Reclaiming History

by Vincent Bugliosi

  Interestingly, Forrest Sorrels recalls that while driving the motorcade route with Winston Lawson prior to the actual motorcade, when they turned from Main Street to Houston, Lawson “was startled to see the building facing us. He asked me what building it was and I told him it was the book warehouse” (HSCA Record 180-10074-10392, HSCA interview of Forrest Sorrels on March 15, 1978, p.4).

  †Contrary to the suggestion of Palamara, and the belief of many, even if the bubbletop had been on the limousine it would not have prevented the assassination because, as noted earlier in the book, it was only a plastic shield at that time, furnishing protection only against inclement weather (WR, p.2; HSCA Report, p.183 note 2). The decision not to use the bubbletop was made at Love Field right after Air Force One landed there from Fort Worth. Secret Service agents wanted the bubbletop to be used because they were expecting rain, but Kennedy didn’t want the bubbletop, and presidential assistant Bill Moyers, on the phone from Austin, Texas, told the Secret Service, “Get that Goddamned bubble [top] off unless it’s pouring rain.” (HSCA Record 180-10078-10272, Deposition of Elizabeth Forsling Harris before HSCA on August 16, 1978, p.28)

  Remarkably, although the FBI had a bulletproof car for its director in 1963, the Secret Service did not have the foresight or common sense to have one for the president of the United States (LBJ Record 177-10001-10237, Telephone conversation between LBJ and J. Edgar Hoover, November 29, 1963, pp.7–8).

  * In his 1973 book, 20 Years in the Secret Service: My Life with Five Presidents, Rufus W. Youngblood, one of sixteen Secret Service agents in the Dallas motorcade, writes that “as a Secret Service agent you are constantly on the alert for the individual who somehow does not fit” (Youngblood, 20 Years in the Secret Service, p.12).

  * Fourteen months later, Gerald Behn, the special agent in charge of the White House’s Secret Service detail at the time of the assassination, was demoted by Rowley. It is not known whether the demotion was related to the assassination, but a demotion right after the assassination would have been more likely to be construed that way, and if, indeed, Behn was demoted because of the assassination, this may have been the reason why Rowley waited over a year.

  * In fact, at the time Khrushchev was ousted as Soviet premier on October 15, 1964, informed sources said that his constant rift with Peking (now Beijing), which gave every indication of heading toward a showdown, was the pivotal issue in his downfall. Not that the Soviet hierarchy wanted to get muscular with the West, but clearly China did not like Khrushchev, subjecting him to vitriolic personal attacks, and his successor, Leonid I. Brezhnev, a protégé of Khrushchev’s, said even before he became premier that the Soviet-Sino split had to end. (New York Times, October 16, 1964, p.14; New York Times, October 17, 1964, p.1)

  * In what has to be one of the most interesting and, at least to me, funny lines ever to come out of the CIA’s storied history, the CIA director himself, William Colby, after calling Angleton “supersensitive,” had to confess that although he did not suspect Angleton and his staff of engaging in improper activities, he “just could not figure out what they were doing at all” (Colby and Forbath, Honorable Men, pp.334, 364). Colby would eventually fire Angleton, after the latter’s thirty years with the agency. Author David Martin would say of Angleton that he fulfilled public fantasies of the master spy, looking and sounding like a character out of a Graham Greene or John le Carré novel. (Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, photo section, pp.211–214).

  †However, Angleton did not believe—nor is there any evidence that Golitsyn tried to convince him—that Oswald was acting under the control of the KGB when he killed Kennedy.

  * Among other things, the CIA has acknowledged that Nosenko was confined (at one time, in a ten-by-ten-foot cell) at secure CIA locations from April 1964 through October 1967, during which time he was intermittently interrogated, was under “constant visual observation,” and “did not have access to TV, radio or newspapers.” Nosenko was in “solitary confinement” during this three-and-a-half-year period. (Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1976, p.1; ten-by-ten-foot cell: Gest, Shapiro, Bowermaster, and Geier, “JFK: The Untold Story of the Warren Commission,” p.37). His contact with other people “was limited to Agency personnel from April 1964–December 1968” (12 HSCA 544–545). Richard Helms, the CIA deputy director of plans and CIA director during this period, wrote that “despite what has been reported in some of the literature, [Nosenko] was never drugged or subjected to any form of physical abuse, and was regularly examined by an Agency doctor” (Helms with Hood, Look over My Shoulder, p.243).

  * That this “reliable” informant seemed to have good information was corroborated by Thomas Hughes, the director of intelligence and research at the State Department, who sent a memo to Secretary of State Dean Rusk the day after the assassination setting forth what his office had picked up from its international sources. In addition to saying that “the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries displayed the same sense of shock as the rest of the world at the assassination of President Kennedy” and that “Soviet media gave considerable and sympathetic coverage to the tragedy, including for the first time a Telstar transmission,” he said that “at the same time there were signs of uncertainty about the course which President Johnson will follow” (WC Record 179-40005-10409, November 23, 1963).

  What little the Soviets could have known of Johnson from his few public pronouncements could not have sounded, to them, too congenial to their interests. For instance, on June 2, 1960, in Washington, D.C., Johnson said, “Mr. Khrushchev does not understand that Americans of whatever their political creed—Republican or Democrat—will stand united against him in his effort to divide the country and weaken the hopes of freedom.” And in Berlin, on August 19, 1961, he said, “The Communist dictatorship has the power temporarily to seal a border, but no tyranny can survive beyond the shadow of its own evil strength.” (New York Times, November 24, 1963, p.7)

  * As Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev said in a Teletyped letter to Washington at the height of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, “Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish,” would risk a nuclear war (Thomas, “Bobby at the Brink,” p.56).

  Few knew the character of the Russian bear as well as George Kennan, the American diplomat who studied the Soviet Union and its leadership for years. In his famous “Long Telegram” from the American embassy in Moscow in 1946 to his superiors at the State Department in Washington, D.C., he said, “Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany is…not adventuristic…It does not take unnecessary risks” (Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, p.557).

  * Kennedy’s brother RFK, the nation’s attorney general, was always more outspoken and passionate about civil rights than the president, turning the power of his office to the vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws in the South after his original emphasis on organized crime.

  From all I have read, it seems that JFK was much more easy-going and less intense than his younger brother, Bobby, for whom the adjective “ruthless” was frequently used, and who had his severe detractors as well as his even more dedicated followers. On the matter of RFK’s being intense and passionate, syndicated columnist David Broder wrote, “His distinguished quality was his capacity for what can only be called moral outrage. ‘That is unacceptable,’ he said of many conditions that most of us accepted as inevitable—so long as we and ours were spared their damage. Poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, prejudice, crookedness, conniving—all such accepted evils were a personal affront to him…He cared passionately about his family, his country, and this world, and he was prepared to play his part in the drama of his times, no matter what it might be or what it might cost” (David Broder, “The Legacy of Robert Kennedy,” Dallas Times Herald, May 31, 1978). Tom Billings, JFK’s close friend, recalled that when RFK gave a stirring civil rights speech in May of 1961 at the University of Georgia at Athens, JFK “wasn’t too happy…He said it wouldn’t do him any good to bring that kind of civil rights talk directly into the heart o
f the South” (Beschloss, Crisis Years, p.304). On the other hand, Look senior editor Laura Berquist wrote, “I first began trailing [Kennedy] in 1956, just after he’d lost the nomination for Vice-President. Democratic insiders pooh-poohed his quest for the presidency as impossible—he was too rich, too glamorous, had too much father…But in Columbia, South Carolina, a conservative bastion, I heard him [Berquist doesn’t give the year] speak out on civil rights with a ferocious, startling candor. I knew then he was better than the glamour image that dogged and often irked him” (Berquist, “John Fitzgerald Kennedy,” p.35).

  * Because of the speech’s importance, for those who are interested, most of its text appears in an endnote. What made the speech particularly remarkable is that, as indicated, it was prepared within just hours of its delivery, 8:00 p.m. EST. Earlier in the day, JFK had been watching television reruns of U.S. Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach’s encounter in 100-degree heat with the Alabama segregationist Governor George Wallace “at the schoolhouse door” of the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa. Katzenbach was seeking the peaceful admission, pursuant to a court order, of two black students to the all-white university, and Wallace, who had campaigned for governor on the slogan of “segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever,” refused to step aside. (Kennedy federalized the Alabama National Guard in the late morning and Wallace stepped aside only when an Alabama National Guard brigadier general, Henry Graham, confronted Wallace at the door in midafternoon and said, “Governor Wallace, it is my sad duty to inform you that the National Guard has been federalized. Please stand aside so that the order of the court may be accomplished.”) Kennedy decided, “I want to go on television tonight.” As late as one hour before the speech, Kennedy was asking his aides to help him with ideas and articulations for his address. (Reeves, President Kennedy, pp.518–521; HSCA Report, p.32)

  Kennedy had already let the good folks of Alabama know that its segregationist philosophy did not sit well with him. Nothing is more important to Alabamians, even today, than the fortunes of their college football team at Tuscaloosa. And before the 1963 Orange Bowl in Miami, President Kennedy visited the locker room of the integrated Oklahoma Sooners. He did not visit Coach Bear Bryant’s Crimson Tide, which was still all-white. (Will, “Eleven Men and Sic ’Em,” p.88)

  † Kennedy tried to discourage Martin Luther King from holding the march, “fearing that it would lead to violence, looting and—more important—a mark against his Administration.” Despite the entreaties of King and other civil rights leaders, Kennedy did not participate in the march. However, when the march, which was peaceful and did not ignite any violence, was over, he invited King and others to the White House “where he congratulated them—in private” (Los Angeles Times, November 22, 1993, p.A11).

  ‡ Indeed, it went further than that. One of the biggest apparent misconceptions that has developed about the passage of these two acts is that they were pushed through Congress only by the strength of Johnson’s personality and the deepness of his commitment. Neither Johnson’s congressional magic nor his strong support for civil rights can be denied, but according to those who should know—the congressional leaders of both parties—this simply was not true. Though unquestionably the assassination speeded up the passage of Kennedy’s legislative program (not just the civil rights bill, but the proposed tax cut to stimulate the economy, both of which were being delayed—the civil rights bill by the House Judiciary Committee, the tax-cut bill by the Senate Finance Committee), they say Kennedy’s bill would have passed, with or without Johnson.

  Among a plethora of Kennedy initiatives in the areas of mental illness, trade, mass transportation, juvenile delinquency, antipoverty (Kennedy started the movement to eradicate poverty in America three days before his assassination, calling it an “attack on poverty,” Johnson changing the name to the “war on poverty”), the biggest ones at the moment of his death were his civil rights bill and tax reduction bill. Speaking primarily of these two bills, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), the leader of the Senate majority, said in November of 1964, “The assassination made no real difference. Adoption of [Kennedy’s] tax bill and the civil rights bill might have taken a little longer, but they would have been adopted.” His counterpart in the Senate, Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.), said, “This program was on the way before November 22, 1963. Its time had come.” In the House, Representative Carl Albert (D-Okla.), the leader of the House majority said, “The pressure behind this program had become so great that it would have been adopted in essentially the same form whether Kennedy lived or died.” His counterpart, Representative Charles A. Hallek (R-Ind.), said, “The assassination made no difference. The program was already made.”

  The head of Kennedy’s legislative team, Lawrence F. O’Brien, who carried on in the same capacity for Johnson, said, “If we were ever sure of anything, it was that the tax bill and the civil rights bill would be passed.” (Wilson, “What Happened to the Kennedy Program?” pp.117–121; delay by House Judiciary Committee and Senate Finance Committee: Reeves, President Kennedy, p.658) Without slighting LBJ’s considerable contributions in the least, it is hard to ignore the reality that LBJ was carrying out the vision and reform agenda of JFK.

  * Emblematic of right-wing extremism in parts of Dallas and the South prior to the assassination, Walker gave a speech to the Annual Leadership Conference of the White Citizens’ Council of America in Jackson, Mississippi, a little less than a month before the tragedy in Dealey Plaza. A few excerpts: “The Kennedys have liquidated the government of the United States. It no longer exists. The nation has no government. The Constitution is well on the way to destruction…Ladies and gentlemen, your State Department is…well infiltrated with Communists…and it has been for a long time, Republican or Democrat, Eisenhower or Kennedy…The best definition I can find today for Communism is ‘Kennedy liberalism,’ or ‘Kennedy socialism’…[Kennedy] is the greatest leader of the anti-Christ movement that we have had as a president of the United States…I have seen this country being sold out, lock, stock, and barrel by a bunch of sophisticated, professor, Harvard liberals…It’s interesting that the Communists killed first the people that helped them in their revolution…So we’ve got something to look forward to, ladies and gentlemen [i.e., the Communists taking over and killing the Kennedys]…Now, I’m not a fanatic, but I do get mad and angry when the truth can’t be told in this country. And I’m not an extremist either.” Walker said that when people ask him why he went to Mississippi, his response is, “I’ll go to Kalamazoo next or Alaska, if that’s where the Russians and Communists want to enter next. It just happened that they entered Mississippi and then they entered Alabama.” (Transcript of Walker’s speech in Jackson, Mississippi, on October 25 or 26, 1963, published in the Fourth Decade, January 2001, pp.17–19, 21, 26–27)

  † “Messages were crisscrossing this town [Dallas] that something was going to happen and the right wing was going to be blamed for it,” General Walker would later recall to a Texas reporter. “I made sure I was out of Dallas that day. It drove them [the authorities] crazy that I was in New Orleans, Oswald’s old stomping ground. I was on a plane flying from New Orleans to Shreveport when the pilot announced that Kennedy had been killed. I’ve got the plane and everyone who was on it, if you want to check.” Walker added, “They asked me if I wanted to cancel my speech that night, and I said ‘Hell, no.’” (Cartwright, “Old Soldier,” p.59)

  * In desperation, the conspiracy theorists have tried (e.g., Shaw with Harris, Cover-Up, p.167) to connect Hunt to Kennedy’s murder by pointing out that one of his sons, Nelson “Bunker” Hunt, admitted to the FBI that he contributed between two and three hundred dollars toward payment of the negative “Welcome Mr. Kennedy” advertisement in the Dallas Morning News on the morning of the assassination, which asked Kennedy twelve “why” questions (see earlier text) (CE 1885, 23 H 690, FBI interview of Nelson Bunker Hunt on May 15, 1964; CE 1031, 18 H 835). You see, Bunker was probably in on the conspiracy
himself, and being so, he wanted to advertise his complicity by helping to pay for the advertisement. By the way, the advertisement was a reasonably dignified criticism of Kennedy’s policies, which the ad suggested gave aid and comfort to international Communism. The ad was signed by one Bernard Weissman, “chairman” of the “American Fact-Finding Committee.” Weissman had recently been discharged from the U.S. Army in Germany, where he and two men who served with him agreed to form a politically conservative organization when they returned to the states. (WR, p.295; 5 H 489–497, WCT Bernard Weissman)

  † Although Hunt was a “social Darwinist” who believed minorities, like blacks, did not do well because they were innately less advantaged, he had no reputation for racial hatred, and certainly was no fanatic about keeping the black man down (Hurt, Texas Rich, pp.30–31).

  * Accompanying the letter was a typed note in Spanish saying that the sender, who signed his name as “P.S.,” had sent a copy of the letter to the FBI in late 1974 but had not heard back from the bureau. “Señor P.S.,” as the sender became known, said that fearing what might happen to him, he intended to go into hiding for awhile, but left a return address of “Insurgentes Sud, No. 309, Mexico, Df, Mexico.” Number 309 South Insurgentes in Mexico City at the time was a four-story white stone apartment building containing a number of lower-middle-class flats. On the first floor of the building were low-quality clothing stores and a shop that sold lottery tickets. Two other assassination researchers, Harold Weisberg and Howard Roffman, also received copies of the handwritten letter to Hunt in the mail. Each wrote letters to the Mexico City return address on the envelope, but received no answer, though their letters were not returned as undelivered. (New York Times, April 4, 1977, p.50)