by Home home
culpability has been greatly exaggerated.
These are not concepts found only in spy novels and the
furtive imaginations of conspiracy theorists. There are
numerous, proven examples of intelligence agencies, the
world over, using informants, infiltrators, assets and
patsies.
Nor is there any reason such tactics shouldn't be used. It
seems prudent for intelligence and security services to use
all means at their disposal to apprehend terrorists, uncover
prosecutable evidence and foil plots to kill.
However, these techniques have evidently crossed the line
from intelligence gathering and prevention to active
participation on many occasions. It is legitimate to ask at
what point the security services may act as terrorists or
facilitators of terrorist attacks. “To state the proposition” does
not “reveal its absurdity.”
Few suggest the security services could have been complicit
in 7/7 and there is no proof they were. However, by denying
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any consideration of the possibility, nor was there any
chance of uncovering evidence that could have potentially
exposed such activity. Recent history, which indicated this
was entirely feasible, was ignored without justification.
Sharing concerns about the actions of the security services,
nineteen survivors requested the opportunity to cross-
examine the intelligence agencies. Lady Justice Hallett
denied their application. The inquests represented the last
opportunity for the survivors and victim's families to get
answers to their questions.
One of the survivors of the Edgware Road blast Jacqui
Putnam, said:
“Our role now will be one of answering
questions, which we will do, but our
questions are not going to be answered.
Once again, we have been shunted aside by
officialdom.”
During the inquests, Lady Hallett considered some evidence
from the security services in closed session. This evidence
was withheld from all but the victim's families, who were
themselves placed under gagging orders. In her summation
Lady Hallett stated:
“Security Service and the police put before
me material that was relevant to the issues,
but which they reasonably believed could
not be disclosed in an unredacted form
without threatening national security.”
Ultimately this led her to conclude:
“The evidence I have heard does not justify
the conclusion that any failings on the part
of any organisation or individual caused or
contributed to any of the deaths”
By the end of 2011, the British Government had successfully
fought off all calls for an independent inquiry and had
concluded an inquest with a largely predetermined outcome.
The inquest didn't fulfil the legal requirements of a coroner's
inquiry and the government had gone to great legislative
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lengths to severely restrict its scope. The UK state also
presented a number of intelligence reports that were
evidently false or inaccurate and denied legal aid to those
who questioned their 'narrative.'
It seemed that every time evidence came to light, the official
account was forced into another retraction or alteration. This
gradual unravelling of the state's story was exemplified by
the inquests which laid bare numerous problems with the
evidence supposedly substantiating it. In reality, the
evidence presented appeared to bring the whole story into
considerable doubt.
Lady Justice Hallett's closing remarks about the absurdity of
conspiracy theories were both historically inaccurate and
irrational. It was the state's determination to maintain their
own questionable conspiracy theory, and refusal to disclose
information or investigate potential leads, that aroused and
perpetuated public suspicion.
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Chapter 14
Oops! Looks Like We Did It Again.
Mohammad Junaid Babar was a key witness in both
the fertiliser bomb plot trial, built upon evidence uncovered
during Operation Crevice, and the trial of the three alleged
7/7 accomplices who, despite Babar’s testimony, were found
innocent of any involvement in the London bombings.
From the age of two, Pakistan born Babar grew up in
Queens, New York. He initially achieved notoriety, shortly
after 9/11, by appearing in a number of interviews where he
openly declared his plan to kill Americans. These interviews
were syndicated globally by the MSM, ramping up fear of the
threat presented by al Qaeda.
For instance, speaking to a Canadian news team, without
the customary face covering usually worn by Islamist
terrorists, he said:[110]
“I am willing to kill the American Soldiers if
they enter into Afghanistan with their
ground troops. I am willing to kill the
Americans and, if the Americans use
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Pakistan soil as their bases, we will kill the
Americans here in Pakistan too.”
Over the next few years, Babar apparently became a
reasonably influential terrorist, though he was also
something of a self-publicist, so some scepticism is
warranted.
He allegedly met with senior members of al Qaeda, such as
its third in command Abdul Hadi. He was a logistician and al
Qaeda fundraiser, providing them with money, weaponry
and equipment. He smuggled arms and facilitated the
passage of U.S, Canadian and UK extremists to al Qaeda
training camps in Pakistan. His motivation for doing all this
was questionable. Babar's mother had been working in the
World Trade Center on 9/11. She escaped and thankfully
survived. So Babar's rabid fanaticism, for the terrorist group
who had nearly killed his mum, was surprising.
Between 2001 and 2004, despite having been on global
television networks making threats to kill and pledging his
allegiance to the al Qaeda cause, Babar flew between the
U.S, UK and Pakistan, without any problem at all. In 2004
he flew back to the U.S. and moved back in with his parents.
More than a month after his return, the FBI picked him up
for 'questioning' while he was walking down the street in
Queens, New York.
There was no 'door kicking' raid, no terrorist last stand or
dangerous hostage situation, no need for the bomb squad or
indeed any guns at all. The FBI didn't even handcuff him.
They simply asked him to accompany them. Nor did they
throw him in a cell, or start water boarding him in the
Guantánamo Bay detention centre. They instead took him to
a Manhattan Hotel. A comfortable arrangement he would
become accustomed to, throughout his ‘imprisonment.’
Over the next few weeks, Babar not only signed a d
ocument,
enabling the FBI to question him without the presence of a
lawyer, but also gave them incredible detail about the al
Qaeda networks he embedded himself within and the large
number of terrorists he had trained. In fact, he built some of
these networks and ran the training camps.
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Babar struck a deal with U.S. prosecutors and the FBI. The
Western MSM eagerly promoted his life story, dubbing him
‘the al Qaeda super grass.’[111] Between 2004 and 2010
Babar frequently testified in courts in the U.S, UK and
Canada, resulting in the conviction of 12 suspected terrorist.
U.S. district judge Victor Marrero commented:
“Mr Babar worked with the FBI and foreign
governments to assist in investigations of
terrorism organisations, including al Qaeda,
and of terrorist activities such as the London
bomb plot … As a result of Mr Babar's co-
operation, multiple defendants were
arrested, prosecuted, and eventually
sentenced not just in the United States but
in England and Canada as well.”
Facing a possible seventy-year sentence for his terrorist
activities, in December 2010 a New York court gave Babar a
'time served' sentence, amounting to four and a half years,
and released him. The court thanked him for his
'exceptional cooperation.' For most of his time in custody
Babar had been jetting around the world as the security
services 'star witness,' staying in hotels rather than prison
cells. For the last two years of his sentence he was on bail,
living freely in the U.S. The leading international terrorist
spent very little time behind bars.
Documents from his trial confirmed that Mr Babar had been
cooperating with the security services 'before his arrest' in
2004. They didn't indicate when this cooperation began but,
given the other unusual facets of his life as a terrorist, it
seems fairly clear that Babar was at least an informant, and
probable agent, infiltrating al Qaeda for the U.S. intelligence
agencies.[112]
During the Operation Crevice trial (the fertilizer bomb plot) it
became apparent the police and the intelligence agencies
had invested a considerable amount of time and manpower
in the surveillance of Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammad
Sidique Khan. Claims that they were 'clean skins' were
abject nonsense.
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A Dangerous Ideology
Junaid Babar testified he had met with both Khyam and
Khan during his frequent trips to the UK from Pakistan.
Khan and Tanweer had been photographed, captured on
video and tailed. Numerous vehicle checks had been run on
the cars the men travelled in, and their meetings were often
bugged.
For example, Khan and Tanweer had been with a group of
men who had met with the fertilizer plot ringleader Omar
Khyam. After Khyam left, MI5 tailed the remaining group
containing Khan and Tanweer. They followed them to
Toddington Services on the M1 and captured high quality,
colour photographs of the men, including clear images of
both Khan and Tanweer.
At the same time, Junaid Babar was with the FBI in the U.S.
In April 2004, more than a year before 7/7, one of the photos
taken at Toddington, which clearly showed Khan and
Tanweer, was sent by MI5 to the FBI for the attention of
Babar. There was a strong possibility that Babar would have
recognised Khan. He claimed to have trained both Khan and
Khyam, among others.
In 2003 Khan allegedly flew out to a terrorist training camp
in Malakand, North West Pakistan, which had been set up
by Babar. Khan's training, at Barbar's camp, almost
certainly including how to handle explosives.
Unfortunately, the perfectly distinct image, taken at the
services, had apparently been photocopied and sent to the
U.S. by an idiot. Tanweer looked like a grainy, amorphous
blob and the only part of Khan that hadn't been cropped out
of the image was his nose. Even his own mother couldn't
have recognised him, so perhaps Babar can be forgiven for
not doing so himself.[113]
When this was revealed at the inquests it prompted John
Taylor, the father of one of the 7/7 victims to say:
“I think they could have made a better effort.
They could have stuck it on a Jumbo Jet and
got it there overnight if they really wanted
to. They could have sent it over with a
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member of the security services or the
Metropolitan Police.”
However, in light of the Stevens Report, was it possible the
security services had another reason to literally keep Khan
out of the picture? Khan was also recorded in conversation
with the Omar Khyam in Khyam's car. The men discussed
financial 'scams' and Khan's plans to go overseas to fight
jihad. At one point Khan asked Khyam if he was a terrorist.
Khyam said “I'm not a terrorist but they're working through
us.” Khan then asked “who are, there's no one higher than
you?” [114]
This appeared to indicate there was someone Khyam was
taking orders from. It isn't known who this was but, during
his subsequent trial, Khyam testified that he had trained in
Pakistan training camps set up by the Pakistani ISI. Later he
refused to give any further testimony. The judge in the
Crevice trial warned Khyam that his silence could be
interpreted as a refusal cooperate and could go against him
in court. Khyam acknowledged this but added the ISI had
threatened his family in Pakistan and he had no choice.
Khan, Tanweer and Khyam were also tailed to a meeting in
Wellingborough in the East Midlands where again they were
heard to discuss financial fraud. MI5 believed they were
trying to raise money to fund their training and operations
overseas. This placed Khan and Tanweer's alleged
'martyrdom videos' in a different light. It appeared they were
eulogising about going to fight jihad overseas, not discussing
a planned domestic terror attack.
MI5 also recorded that Khan and Tanweer had attended a
meeting in Khyam's flat in Slough. When Operation Crevice
came to an end, following the 2004 raids that led to the
arrest the fertilizer bomb plotters, MI5 again ran another
vehicle check on Khan's car.
The idea that MI5 had no knowledge of Khan or Tanweer,
prior to the bombings, simply wasn't true. Far from being on
the periphery of their investigation, it seems Mohammad
Sidique Khan, at least, was of notable interest to them. Their
claim that Khan hadn't been considered a priority appeared
false. Yet this had been enough to convince the 2009
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Intelligence Security Committee that they could not have
done more to foil 7/7.
Why Lady Justice Hallett maintained this opinion is
mystifying. In additio
n to the evidence demonstrating the
security services awareness of Khan and Tanweer, other
information revealed at the inquest plainly suggested the
intelligence agencies possible involvement in their
recruitment and training.
Martin McDaid was described at the inquest as a former
Marine who had converted to Islam in the 1990s, changing
his name to Abdullah McDaid. According to Hugo Keith QC,
he had been known to West Yorkshire Police and the
security services since at least 1998, and was suspected of
involvement in extremism. Though, as a former soldier of the
elite Special Boat Service (SBS)[115] and a counter-terrorism
operative, he was probably known to the security services
throughout his professional career, long before 1998.[116]
McDaid had worked at an Islamist book store in Beeston,
Leeds, called the Iqra Learning Centre. Mohammad Sidique
Khan and Shehzad Tanweer were both volunteers at the
shop.
Martin Gilbertson was an IT consultant employed by the Iqra
Learning Centre to copy Islamists leaflets and videos. In his
inquest testimony he said:[117]
“Martin 'Abdullah' McDaid did most of the
talking, most of the ranting and raving; and
as an ex-Marine, he knew about matters
military.”
Gilbertson, who was previously caught lying in a couple of
media interviews, was absolutely savaged at the inquests.
However, he wasn't the only person who thought McDaid
was actively inciting hatred and advocating Islamist
extremism.
Mark Hargreaves, a youth worker, testified how it had been
McDaid who had shown him 'hateful, deeply offensive'
Islamist extremist pictures and videos. McDaid and another
man, Max Gillespie, known as 'Abdul Rahman,' told
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Hargreaves they were distributing the Islamist propaganda.
When asked, Hargreaves confirmed it was McDaid who was
'whipping up hatred.'
In January 2001, 8 months before 9/11, West Yorkshire
Police's Special Branch launched a surveillance operation
called Operation Warlock.[118] They surveilled a group of
young Muslim men on an outward bound trip to Dalehead in
the Dudden Valley, Cumbria. They did so at the request of
the security services. The trip was one of many organised
and led by McDaid.
It was alleged that this was a terrorist training camp.
Mohammad Sidique Khan was photographed at the camp.
