8. From the previous footnote, the use of ‘sive’ might provide some prima facie evidence that (b) is a more likely interpretation than (a).
9. AT VIIIA 64; CSM I.242.
10. There is, of course, something odd about wondering about chronological primacy when conceiving of the nature of time itself, but this oddity can just be set aside at this point.
11. AT VIIIA 27; CSM I.212. The Latin is as follows:
Alia autem sunt in rebus ipsis, quarum attributa vel modi esse dicuntur; alia vero in nostra tantum cogitatione. Ita, cum tempus a duration generaliter sumpta distinguimus, dicimusque esse numerum motus, est tantum modus cogitandi; neque enim profecto intelligimus in motu aliam durationem quam in rebus non motis: ut patet ex eo quod, si duo corpora, unum tarde, aliud celeriter per horam moveatur, non plus temporis in uno quam in alio numeremus, etsi multo plus fit motus. Sed ut rerum omnium durationem motuum illorum maximorum, & maxime aequabilium, a quibus fiunt anni & dies; hancque durationem tempus vocamus. Quod proinde nihil, praeter modum cogitandi, duration generaliter sumptae superaddit.
12. The Latin reads, “ita, cum tempus a duration generaliter sumpta distinguimus, dicimusque esse numerum motus, est tantum modus cogitandi,” emphasis added.
13. I previously explained that ‘principal attributes’ refers to the “principal property which constitutes [a substance’s] essence,” and that ‘mode’ refers to a nonessential way that a substance can be.
14. AT VIIIA 26; CSM I.211.
15. AT VIIIA 27; CSM I.212.
16. One might claim that I.57 excludes (i), that is, the view that time-in-thought might be identical to the duration of the cosmic motions since Descartes claims (just prior to introducing the role of these motions that “if there are two bodies moving for an hour, one slowly and the other quickly, we do not reckon the amount of time to be greater in the latter case than the former.” The fact that this passage indicates that the amount of motion in a body is irrelevant to the question of time, might count as denying any sort of identity relation between time-in-thought and the celestial motions if the claim is taken to apply universally to all bodies—including the celestial bodies. That is to say, if Descartes were claiming that the speed of any motions—including say the motions of the sun—are irrelevant to the question of how much time has passed, then clearly this claim would deny any sort of identity between time-in-thought and celestial motions.
Though Descartes might be making the universal claim that the motions of all bodies are irrelevant to the question of the amount of time, it is also possible that he is making the less controversial point that faster and slower movements of two non-celestial bodies indicate nothing about the length of time through which the bodies endure. The latter point would be less controversial than a claim including celestial motions since Descartes himself indicates in I.57 that he follows the common tendency of appealing to the sun’s rotation as a measure of time. Though Descartes does not clarify the precise way that the celestial motions function in his account of time, it seems reasonable to suppose that he would not intend to claim that the speeds of all celestial motions are equally irrelevant to the question of how much time a body might have endured through. The speed of the sun’s motion, for example, might be relevant to the question of how much “time” has passed since if the sun could make two complete rotations in a 24-hour span, then it might be subject to debate if anything enduring through the sun’s swift cycling would have endured for two days rather than one. Thus, when Descartes claims that the speed of a body’s motion is irrelevant to the question of time, it seems that there may be some reason to doubt that the claim should be read as making the universal claim about all bodies—including celestial ones. As there appears to good reason to doubt the universal claim, it seems that interpretation that supposes that time-in-thought might be identical to the duration of the cosmic motions cannot be positively excluded based on Descartes’ claim that the speeds of two bodies motions are irrelevant to the amount of time through which they endure.
17. AT VIIIA 27; CSM I.212.
18. AT VIIIA 30; CSM I. 214.
19. AT VIIIA 30; CSM I.214.
20. AT V 223; CSMK 358.
21. AT VIII 27; CSM I.212, emphasis added.
22. AT VIII 27; CSM I.212.
23. Fourth Set of Replies: AT VII 235; CSM II.164.
24. Disp. Meta., 50.9.1; Stephen H. Daniel, “Seventeenth-Century Scholastic Treatments of Time,” Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981): 592.
25. Disp. Meta., 48.4.15; Daniel, “Scholastic Treatments of Time,” 594.
26. Disp. Meta., 40.9.10; Ibid., 594.
27. Disp. Meta., 50.9.16; Ibid., 596.
28. Ibid., 597.
29. Quoted in Piero Ariotti, “Toward Absolute Time: The Understanding and Refutation of the Aristotelian Conception of Time in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Annals of Science 30 (1973): 159.
Chapter 4
Two Temporal Attributes that are Ontologically on Par
An analysis of Descartes’ accounts of time-in-thought, duration, and motion has led to the conclusion that Descartes posits two distinct, temporal attributes. This chapter will offer an analysis of the more elusive second attribute, which I have termed “time-in-thought” and which Descartes identified with the “measure of motion” in Principles I.57. Despite the terminology I am using, the second attribute is (of course) not the only temporal attribute found in thought. Intrinsic duration is certainly found in minds,[1] but unlike the first temporal attribute, time-in-thought is unique in being the attribute that is only found in minds. Apart from knowing that time-in-thought is a “mode of mind,” this latter attribute presents significant interpretive challenges. One must minimally determine what kind of mental mode it is, but since Descartes offers few texts that seem to explicitly address this mode, this is not easily done. Nonetheless the task must be accomplished in order to determine if this second attribute is like Suarez’s extrinsic/imaginary time. Or, more specifically, to determine if time-in-thought has a lesser, ontological standing than duration. As a derivative status would suggest that duration is the most important feature of Descartes’ account, such a determination would suggest that duration is the appropriate focus of study when considering Descartes’ account of time. On the contrary, if time-in-thought is of equal ontological standing, as I here argue, then any study that fails to adequately consider time-in-thought is thereby significantly lacking.
In analyzing time-in-thought, I conclude that Descartes’ time-in-thought is on an ontological par with duration. From this conclusion I contend that Descartes does not simply offer a type of Suarezarian temporal dualism; rather, he offers his own distinct type of temporal dualism—one that is unique in virtue of its making both temporal attributes equally significant. This point is significant in and of itself and because current scholarship is virtually silent on the topic of time-in-thought in Descartes.[2] Thus, in arguing that time-in-thought and duration have equal ontological standing, I argue that most current understanding of Cartesian time is markedly incomplete.
I claim that time-in-thought possesses equal ontological standing to duration by arguing that time-in-thought is an innate idea, and thus an idea of a Cartesian “true and immutable nature.” My argument for time-in-thought’s being an innate idea begins with an explanation of Descartes’ account of measure in order to clarify what Descartes means when he claims that time-in-thought is a “measure of motion.” I then argue that time-in-thought must either pick out an idea or an activity of minds, before concluding that time-in-thought is an idea (and not an activity). In particular, I propose that time-in-thought picks out an idea like one’s idea of the number line, which is employed in measuring, but is not identical to an act of measuring. I establish that this idea is innate by i) showing philosophical reasons why Descartes should think it is innate, and then ii) compelling textual evidence that Descartes actually did think it was innate. By arguing that time-in-thought is an innate idea, I conc
lude that it is an idea of a true and immutable nature. Accordingly, I argue that time-in-thought is an idea found in minds, but that is only weakly mind-dependent since the content of this idea is not created by minds.
Time-in-thought as the “Measure of Motion”
Though the previous chapter established that time-in-thought is distinct from duration insofar as time-in-thought depends on motion, I have not yet established the nature of time-in-thought’s dependence on motion. Indeed, arguing that time-in-thought is dependent upon motion at all is rather odd—given my thesis that time-in-thought is an innate idea.[3] Thus, to argue that time-in-thought is an innate idea, I must explain how time-in-thought can both be dependent on motion and nonetheless be innate. To do this, I must carefully examine the passages where Descartes discusses his concept of measurement.
In Rule 14, Descartes offers an extended discussion on the meaning of measure and its role in comparisons. In this rule, Descartes claims that one ought to think of all knowledge (besides simple, pure intuitions) “as resulting from a comparison between two or more things.”[4] As such, he asserts that it is the business of reason to prepare for this operation.[5] Such preparation, Descartes explains, begins with one’s finding a “common nature” which is participated in by all the things that are compared.[6] These “common natures” become the unit according to which various things can be compared. Descartes explains that these common natures may either be drawn from the things themselves, or can be arbitrarily chosen and applied to the things compared. He writes:
If no determinate unit is specified in the problem, we may adopt as unit either one of the magnitudes already given or any other magnitude, and this will be the common measure of all the others. We shall regard it as having as many dimensions as the extreme terms which are to be compared.[7]
By either identifying or stipulating a common unit among things to be compared, one is able to first measure and then to relate one thing to another. As such comparisons are the source of all knowledge beyond (pure intuitions), identifying a common nature is the key by which most things are known.
Descartes explains that measurement makes a comparison possible by translating various wholes into quantities with identical units—the magnitudes of which can then be compared. According to Descartes, measuring just is the translating of a whole into a collection of parts, since measuring is the converse of counting:
If we consider the order of the parts in relation to the whole, we are then said to be counting; if on the other hand we regard the whole as being divided up into parts, we are measuring it. For example, we measure centuries in terms of years, days, hours, minutes; if on the other hand we count minutes, hours, days and years, we end up with centuries. It is clear from this that there can be countless different dimensions within the same subject, that these add absolutely nothing to the things which possess them, and that they are understood in the same way whether they have a real basis in the objects themselves or are arbitrary inventions of our mind.[8]
By ‘dimension,’ Descartes explains that he is picking out “a mode or aspect in respect of which some subject is considered to be measurable.”[9] Thus, in the passage above, Descartes asserts that there are as many different “dimensions” for any given magnitude as there are units that one can specify for dividing up the magnitude. It is in this way that measuring is the converse of counting. Whereas in counting one builds up from parts to a whole, in measuring one divides (in thought) a whole into parts.
In Principles I.57, when Descartes explains that time-in-thought is the “measure of motion” he claims that the cosmic motions provide the means of measuring all durations. He claims, “in order to measure the duration of all things, we compare their duration with the duration of the greatest and most regular motions which give rise to years and days, and we call this duration ‘time.’”[10] Given Descartes’ understanding of measurement, he is evidently proposing that the cosmic motions provide the unit according to which the durations of all things can be quantified and compared.[11] This unit seems to be something real within the celestial motions, since Rule 14 explicitly states that “the division of a century into years and days” is something real whereas “the division of the day into hours and minutes is not.”[12] The difference in these cases would seem to be that there is a characteristic motion that marks off each day, whereas there is no specifiable motion that relates to hours or minutes. The division of a day into hours or minutes is determined according to the arbitrarily chosen number according to which the day’s motion is divided. If a day had been divided by 20 instead of 24, then the length of an hour would be different. The length of a day is, however, determined by the celestial motions and not by a chosen unit.
As the celestial bodies have a specifying motion according to which the unit of a day corresponds, it seems that a day is an identifiable stage in the intrinsic and successive duration of the celestial bodies. Recall that in my earlier analysis of duration (in chapter 3) I determined that each substance has an intrinsic duration, and that this duration is made knowable via the motions of a substance. Thus, in the case of the celestial motions, the inherent duration (successive enduring) of the celestial bodies grounds the possibility of their motions, but the regular motions themselves make this successive enduring measurable by specifying knowable, divisible units.
Principle I.57’s contention that it is possible to measure the duration of all things via a comparison with the regular, celestial motions now seems easily explained. Though the movements of the celestial bodies only specify the intrinsic duration of these particular bodies, the units determinable by these motions can be applied to an analysis of the duration of all things. When the unit of a day is extracted from these motions and applied to an analysis of other durations, this unit provides a “common nature” according to which other durations can be compared. These day units are nothing real in relation to any other substance besides the celestial bodies, but can nonetheless serve as a unit to measure all substances. In other words, when the durations of the celestial bodies are used to measure any other duration, the day unit employed is an example of one of the “adopted” units that Descartes admits as applicable to the problem of comparison. The celestial motions are adopted because they are regular and easily observed.
Though Descartes’ account of measure clarifies how Descartes thinks that all durations can be compared, how this comparison relates to his account of time-in-thought is not yet clear. Descartes claims that when the durations of the celestial motions are compared to all other durations that this results in (or perhaps is) ‘time’ (i.e., time-in-thought). Despite having clarified the nature of this comparison, we have little insight into the nature of time-in-thought itself, because it is not obvious where time-in-thought is found in this comparison process. All that has been discovered is that time-in-thought is part of the process of using the duration of the celestial motions as a unit to compare durations. From this fact alone, one might think that time-in-thought could pick out the extramental fact corresponding to the number of cosmic motions that have occurred simultaneously with another substance’s continued enduring. Such a conclusion would make Descartes’ account much closer to the celestial reductionists discussed in chapter 1. However, since Descartes explains that time-in-thought is a mode of thought,[13] it cannot pick out an extramental feature of the world (e.g., some particular amount of cosmic motion). As a mode of thought, it seems that time-in-thought must relate to the mind’s comparison of various durations, and not to the extramental facts discovered as a result of such comparisons.
If time-in-thought is a mode of thought, then it seems that it must refer either to the act of mind by which various durations are measured, or to some idea according to which durations are measured. That is to say, time-in-thought must be either the comparing/measuring of various durations or it is some idea according to which such mental acts are accomplished. Of these two alternatives, it seems that the latter is much more plausible. The former seem
s less likely for various reasons—not excluding the fact that Descartes calls this mode of mind the measure, and not the measuring of duration. It is unlikely that time-in-thought could refer to an activity of mind because such an activity account would make this mode both strongly mind-dependent and particular. That is to say, if time-in-thought referred to an activity of measuring, then time would not be a common framework within which all substance’s endurings are measured. Rather, there would only be individual instances of timings. If time-in-thought referred to the act of comparing the enduring of substances against the cosmic motions, then there would be numerous time-in-thoughts, not one time-in-thought. Each act of comparing would be its own time. And as noted in the last chapter, part of the reason Descartes wants to introduce time-in-thought is to provide a single, all-encompassing time by which to measure all of the individual attributes of duration. Making time-in-thought into an activity of minds would defeat this purpose.
If time-in-thought is not an activity of mind but instead is an idea in accordance with which durations are measured, then these problems are avoided. In suggesting that time-in-thought is an idea “according to which durations are measured,” I propose that time-in-thought functions like the idea one has of the number line. All measuring employs some idea of a number line. How this idea is employed varies according to the thing measured and thus according to the unit chosen for measuring that thing. In the case of spatial measurement, for example, a ruler is employed for measuring length. A ruler is just one’s idea of a number line made applicable for spatial measurements via the determination of a unit (say, an inch). By positing that time-in-thought picks out an idea like one’s idea of the number line, I suggest that time-in-thought picks out an idea that one has prior to the determination of a unit. In the case of temporal measuring, time-in-thought is an idea of an infinitely extended series of successively related parts that is used to measure various durations via the stipulation of a particular unit—namely, the unit given by the movements of celestial bodies. According to this interpretation, time-in-thought refers to an idea that is integral to the nature of measuring, but is not identical to the act of measuring itself.
Descartes' Temporal Dualism Page 10
