If the nerves in Kennedy’s neck had been sufficiently stimulated by the passage of the bullet, as Dr. Baden suggests, how soon after being struck could we expect to see the president react? In other words, how quick is a reflex, or involuntary reaction, as opposed to the slower voluntary reaction? Larry M. Sturdivan, a research physical scientist involved in wound ballistic studies for the U.S. Army, showed the HSCA high-speed films of a goat being shot in the head. The films show that neuromuscular, involuntary reactions in the goat begin one-twenty-fifth of a second after the bullet impact.99 If the same time frame were applied to humans, and the president’s reaction in Z225–226 was involuntary, it could be the result of a bullet impact less than one frame earlier, at Z224, although the president’s reaction, of course, could also have started several frames earlier, only becoming visible for the first time as he emerged from behind the Stemmons Freeway sign at Z225.
Despite the suggestion that Kennedy’s reaction to being hit might have been immediate, the HSCA panel of forensic pathologists was unable to determine, based on the medical evidence alone, “whether President Kennedy’s reaction was voluntary or involuntary.”100 The majority of the panel (including Baden) believed the president’s physical reaction around Z225 was a voluntary reaction (i.e., Kennedy consciously brought his arms up in reaction to the shot through his back and neck), though they recognized that his movements “could have been involuntary had the bullet caused sufficient shock to his spine and spinal cord. The majority [of the panel] cannot say definitely, based on the available evidence, whether this more serious injury occurred and precisely when the president was struck.”101 The reason for the uncertainty is that, as indicated, specific human reactions to gunshots are difficult, if not impossible, to predict or prove given all of the variables involved. This might partly explain why there was a discrepancy between the conclusions of the two government investigations that attempted to pinpoint when the president was first hit—the Warren Commission concluding that Kennedy was struck somewhere between Zapruder frames 210 and 225 and first showed a reaction at frame 225, and the HSCA concluding that Kennedy was first struck around Z190 and first showed a reaction at frame 200. In either case, I think we can all agree that the position the president was in, at Z225–226, is a very unusual position and that the president is undoubtedly reacting in these frames to having been struck by a bullet.
What about Governor Connally’s reaction as seen in the Zapruder film around the time of the second shot? Though Warren Commission counsel elicited much testimony from experts analyzing the president’s reactions in the Zapruder film, they, perhaps inadvertently, did very little of this during their hearings with respect to Connally. There was testimony as to when he could have been hit, and when he was hit (Connally himself, after watching the Zapruder film, testified he felt he was hit somewhere between frames “231 and 234”),102 but not an analysis of his specific facial or bodily movements from which an inference could be drawn as to what Zapruder frame he was struck at. Representative Ford did ask Shaneyfelt, “Isn’t it apparent in those pictures [never spelled out precisely which ones, but frames 222, 231, 248, and 249 are discussed in no discernible pattern in the preceding paragraphs] that after a slight hesitation Governor Connally’s body turns more violently [to the right] than the president’s body?”
Shaneyfelt: “Yes.”
When asked by Senator Cooper when Connally commenced this turn, Shaneyfelt responded, “Approximately at frames 233 to 234.”103
Commission members John McCloy and Allen Dulles expressed puzzlement over the fact that Connally did not seem to exhibit a reaction until Z233–234, whereas Kennedy was reacting by Z225–226—a difference of seven to eight frames, the equivalent of less than a half second.104 Absent an explanation, this pointed in the direction of Connally being hit by a separate bullet and hence, necessarily a conspiracy. The Warren Commission noted that “there was, conceivably, a delayed reaction between the time the bullet struck [Governor Connally] and the time he realized he was hit…The Governor didn’t even know he had been struck in the wrist or in the thigh until he regained consciousness in the hospital the next day.”105 The Commission’s receptiveness to the delayed-reaction theory was not quixotic on its part.
It is well known, of course, that men can sometimes experience a delayed reaction when struck by bullets. Recall the testimony I elicited from Dealey Plaza witness Charles Brehm at the London trial. Another example among many—Secret Service agents reported that President Ronald Reagan was not aware, until being told, that he had been shot by John W. Hinckley in 1981. And Dr. James Humes, the chief autopsy surgeon, testified before the Warren Commission that “people have been drilled through with a missile and didn’t know it.”106 Likewise, Dr. Arthur J. Dziemian, a physiologist at the U.S. Army Chemical Research and Development Laboratories and the chief of the Biophysics Division, told the Commission, “All I can say is that some people are struck by bullets and do not even know they are hit. This happens in wartime. But I don’t know about [Connally’s reaction].”107
The Commission said that by merely looking at the film, it appeared Connally “could have” received his injuries as late as Z235–240.108 This conclusion strangely ignores the important testimony of FBI firearms expert Robert A. Frazier, who participated in the FBI’s 1964 reenactment of the assassination utilizing frames from the film. Frazier testified that with respect to the trajectory from the sixth-floor window and the location of the governor’s wounds, Connally “could have been struck anywhere…from [frames] 207 to 225.” Asked if the same were true for frames after 225, Frazier replied that from frames 226 to 239 Connally’s body was facing “too much towards the front” for the bullet to enter Connally’s back where it did, and from 240 on he was turned “too far to the right” to be hit where he was—that is, the governor’s wounds would have been misaligned with the trajectory of the bullet.109 In its final report, the Commission noted Frazier’s testimony and Connally’s belief, after viewing the film, that he was hit between Z231 and Z234.110 But then the report erroneously states, “At some point between frames 235 and 240…is the last occasion when Governor Connally could have received his injuries [in fact, Frazier’s testimony—which, as indicated, the report cites—reflects the opposite], since in the frames following 240 he remained turned too far to his right.”111 It was FBI photographic expert Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, not Frazier, who testified that Connally might have been in the requisite alignment position to be shot as late as Z240. However, Shaneyfelt deferred his opinion to that of FBI expert Frazier who, he pointed out, was “in the window with the rifle scope and made a more thorough study of the possible path of the bullet [than I].”112
Although the Warren Commission’s analysis of Connally’s reactions to determine just when he was struck by the bullet in the back was superficial, Commission members did opt for common sense in reaching their ultimate conclusion that the bullet that hit Connally had previously exited from the president’s throat, inferentially concluding, therefore, that Connally, like Kennedy, was struck by a bullet somewhere between Zapruder frames 210 and 225.113 They were aided in this commonsense conclusion by the testimony of experts. Robert Frazier testified before the Commission that because Kennedy and Connally were in direct alignment with each other during those frames from the vantage point of the rifle in the sniper’s nest, “the [bullet] through the president had to cause Connally’s wound, otherwise it would have struck somewhere else in the car and it did not strike somewhere else. Therefore, it had to go through Governor Connally.”114 Among other Warren Commission witnesses, Dr. Frederick W. Light Jr., a wound ballistics expert, testified, “Perhaps the best, the most likely thing is what everyone else has said so far, that the bullet did go through the president’s neck and then through the [governor’s] chest and then through the wrist and then into [his] thigh.”
Question: “You think that is the most likely possibility?”
Answer: “I think that is probably the most like
ly, but I base that not entirely on the anatomical findings but as much on the circumstances.”
Question: “What are the circumstances which lead you to that conclusion?”
Answer: “The relative positions in the automobile of the president and the governor.”115
As opposed to the Warren Commission, the HSCA photographic panel spent a considerable amount of time studying Connally’s movements in the Zapruder film. As we discussed earlier, the governor’s initial reaction was to turn to the right at the sound of the first shot, believing the sound to have originated from his right rear. Calvin McCamy, a member of the photographic panel who studied the Zapruder film for the HSCA, testified that Connally’s entire torso remained twisted to the right as he disappeared behind the Stemmons Freeway sign.116 When he emerged from behind the sign, about a second later, at Z222–224, the panel perceived that Connally was reacting to a severe external stimulus: “He appears to be frowning, and there is a distinct stiffening of his shoulders and upper trunk. Then there is a radical change in his facial expression and rapid changes begin to occur in the orientation of his head.”117 Hence, the HSCA, and without the use of the delayed-reaction argument, has Connally first showing a reaction to being hit by a bullet at the same time Kennedy clearly showed a reaction—as the two of them were emerging from behind the Stemmons Freeway sign.* As with Kennedy, Connally, of course, could have been struck several frames earlier when his body was hidden from Zapruder’s camera by the sign.
However, the HSCA ultimately concluded that “the second shot hit the limousine’s occupants (both Kennedy and Connally) at about Zapruder frames 188–191,”118 and the committee says that Kennedy “does not appear to react to anything unusual prior to 190,” although it does not say what change in Kennedy it noticed at frame 190.119 The HSCA goes on to say that “at approximately Zapruder frame 200, Kennedy’s…head moves rapidly from right to his left in the direction of his wife.”120
There are many reasons why the HSCA was wrong in its Z188–191 conclusion, one of which is obvious to even a lay reader. Z frame 193 (see photo section), three frames after Kennedy was supposedly reacting at frame 190 to being hit, clearly shows Kennedy still waving to the crowd. But more importantly, it is difficult to see how the HSCA photographic panel can say that at Z frame 200 Kennedy’s head moves rapidly from right to left in the direction of Mrs. Kennedy. Z frames 200 to 203 in the Warren Commission volumes121 show that Kennedy is still very definitely looking to his right. In fact, as late as Z frame 204 (see photo section) he is still looking to his right. And Willis photo number 5, taken from the motorcade’s rear at around frame 202, shows Kennedy looking to his right.122†
One support the HSCA has cited for its Z188–191 conclusion is that a jiggle or blur analysis of the Zapruder film showed a jiggle around that time. But there was also a jiggle around frames 220–228.123 Since even the HSCA agrees that shots were not fired both at 181–191 and at 220–228, this only confirms the unreliability of jiggle analysis, the reason being that blurs can be caused by things other than the sound of a gunshot. Inasmuch as the HSCA can’t have it both ways (i.e., it accepts the jiggle analysis supporting a shot hitting the limousine occupants around frames 188–191, but does not accept the jiggle analysis showing a second shot being fired around frames 220–228), the jiggle analysis is negated and is no support for the HSCA’s conclusion that the bullet that hit Kennedy and Connally struck them both around frames 188–191.
Second, though the Warren Commission’s conclusion on this issue cannot be automatically accepted, it cannot be cavalierly ignored either, and as we’ve seen, the Warren Commission’s conclusion is that the Kennedy-Connally bullet struck them between frames 210 and 225.
Indeed, the HSCA’s own forensic pathology panel didn’t agree with its conclusion, saying that “the first visual evidence that the president was struck was the movement of his hands to a position in front of his neck.”124 Of course, that was around frames 225–226, two full seconds after the HSCA said Kennedy was hit.
Finally, and most importantly, logic and human experience would seem to dictate that the HSCA was wrong on this score. We know that from the sixth-floor sniper’s nest, with the exception of one-eighteenth of a second at Z186,125 the oak tree obstructed a view of the president from around the time of Z166 up to Z210.126 A bullet striking Kennedy around Z188–191 would mean that the sniper who fired this bullet (who the HSCA itself concluded was Oswald in the sniper’s nest of the Book Depository Building)127 fired the shot a fraction of a second earlier—around Z186—which seems to fit the one-eighteenth-of-a-second moment when an opening in the leaves would have afforded him a clear view. But even making the illogical assumption that one-eighteenth of a second (Z186) is long enough for a gunman to have realized that he had a clear shot and to fire the rifle, which seems extremely unlikely, why would a sniper fire almost blindly through the leaves of the oak tree, when he would know that in just one second or so he would have a completely clear and unobstructed view of the president for the rest of the road ahead?
But since HSCA members nevertheless embraced their seemingly illogical position that Kennedy and Connally were hit by the same bullet back at Z188–191, they had a problem. Though they saw Kennedy first reacting at Z200128 to the shot at Z188–191, the first reaction they saw in Connally was when he emerged from the Stemmons Freeway sign at Z222–224.129
Because of the differences in apparent reaction times between Kennedy and Connally, the HSCA forensic pathology panel was compelled to deal head-on with the allegation that the “observable interval” between the reactions of Kennedy and Connally in the Zapruder film was inconsistent with the single-bullet theory, which the HSCA had accepted. The committee’s report noted that, contrary to the allegation, a majority of the panel “believes that the interval is consistent with the single-bullet theory. At issue is the time delay between bullet impact and the observable reactions of each man to his injury, which in turn is determined by many factors, including whether or not their reactions were voluntary or involuntary. If involuntary, they would have occurred almost simultaneously with the injuries. If voluntary, there is often a slight delay in reacting.”130 As mentioned earlier, the majority of the panel thought the movement of Kennedy’s arms around Z225 was voluntary, although they recognized that it could have been involuntary had the bullet caused sufficient shock to the president’s spinal cord. Turning to Connally, the medical panel said that they were unable to say precisely when the governor was hit, but the majority of the panel felt that the “nature of his injuries could have resulted in a voluntary motion, which would mean a delayed reaction. Thus, the majority believes that there could have been sufficient delay in Governor Connally’s reaction to account for the interval seen in the film and to permit the conclusion that a single bullet injured both men.”131 In other words, both men were hit by the same bullet around Z190, with Kennedy first showing a visible reaction at around Z200 and Connally at around Z225.
Why, one may ask, was the HSCA forensic pathology panel more inclined to think that Connally was more likely than Kennedy to have had a voluntary response? Dr. Charles Petty, a member of the HSCA pathology panel, testified at the London trial that the bullet that entered Kennedy’s back went closer to his spinal cord, where there is a concentration of nerves. (Petty felt Kennedy “had an involuntary response.”) “Governor Connally,” Petty went on, “had no such wounds. He was wounded in the chest, the wrist, and the thigh. These were not close to any major nerve system.”132
Despite the numerous medical opinions and documented empirical evidence relating to delayed reactions in the wake of bullet strikes to human flesh, critics have, predictably, opted for the notion that a separate shot struck Governor Connally, necessitating a second gunman, and hence, a conspiracy. One of the first such critiques appeared in Josiah Thompson’s 1967 book, Six Seconds in Dallas, in which he writes,
In Z236–237 [Connally’s] mouth opens in what appears to be an exclamation. Then,
suddenly, in Z238 his cheeks puff [out] and, in succeeding frames, his mouth opens wide—he gives the appearance of someone who has just had the wind knocked out of him. Dr. [Charles F.] Gregory told me in Dallas that a necessary consequence of the shot through Connally’s chest would be a compression of the chest wall and an involuntary opening of the epiglottis, followed by escaping air forcing open his mouth. Dr. Gregory estimated the interval between impact and mouth opening to be on the order of ¼ to ½ second. Thus the surge of air to the cheeks in Z238 and the subsequent mouth opening indicate the impact of a bullet only the barest fraction of a second earlier. Had both victims been hit by the same bullet, we would expect Connally to be manifesting the signs of impact at least sixteen frames earlier.133*
Not only is Thompson incorrect about the time that Connally first reacts (subsequent investigations agree that Connally is shown reacting immediately after emerging from behind the Stemmons sign, at Z222), but the medical premise Thompson bases his observations on is apparently flawed. When I read the above passage to Dr. Baden, he asked, “Was Thompson quoting Dr. Gregory?”
Reclaiming History Page 89
