on newspaper front pages worldwide showing smoking hulls lying in the mud on the bottom of Pearl Harbor.
Probably the most significant reaction must have been in the mind of Admiral Chester Nimitz, who became the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet after the debacle. In the first months after the attack Nimitz sent the battleships to the West Coast, where they could be overhauled, repaired, modernized, fueled, fed, and trained without straining his logistical resources. For a few months, battle damage kept the battleships out of the front lines. Then, logistics kept the battleships where they were.
Later, when the logistics strains eased and the battleships were cocked and ready, Nimitz hesitated. As a submariner he was not an official member of the “Gun Club,” in spite of a tour as commanding officer of a battleship, so he did not have the professional and emotional commitment to the battlewagons and nowhere near as much faith in their capabilities as the True Believers. Although pressed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, to get the battleship forces into combat, Nimitz was hesitant—there were always reasons to keep them out of the theater, and when he finally sent them forward, reasons to keep them out of the fight. They were too slow. They were ill-suited for combat in the constrained waters of the Solomons. They sucked up too much fuel.
The battleships that did get to the Southwest Pacific mostly swung at anchor, their combat edge deteriorating as their crews idled.
Overall, one suspects that the Pearl Harbor attack influenced Nimitz’s perceptions of the utility and survivability of the Treaty battleships in the early months of the war. It was not until the end of 1943 that these ships came to take a more prominent place in the war. They were afforded a place in the 5th Fleet’s surface action plans during the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaigns, perhaps an essential place. They eventually displayed their ship-to-ship combat capabilities in the constrained waters of Surigao Strait. Perhaps they could have done as well in the constrained waters of the Solomons in 1942.
So, perhaps the greatest impact of the Pearl Harbor attack was in its influence on how the war would be fought. Overall, a change in the results of the Pearl Harbor attack would have resulted more in a change in the characteristics of combat in the Pacific war, with little change in the pace, and no change in the outcome.
At the same time, the Pearl Harbor attack distorted the Japanese view of war. Commanders take the results of every battle and subconsciously build internal mental models of how modern war is fought, including the expected results when different forces are pitted against each other. Pearl Harbor contributed to these mental models. Out of it, the Japanese would have found a renewed faith in the concept of a decisive battle. They saw how a relatively small force operating far from home could attack the hub of the enemy’s power and inflict debilitating losses at little cost. If this could happen, perhaps the Japanese could be victorious in a later decisive battle as well. The Japanese victories at Pearl Harbor, Darwin, the Java Sea, and the Indian Ocean not only contributed to “Victory Disease,” that fatal underestimation of American capabilities, but also to a mental model of warfare that held out the hope that all the losses of 1943 and 1944 could be reversed in one powerful blow supported, as was the Pearl Harbor attack, by chance and the favor of the gods. The Pearl Harbor attack not only forced a long war strategy onto the Americans, it added hope to the Japanese that they could win such a war.
At Pearl Harbor, the efforts of tens of thousands of Japanese culminated in the skills and dedication of the aviators on 15 torpedo bombers, men who successfully “dedicated their life to that one torpedo.” Had they faltered, the history of the Pacific War would have been dramatically different.
APPENDIX A
TABULATION OF SECOND-WAVE DIVE-BOMBER ATTACKS
Ship (Hull number)—# of Bombs; reasons and sources
Aylwin (DD-355)—1
One bomb dropped off Aylwin’s bow. Henley (DD-391) also observed a bomb strike in this area, with a different time recorded. Time records in the logs can be very imprecise, with some ships recording the beginning of an event, some the end of the event, and some the time of the log entry (which might be minutes after the event). It was assumed that these two entries were a record of the same bomb. Sources: Aylwin (DD-355) AR, Henley (DD-391) AR.
Solace (AH-5)—1
One bomb 400 yards off Solace. Sources: Chronology, Allen (DD-355) AR. Note that Solace, a hospital ship, did not report that she was attacked. The bomb was likely a very badly aimed bomb directed at Dobbin or Whitney’s destroyer nest, or was jettisoned from a damaged bomber.
Dobbin (AD-3)—3
Three dive-bombers in a single attack against Dobbin. One was shot down prior to bomb release, two others dropped their bombs (the ComDesFlotOne AR reported that all three dropped bombs). Sources: Dobbin (AD-3), Breeze (DM-18), Dewey (DD-349), Hull (DD-350) ARs; Chronology.
Raleigh (CL-7)—3
A single shotai of three bombers attacked Raleigh. Raleigh AR says “many,” Chronology states five, but this may be confusion in numbers with the five (see below) that attacked Tangier. Number of bomb splashes not recorded. One hit scored on Raleigh. A conservative estimate of one three-aircraft shotai was used, which is apparently confirmed by the postwar testimony of Lt. Zenji Abe, who reported that he led three bombers against Raleigh. His rear-seater reported:
Formation leader short. Second plane short. Third plane hit! Adjustment correct. Second echelon successful!’ I was later able to identify our target as an Omaha-class light cruiser–Raleigh.
Sources: www.historynet.com/lieutenant-zenji-abe-a-japanese-pilot-remembers.htm, Raleigh (CL-7) AR, Chronology.
Tangier (AV-8)—5
A single attack on Tangier likely with elements of two shotai. Tangier AR indicates four near-miss splashes and one bomb that hit Ford Island, and is considered authoritative. The possibility was considered that the Raleigh and Tangier attacks were the same, but both ship’s AR report how close the bomb misses were, so it is unlikely the bomb misses would be double counted, since the ships were located 800 yards apart. Source: Tangier (AV-8) AR.
Curtiss (AV-4)—6
Two attacks on Curtiss, each by three aircraft. One aircraft crashed into Curtiss’ crane. One bomb hit from the second attack. The time of attacks were reported as 0910 and 1913. Medusa (AR-1) (about 200 yards away) claimed an attack where one bomb was aimed at Curtiss and four aimed at Medusa, claiming four bomb misses close aboard Medusa. These two claims have been consolidated. Sources: Curtiss (AV-4) AR, Medusa (AR-1) AR, Zane (DMS-4) AR.
Helm (DD-388)—2
Helm was attacked outside the entrance buoy. Helm reported only one aircraft sighted, but two bombs in distinctly different locations close aboard, causing some shock damage. Since the attack was evidently a surprise, and the aircraft evidently sighted by only a few crewmembers, it is evident that one of the attacking D3A Vals was unobserved. Source: Helm (DD-388) AR.
Dale (DD-353)—5
Dale was attacked on two occasions, first by at least two dive-bombers while in the channel, and three more just outside the entrance buoy. Sources: Dale (DD-353) AR, Olson Tales of a Tin Can, crew interviews with Miller at www.historynet.com/first-hand-accounts-from-the-crew-of-uss-dales-escape-from-pearl-harbor.htm, accessed 1/27/10.
Shaw (DD-373)—8
Shaw was in the floating drydock. Eight bombers attacked. Three bombs hit Shaw, and five hit in or around the floating drydock, which received 155 holes from splinters that had to be welded or plugged before she was raised on 9 January 1942. Sources: NAVSHIPS A (374), Shaw (DD-373) AR and War Damage Report, Chronology, Wallin 205.
Nevada (BB-36)—14
The testimony on the attack on Nevada is contradictory and subject to inflation by the drama of the event. Smith, in his biograp
hy of Egusa, says Egusa’s section of 18 aircraft attacked Nevada; in his book on the D3A Val, he intimates one attack of eight and a second wave of six, without being specific. Chronology states that 15 dive bombers attacked the Nevada and a destroyer, which would likely be the first attack against Dale; other ships’ ARs list as many as 21 attackers, but also state that some of them (one-third in one account) broke off to attack the floating drydock. The Japanese dive-bombing techniques used a dive angle of 60 degrees initiated at 15,000 feet, so it was difficult for observers to differentiate the attacks delivered against targets in close proximity, as were Nevada, the floating drydock containing Shaw, the permanent drydock containing Pennsylvania, and the Navy Yard. Some of the bombs that hit in the water near Shaw could have been interpreted as attacks against Nevada. All that appears firm is that Nevada took five hits in two waves of attackers. After balancing accounts and considering the aircraft accounted in attacks against other nearby targets, 14 attackers appears a reasonable estimate.
Pennsylvania (BB-38)—9
This number was arrived at by bomb count. This includes the misses on Pennsylvania that hit Cassin (2) and Downes (1), the hit on Pennsylvania (1), the DNM near Pennsylvania’s bow (1), hits on the edge of the drydock (2), and at least two bombs that splashed just outside the caisson. Sources: Pennsylvania (BB-38), Cassin (DD-373), Downes (DD-375), Tracy (DM-19) ARs, Lord 132, Wallin.
California (BB-44)—3
According to Prange, Ofuchi attacked California. It may have been a solo attack, but likely his shotai of 3 bombers. The attack resulted in one 250kg DNM by the bow.
Helena (CL-50)—4
By bomb count. Sources: Lord, 119, Helena AR. Fuchida gave the dive-bombers credit for 6 hits.
Neosho (AO-23)—2
By bomb count. Neosho’s AR states that “several bombs fell close to the stern jarring the ship appreciably.” At the time of the attack Neosho was well into the channel and possibly passing the Naval Shipyard piers, so these bombs must have been directed at her and not at Battleship Row. There is a possibility that these bombs were simply wide misses by bombs directed at the Yard.
Pyro (AE-1)—1
By bomb count. Pyro was at the ammunition piers in the West Loch when she was attacked by a single dive-bomber, which put its bomb on the pier. Pyro AR.
Navy Yard—10
An accurate number is difficult to determine because the various accounts tended to mix attacks on the Navy Yard with attacks on the Drydocks and attacks on 1010 Dock. This number is intended to include attacks only on the repair basin area and piers. Chronology claims 30 dive-bombers attacked the Yard; Sumner’s AR states 10 went against the Navy Yard and docks; Tautog claimed 18 attacked at 0900; and Chronology states that 10-12 attacked the repair basin at 0910. The final number came through a count of bomb detonations reported and some interpretation in the ARs of Honolulu (CL-48), Rigel (ARB-1), Tautog (SS-199), Sumner (AG-32), Ramapo (AO-12), Pyro (AE-1), and Preble (DM-20) ARs.
APPENDIX B
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND JAPANESE TERMS
AA Anti-Aircraft
AAC Army Air Corps
AR Action Report
AP Armor piercing
AS Anti-Submarine
BB Battleship
BC Battlecruiser
CA Heavy cruiser
CAG Commander Air Group
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CEP Circular Error Probable
chutai a flight of nine aircraft, usually made up of three shotai
CinCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CL Light cruiser
CNA Center for Naval Analyses
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CV Fleet carrier
CVL Light carrier
CW Continuous Wave (keyed HF radio transmission)
daitai 27 aircraft, usually made up of three chutai
DC Damage control
DD Destroyer
DEAD Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses
DP Duel Purpose
DNM Damaging Near Miss
FMC Fully Mission Capable
GP General Purpose
GQ General Quarters (i.e. battle stations are manned)
HF High frequency
HURL Hawa’ii Undersea Research Laboratory
IJN Imperial Japanese Navy
IP Initial Point
kg kilogram
Kaigun Daigakko Naval Staff College
Kido Butai literally “Mobile Force,” the Japanese carrier-centric striking force
Mod Modification, as in the Type 91 Mod 1 torpedo
MPI Mean Point of Impact
MRI Minimum release interval
nm nautical miles
NSFO Navy Standard Fuel Oil
NWC Naval War College
OBE overtaken by events
OCA Offensive Counter-Air
OR Operations Research
RPB Rounds Per Bird
rpm rounds per minute
SAP Semi Armor Piercing
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
shotai a flight of 3 aircraft, the fundamental tactical unit in Japanese naval aviation
SNAFU “Situation Normal, All Fouled Up”
TOT Time on Target
US United States
USN United States Navy
USNWC United States Naval War College
USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey
VB Bomber
VF Fighter
VT Torpedo bomber
WDR War Damage Report
APPENDIX C
SHIPS IN PEARL HARBOR AND VICINITY, 7 DECEMBER 1941
(• = Sunk or destroyed)
Battleships (BB)
Pennsylvania (BB-38) (in Dry Dock No.1)
• Arizona (BB-39)
• Nevada (BB-36)
• Oklahoma (BB-37)
Tennessee (BB-43)
• California (BB-44)
Maryland (BB-46)
• West Virginia (BB-48)
Heavy Cruisers (CA)
New Orleans (CA-32)
San Francisco (CA-38)
Light Cruisers (CL)
Raleigh (CL-7)
Detroit (CL-8)
Phoenix (CL-46)
Honolulu (CL-48)
St. Louis (CL-49)
Helena (CL-50)
Destroyers (DD)
Allen (DD-66)
Schley (DD-103)
Chew (DD-106)
Ward (DD-139) (patrolling entrance to Pearl Harbor)
Dewey (DD-349)
Farragut (DD-348)
Hull (DD-350)
MacDonough (DD-351)
Worden (DD-352)
Dale (DD-353)
Monaghan (DD-354)
Alywin (DD-355)
Selfridge (DD-357)
Phelps (DD-360)
Cummings (DD-365)
Reid (DD-369)
Case (DD-370)
Conyngham (DD-371)
Cassin (DD-372) (in Dry Dock No.1)
Shaw (DD-373) (in floating drydock YFD 2)
Tucker (DD-374)
Downes (DD-375) (in Dry Dock No.1)
Bagley (DD-386)
Blue (DD-387)
Helm (DD-388) (underway, nearing West Loch)
Mugford (DD-389)
Ralph Talbot (DD-390)
Henley (DD-391)
Patterson (DD-392)
Jarvis (DD-393)
Submarines (SS)
Narwhal (SS-167)
Dolphin (SS-169)
Cachalot (SS-170)
Tautog (SS-199)
Minelayer (CM)
• Oglala (CM-4)
Minesweepers (AM)
Turkey (AM-13)
Bobolink (AM-20)
Rail (AM-26)
Tern (AM-31)
Grebe (AM-43)
Vireo (AM-52)
Coastal Minesweepers (AMc)
Cockatoo (AMc-8)
Crossbill (AMc-9)
Reedbird (AMc-30)
Light Minelayers (DM)
Gamble (DM-15)
Ramsay (DM-16)
Montgomery (DM-17)
Breese (DM-18)
Tracy (DM-19)
Preble (DM-20)
Sicard (DM-21)
Pruitt (DM-22)
High Speed Minesweepers (DMS)
Zane (DMS-14)
Wasmuth (DMS-15)
Trever (DMS-16)
Perry (DMS-17)
Gunboat (PG)
Sacramento (PG-19)
Destroyer Tenders (AD)
Dobbin (AD-3)
Whitney (AD-4)
Seaplane Tenders (AV)
Curtiss (AV-4)
Tangier (AV-8)
Seaplane Tenders (Small) (AVP)
Avocet (AVP-4)
Swan (AVP-7) (on Marine Railway)
Seaplane Tenders (Destroyer) (AVD)
Hulbert (AVD-6)
Thornton (AVD-11)
Ammunition Ship (AE)
Pyro (AE-1) (at Naval Ammunition Depot, West Loch)
Oilers (AO)
Ramapo (AO-12)
Neosho (AO-23)
Repair Ships (AR)
Medusa (AR-1)
Vestal (AR-4)
Base Repair Ship (ARb)
Rigel (ARb-1)
Submarine Tender (AS)
Pelias (AS-14)
Submarine Rescue Ship (ASR)
Widgeon (ASR-1)
Hospital Ship (AH)
Solace (AH-5)
Cargo Ship (AK)
Vega (AK-17) (at Honolulu)
General-Stores-Issue Ships (AKS)
Castor (AKS-1)
Antares (AKS-3) (at Pearl Harbor entrance)
Ocean-going Tugs (AT)
Ontario (AT-13)
Sunnadin (AT-28)
Keosanqua (AT-38) (at Pearl Harbor entrance)
Navajo (AT-64) (12 miles outside Pearl Harbor entrance)
Miscellaneous Auxiliaries (AG)
• Utah (AG-16)
Argonne (AG-31)
Sumner (AG-32)
Motor Torpedo Boats (PT)
PT-20
PT-21
PT-22
PT-23
