Meta-states do not refer to those states of mind we have from our external experiences. Meta-states refer to those internal states we have about our internal experiences. Our brains have the unique quality for abstracting. In NLP you read and hear a lot about “logical levels.” Logical levels refer to higher level abstractions. Consider the following:
Figure 1.4 Levels of Abstraction
Higher levels modulate lower levels.
In Figure 1:4 note how with each word going up, with the word “transportation.” We know that “transportation” functions at a higher logical level than does the word “car,” for transportation includes “cars”, but it includes more. The word “car” includes the term “car door” but it includes more than just a car door, etc. Hence, each word functions as a higher order abstraction in that it contains what lies below it and more. Important to the meta-state model concerns the discovery by Gregory Bateson that higher levels modulate lower levels (1972). The term “Meta-levels” refer to higher logical levels.
In the meta-state model, we utilize the power of higher levels in the modulation of lower levels. The brain has the unique ability to internally apply one thought to another thought. The brain abstracts to another state level and reflects that state to another state. Suppose you experience a primary state of fear from some external event. Internally you may choose to apply the thought of “appreciation” to your fear and take appropriate action to any external threat. Or, you may choose to apply another state of consciousness called fear to the fear you had from the primary state of fear. Thus, you fear your fear. Guess what you will get? Paranoia. You fear your fear and the higher level fear modulates and increases your primary state of fear and suddenly you experience paranoia. But, notice the difference in outcome states when you apply the meta-level state of appreciation to fear. What do you get? You sure don’t get paranoia, do you?
Primary levels refer to our experience of the outside world primarily through our senses.
Primary states describe those states of consciousness from our primary level experiences of the outside world.
Meta-levels refer to those abstract levels of consciousness we experience internally. As the meta-levels connect with the body (kinesthetic) we have a “state” containing emotions.
Meta-states describe those internal states of consciousness we have “about” or “above” lower level states.
Michael formally defines meta-states:
To model the structure of subjective experience, we begin with states—states of mind, body, & emotion, hence mind-body or neuro-linguistic states. What mechanisms drive these states? “Thoughts” (mental representations, ideas, meanings, etc.) as processed & embodied in our nervous system. When our consciousness goes out to some reference outside of us (a person, event, or thing), we experience a Primary state. But when our thoughts-and-feelings come back to reference our thoughts-and feelings, we have a Meta-state.
In a Meta-state, conscious awareness reflects back onto itself. We call this self-reflexive consciousness. Thinking-about-thinking generates thoughts-feelings at higher logical levels so that we experience states-about-states. Rather than referring to something “out there” in the world, Meta-states refer to something about (@) some previous thought, emotion, concept, understanding, Kantian category, etc. Korzybski talked about Meta-States as “abstractions about abstractions” or a second-order abstraction.
As a Meta-class of life, we live our lives at Meta-levels. There we experience beliefs, values, domains of understandings, conceptual and semantic states, “core” or transcendental states, etc. To model human excellence (or pathology) we have to “go meta” (Bateson) and recognize the Meta-levels as they play in the systemic nature of consciousness (i.e. it operates reflexively and recursively).
By Meta-stating we bring a mind-body state to bear upon another state. In this way we set a frame-of-reference that, in turn, governs all of the lower levels. It operates as an attractor in a self-organizing system. Bateson noted that the higher levels organize, drive, and modulate lower levels. In this way we create our Model of the World or map which we then use as we navigate through life.
Our layered Meta-states becomes our reference system for “making sense” of things. It frames our meanings (semantics). When we change our internal universe, we reframe our understandings, beliefs, values, and meanings. Since we give meaning according to context, our Meta-states describe the structure of our mental contexts.
In Outframing we make the ultimate meta-move of going above all frames to set an entirely new frame-of-reference. We can engage in Meta-magic by this maneuver to re-set our whole reality strategy (1999).4
So to summarize, primary levels refer to our experience of the outside world primarily through our senses. Primary states describe those states of consciousness from our primary level experiences of the outside world. Meta-levels refer to those abstract levels of consciousness we experience internally. Meta-states describe those internal states of consciousness we have “about” or “above” lower level states. Meta-states describe the mind’s ability for self-reflexive thought—thoughts about thoughts about thoughts, etc. Meta-states come directly from the human experience of self-reflective consciousness as we reflect or apply one state to another state. The point: when we have a thought about another thought, the second thought will modulate to some degree the primary thought. A meta-state transcends the primary state, and as it transcends, that makes it a higher logical level from the primary thought.
The words we apply to our internal representation function at a higher logical level. Hence, our language modulates our internal representations.
Later we will cover more about meta-states and how they inform submodalities. For now, note that the words we apply to our internal representation function at a higher logical level. Hence, our language modulates our internal representations. Or to put it another way, words “control” our internal representations.
2.12.0.1 Experiment # 1
So… recall a pleasant experience again. Do you see that experience that you found so pleasurable? Now look closer at the qualities of that picture: color or black-and-white; three-dimensional or flat like a photograph; do you see yourself in the picture (dissociated) or do you look through your own eyes as if you have stepped into the picture (associated); does the picture have a frame around it or do you have it coded as panoramic? Does it move like a movie or does it look more like a still picture? Do you see the picture far off or close; bright or dark, or in between; in focus or out of focus? Where do you have this picture located––up to your left, in front of you? These qualities of your representations identify a number of what we call submodalities.
Now let’s do the same with the auditory system: dDo you have sounds in your representations of pleasantness? Would you describe those sounds as loud or soft? What about the tone––soft or harsh? Full or thin (timbre)? What direction does the sound come to you from? Fast or slow? How clearly do you hear this sound? Do you hear in stereo or mono?
What about the kinesthetics that go along with this internal experience? How intensely do you feel the sensations? Do you feel any texture, weight, heaviness or lightness, shape or form, temperature? Where do you feel these sensations in your body? Any smells or tastes?
Identifying and making these distinctions in our internal representations provides specific details for this domain of submodalities. In a way, they function as the “building blocks” of the representation system—the very qualities of our awareness that make up their properties. These distinctions, in turn, provide the brain and nervous system the messages, or commands, for how to feel and respond. In a way, they fulfil the category of distinctions that Gregory Bateson called “the difference that makes the difference.” Yet they do not do so at what we might call “the submodality level.” They do so at a level meta to the rep systems themselves. Now you won’t read about this in NLP literature itself. We have just recently (1998) come to this understanding. But more about ho
w submodalities actually work later.
Submodalities essentially function as the building blocks of the rep system.
Regarding submodalities, Woodsmall (1989) wrote:
“If the mind/body is capable of making any distinction, then it must have some way of making that distinction; and the way it in fact does so is by differences in the submodalities by which the alternatives of the distinction are internally represented.” (p. 4).
This means that the human brain determines the parameters of our experiences by using these submodality distinctions. The brain represents all experiences, emotions and even beliefs using modalities (rep system) and especially the qualities or properties of these modalities (that is, the submodalities). Submodalities provide us another understanding of the proverb about “as a man thinketh, so he is.” This truth shows up as the heart of the Cognitive-Behavioral model. If our cognitions (thoughts) control our inner subjective reality and move us to begin to literally “realize” such externally in behavior, then it lies within submodalities that these cognitions control the human system. This has given rise, in NLP, to the saying, “Submodalities determine behavior.”
How do you know the difference between what you believe and what you do not believe? Traditionally in NLP we have assumed the following:
You have different words, different voices, different tones, you hear these voices perhaps in different locations, or, if you code primarily visually, you will have very different quality of pictures for those you believe versus those you do not. You tell the difference by representing the beliefs differently. The distinctions between these two beliefs lie at the submodality level.
Bandler and MacDonald (1988) have written that if you change the submodalities of a belief, you can change the belief (pp. 67-75). Similarly, with Time-Lining we use the metaphor of a “line” designating “time.” This seems to work because of the physiological fact that submodalities in-form our autonomic nervous system about how to respond. Thus, all of the changes made through Time-Line processes, as well as any process, occur ultimately at the submodality level.
Yet this does not accurately explain submodalities. Actually, to even note or detect these qualities of our representations—we have to go meta or above the internal representation. The word “meta” comes from a Greek word meaning “above” or “beyond.” Try it for yourself. Think about a pleasant experience until you step into it so much that you fully experience it again. Now think about that experience. How did you code your pictures in terms of distance, clarity, color, etc? And your sounds—how did you code the volume, tonality, tempo, distance, etc? As you think about the qualities of your internal representations—the submodalities—do you not have to step back or go meta? Do you not have to get out of content by moving to a higher level and then notice their structure? Of course.
But so what?
This shows and suggests that when we alter the quality or properties of our internal representations, we do not do so “at the submodality level.” But we rather do so at a meta-level of awareness.
When we alter the quality or properties of our internal representations, we do not do so “at the submodality level.” But we rather do so at a meta-level of awareness.
The qualities (submodalities) of our pictures do not exist at a level lower than the picture. They occur inside and exist as part of the representation.
And so what does this mean? It means that we cannot change some experiences with only submodality shifts.
The problem with the old view about submodalities lies in part with the term itself. By labeling the quality and properties of the representations “sub,” the language created—by presupposition—the idea that we have moved to a lower logical level. But we have not.
The qualities of our pictures do not exist at a level lower than the picture. Try to picture any visual image that does not have color or black-and-white, closeness or farness, clarity or fuzziness. These do not represent “members” of the class—but qualities of the picture. They occur inside and exist as part of the representation.
When I (BB) try to process submodalities at a lower logical level, my mind goes blank because submodalities do not exist at a lower logical level. Submodalities exists as a part of the representation system and not apart from it. For instance, a car door can exist apart from the car as a separate entity and therefore the car door exists at a lower logical level from the car. Also, transportation exists at a lower logical level from existence and as such transportation can exist as a separate conceptual reality––but not so with submodalities. But a submodality like color cannot exist separately from the visual modality. A loud sound cannot exist as a separate entity from sound, for without sound you could not have loud or soft, high pitch or low pitch, etc. Therefore submodalities exist as part and parcel of the representation system.
We cannot change some experiences with only submodality shifts. This powerfully applies to belief change.
And so what does this mean? It means that we cannot change some experiences with only submodality shifts. This powerfully applies to belief change. Think about something that you do not believe. Can you represent what you do not believe? Can you even turn up all of the submodality properties of the representation making it closer, brighter, more life-like, etc.? When you do, do you suddenly “believe” it? I don’t. For example, get an image that represents the awfulness of Adolf Hitler. Note the submodalities. Now get an image that represents a great person like Mother Theresa. Note the submodalities of Mother Theresa. Now put the submodalities of the image of Adolf Hitler into the submodalities of Mother Theresa. This may prove difficult but go ahead and do it. Do you believe that Adolf Hitler represents a person like Mother Theresa? Of course not––when you see Adolf Hitler your words which operate meta to the image will modulate the meaning of the image.
In understanding this model, let’s review the difference between two basic levels of thought. The first level we call the level of the Primary State. The Primary States of consciousness define those everyday states of consciousness wherein we experience thought-and-feelings “about” something in the world “beyond” or “outside” our nervous system. In these states our thoughts relate to things “out there” and our bodies experience the primary emotions like fear-anger, relaxation-tension, glad-mad, attraction-aversion, etc.
The second level of thought refers to those abstract states of thought that Michael calls meta-states. Meta-states of consciousness define those thoughts about thoughts, feelings about feelings and states about states. Here our thoughts-and-emotions relate to and “about” the world “inside” ourselves. We can hate our hatred and minimize and/or eliminate our hatred. Thus, as Gregory Bateson has said, higher level thoughts modulate lower level thoughts (1972). By the process of Meta-stating ourselves, that is, bringing one thought to bear on another thought, we can increase a state as fearing our fear, minimize a state or even eliminate a state. When we really get tired of hating someone or something and then start hating our hatred, we may hate our old hatred right out of existence. What happens when you bring forgiveness to bear on your bitterness? What happens when you bring forgiveness to bear on your guilt? What happens when you bring appreciation to bear on frustration? Anger? Guilt? Sadness? Try it, you might like it.
Now, concerning beliefs: beliefs do not exist at the primary level — but at a level meta to representations. To believe in something, anything, we have to “say ‘Yes’ to the representation.” We have to confirm it. To disbelieve, we say “No” to the representation. To doubt, we say, “Maybe it is, and maybe it isn’t.” These phenomena occur at a meta-level and therefore need a metarepresentational system to carry them, and that primarily means words. With beliefs we have moved from thinking about something outside us in the world to thinking about some internal representation of what we have already experienced in the world.
So what?
This means that to turn a thought into a belief or a belief back into a mere thought, we have to move
to a meta-level and confirm or disconfirm the thought. Mere submodality shifting will often not work in shifting these beliefs. Submodality shifting that effects the saying “Yes” or “No” to a thought will alter the belief. In Part III we will give you models for shifting submodalities that work and work well.
2.12.1 Digital and Analogue Submodalites
A digital submodality functions either on or off. An analogue submodality varies over a continuum.
In looking at the submodalities, you will note a distinction even within the submodalities. Consider the visual submodalities. What difference exists between a picture that we code in color or black-and-white and a picture we see as far off or close? We will represent a picture as either black-and-white or in color. We have no choices for anything in-between. However, we can represent a picture as far off or close or anywhere in-between. Some submodalities then function like a light switch. We can code it one way or the other, but nowhere in-between. We can code a picture as a movie or a still shot, but not both. We refer to this as a digital submodality. A submodality that we can vary over a continuum we refer to as an analogue submodality. Location operates as an analogue submodality.
Most people learn to appreciate the submodality structure of experience by experiencing these distinctions via changing them. When an event happens, the event occurs as a fact of history. We cannot change what occurred “out there” beyond our skin. But once we take cognizance of that fact and represent it inside our heads/nervous systems––then thereafter we respond, not to a fact of history, but to our memory of that event (we respond to our “map” rather than the “territory”). So, while we cannot change external history, we can change our memory of that event (our internal map). When we do, the change takes place at the submodality level. How we feel about a certain event usually depends upon a few critical submodalities.
The User's Manual for the Brain Volume I Page 6
