by Tim Saunders
Not only were Montgomery’s troops in better mental and physical shape but they had become experienced campaigners. An officer of the Dorset Regiment who had been wounded in Normandy returned to his battalion in time for the Rhine crossing and found his company greatly changed from the formally dressed and inexperienced unit he left in August 1944.
It was a tonic to find oneself again in the free air of good comradeship, cooperation and good humoured stoicism of the front line after months of jealousies and petty rivalries so rampant further back ... The company looked a truly amazing sight as we marched into our concentration area. The men were loaded down with the usual impedimenta of ammunition, weapons, picks and shovels; but then in addition, every man had some personal treasure; some had hurricane lamps, some oil house lamps or an oil stove, others carried baskets and two whole sections arrived each with some joint of the pig they had killed the day before slung across their haversacks. They looked a motley crew in a variety of battledress, leather jerkins or camouflage jackets, topped with weather beaten faces and a range of scarves but they knew their trade as soldiers and they could be relied on in battle; that was all that mattered.
Second British Army.
General Sir Miles Dempsey, commander Second Army.
The practicalities of everyday life on campaign were not the only changes in the British Army. The green formations, such as 15th Scottish and 43rd Wessex Divisions, who had seen their first action in Normandy, were now made up of experienced combat soldiers and were highly competent; from divisional staff down to the rifle sections, they knew their tasks in battle and understood that the only way to return to their families was to finish the war. Similarly, the desert veterans of 51st Highland Division, who had been criticised for their poor performance in Normandy and, for a while, labelled as one of the ‘non fighting divisions’, had been restored to their former level of performance and determination to win, largely by its new commander Major General Thomas Rennie.
The worst of the infantry manpower crisis of the autumn had also passed. Men were ruthlessly combed out of units in the UK that were now largely redundant. The organisations that bore the brunt of this process were typically, those who earlier in the war provided Britain with her air defence. Anti-aircraft gunners found themselves converted to infantry and undergoing a crash course in small arms and close quarter battle. RAF radar operator, Corporal Southam found himself one of the thousands drawing khaki battledress and joining the Army.
I was surprised that I took to the army, especially as it was mid-winter when I reported to Barnard Castle for infantry training. The discomfort of living in the field more than made up for escaping from the boredom of routine RAF shift work on an air station in the middle of nowhere.
Southam was lucky, he was posted direct to a battalion but others, usually less enthusiastic about their transformation to the dangers and discomforts of life as an infantryman, suffered the misfortune of having to wait in the uninspiring environment of a battle casualty replacement unit.
Also joining the order of battle for the coming Rhine Crossing was 6th Airborne Division. They had since their withdrawal from Normandy at the end of the battle, plenty of time to retrain and take in replacements to make good the losses of a hundred days in close contact, with the enemy. Their austere Christmas 1944 celebrations in their camps on Salisbury Plain were cancelled by an emergency deployment to the Ardennes as a part of the force to block the German drive on the Meuse and their ultimate objective; Antwerp. The veteran airborne division, now under a new British airborne commander, Major General Eric Bols were ready for the battle again. Their former commander, the experienced Lieutenant General ‘Windy’ Gale, however, would not be far away, as he was deputy commander of the Allied Airborne Army.
In summary, costly though the Rhineland battles had been, the British, American and Canadian armies were well led and their soldiers had endured the worst of the winter. With battle casualty replacements swelling their ranks, they knew that victory was inevitable, despite the motivational cautioning of their officers. With logistic superiority and air supremacy to support them, the only real question was when it all would end. Conversely, as we will see in the next chapter, the Germans after the Battle of the Bulge and the losses suffered facing VERITABLE and GRENADE, were in a parlous state.
Victory for the Allies was certain, the remaining question was ‘when’. British infantry pass a column of German prisoners.
CHAPTER 2
The German Defenders
DEFEATED IN NORMANDY, the Germans belatedly took measures to put their economy and nation onto a total war footing. Places of entertainment were closed, non-essential activities curtailed and men and women were directed into crucial industries and into the Wehrmacht. Within the forces, as already mentioned, men were taken from the now largely redundant Kriegsmarine and from the bloated ranks of Goering’s Luftwaffe. The results were spectacular. Germany’s armoured vehicle production reached a peak despite the best efforts of the Allied bomber offensive and divisions such as the 84th Infantry, who Second Army were to face on the banks of the Rhine, were reconstituted following its virtual destruction at Falaise. Others became volksgrenadier divisions made up of Germany’s last reserves. The best of the reconstituted formations were sent to the Siegfried Line along with two thirds of all armoured production.
Young and old, along with party officials, were swept up into the ranks of the new German Army in a last ditch defence of the Fatherland.
Despite rebuilding the Wehrmacht in a matter of months, this was not the same quality of Army as before, being made up of a high proportion of men who would previously have been regarded as too old, too young or had a physical infirmity that would previously have excluded them from service. The better ‘divisions’, in many cases, consisted of two regiments (equivalent to a British brigade) each of two infantry battalions with little transport. Artillery was short but this deficiency was made up by a generous allocation of mortars and multi-barrel rocket launchers; the Nebelwerfer, which was a major cause of allied casualties. German small arms firepower, was however, largely undiminished with an equally generous allocation of MG 34 and MG 42 spandaus in infantry battalions.
Volkssturm
At the lower end of the scale, the weakest formations were based on the Volkssturm; the old and sick men of the German Home Guard, with in some cases their only uniform being an arm-band. The commanding officer of 41st Volkssturm Battalion described what occurred when his unit was sent into battle early in March. Although an extreme case, his story is generally representative of what happened to many battalions such as his.
I had 400 men in my battalion and we were ordered to go into the line in our civilian clothes. I told the local Party Leader that I could not accept the responsibility of leading men into battle without uniforms or much training. Just before commitment the unit was given 180 Danish rifles, but there was no ammunition. We also had four machine guns and 100 Panzerfausts. None of the men had received any training in firing a machine gun, and they were all afraid of handling the anti-tank weapon. Although my men were quite ready to help their country, they refused to go into battle without uniforms and without training. What can a Volkssturm man do with a rifle without ammunition! The men went home. That was the only thing they could do.
Goebbels inspects a mixed Volkssturm unit of the type that was rejected after the Ardennes offensive.
The Hitler Youth
The younger soldiers recruited from the Hitler Youth (HJ), despite their lack of age, were often good and dedicated material. However, in the Ardennes the Volksgrenadier division’s HJ soldiers had not performed to their potential, as the Normandy Veterans and older Volkssturm knew it was ‘all up for Germany’ and encouraged the boys – for that is what they were – to surrender. Consequently, the HJ leadership decided to keep HJ conscripts, some of whom were boys as young as twelve years of age, in separate units, rarely more than a hundred strong.
By keeping the boys in their o
wn HJ units, with fanatical Nazi leadership, they were able to exploit the qualities brought about by years of indoctrination, along with those of youth that makes warfare a young man’s game. Many went willingly, with patriotism and the gullibility of youth; believing Goebbels’ propaganda that Hitler’s ‘wonder weapons’ and one last push would turn the tide and ultimately deliver victory to the Fatherland. Of all the Nazi deceptions perpetrated on the German people this was possibly the most cynical and evil of them all.
Even though they had little formal recruit training, most of the HJ had received, along with Nazi indoctrination, years of military training during routine HJ meetings and camps. This ‘training’, with weapons and ammunition, often re-enacting German victories earlier in the war, laid a solid military foundation but in reality, as with the Volkssturm they lacked weapons and equipment. However, the spirit was willing and HJ units from the Rhineland were prepared to defend their hometowns with what ever they had. The Panzerfausts proved to be an effective weapon even in the hands of novices.
Hitler Jugend recruits in late 1944 were facing the enemy in a matter of weeks.
Some well equipped Hitler Jugend soldiers. In most cases this was far from the reality by late March 1945.
HJ units were amongst those rushed to the banks of the Rhine from the nearby Ruhr and were encountered, along with other troop types, across the PLUNDER battle area but particularly in Wesel.
Fallschirmjäger
The SS panzer divisions, now deployed to the east to stem the Russian offensive, and the Fallschirmjäger alone retained much of their former quality. The latter provided the backbone of the German defences in the Rhineland and were the major opponents of the British and Canadian forces during VERITABLE and BLOCKBUSTER. Mostly aged under twenty-five these troops were parachutists in name only, mostly having never been trained to jump but, nurtured on the deeds of their forebears at Crete, Cassino, etc. they had an esprit de corps that the Wehrmacht had long since lost. Also, with many men coming from Luftwaffe stations, they had not tasted the bitter pill of defeat and their tenacity in the fighting in early 1945 may have had a lot to do with the fact that only unconditional surrender by Germany was on the table and they had little choice but to continue resisting.
Veteran Fallschirmjäger, and persistent thorn in the Allied side, Oberstleutnant von der Hydte left the text of his early 1945 speech to new recruits joining his regiment:
I demand of every soldier the renunciation of all personal wishes. Whoever swears on the Prussian flag has no right to personal possessions! From the moment he enlists in the Fallschirmjäger and comes to my regiment, every soldier enters the new order of humanity and gives up everything he possessed before and which is outside the new order. There is only one law henceforth for him – the law of our unit. He must abjure every weaker facet of his own character, all personal ambition, and every personal desire. From the renunciation of the individual, the true personality of the soldier arises. Every member of the regiment must know what he is fighting for.
He must be quite convinced that this struggle is a struggle for the existence of the whole German nation and that no other ending of this battle is possible than that of the victory of German arms... . He must learn to believe in victory even when at certain moments logical thinking scarcely makes a German victory seem possible.... Only the soldier who is schooled in philosophy and believes in his political faith implicitly can fight as this war demands that he shall fight. ... lack of this faith is the reason why so many German infantry divisions have been destroyed.
In summary, despite the presence of the committed Fallschirmjäger, overall the Wehrmacht, as demonstrated by the Battle of the Bulge was no longer capable of successfully mounting major offensive operations. There were too few first class formations, panzer divisions were armoured largely in name only and of course, the Allies were no longer the bemused force of 1940 that was so easily overwhelmed by Hitler’s blitzkrieg.
Oberstleutnant von der Hydte, a persistent thorn in the Allies’ side from 1940 through Crete and Normandy to Hell’s Highway.
Defence on the Rhine
Charged with holding the Rhine, as Hitler’s new C-in-C West, was the stocky, blunt jawed and resolute Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring. He had gained a reputation as a defensive genius fighting delaying actions in Italy on the Gustav and Gothic Lines. Arriving in his new headquarters he reputedly announced to his staff ‘Well gentlemen, I am the new V3’. On the Rhine the policy ‘Laughing Albert’ had to implement remained focussed on the defence of the Ruhr, which following the loss of Upper Silesia to the Russians was the last industrial area, vital to sustain German forces in action. To achieve this, Kesselring had nominally sixty-five divisions but in reality they had a strength of less than half this number.
Despite an acute weapons shortage and the crippling blows German industry and communications were receiving from the Allied air forces, Kesselring managed to put together a creditable defence to oppose the expected assault crossing of the Rhine. However, this defence was less strong than Montgomery believed he would encounter, based on the experience of the bitter fighting during VERITABLE and BLOCKBUSTER.
General Schlemm’s First Fallschirmjäger Army remained responsible for the sector opposite 21st Army Group, including the Rees – Wesel sector. During his post war interrogation Schlemm explained that:
A parachute drop over the Rhine was considered inevitable, and efforts were made to determine the most probable spot. Schlemm had captured an Allied report analysing the parachute drop at Arnhem in September 1944, and from this document, he learnt that Allied views were now against a paratroop landing too far away from the ground troops destined to contact it. By plotting the areas that were topographically suitable for a parachute drop and not too far from the Rhine, Schlemm claims the most likely area seemed to be just east of Wesel. It was in this neighbourhood that he therefore expected the crossing attempt would be made.
Feldmarschall Kesselring, known as ‘Laughing Albert’, the self confessed ‘V3 weapon’.
Schlemm’s views however were not considered sound by his superiors at Army Group H:
The expected northern crossing was to take place, according to these latter opinions, in the neighbourhood of Emmerich. The assault would be directed north-east and designed to take the Ijssel line in the rear. Since this was to be the big attack, Schlemm was ordered to send a large part of his artillery to Twenty-Fifth Army who would be faced with this new offensive.
As subsequent events would prove, this was a miscalculation of some significance and Schlemm’s deployment on the Rhine with two corps and an armoured reserve was, as was the case Fallschirmjäger Korps were deployed in the north, with 6, 7 and 8 Fallschirmjäger Divisions astride the town of Rees. In what was to become the right assault sector of Second British Army, Schlemm had deployed General Straube’s LXXXVI Korps centred on Wesel, with 84th and 180th Divisions under command. Schlemm’s armoured reserve, XLVII Panzer Korps, was located fifteen miles to the north east of Emmerich. 116th Panzer Division was assessed by allied intelligence on 22 March, as having up to seventy tanks, while 15th Panzer Grenadiers was believed to hold fifteen panzers and twenty to thirty assault guns.
The divisions directly facing the British assault were 8th Fallschirmjäger and 84th Infantry Division. 7th Fallschirmjäger Division had not been properly located but some of its units were known to be well forward. The former was on the left of II Fallschirmjäger Korps and had lost heavily in the fighting west of the Rhine and when it withdrew across the line in early March, it had an infantry strength of just 900 men. 84th Division, a luckless formation under the command of Generalmajor Fiebig, had been virtually destroyed, for the second time, at the beginning of VERITABLE and was assessed on 12 March, as having a strength of just 500 infantrymen. However, it was in the process of being reconstituted as a mountain formation when PLUNDER started on the night of 23/24 March. Amongst those who had already arrived to join the beleaguered division were
some Volkssturm (German Home Guard), some static Wehrkreis (German military district) troops (possibly 317 Ersatz Battalion in Wesel and those troops encountered around Bislich) and amongst others, 286th Ear Battalion, made up of soldiers who were deaf or hard of hearing.
General Schlemm.
The best of the men and equipment were concentrated in armoured formations, including anti-airlanding battlegroups. In this case they are mounted in an armoured half-track.
One formation that the Allies had little information on was Kampfgruppe Karst. It is not clear whether the half-tracks, armoured cars and light armour had been identified and included in the armoured totals listed in Second Army’s intelligence summaries but what had been missed was that its specific role was anti-airlanding. It was German tactical doctrine to drive into the heart of an airborne drop, seeking to disrupt the enemy while he was at his most vulnerable i.e. before he could assemble and receive all of his heavier weapons. Kampfgruppe Karst was located to the east of the River Issel; exactly where Schlemm had assessed the Allies would deploy their airborne forces. Even though they were, in the event, just the wrong side of the Issel they were well placed to be in operation against the Allies promptly.
Defending the east side of the Rhine, an 88 mm flak battery.
