Questions
1 How is cyberwar or cyber attack distinct from other cyber operations like cyber network exploitation?
2 How does cyber attack relate to the broader concept of information warfare or information operations?
3 What is the NATO position on cyber war as a tool of warfare?
4 What are some notable aspects of strategic thought on the conduct of war in the cyber dimension?
5 By what criteria can it be determined if a cyber attack is a use of force or an armed attack?
6 What are some strengths and shortfalls of using cyber attack as a tool of warfare?
7 How likely is it that cyberwar will take place and why? Who are the actors likely to wage a cyber attack that rises to the level of armed attack?
8 How does the cyber domain relate to non-state actors and netwar?
Notes
1 National Research Council, Technology, Policy, Law and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2009), 11.
2 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’, Comparative Strategy 12 (1993), 146.
3 Martin Libicki, What is Information Warfare? (Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, ACIS Paper 3, August 1995); Martin Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 16–17.
4 Keith Alexander, ‘Warfighting in Cyberspace’, Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 2007), 59.
5 US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016–2028 (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army, February 2010), 21.
6 Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace, 17.
7 Libicki, What is Information Warfare?, 51.
8 Richard Mesic, Myron Hura, Martin C. Libicki, Anthony M. Packard, Lynn M. Scott, Air Force Cyber Command (Provisional) Decision Support (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), 16.
9 Author question to Polish General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, Deputy Commander NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, at the Ottawa Conference on Defence and Security, 25 February 2011.
10 NATO, ‘Cyber Security’, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm, accessed 14 December 2015.
11 Timothy Thomas, ‘China’s Electronic Long-Range Reconnaissance’, Military Review (November/December 2008).
12 Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2006), 4.
13 Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace, 39.
14 William J. Bayles, ‘The Ethics of Computer Network Attack’, Parameters (Spring 2001).
15 Libicki, Conquest in Cyberspace, 5.
16 Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1.
17 Mesic et al., 8.
18 Martin Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 121.
19 Ibid., 140.
20 Ibid., 127.
21 Ibid., 143, 158.
22 Bryan Krekel, ‘Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation’, report prepared for the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 9 October 2009, 15.
23 David Hollis, ‘Cyber War Case Study: Georgia 2008’, Small Wars Journal (January 2011), 8.
24 William J. Lynn III, ‘Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy’, Foreign Affairs 89:5 (September/October 2010), 99.
25 Kenneth Geers, Sun Tzu and Cyber War (Tallinn, Estonia: Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD CoE) Publications, 2011),www.ccdcoe.org, accessed March 2011.
26 William Matthews, ‘U.S. Faces Many Cyber Threats, Commander Warns’, Defense News, 27 September 2010, 23.
27 Mesic et al., 10.
28 National Research Council, 13, 161, 166.
29 Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4.
30 Geers.
31 ‘Cyberwar’, Economist, 3 July 2010, 11.
32 Greg Day of McAfee, as quoted in ‘War in the Fifth Domain’, Economist, 3 July 2010, 26.
33 Bruce Schneier of Counterpane, as quoted in Rob Lever, ‘U.S. May Use Cyberhackers as War Weapon’, National Post, 17 February 2003.
34 Hollis, 51.
35 NATO official as quoted in ‘A Cyber-Riot: Estonia and Russia’, Economist, 12 May 2007.
36 ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014, para. 72.
37 James Adams, ‘Virtual Defense’, Foreign Affairs 80:3 (May/June 2001), 109.
38 National Research Council, 3, 21.
39 James Lewis, A Note on the Laws of War in Cyberspace (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2010), 2.
40 Senior US military source paraphrased in ‘War in the Fifth Domain’, 28.
41 Lynn, 104.
42 National Research Council, 164.
43 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, 2004), 61–67.
44 Lynn, 99–100.
45 Jon R. Lindsay, ‘Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare’, Security Studies 22 (2013), 402.
46 ‘War in the Fifth Dimension’, 28.
47 As quoted in Ken Dilanian, ‘Iran’s Nuclear Program and a New Era of Cyber War’, Los Angeles Times, 17 January 2011.
48 Amit Sharma, ‘Cyber Wars: A Paradigm Shift from Means to Ends’, Strategic Analysis 34:1 (January 2010), 72.
49 Erik Gartzke, ‘The Myth of Cyberwar’, International Security 38:2 (Autumn 2013), 43.
50 David Betz, ‘Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35:5 (October 2012), 697.
51 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 141.
52 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997), 5; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 1.
53 Kevin Soo Hoo et al., ‘Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat’, Survival 30:3 (Autumn 1997), 138, 140–141.
54 James A. Lewis, Cyber Attacks: Missing in Action (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), http://csis.org/publication/cyber-attacks-missing-action/, accessed 21 December 2015.
55 Gartzke, 67.
56 Lewis, Cyber Attacks.
Further reading
Alexander, Keith. ‘Warfighting in Cyberspace’, Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 2007).
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’, Comparative Strategy 12 (1993).
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001).
Betz, David. ‘Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35:5 (October 2012).
Bonner, E. Lincoln. ‘Cyber Power in 21st Century Joint Warfare’, Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 2014).
Farwell, James P. and Rafal Rohozinski. ‘The New Reality of Cyber War’, Survival 54:4 (August/September 2012).
Foltz, Andrew C. ‘Stuxnet, Schmitt Analysis, and the Cyber “Use-of-Force” Debate’, Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 2012).
Gartzke, Erik. ‘The Myth of Cyberwar’, International Security 38:2 (Autumn 2013).
Hollis, David. ‘Cyber War Case Study: Georgia 2008’, Small Wars Journal (January 2011).
Libicki, Martin. What Is Information Warfare? (Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, ACIS Paper 3, August 1995).
Libicki, Martin. Conquest in Cyberspace: National Security and Information Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Libicki, Martin. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2
009).
Lindsay, Jon R. ‘Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare’, Security Studies 22 (2013).
Lynn, William J. III. ‘Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy’, Foreign Affairs 89:5 (September/October 2010).
Schmitt, Michael N., ed. Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
US Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2006).
US Army Training and Doctrine Command. Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016–2028 (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army, February 2010).
9 Spacepower
With the launch of Sputnik I in October 1957, space joined air, land and sea as a potential fourth domain of warfare. Over the next three decades hundreds of satellites were sent into orbit, including among them communications satellites in high earth orbit, navigation satellites in medium earth orbit and earth observation satellites in low earth orbit. The combination of communication and navigation satellites enabled the dramatically increased precision in force application, and speed of information transmission, that figured so prominently in the 1991 Gulf War. These attributes have led many to characterize the Gulf War as ‘the first space war’, while others – fewer in number – claim the distinction belongs to the Cold War. But ‘both claims are dubious’, argues one of a handful of spacepower theorists who have emerged in the period since the end of the Cold War. ‘Though replete with examples of space support for terrestrial forces, these conflicts were devoid of confrontation in space. It is doubtful history will remember either as space wars.’1 Indeed, the organizing principle of examining strategic thinking on the conduct of war in this particular domain is (fortunately) limited by the lack, so far, of empirical examples. Yet this doesn’t mean that there has not been discussion of the parameters and character of spacepower, and the potential role and mission of space forces acting both in and from space.
This chapter examines strategic thought on spacepower. It begins by discussing what is meant by ‘space’ and the particular attributes unique to space, out to the geostationary belt around earth, that impact its use. It then goes on to define spacepower, only one component of which is military, before drawing out some of the defining features of what might be the character of war in this dimension. Specific theorists are found largely in the United States defence community. They include the authors of official government and Pentagon documents but also, and more notably, military and civilian scholars associated with the US Air Force. Despite their institutional affiliation these thinkers are paradoxically united in the view that far from being an extension of airpower, as the term ‘aerospace’ would indicate, space is a domain deserving and requiring its own tradition of strategic thought.
What is space?
In 1958, the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, General Thomas White, declared: ‘There is no division … between air and space. Air and space is an indivisible field of operations.’2 Thus was set the post-Sputnik tone under which air and space are seen as a seamless medium, unconstrained by altitudinal demarcations. Yet despite the fact that the atmosphere gradually rather than abruptly disappears the further one moves away from earth, there are important markers. ‘Air’ extends upward from the earth’s surface to the highest point at which air-breathing engines can operate, about 50 kilometres, while ‘space’ begins above the surface of the earth at the lowest altitude at which a satellite can sustain a circular orbit, roughly 150 kilometres. Between the ‘ceiling of aviation’ and the ‘floor of astronautics’, notes spacepower theorist Colonel M.V. Smith of the US Air Force, there is a 100-kilometre-wide band called the transverse region within which neither aerodynamic flight nor orbital rotation is possible.3 The region divides the air from space, calling into question the idea of an aerospace continuum.
The ‘aerospace fallacy’ of an aerospace continuum, perpetuated over decades and reflected for example in the official name of NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), has had the effect of hindering the development of spacepower theory. Despite Sputnik’s launch in 1957 the first substantive work on spacepower, David Lupton’s On Space Warfare, did not appear until the closing days of the Cold War.4 The first dedicated effort on the part of the United States to craft a spacepower theory similar to that of other domains was launched in 2006 but was unable to develop a coherent theory of spacepower, in part because of the little empirical evidence available to aspiring theorists.5
The topography of space
At first glance space appears to be simply a vast expanse. But a closer look reveals that as a result of the laws of physics it is as demarcated and bounded a domain as are the land and sea environments by earth’s geographic features. Terrestrial orbits have been categorized into four, depending on their altitude and mission utility. Low earth (or altitude) orbit extends from 150 to 800 kilometres upward from the earth and, being relatively close to the earth, is particularly useful for earth observation satellites, as well as manned space flights and the international space station. Medium earth orbit ranges from 800 to 35,000 kilometres and includes most notably (as mentioned above) navigational satellites like GPS at 20,000 kilometres up. The lower the satellite, the faster it moves in relation to the earth; satellites in low earth orbit travel around the earth between 14 and 16 times a day, while those in high earth orbit go around between two and 14 times a day.
High earth orbit lies above 35,000 kilometres and satellites here travel around the earth no more than once a day. If a satellite’s orbital period is exactly the same as the earth (just under 36,000 kilometres), it is considered geosynchronous and appears fixed above one spot of the earth. With only three such satellites carefully placed equidistant from one another directly above the equator, in geostationary orbit, all points of the earth between 70 degrees north and 70 degrees south are in constant view. As a result this orbit is the preferred location for military and civilian communications satellites, as well as those that detect ballistic missile launches. Finally, satellites in highly elliptical orbit do not stay at the same altitude as they go around the earth but rather travel as close as 250 kilometres and as far out as 40,000 kilometres, allowing them to ‘see’ the polar regions of earth. Today there are about 1,100 operating satellites in orbit, most in low earth and geostationary orbit. In theory, a satellite could be placed as far out as 900,000 kilometres, the limit of earth’s gravitational field and just over twice the distance to the moon, at one time earth’s only satellite.
Our concern here is space out to about 40,000 kilometres. The most important factor in the topography of this area around earth is gravity, which has the effect of creating strategic narrows and celestial lines of communication no less important than the maritime chokepoints and sea lines of communication on earth. The first strategic narrow is low earth orbit, a narrow band of space around the earth which is relatively ‘easy’ to reach because satellites going this distance do not need a third-stage rocket boost to go into orbit. The second obvious strategic narrow is the geosynchronous altitude, especially the geostationary belt above earth’s equator, where satellites are stable relative to a position on earth, thereby allowing for fixed antennae on earth.
Apart from orbits, the topography of space around earth also features common pathways. In theory it is possible for a satellite to manoeuvre between orbits anywhere in space, but this requires enormous amounts of very limited onboard fuel. Earth’s gravitation pull is such that anything done close to earth requires exponentially more energy or, in space travel terms, ‘total velocity effort’. It takes twice as much effort to propel a satellite from earth out 100 kilometres, as it does from that altitude to the moon. The most effort-efficient way to move from one orbit to another is a two-step engine boost, the first to accelerate the spacecraft into a higher orbit (or decelerate into a lower orbit) and a second, once the new orbit is intersected, to circularize and stabilize the destination orbi
t. The concave line travelled between orbital levels is known as the Hohmann transfer orbit. Because of their advantages in fuel efficiency, notes one scholar: ‘The future lanes of commerce and military lines of communications in space will be the Hohmann transfer orbits between stable spaceports.’6 Beyond this, the trajectory of satellites in or on the way to orbit must also account for the Van Allen radiation belts. These are two doughnut-shaped regions of space, one straddling low and medium earth orbit and another straddling (and going beyond) medium and high earth orbit, comprised of electrically charged particles. The belts are dangerous to space vehicles and must be avoided.
Strategic areas for spacepower are also found on the surface of the earth. Launch trajectory impacts the effort required to place a satellite into orbit. The fact that the earth rotates west to east gives a ‘boost’ to satellites launched upward in an eastwardly direction. Since booster rockets fall to earth once expended, launch sites are best located on the eastern seaboard of an ocean (Cape Canaveral, Florida) or in the middle of a vast unpopulated area (Baikonur, Kazakhstan). Launch latitude also matters. Because the boost from the earth’s rotation peaks at the equator where the speed of its rotation is greatest, a country that has territory straddling the equator or close to it (Kourou, French Guinea) has a decided edge in launching satellites into geostationary orbit. Twice the payload for the same energy can be launched into geostationary orbit from the equator as from Kazakhstan. Strategic areas for spacepower are also found on earth wherever there are satellite ground stations to receive the electromagnetic information from the satellite and pass it on to the user.
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