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  who thought international terrorism is often a project of the

  Western intelligence agencies.

  Further research indicated even these figures may have been

  conservative estimates. A number of polls were conducted in

  the wake of the 9/11 attacks, as governments and

  institutions sought to gauge public reaction. These varied in

  size and methodology but still revealed some interesting

  figures.

  According to Wikipedia, who claim to have collated these

  studies, only 46% of Americans believed Al Qaeda were

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  behind the 9/11 attacks, with 29% of the opinion another

  group were responsible. 15% in total blamed the U.S.

  Government itself.

  Nor, it seems, does the passage of time diminish these deeply

  held views. A 2003 Gallup poll found that three quarters of

  Americans believed the 1963 assassination of President

  Kennedy was a conspiracy of some sort. Just 19% believed

  the official explanation.[6]

  So it seems that conspiracy theorists, far from being a

  lunatic fringe, existing in the twilight zone of social

  exclusion, are actually a sizeable minority, perhaps a

  majority by some measures. They are our neighbours, shop

  keepers, teachers and even police officers. They are our

  friends, family and colleagues. Just like the rest of us in

  other words.

  So why on Earth do so many people believe these apparently

  incredible theories?

  Having looked at many of the explanations offered thus far,

  it seems that nearly every researcher and commentator, who

  has attempted to answer this question, have, for whatever

  reason, avoided the most obvious explanation. As a result,

  while many offer extremely plausible rationales, their

  arguments are invariably unbalanced.

  The well know experimental psychologist, and founder of The

  Septic Society, Michael Shermer, who advocates scientific

  scepticism, has offered some interesting observations. He

  suggests that people tend to believe conspiracy theories in

  response to powerful, underlying psychological influences.[7]

  Shermer theorises they struggle to manage something called

  'cognitive dissonance.' This is a known form of psychological

  distress which occurs when people are exposed to two or

  more plausible, but contradictory thoughts. It is an

  uncomfortable feeling we experience whenever we hold

  opposing beliefs, values or ideas.

  Shermer suggests that cognitive dissonance will not allow

  people to easily accept that a great leader like President

  Kennedy can be murdered by a lone crank like Oswald. It

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  'feels' unbelievable, so we seek alternative interpretations to

  account for this feeling. He wrote:

  “Big effects need big causes — we want

  balance between the size of the cause and

  the size of the effect.

  . . . . . . . . . . . JFK was the most powerful

  political person on the planet, yet he was

  killed by a lone nut, a nobody living on the

  margins of a free society. There’s no

  balance. To reduce this dissonance and

  balance the scales, people have concocted

  countless co-conspirators”

  Furthermore, he contends that anxiety is a powerful

  influence. When events occur which expose our

  vulnerabilities and sense of helplessness, we are compelled

  to find reassuring narratives, no matter how absurd, that

  explain our experience.

  “Psychological research also shows that

  when people are placed in environments or

  conditions in which they feel anxiety and a

  loss of control, they are more likely to see

  illusory patterns in random noise and to look

  to conspiracies as explanations for ordinary

  events.”

  Shermer also identifies the psychological difficulty he thinks

  conspiracy theorists have in managing the concept of chaos

  or randomness.

  “Another psychological factor at work is that

  the mind abhors randomness. We humans

  are terrible at understanding chance and

  probabilities. We find hidden patterns

  everywhere, even in purposefully random

  sequences and noise. And yet much of what

  goes on in life, in politics and in history at

  large is the product of chance and

  randomness. By this I do not mean to imply

  that JFK was killed by a random event, but

  that Oswald acting alone feels like a

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  random factor when compared to a vast

  conspiratorial cabal plotting to overthrow the

  United States government.”

  So, whilst Shermer stops short of defining so called 'truthers'

  as crazy, he advocates that conspiracy theories emerge as a

  consequence of mental health problems. This is a view

  echoed by many other researchers, commentators and

  academics who have attempted to explain why so many

  people accept such apparently preposterous ideas.

  Two years after the Kennedy assassination the American

  historian Richard Hofstadter suggested that conspiracy

  theorists refusal to accept official narratives was bordering

  upon delusional. He also noted the strain of unjustified

  elitism common to the 'truther:'

  “As a member of the avant-garde who is

  capable of perceiving the conspiracy before

  it is fully obvious to an as yet unaroused

  public, the paranoid is a militant leader. He

  does not see social conflict as something to

  be mediated and compromised, in the

  manner of the working politician. Since what

  is at stake is always a conflict between

  absolute good and absolute evil, what is

  necessary is not compromise but the will to

  fight things out to a finish. Since the enemy

  is thought of as being totally evil and totally

  unappeasable, he must be totally

  eliminated–if not from the world, at least

  from theatre of operations to which the

  paranoid directs his attention. This demand

  for total triumph leads to the formulation of

  hopelessly unrealistic goals, and since these

  goals are not even remotely attainable,

  failure constantly heightens the paranoid’s

  sense of frustration. Even partial success

  leaves him with the same feeling of

  powerlessness with which he began, and

  this in turn only strengthens his awareness

  of the vast and terrifying quality of the

  enemy he opposes.”

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  This theme of the confused, irrational victim, struggling to

  come to terms with overwhelming events and living in fear of

  the 'unseen,' is often cited as a reason for conspiratorial

  beliefs. Another is the sense of exclusion from the political

  mainstream.

  The suggestion is conspiracy theorists feel ignored by the

  political establishment. They are 'unheard' and their

  concerns are not r
eflected by any political representatives

  who have realistic hopes of gaining power. Without

  representation, these people feel disenfranchised, shut out of

  the democratic process and, again, are driven to find

  alternative 'stories' that account for this.

  This conspiracy theorist's experience of political exclusion,

  real or perceived, was described by the Rolf Fredheim

  (Research Fellow at Cambridge University.)[9]

  “Conspiracy theories are a marginal

  phenomenon, a form of disreputable counter-

  knowledge, and therefore unlikely to bring

  down strong democratic governments.

  Nonetheless, a case might be made that

  they contribute to a sometimes misplaced

  trust in elites. By all accounts, such trust is

  at historic lows. Complacency and political

  cynicism may be at corresponding highs. As

  Hugo noted, the polling data we have seen

  tends to suggest a link between conspiracy

  theorising and political disengagement.

  Trust correlates with irrational suspicion.”

  It is also something which Dr Drochon identifies:

  “..it is a sense of exclusion that

  characterises conspiracy theorists: those

  who reject the political system as a whole,

  who have a complete distrust of all political

  institutions, and those who don’t vote. Or if

  they do vote, they vote for extremes.”

  Given that research shows the huge number of people who

  believe at least one of these conspiracy theories, if we believe

  the assertions of researchers like Fredheim, Drochon and

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  Hofstadter, we have an immense social problem. Their

  findings suggest that a significant number of our fellow

  citizens are not only delusional, but lack any sense of

  participatory involvement in society. A pretty dangerous

  cocktail.

  However, before we get tooled up, and start digging defensive

  positions in the local park to fend off gangs of marauding,

  befuddled, middle-aged fat blokes wearing provocative tee

  shirts, I suggest we have a rethink.

  Whilst this image of the 'conspiracy nut' raises worrying

  fears of chaotic disorder, these attempts to define

  conspiracists miss an essential, rather crucial point. They

  are all based upon an assumption which, if it's incorrect,

  renders these conclusions practically meaningless. The

  assumption is that conspiracy theories themselves are all

  baseless.

  What if there really is evidence to support the theories? That

  would change any assessment of the conspiracy theorists'

  motivations, wouldn't it?

  Suddenly their reasoning, far from being driven by irrational

  paranoia, is potentially rooted in awareness of the facts.

  Rather than disenfranchised ne'er-do-wells, impotently

  scrabbling for a social and political foothold, they could just

  as easily be active citizens, fighting for our collective

  enlightenment. The 'idiot' becomes the 'critical thinker.'

  How can any academic researcher claim objectivity if their

  own study is based upon an unsubstantiated presumption?

  Namely, that conspiracy theories are without foundation.

  Effectively, by excluding the possibility that the conspiracy

  theorists have good reason to hold their beliefs, any attempt

  to understand their motivation is flawed.

  This doesn't mean it should be 'assumed' conspiracy theories

  are rational. Assumption has no place in objective inquiry.

  However, if the whole premise of your research is to

  understand why people hold supposedly delusional beliefs

  you do need to be reasonably certain their expressed

  opinions are, in fact, delusional in the first place.

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  Consider undertaking research into why seagulls choose to

  live on precarious cliff edges, while excluding their ability to

  fly as a possible contributory factor. You will inevitably

  conclude that seagulls are either adrenalin junkies or have

  suicidal tendencies. Your conclusion is unavoidably awry.

  This is understandable for most of us. We are free to simply

  dismiss conspiracy theorists as silly, but leading academics

  and paid researchers, who are funded to publish their

  results for our information, are required to maintain higher

  intellectual standards. Otherwise, what purpose do they

  serve? You may just as well ask your mates down the pub.

  They should first consider 'truthers' arguments and look at

  the evidence they offer, before announcing their idiocy. This

  is indivisible from seeking an understanding of their

  motivations.

  While eminently qualified individuals like Drochon, Shermer,

  Hofstadter and Fredheim are a lot smarter than I am, even I

  know that academic theories stem from empirical evidence. I

  am reasonably certain that disregarding, or deliberately

  avoiding, evidence that doesn't fit with your predetermined

  conclusion, is not a scientific principle.

  I am not suggesting these men, or the other academics who

  have come to similar conclusions, have done so. I am saying

  I can find no evidence in their 'conspiracy theorist' research

  that addresses the veracity, or otherwise, of 'truthers' claims.

  The assumption is that they are all entirely without merit,

  but no evidence is offered to substantiate this claim.

  What we most commonly see in this research is a blanket

  acceptance of the official account of events. No consideration

  is given to the possibility the accepted narrative is wrong.

  The basic facts, underpinning the study, are unknown.

  Many government conspiracies have been proven and are

  common knowledge. Iran-Contra[10], The Gulf of Tonkin

  incident[11] and numerous others, actually happened. The

  reality that the public have frequently been misled to further

  policy objectives is a proven, historical fact.

  Therefore, the assumption that anyone who claims

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  A Dangerous Ideology

  conspiracies exist must be some sort of 'defective' is simply

  wrong. It is reasonable for people to identify conspiracy as a

  potential cause. The observations do not rule out the ‘false

  flag’ hypothesis.

  The respected author and essayist Christopher Hitchens

  addressed this in his essay 'On the Imagining of Conspiracy.'

  He wrote:[8]

  “… ...you may have noticed that those who

  are too quick to shout ‘conspiracy theorist’

  are equally swift, when consequences for

  authority and consensus impend, to look

  serious and say: ‘It’s more complicated than

  that.’ These have become standard damage-

  control reflexes.”

  Writing about the use of the term 'conspiracy theorist' to

  discredit people he added:

  “One has become used to this stolid,

  complacent return serve: so apparently

  grounded in reason and scepticism but so

  often naive and one-dimensional.”

  Hitchens was referring to the pejorati
ve use of the term.

  There is no doubt the modern usage is derogatory. When

  most of us use the phrase 'conspiracy theorist' we mean

  someone who has taken leave of their senses and will believe

  any old bunk. These people are fantasist who understand

  next to nothing about the 'real world.'

  The Oxford English Dictionary, on the other hand, offers a

  fairly benign definition of conspiracy theory:

  “A belief that some covert but influential

  organization is responsible for an

  unexplained event.”

  I know many conspiracy theorists who broadly accept this.

  Though they are quick to point out they are interested in

  offering explanations for so called 'unexplained' events.

  Generally it isn't their attempts to provide narratives that

  account for unexplained world events that annoy us. It is

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  A Dangerous Ideology

  their insistence that we consider counter narratives for

  events we have already satisfactorily explained which really

  wind us up. Wikipedia offers a definition that most of us

  would probably consider closer to the mark.

  “A conspiracy theory is an explanation of an

  event or situation that invokes an

  unwarranted conspiracy, generally one

  involving an illegal or harmful act carried out

  by government or other powerful actors.

  Conspiracy theories often produce

  hypotheses that contradict the prevailing

  understanding of history or simple facts.

  The term is a derogatory one”

  This is the definition adopted by many of the academic

  researchers. The suggested conspiracy is unwarranted,

  contradicts our understanding of history and does not

  account for simple facts. Yet the legal definition of

  'conspiracy' makes no assumption that a suspicion of

  conspiracy is unwarranted:

  “An agreement between two or more

  person's to engage jointly in an unlawful or

  criminal act, or an act that is innocent in

  itself but becomes unlawful when done by

  the combination of actors.”

  Surely few of us can disagree with this? The planning of

  crimes by two or more individuals is something which

  happens all the time. This suggests that a 'conspiracy

  theory' is nothing more than a rationale alerting us to a

  possible crime planned or committed by a group.

  So how come we now use the phrase 'conspiracy

  theorist' to mean someone who is making a deranged

  allegation? A person who thinks they are smarter than

 

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