Kilcullen notes that in the modern era some classical insurgencies do exist, such as in Colombia and Thailand, where insurgents seek to challenge the status quo, a functioning political body. But others follow state failure and the battle is over an ungoverned space, a situation that may be better described in new wars terms as a ‘war among the people’ than as an insurgency. Still more are sparked by an outside intervening power, against which the insurgents react. The invading coalition is in a sense more revolutionary than the insurgent, who is fighting to repel an occupier or to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces. Tied to this phenomenon is an entire cycle of activity, sparked by the initial presence of al Qaeda or an associated movement, which leads to the creation of ‘accidental’ guerrillas. In his book The Accidental Guerrilla, Kilcullen argues such guerrillas are the product of a four-stage process that is not unlike a disease. Transnational extremists first ‘infect’ an ungoverned area; the ‘contagion’, initially resisted by the local people who see them as alien outsiders, spreads via cooption and intimidation throughout the country and region; outside powers eventually intervene, taking action against the extremist presence using a range of tools from humanitarian aid to military force; finally, the local population lashes out in an immune ‘rejection’ response, closing ranks with the original alien outsiders against the new external threat. Local people fight alongside extremist forces, in the process becoming accidental guerrillas.
It is not difficult to see that at this stage the insurgency, despite having its origins in the existence of extremists with no real-world goals, begins to look like traditional counterinsurgency. As Kilcullen notes, at the operational level counterinsurgency remains a competition among sides, each seeking to mobilize the population. ‘The people remain the prize.’43 Tactically, whereas classical insurgents generally hid among the people in rural environments, modern insurgents are at least as likely to be found among the people in urban environments.
Other features echo those identified by Hammes. Modern communications, Kilcullen argues, have had the effect of compressing the operational level, such that tactical events have strategic effect once spread through the internet, i.e. they become part of the strategic communications plan. Kilcullen also approaches Hammes’ view that all insurgent activity is aimed at the mind of enemy decision makers when he notes that the pervasive and near-instantaneous character of modern media, the ‘globalization effect’ of an instantaneous worldwide audience, is such that revolutionary war is almost 100 per cent political, with little or no focus on the military aspect at the local level. And although he argues the notion of organizational networks and nodes is a bit too organized, Kilcullen comes close to Hammes’ perspective when he notes modern insurgencies discard hierarchy in favour of a ‘self-synchronizing swarm of independent but cooperating cells’.44
A notable aspect of Kilcullen’s strategic thought lies in his elaboration of this organizational aspect of modern insurgency. The essence of jihadist ‘operational art’ – the existence of such a thing in itself being controversial – he argues, lies in its ability to aggregate numerous tactical actions into one common movement. This is done through a ‘nested series of links’ across theatres and including groups with common ideologies, cultures, languages and above all the shared Islamic faith.
Kilcullen’s analysis has important repercussions for counterinsurgency. In its classical form, as put forward for example by Galula and Thompson, counterinsurgency is optimized to defeat insurgency in one country. But traditional concepts are problematic when applied to countering a global insurgency. Here the approach must first be on severing the links and communications between the international terrorists’ core leadership and local and regional players, isolating theatre-level actors from their global sponsors. The idea behind this strategy, what Kilcullen calls ‘disaggregation’, is not to resolve a specific conflict situation but rather to ensure the insurgent activity is isolated from that in other theatres. ‘The pathology of [contemporary] insurgency’, one scholar has argued, ‘suggests that we [must] isolate the guerrillas physically, cybernetically and psychologically from their base of support and from the media’.45 If it subsequently becomes necessary to address the local insurgency itself (and Kilcullen advises to avoid this if at all possible), then at least eight counterinsurgent ‘best practices’ come into play, the most notable of which are to adopt a comprehensive (whole-of-government) approach that integrates civil and military efforts; ensure population security; build local security forces; conduct combat strikes against insurgents when necessary; and effect a region-wide approach that controls borders and disrupts insurgent safe havens.46
David Petraeus and counterinsurgency
‘Best practices’ is perhaps the best way to characterize US counterinsurgency doctrine as expressed in the 2006 US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3–24), produced under the guidance of US Army General David Petraeus. Notwithstanding substantial discussion during this period, by Hammes and Kilcullen and others, of the transnational, globalized nature of modern insurgency, and of the need to sever links and networks operating across boundaries, FM 3–24 is strongly imbued with a classical, Maoist perspective. This is evidenced in its characterization of insurgencies as ‘normally seeking to achieve one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity’.47 Its counterinsurgency doctrine is accordingly ‘state-centric’, reflecting Galula’s rejoinder to Maoist doctrine and focused on what Kilcullen would call the operational (vice strategic) level of counterinsurgency.
FM 3–24 puts forward a number of principles, imperatives and paradoxes pertaining to counterinsurgency operations that together form the core of Petraeus’ strategic thinking (see Box 5.1). Upon FM 3–24’s publication it was the paradoxes that drew the most attention. This may have been because at a time when kinetic approaches were largely and ineffectually dominating American counterinsurgency responses, the manual emphasized the strength of non-kinetic responses (while still underscoring that killing clearly will often be necessary).
Box 5.1 The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
The core of official US strategic thought on counterinsurgency lies in the 2006 US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which identifies several historical principles for counterinsurgency, contemporary imperatives for counterinsurgency and paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations.
Historical principles:
• Legitimacy is the main objective. Any counterinsurgency operation must seek to establish an effective, legitimate government.
• Unity of effort is essential. Outside military, diplomatic, governmental and non-governmental organizations must coordinate their counterinsurgency efforts.
• Political factors are primary. Military commanders must consider at all times how operations will impact host nation legitimacy.
• Counterinsurgents must understand the environment. Soldiers and Marines must understand the society and culture within which they are conducting operations.
• Intelligence drives operations. As with all military operations, intelligence is imperative; however, counterinsurgency missions are unique in that counterinsurgents’ own actions are a key generator of intelligence. A cycle develops wherein operations create intelligence which defines subsequent operations.
• Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support. Killing every insurgent is not possible; a better approach is redress the social, political and economic grievances that fuel the insurgency, and to cut off physical and financial support – all extremely difficult tasks.
• Security under the law is essential. Security of the population is essential and involves establishing a legal system in line with local culture and practices to deal with insurgents.
• Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment. The populace must have confidence in the long-term
will and staying power of the counterinsurgents and host nation government.
Contemporary imperatives:
• Manage information and expectations. The populace must be given a realistic set of expectations so that the lack of immediate results is not interpreted as counterinsurgent or host nation deception.
• Use the appropriate level of force. Commanders must apply appropriate and measured levels of force precisely so as to minimize loss of life and any potential backlash.
• Learn and adapt. Insurgents constantly exchange information about counterinsurgent vulnerabilities so counterinsurgents must be able to adapt their best practices just as fast.
• Empower the lowest levels. Higher commanders should empower subordinates to make decisions within the commander’s intent because in counterinsurgency local commanders have the best grasp of the situation.
• Support the host nation. While it may be easier for counterinsurgents to conduct operations themselves, it is better to work to strengthen host nation capabilities since the long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself.
Paradoxes of counterinsurgency operations:
• Sometimes the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be. Keeping military forces safe in their compounds rather than out among the people reduces access to the intelligence needed to drive successful operations.
• Sometimes the more force is used, the less effective it is. The greater the use of force, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes and the greater the opportunity for insurgent propaganda.
• The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted. As counterinsurgent efforts progress, more reliance is placed on police work and troops will have to adhere to more stringent rules of engagement that may involve greater risk to the counterinsurgent.
• Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. Sometimes insurgents attempt to incite a counterinsurgent reaction that would create a propaganda opportunity.
• Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot. Legitimacy and public support for the host nation’s government can be achieved at times with activities that do not involve killing insurgents.
• The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than the counterinsurgent doing it well. ‘Tolerable’ host nation activity promotes the creation of a government able to stand by itself, but if the host nation cannot perform tolerably counterinsurgents may have to act.
• If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next. Insurgents quickly adjust to successful counterinsurgency practices so counterinsurgents need to continually adapt.
• Tactical success guarantees nothing. Military action cannot achieve success in counterinsurgency but must be linked to host nation political goals.
• Many important decisions are not made by generals. Successful counterinsurgency requires competence and judgement at all levels since even tactical decisions can have strategic consequences.
See: US Army, US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
Perhaps the most useful strategic direction for operational-level activities is found in the manual’s summary of successful counterinsurgency practices which advises the occupying power to, among other things, focus on the population, its needs and its security; establish and expand secure areas; and secure host nation borders. Indeed, ‘secure the population’ has been identified by Petraeus as the central lesson of counterinsurgency.48 The doctrine later elaborates that counterinsurgency efforts should begin by controlling key areas and that security and influence should then spread out from secured areas. But considering its importance, this ‘oil spot’ strategy, which was advised by counterinsurgency theorists from Galula to Thompson to Krepinevich, receives surprisingly little attention. The latter two theorists stressed especially the importance of first securing the populous urban areas, an approach that was adopted in practice when it came to implementing the doctrine’s tenets in Iraq.
Despite FM 3–24’s predominantly classical counterinsurgency approach, the manual does touch on elements familiar from Hammes’ and Kilcullen’s strategic thought. ‘Today’s operational environment’, it notes, ‘includes a new kind of insurgency, one that seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide … Defeating such enemies requires a global, strategic response [that] addresses the array of linked resources and conflicts that sustain these movements.’49 Yet the manual is short on what measures might be taken to effect such ‘disaggregation’. It includes an extensive discussion of tools to map an insurgent organization’s social network, noting that ‘such knowledge helps commanders understand what the network looks like, how it is connected, and how best to defeat it’, such as whether one should target enemy forces or enemy leaders.50 But, as with Kilcullen’s strategic thought, there are no further details on how, in this globalized, interconnected, real-time world, it is actually possible to sever links and isolate insurgents. This may be by design. The counterinsurgency manual agrees that networked organizations are difficult to destroy, but goes on to argue networks in any case have a limited ability to attain strategic success because they cannot easily muster and focus power. Meanwhile, commanders on the ground have expressed the view that thinking of the enemy as a network has had the effect of underemphasizing the critical and enduring importance of geography and controlling key terrain as a first step in spreading stability outward – perhaps a case of classical theory trumping the new-wave thinking of the information age.
A key author behind the production of FM 3–24 was Lieutenant-Colonel (retired) John Nagl, a strategic theorist in his own right. In his 2002 book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Nagl argued the better performance of the British military in implementing a counterinsurgency strategy in Malaya in the 1950s as compared to the US military in Vietnam was due to differing organizational cultures. The British army was a learning institution, he determined, while the American army was not, and this led to different performances in terms of absorbing and applying the lessons of counterinsurgency.51 Cutting counterinsurgent strategies to their essence, Nagl usefully frames counterinsurgency approaches throughout history as comprising basically two: annihilating the insurgents and appealing to the loyalty of the people.52 For Nagl, Britain practised the latter in Malaya, evolving its approach from an attrition-based strategy to one centred on small-unit tactics and intelligence from a supportive local population. By contrast, the United States fatefully continued to rely on an attrition-based search-and-destroy strategy.53 Critics contend that Nagl did not interpret the Malayan case accurately (nor indeed the Vietnamese case), and that in fact a lot more coercion was responsible for the British success than Nagl indicated.54 Nonetheless, the fingerprints of population-based counterinsurgency as expressed in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife can be seen throughout FM 3–24 – although Nagl himself has stated it is Galula’s strategic thought on the Algerian case that most informed the manual’s drafters.55
Critiques
America’s turn to counterinsurgency was not without criticism among strategic theorists. Gian Gentile, a Colonel in the US Army and professor at the US Military Academy, and Douglas Porch, a distinguished research professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, are two that stand out. In writings from the mid-2000s onward, Gentile’s strategic thought has had three main themes. The first considers the impact of the US Army’s shift to counterinsurgency, the story behind which is well told by Fred Kaplan in The Insurgents.56 In a 2008 directive, reissued in 2014, the Department of Defense (DoD) stated that irregular warfare, including counterinsurgency, was now ‘as strategically important as traditional warfare and DoD must be equally capable in both’.57 But from Gentile’s perspective the shift went well past the balance implicit in the directive, with deleterious effects. ‘Nationbuilding [and counterinsurgency] has become the core function
of the U.S. Army’, he argued in 2009, and this move was eroding America’s ability to wage large-scale conventional war.58
A second theme is Gentile’s view that America’s focus on population-centric counterinsurgency, as expressed in FM 3–24, is misplaced because it simply doesn’t ‘work’. ‘[T]he idea that [population-centric] counterinsurgency works is wrong’, he states in a 2013 book that brings together his ideas, ‘and history supports this assertion’.59 He gives as evidence the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, and his argument is supported by Porch (see Box 5.2).
Modern Military Strategy Page 17
