Reclaiming History

by Vincent Bugliosi

  Or had he? The brigade of Cuban exiles (mostly recruited from the large Cuban population in Miami) who invaded Cuba, as well as their leaders, have said many times that the failure of the plan was, as previously indicated, a result of the lack of promised air support, and for that they directly blamed President Kennedy. Barry Sklar, a Latin American affairs specialist for the U.S. government’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, writes that “exile leaders believed that the United States promised air and sea cover for the invasion force and that its failure to materialize was a major reason for the invasion’s defeat.”109 But Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., who was a special assistant to the president throughout the entire period, not only participating in most of the administration’s meetings on the invasion but writing a white paper for the president in which he inveighed against the invasion, disagrees. He writes in his book A Thousand Days, a friendly but incisive biography of JFK in the White House, that “mythologists have…talked about a supposed presidential decision to ‘withdraw United States air cover.’ There was never, of course, any plan for United States air cover, and no air cover for the landing forces was withdrawn.”110

  Indeed, on April 12, 1961, just five days before the invasion, President Kennedy was asked at a press conference, “Mr. President, has a decision been reached on how far this country would be willing to go in helping an anti-Castro uprising or invasion of Cuba?” (It was public knowledge that an invasion of the island was imminent. What started out as a covert operation had long since become known. Only the date of the invasion—April 17—was unknown.) The president was unambiguous in his reply: “I want to say that there will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by United States armed forces.” He went on to say that the U.S. government would do everything possible “to make sure that there are no Americans involved”* in such an action, adding that “as I understand it, this Administration’s attitude is…understood and shared by the anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in this country.” And it’s not as if this statement by Kennedy was buried in the media’s coverage of the conference. A front-page headline the following day in the New York Times read, “President Bars Using U.S. Force to Oust Castro.” The Times reported that elsewhere in the press conference, “the President indicated by indirection that he would continue the Eisenhower policy of supplying aid and military training to refugee groups” seeking to overthrow Castro.111 This, of course, was substantially misleading. More than just “aid and training” was involved. The invasion was CIA-organized, and hence U.S. government–sponsored. But Kennedy made it clear that U.S. military forces would not physically participate in the invasion.

  The innocuous “Eisenhower policy” referred to by Kennedy was much more muscular than he had indicated. Indeed, the institutional stem for the eventual Bay of Pigs invasion goes back to the Eisenhower administration. What Eisenhower authorized and approved of on March 17, 1960, was a March 16, 1960, “Top Secret” CIA document drafted by CIA wunderkind Richard Bissell and titled “A Program of Covert Action against the Castro Regime.” The very first words of the document read, “Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially, the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible, direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans,” the type who could be expected to undertake such a mission “on their own initiative.” Paragraph d provides that “preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba…A number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the United States so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba.”

  Although invasion plans under the auspices of the CIA and the U.S. government gained speed, momentum, and force under the Kennedy administration, culminating in the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961, there is no question that not only did it all start under Eisenhower, but Eisenhower was not just a passive signatory to the plans. Eisenhower was arguably almost as obsessed as the Kennedys with removing Castro from power.† So committed that he called a meeting in the Oval Office on January 3, 1961 (a little over two weeks before he left office), attended by, among others, the CIA chief, Allen Dulles; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lyman Lemnitzer; and the secretary of defense, Thomas Gates. The main topic was Cuba, and when to sever diplomatic relations with Castro. Eisenhower opened the meeting by saying he was “constantly bombarded by people outside of government as to the situation in Cuba.” So committed that although the record of the long meeting doesn’t indicate there was any serious follow-up to his seemingly offhanded remark, Eisenhower said that he “would move against Castro before the 20th” (when he would be leaving office) if he were provided a really good excuse by Castro (note this would not appear to be referring to the upcoming Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles in April—since the exile force, on January 3, was in no operational position to invade in less than three weeks—but to an invasion by U.S. forces), and then actually adding that “failing that, perhaps we could think of manufacturing something that would be generally acceptable.” Later in the meeting Eisenhower spoke knowledgeably about the training of the exile force and how to make it stronger, as well as whom to recognize as the new leader of Cuba if the invasion by the exiles was successful.112

  Although Kennedy made it clear that the U.S. military would not actually participate in the invasion itself, he did authorize a preinvasion air strike on Cuba’s air force. In the early morning hours of April 15, two days before the invasion, CIA-directed Cuban exile pilots flew eight U.S. planes (war surplus B-26s, light bombers) to attack three Cuban airfields (one on the outskirts of Havana, one at San Antonio de los Baños, thirty miles south of Havana, and one at Santiago de Cuba, over four hundred miles southeast of Havana). Why only eight of the twenty-two B-26s available at the brigade’s Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, air base (code-named “Happy Valley”) were used has never been satisfactorily answered. One aircraft was shot down, one lost an engine from ground fire and landed at Key West, and another, low on fuel on the return flight, was forced to land at Grand Cayman Island. The rest returned to Puerto Cabezas.113 The returning exile pilots estimated that they had destroyed twenty-two to twenty-four of Castro’s planes, believed to be over half of Castro’s air force. The estimate was inflated. Based on all sources, including aerial photography, Cuba’s air force prior to D-day consisted of thirty-six planes, eighteen of which were believed to be operational. During the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro had seven aircraft in the air, the conclusion being that eleven operational aircraft had been taken out by the U.S. air strike on April 15.114

  Kennedy originally had authorized a second air strike on Castro’s planes at Cuban airfields (this is not to be confused with air support and cover for the invading forces at the time of the invasion), hoping to finish the job of neutralizing the Cuban air force, thereby greatly enhancing the invading brigade’s chance of success by eliminating air assaults on the landing force. The strike was to occur at dawn on April 17, 1961, coinciding with the landing of the exile invasion force on the three beaches (denominated Red, Blue, and Green, though landing on Green was canceled at the last moment) at the Bay of Pigs.* Late in the day on April 16, Kennedy did, in fact, withdraw this second air strike after Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised him that a second strike would put the United States in an untenable position internationally.115

  What makes the withdrawal of the second air strike difficult to understand is the question of how much worse could a second air strike (which might have finished off Castro’s remaining air force) be in the eyes of the international community than the one that had already taken place?

  Because of Kennedy’s withdrawal of a second strike, Castro still had enough planes (T-33 jets, B-26s—given to Batista by th
e U.S. government—and British Sea Furies) to strafe the beachhead and offshore supply ships, raising deadly havoc with the invading brigade as well as some of its ships. One ship, the Houston (which had transported troops and supplies and still had 180 troops aboard), was hit and went aground on the west shore of the Bay of Pigs, five miles from Red Beach. The Rio Escondido, carrying ten days of ammunition and other important supplies, was sunk.116

  Haynes Johnson, in his book Bay of Pigs, written with four of the brigade civilian and military leaders (Manuel Artime, the civilian exile leader, who was the CIA favorite among all the rebel leaders; José [Pepe] Pérez San Román, brigade commander; Erneido Oliva, second in command; and Enrique Ruiz-Williams, a lower brigade officer), mentions only one lone brigade B-26 (piloted by a Cuban) attempting to provide air cover for the troops landing on the beaches at daybreak on the first day of the invasion. But facing Castro’s faster T-33 jets and Sea Furies, “the slower Brigade plane didn’t have a chance” and was quickly shot down.117 Without air cover from American jets, which were available on the aircraft carrier Essex just fifteen miles from shore, the brigade landing force was essentially at the unchallenged mercy of Castro’s air force, and the fate of the invasion was sealed.

  On this very key issue of whether the landing forces had air cover from their own B-26s (not U.S. jets) on D-day, there is some ambiguity. As indicated, Haynes Johnson, speaking from the authority of those who were there, says only one B-26 provided air support and was quickly shot down. Peter Wyden’s very authoritative book Bay of Pigs only mentions two brigade B-26s providing air cover four hours after large numbers of troops had already started landing at sunup, both of which, after dropping bombs on an enemy column, were quickly shot down by a T-33 and a Sea Fury, and one B-26 providing cover later in the day, which was also shot down. Wyden never explicitly says how many B-26s supplied air cover during D-day, but the implication is very few, and they were not very effective.

  The next day, D+1 (April 18), six brigade B-26s piloted by Cuban exiles (and two American CIA contract men known as “Peters” and “Seig,” who were authorized by the CIA’s Richard Bissell without knowledge or approval from the Kennedy administration) successfully bombed a column of Cuban trucks and tanks approaching the beach, destroying seven tanks and inflicting an estimated eighteen hundred casualties, an unrealistically high number. But the efforts of the slower B-26s during the three days of war were virtual suicide missions, with nine of the sixteen being shot down, most by the surprisingly effective Cuban T-33 jets. Here and there over a period of three days, the brigade, ashore and with makeshift command posts established, achieved small tactical successes. But it was clear early on that it was only a matter of time before the brigade, without American air support and outnumbered fifteen to one by Castro’s twenty thousand troops, would succumb. Nonetheless, during most of the battle, the brigade leaders still felt, as Johnson wrote, “that victory was inevitable. [They felt] it was inconceivable that they would be stranded” by the American military.118

  To save the invasion on the second day, April 18, the CIA and Joint Chiefs of Staff had beseeched Kennedy to reverse his publicly stated position and allow U.S. planes and ships to come to the rescue of the brigade on the two beaches. Kennedy wavered for a moment but refused the request. U.S. military forces would not physically participate in the invasion. In the hope that Kennedy just might change his mind, Admiral Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations, had placed two Marine battalions on ships in his fleet of destroyers and carriers that had accompanied the brigade to the Bay of Pigs and remained offshore to lend logistical support. Later on April 18, Burke made one last plea to Kennedy, who reiterated he did not “want the United States involved in this.”

  “Hell, Mr. President,” Burke said, “we are involved…Can we send a few planes [U.S. Navy jets aboard the carrier Essex]?”

  “No, because they could be identified as United States,” Kennedy retorted.

  “Can we paint out their numbers?”

  “No.”

  “Can we get something in there?”

  “No.”

  “If you’ll let me have two destroyers, we’ll give gunfire support and we can hold the beachhead with two ships forever.”

  “No.”

  “One destroyer, Mr. President?”

  “No,” Kennedy said.119 In speaking of the pilots of the U.S. jets aboard the Essex, Wyden writes that their “inability to help the brigade moved them to tears.”120 Robert Kennedy would later say that “D plus one” (April 18, the second day of the invasion), when “the CIA asked for air cover, Jack [JFK] was in favor of giving it. However, Dean Rusk was strongly against it. He said that we had made a commitment that no American forces would be used and the President shouldn’t appear in the light of being a liar.”121

  What follows is just one of many desperate pleas for American military help before the invasion ended in defeat on April 19. At 11:52 p.m. on April 18, the Cuban exile brigade commander, Pepe San Román, radioed from the beach, “Do you people realize how desperate the situation is? Do you back us up or quit? All we want is low jet cover and jet close support. I need it badly or cannot survive. Please don’t desert us. Am out of tank and bazooka ammo. Tanks will hit me at dawn. I will not be evacuated. Will fight to the end if we have to. Need medical supplies urgently.”122

  The Cuban exile community is virtually unanimous in its belief that American jets could have saved the invasion. Exile leader Dr. José Miro Cardona, in testimony on May 25, 1961, before a committee appointed by Kennedy and headed by General Maxwell Taylor to determine the cause of the invasion’s failure, said that “in talking with the refugees and everyone who has come back [from the invasion], it seems apparent that but for three jets, the invasion force would have won the fight.”123 A “Mr. Betancourt,” the air liaison officer for the second brigade battalion that landed at Red Beach, testified, “We know the success of the Brigade depended on the success of the air strikes. Otherwise, it’s just like sending a bunch of human beings to get killed. There’s no point in asking why the American jet planes didn’t help us. They could have very well. They could have been our planes as far as we were concerned. We could have arranged to take all the insignia off.”124 Exile leader Manuel Antonio (Tony) de Varona told the committee on May 18, “I would just like to state that we would be in Cuba today if it was not for the lack of air support that our forces suffered. All those who’ve returned said that [with] three airplanes, they would have been successful in their invasion attempt.”125*

  Kennedy felt enormous sorrow over the failed invasion and the fate of the captured rebels, and encouraged and authorized the formation of a group of citizens to raise millions of dollars from private Americans to pay ransom for the prisoners’ release. In December of 1962 Castro was paid $2,925,000 in cash and given $53 million worth of medicine and baby food, meeting his conditions for the release of the brigade prisoners. “As a Christmas bonus,” Castro also allowed one thousand Cuban relatives of the prisoners to leave Cuba by ship.126

  Richard Bissell, who was the perspicacious brainchild behind the invasion and who, with CIA Director Allen Dulles in tow, had sold the merits of it to President Kennedy and the Departments of State and Defense, would later write sourly that Kennedy’s cancellation of the second air strike was “certainly the gravest contributing factor in the operation’s failure.”127

  As deputy director of plans, Bissell was in charge of all covert and clandestine operations of the CIA at the time of the invasion. There are those who maintain that Bissell, of all people, had no right to complain. The nature of the invasion was ill advised to begin with. Also, when Rusk was speaking to the president over the phone from Rusk’s office close to 9:00 p.m. on Sunday evening, April 16, Charles Cabell (Dulles’s deputy), Bissell, and Bissell’s deputy, C. Tracy Barnes (whom Bissell, back in March of 1960, had delegated the operational responsibility of “putting together a team to overthrow Castro”), were there too. At one point in Rusk�
�s conversation with the president, Rusk held the phone out to Bissell, giving him an opportunity to repeat his arguments in favor of a second air strike (which he and Cabell had made to Rusk to no avail) to the president himself. But after starting to reach for the phone, Bissell withdrew his hand and shook his head, apparently feeling no further argument would succeed. In a later report on the episode by the presidential committee, Bissell’s failure to press his case with the president was severely criticized. If Bissell had spoken to the president, who apparently, along with everyone else, had great respect for Bissell’s intellect, just maybe the president would have reversed his order canceling the second air strike, and this might have changed the outcome of the invasion.128

  In any event, when we’re talking about motive on the question of who killed President Kennedy, the issue is not whether the exiles were correct in their belief that air support and cover was promised, but whether they had that belief, which they clearly did. One cannot read Schlesinger’s account of the Bay of Pigs debacle as well as Haynes Johnson’s without concluding that what the Kennedy administration was telling the exile leaders in the United States, and what the CIA and American military advisers were telling the brigade force of 1,390 men,* were two very different things. The latter—mostly in training at the main invasion training camp at Trax in the Guatemala mountains, but also in Nicaragua, Panama, Miami, New Orleans, Phoenix, Camp Peary (a CIA training base near Williamsburg, Virginia), and even Fort Knox—were told that U.S. military and air support would be involved in the invasion.129 Pepe San Román, the brigade commander, said that at Camp Trax, “Frank,” the American leader of the camp, told him that there would be more than air support. “He assured us,” San Román said, “that we were going to have protection by sea, by air, and even from under the sea.”130 Peter Wyden, in Bay of Pigs, writes that “Colonel Frank and other CIA briefers” used one word to reassure the brigade leaders more than any other. There would be an “umbrella” above, they said, to guard the entire operation against Castro’s planes.131