by Alan Watson
CHURCHILL’S LEGACY
To my wife on our golden wedding anniversary
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
Europe at Risk
The Germans, Who Are They Now?
Jamestown, The Voyage of English
The Queen and the U.S.A
CHURCHILL’S
LEGACY
TWO SPEECHES TO SAVE THE WORLD
ALAN WATSON
CONTENTS
Foreword by Randolph Churchill
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
PART I
Russian Menace, Western Weakness
1The Warnings
2Churchill and Roosevelt
3Berlin 1945
PART II
Churchill’s Chance
4Genesis of the Journey
5‘I am deserted’
6Outward Bound
7Have a Holiday, Get a Loan
8A Synthesis of Agendas
PART III
Churchill’s Crusade
9Lord Halifax and the White House
10The Train to Missouri
11‘The most important speech of my life’
PART IV
‘It hasn’t half kicked-up a shindig’
12Reactions I
13With Ike to Richmond
14Leaving the Big Apple
15Homecoming
PART V
Europe Restored
16Zurich
17Reactions II
18The USA: From Irritation to Determination
PART VI
Winners and Losers
19How and Why the Impact?
20Perspective
Afterword
Letting Churchill Speak: A Note from Allen Packwood, Director of the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, University of Cambridge
Acknowledgements
Notes
Bibliography
Index
A Note on the Author
Plate Section
‘An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile – hoping it will eat him last.’
Winston Churchill
FOREWORD BY RANDOLPH CHURCHILL
Sir Winston Churchill’s leadership in the Second World War is well documented. Of all the years of my great-grandfather’s life, 1940 is often seen as the most decisive. His stand against Hitler kept Britain in the conflict and made the liberation of Western Europe possible. But at the end of the war that hard-won liberty seemed threatened anew. Churchill’s Legacy: Two Speeches to Change the World argues for a wider perspective and makes a powerful case for an equally decisive year – 1946.
The Europe of 1946 was devastated by war. Churchill was at a low point in his political career. Rejected by the British electorate, his wife, Clementine, consoled him by saying, ‘It may well be a blessing in disguise.’ Churchill replied, ‘At the moment it seems quite effectively disguised.’1
Penetrating this gloom was a letter inviting him to travel to an obscure college at Fulton, Missouri, with a galvanising footnote from Truman promising to accompany him if he accepted. Having travelled to Fulton with the president, Churchill delivered his ‘Iron Curtain’ speech warning of the danger to the West posed by Soviet hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe, and Soviet ambition for even more power. Churchill said that this was the most important speech he had ever made.
Nineteen forty-six was becoming, for Churchill, as important as 1940. The foe had changed but the threat was comparable. He argued for a US commitment to defend Europe – a commitment that had not been made in 1940 when Britain stood alone.
The Roosevelt family was appalled. The US media and much of American public opinion denigrated Churchill as a warmonger intent on a crusade against ‘good old Uncle Joe’. Truman backed away, denying that his presence at Fulton was any kind of endorsement and even claiming – quite wrongly – that he did not know what Churchill was going to say.
This is a tale that has been told before, although never with the detail, political awareness and documentary evidence drawn from the Churchill Archives at Cambridge that empower the narrative of Churchill’s Legacy. Lord Alan Watson analyses the causes and consequences that link Fulton with Churchill’s second speech of 1946, delivered six months later in Zurich on 19 September, and explains how they work together to create a vision for confronting communism.
It is easy today for us, the younger generation that has not known the horrors of world war, to take for granted our freedoms and liberties. However, at the end of the Second World War Churchill realised that communist Russia and its ruthless, murdering dictator Joseph Stalin posed an immense threat to European stability. Europe was weak and bankrupt: Russia, the big bear, stood in an aggressive and dominating position. Hitler was beaten and people assumed the war was won. Yet the Russian bear was in the heart of the great capitals of Europe. After the First World War, Churchill continuously sought to strengthen the League of Nations which the Americans abandoned. In 1946 he saw again that without the backing of America to defend freedom in Europe we might be thrown into a further world war made more grievous in a new atomic age. At Fulton, Churchill appealed to the United States as the world’s only nuclear power to defend Europe. The atomic bomb coupled with their financial dominance gave them the means and the opportunity to do so.
But Churchill knew that if this commitment was not matched by an internal commitment to revitalise and repair the shattered economy and political stability of Europe, then Western Europe could still fall. Churchill’s genius in his second speech was to understand the American position and to shock Europe into action that would win the commitment of the USA – economically and politically.
Churchill called for a kind of ‘United States of Europe’ led by France and Germany. Only their reconciliation would restore France’s ‘moral leadership’ and there would be ‘no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany’. Churchill’s challenge to the status quo of recrimination and despair equalled that of Fulton. Initially it was also rejected. The Nuremberg trials made the idea of reconciliation repugnant to most at a time when the full extent of Nazi atrocities was being revealed.
Still Churchill was haunted by the blindness that had led to 1940 and his failure to get the world to listen before it was too late. In 1946 he got the world to listen. The scale and insight of his vision in making these two speeches has never been truly understood and never adequately explained.
To Churchill’s relief and profound satisfaction, both speeches succeeded. Truman enunciated the Truman Doctrine, committing America to defend freedom. He wrote to Churchill in 1947: ‘Your Fulton speech becomes more nearly a prophecy every day.’2
In the same year George C. Marshall inaugurated the Marshall Plan to restore Europe’s economy. Churchill quoted with great satisfaction Marshall’s acknowledgement that his plan was ‘directly linked’ with the declarations and proposals for the Union of Europe which he had revived in Zurich.
The West defied Stalin’s blockade of Berlin a year later. The shape and direction of the world was altered. Churchill’s Legacy tells how and why Churchill achieved this. Lord Watson contributes a vital dimension to our understanding of Churchill and his vision.
He superbly sheds light on the two remarkable and insightful speeches, which in 1946 helped to save the world. They did so by ensuring the United States played their full part in defending the cherished European liberties, but that America also played her full part in the rebuilding and recovery of Europe.
It is heartening that at the place where Churchill gave that great address at Fulton in the Midwest, the Trustees of Westminster College in the early 1960s sought a way to commemorate it. Shortly thereafter they acquired St Mary Aldermanbury, a
beautiful City of London church designed by Sir Christopher Wren, which had been flattened by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain. In tribute to Churchill they rebuilt it lovingly, stone by stone, at Fulton and underneath they created the remarkable National Churchill Museum. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the greatest political event of my lifetime, Churchill’s granddaughter, the artist Edwina Sandys, was inspired to acquire several sections of the wall. Using them, she sculpted Breakthrough encapsulating the idea that the human spirit always seeks freedom and liberty and will not be denied. This historic piece stands beside the National Churchill Museum.
I grew up in the Cold War, in a world divided by the Iron Curtain, but in a West that was protected by the shield of the trans-Atlantic and European alliances that were forged in that immediate post-war era, and that were first articulated by my great-grandfather seventy years ago in those two monumental speeches of 1946.
Lord Watson’s book is a fine and perceptive tribute to my great-grandfather’s political instincts and his courageous approach to difficult international matters. It also acts as a reminder of the need of vigilance and tenacity in defence of our hard-won freedoms.
Although Churchill died fifty years ago the foundations to our current peace and freedom are drawn from those two speeches of 1946. Let us never forget the brave men and women who fought and gave their lives to secure us those liberties.
ABBREVIATIONS
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
CAC Churchill Archives Centre
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MP Member of Parliament
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OM Order of Merit
RAF Royal Air Force
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USA United States of America
USS United States Ship
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Introduction
This book is about Sir Winston Churchill’s second endeavour to save the freedom of the world. His first was in 1940, when he had led Britain’s defiance of tyranny, enabling eventual victory. Defeat in the Battle of Britain and Nazi occupation would have precluded US intervention against Hitler and ultimately condemned Europe to either total German occupation or total Soviet domination.
Six years later, Churchill’s imperative was to frustrate a new tyranny by winning the support of the United States in the restoration of Europe. This meant defending Europe and restoring its economic life. Both would prove impossible without the total commitment of the United States, its government and its people. To this end, Churchill focused all his energies in 1946.
Churchill’s visit to the United States at the beginning of the year was crucial. He alone had the status and audacity to reveal Stalin for what he was – a tyrant determined to dominate Europe at any cost, except nuclear war. The controversy he ignited also had the effect of restoring his morale, and enabling him to shake off a depression that had gripped him since his electoral defeat the previous year.
His vision of how to preserve freedom required a further initiative. In September 1946 he gave his second speech to save the world, this time in Zurich, Switzerland. It astonished his audience, for he proposed nothing less than a partnership between France and Germany, an idea that he knew was anathema to the French. However, as at Fulton, he warned that time might be short.
To understand what Churchill intended with these two speeches requires perspective. The daring of his imagination and the scale of his architecture for a new Western alliance was extraordinary. At the time, not many recognised the symmetry of what he proposed.
At Churchill’s funeral in 1965, commentators bemoaned the end of an era. In truth, Churchill was the catalyst of a new era – one built upon effective defence, economic revival and European unity.
PART I
RUSSIAN MENACE, WESTERN WEAKNESS
1
The Warnings
Churchill loathed Bolshevism. He did so from its inception. He did not live to witness its demise but his boldness in 1946 contributed decisively to its containment, the frustration of Stalin’s aggression and the eventual implosion of the Soviet empire.
His attitude towards Russia and its people was complex. In 1919 he backed military intervention in their civil war. After the Bolshevik victory he pitied the Russians as ‘a people ruled by terror, fanaticism and the secret police’.1 He admired their extraordinary courage following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and acknowledged the free world’s debt to them. ‘I have always believed that it is the Red Army that has torn the guts out of the filthy Nazis,’ he proclaimed in a toast to Stalin in the Kremlin in 1944.2 He hoped, against the evidence, that a settlement with Stalin might be reached eventually. However, for him the basic character of Bolshevism was malignant. ‘Trying to maintain good relations with a communist is like wooing a crocodile. You do not know whether to tickle it under the chin or to beat it over the head. When it opens its mouth you cannot tell whether it is trying to smile or preparing to eat you up.’3
In 1946 Churchill knew that the moment had come to hit it over the head. To do that he had to persuade the United States to change its attitude to Stalin and the USSR. It was time for his crusade to America.
In the USA Stalin was still seen by most as ‘good old Uncle Joe’, the wartime ally persistently wooed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt whose inherent dislike of British imperialism exceeded his suspicion of Soviet ambition. Could American sentiment be turned? There were some who hoped so – to an extent – including Roosevelt’s successor Harry S. Truman. But only to a calculated degree.
To those both in London and Washington who sensed the growing danger of Soviet power there was a recognition that if anyone was to sound the alarm it had better be Churchill. It was worth the gamble, but a gamble it was.
Churchill was no longer prime minister. He had been comprehensively beaten in the 1945 general election by Clement Attlee and the Labour Party. With Churchill ignominiously ousted from the Potsdam victors’ conference in Berlin in 1945, his chair taken by Attlee, Churchill now faced political oblivion. Leading the Conservative Party in opposition was not a task he relished. He and his party did not much like each other and Churchill was demoralised. He expressed his anguish with candour in the concluding pages of his book The Second World War: ‘All the pressure of great events, on and against which I had mentally so long maintained my “flying speed”, would cease and I should fall.’4
Defeated and disheartened, would he still have the status and appetite to launch a crusade to alert the USA to the imperative of resisting Stalin’s appetite for total hegemony in Europe? Could he alert the United States before it was too late? After all, previous warnings had not led to effective action.
In fact, by the end of the Second World War in Europe it was abundantly clear that Stalin’s ambition was not limited to the defeat of Nazi Germany. He was intent on establishing Soviet rule wherever the Red Army was in place. Before taking Berlin he told his inner circle, ‘This war is not as in the past. Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system – as far as his army can reach.’5 In doing this he discarded the pledge he had given Churchill and Roosevelt at Yalta that the liberated peoples of Eastern Europe would be able to create democratic institutions of their own choice. By 1946 Winston Churchill believed that only the USA, fully committed alongside Britain, could prevent Stalin extending his power even beyond the demarcations agreed at Potsdam, the concluding Allied conference.
Churchill saw menace. He confided to Canada’s prime minister, Mackenzie King, that all Berlin would be on Stalin’s list – not merely the Soviet sector. He was alarmed by Russian intransigence over Iran. Above all he was appalled by the speed and scale of the repatriation of US troops, denuding Western Europe’s defence in front of
the mass formations of the Red Army.
It would take Churchill’s crusade to the USA in early 1946 to fully alert American opinion, but the warnings had been accumulating for years.
The most prescient came in October 1942 when German Panzers were less than 100 km from Moscow. Britain’s third secretary at its Moscow embassy reported to London:
One of my nightmares is that if the Russian armies are eventually successful as I think they will be, they will end this war by marching to Berlin and occupying all points of Europe east. And then how are we going to get them out? There is going to be a most unholy row between us when this thing is over. The final atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust will be far worse than it was two or three years ago [i.e. the time of the Stalin–Ribbentrop pact].6
The most ferocious and comprehensive warning came from another diplomat over three years later. George Kennan was the number two at the American embassy in Moscow. His ‘long telegram’ arrived in Washington on 22 February 1946, two weeks before Churchill’s speech at Fulton. It was secret but caused a sensation in the US administration. It advocated a policy of containment. He believed Roosevelt’s attitude to Stalin had amounted to appeasement especially at the first ‘Big Three’ conference at Tehran. Roosevelt had demonstrated his belief that if only Stalin ‘could be exposed to the persuasive charms of someone like Roosevelt himself . . . Stalin’s co-operation with the West could easily be arranged’. Kennan concluded that ‘for these assumptions there were no grounds whatever and they were of a puerility unworthy of Roosevelt’s status’.7
The third warning also came from a diplomat, this time British. Sir Frank Roberts joined the diplomatic service in 1930 and was Britain’s negotiator in Moscow on the Berlin blockade. Later he served as ambassador to NATO, the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany. Interviewed by me for BBC Radio 4, he described the ‘long dispatches’ sent by him to London in February 1946. He and Kennan consulted each other. Their conclusions were ‘very close’, although Roberts had an inevitable British preoccupation with Soviet influence and propaganda in the British Empire that might disrupt the gradual and peaceful termination of imperial rule and its transformation to the equality of the Commonwealth. He and Kennan agreed on a policy of firm containment, which would deter Russia from a war she feared. Roberts had the good fortune to report to Ernest Bevin, the Labour government’s formidable foreign secretary whose experience of dealing with communism in the British trade unions made him wily and forceful. The Berlin airlift would not have happened without him just as it could not have been attempted without the impact of Churchill’s crusade to alert the West to the dangers it faced.8
