by Richard Mead
On 11 July some more important visitors arrived for a demonstration of parachute and glider landing by the 2nd Parachute Battalion and the Advanced Divisional HQ near Larkhill. At their head was the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, with Portal and the DCIGS, Ronald Weeks. Perhaps more significantly from Boy’s perspective, there were two American Generals in the entourage, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had arrived in the UK just over a fortnight earlier as the newly appointed Commanding General, European Theatre of Operation, US Army, and Mark W. Clark, who was in command of US II Corps and was leading the planning for the future invasion of French North Africa.
The demonstration went well at first, although the wind was really too strong for safe parachuting. The Advanced HQ party, however, was dropped far too close to the VIP line and Brian Urquhart, last out of his plane, landed just in front of Eisenhower and was blown straight through it. According to Urquhart, Ike was perfectly charming, although less than impressed when Urquhart released a carrier pigeon, which flew to a nearby bush and refused to go further. ‘I see that we shall have to do something about your communications,’ said the future Supreme Commander.3
It was time for a return trip. In April, Dill had written to Brooke from Washington: ‘It would, I think, be mutually beneficial if you could spare Browning for a very short visit to parachutists here. I am very favourably impressed by what I have seen. Browning might get some ideas and would certainly give some.’
Boy arrived in the United States on 20 July and was given a friendly welcome by the American Army. He was immediately struck by the close resemblance which the US Airborne Divisions bore to the British, in spite of the fact that they had different origins, the British putting together existing brigades, the Americans converting an infantry division. He spent most of the time touring units with Lee, going as far afield as Texas and Florida, but was also invited to lunch alone with Marshall and to share ideas with him. He found the US Army Chief of Staff impressively well informed on airborne matters and a strong supporter generally of the new arm.
Boy focused much of his attention on the Americans’ basic parachute training, coming away with the impression that their courses were too short, but also concluding that the British equivalents were, in the light of what he had seen, rather too long. He also felt that the Americans, still very new to the use of airborne troops, had some way to go to master other fundamentals such as the seizure of ground around the drop zones, the use of AA and anti-tank guns and the concealment of troops from the air. He expressed his opinions forcefully, as was his habit, and experienced for the first time something of an adverse reaction. ‘I gathered the impression,’ he wrote later in his report to Paget, ‘which was confirmed by General Lee when I discussed quite frankly my reactions before leaving, that officers of his rank and below are fully aware of the necessity of these things, and for learning from us, but that the more senior officers take the following view – “the British Army has not done sufficiently well to lay down the law to the American Army and in consequence we have got little to teach them.” I know our people out there are fully aware of this attitude and take the line that we are prepared to accept a certain measure of their remarks about the British Army, but emphasis should be laid on the fact that we have learnt from painful mistakes and experience what not to do, and that they should at least listen to that.’
It was these attitudes on both sides – the British over-inclined to lecture their new allies on how to wage war, the Americans resentful of what they perceived as unjustified arrogance – which were to impair relationships at a senior level in the two armies as soon as they began to work together and to make a significant and long-lasting contribution to the anglophobia of some top US generals. In his conclusion to Paget, Boy wrote: ‘I personally would have no qualms, from what I have seen of the [US] Army, about the amount of co-operation which can be expected as long as we know their outlook and meet them more than half way, which is not always easy for an Englishman.’ In his own case achieving a meeting of minds with the Americans would prove to be far from easy.
In most other respects, Boy was impressed by what he had seen on his tour. He believed that the American approach to discipline, ‘a curious blend of the strict and the easy going’, would serve them well in battle and that their inherent military qualities and determination to achieve their objectives would bring success. He was astonished by their engineering capabilities when it came to constructing facilities of any sort and envious of their lavish equipment and notably their transport aircraft, the C.47 Dakota. Returning from the United States on 4 August, Boy lost no opportunity to spread the message about cooperation. He followed up his letter to Paget with a meeting, lectured both the Airborne Division and the RAF on what he had learnt and on 13 August held a joint exercise involving night landings by 2/503 Parachute Infantry and 1 Airlanding Brigade, opposed by 1 Parachute Brigade and 2nd Armoured Battalion, Irish Guards.
This frenetic level of activity left little time for the family and, after his ten day leave in March, Boy was only able to spend the occasional night at Readymoney Cove. The children would always know that he had arrived by the tell-tale smell of eau-de-cologne and cigarettes. To them he was always fun. His main party piece, other than his celebrated Cossack dance, was to walk past their bedroom window, simulating going down a flight of steps. He would disappear entirely and then spring up again to howls of delight from inside.
For Daphne his visits were more stressful. The only colleague he ever brought with him was Nigel Norman, whom she took to immediately, but more often he came by himself and once on their own he felt he could share some of his burdens. He managed to take a week off in July, but it was very frustrating for both of them that wartime restrictions meant they were unable to sail. ‘Yggy’ had been laid up in Hunkin’s yard for the duration, but Restless was still afloat and the two of them used to take a picnic out to her.
A return visit by Daphne to Netheravon in October was less successful. Boy worked all hours and she virtually never saw him, writing to Tod that she was grateful that she had brought her typewriter with her. She very much hoped that he would be able to take a longer period of leave over Christmas 1942, but it was not to be. Eight days beforehand he left for North Africa.
Chapter 13
Setbacks (1942–1943)
As the summer of 1942 drew to a close, the Airborne Division was at last beginning to look like a complete formation. In July 2 Parachute Brigade was formed under the command of Eric Down. 4th Parachute Battalion, which had been raised to join the three original battalions in 1 Parachute Brigade, was transferred to the new brigade, but it was no longer possible to rely on volunteers, so two Territorial units were converted to become 5th and 6th Parachute Battalions.1 By this time 1 Airlanding Brigade Group had lost almost all its ancillary units, which became divisional troops. The latter were nearly up to establishment in their complement of engineers and signals, whilst 21 Independent Parachute Company was established to act as pathfinders and there was even a light tank squadron. The most deficient arm was the artillery, which was still only in battery strength in each of howitzers, anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft guns. A second battalion was formed in the Glider Pilot Regiment and Chatterton transferred to the 1st Battalion after the death of Rock in a glider accident in October.
Ground training had also moved forward. On 1 September a divisional battle school was opened, in response to Paget’s decision to create such establishments throughout Home Forces. By the middle of that month, Boy felt that the division was ready to hold Exercise ‘Merlin’ over two days, the first time it had been possible to carry out any such event on a divisional level.
On the RAF side too, progress seemed initially to have been made, with the expansion of 38 Wing in August by two additional squadrons, 295 and 298. However, a major setback occurred in the following month, when it was rather belatedly discovered that the Whitley was unable to tow a fully loaded Horsa. Pending increased production of the n
ew Albemarles and the release of larger bombers, Halifaxes and Stirlings, from Bomber Command, this was to have a significant impact on the conversion of glider pilots from Hotspurs to Horsas and the ability of the airlanding brigade to complete its training. Churchill was furious, but there was no obvious immediate solution.
Worse was to follow as the argument continued within the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In August Arthur Harris, the AOC-in-C of Bomber Command, wrote in a memo highly critical of the airborne forces’ demands, ‘is Bomber Command to continue its offensive action by bombing Germany or is it to be turned into a training and transport command for carrying a few thousand troops to some undetermined destination for some vague purpose?… I find it hard to resist the conclusion that the raising of the airborne division was undertaken without adequate appreciation of how it would be transported, or where and when it could be employed with any prospect of material contribution to victory.’
Brooke challenged Portal to say whether or not he agreed with Harris’s comments on the airborne forces. The Chief of the Air Staff replied that the AOC-in-C had possibly overstated his case, but that he himself doubted if airborne forces could be used effectively against stiff opposition. On 29 September he submitted a memo arguing that the current airborne establishment should be reduced and used for raiding and minor operations. The CIGS countered on 10 October with a memo of his own, pointing to the use made of airborne forces by Germany2 and concluding: ‘The airborne division is an essential formation and our present airborne forces cannot be considered sufficient.’ Two meetings later, it was clear that stalemate had been reached and Portal suggested referring the whole matter to Churchill for a decision. The memos setting out the positions of the two sides were sent to the War Cabinet on 7 November.
It was not a particularly good moment to approach the Prime Minister, who was much preoccupied with events in the Western Desert and the preparations for Operation ‘Torch’. He was, moreover, known to be a strong supporter of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany, the one way in which he could mollify Stalin on the lack of progress in establishing a second front in Europe. The War Office sensed the arguments slipping away from them and Gale wrote to Ismay on 7 November to say that he was concerned that the Air Staff ‘are progressively closing down on progress in connection with airborne forces on assumption paper will go in their favour.’ Gale was right to be concerned, as Ismay himself was moving towards Portal’s position, supporting the reduction of airborne forces to two parachute brigades and a small glider-borne force.
Brooke’s backing, on the other hand, became all the stronger for a visit he had paid to the Airborne Division on the occasion of its first anniversary on 3 November. In his diary for the day he wrote: ‘Made an early start and motored down to Andover to visit Airborne Division. Started with inspection of the Border Regiment, a first-class show and a real workmanlike organization for an airborne battalion. Then proceeded to lunch at Syrencot House, the HQ of the division. This brought back many memories of 3 of the happiest years of my life.3 After lunch inspected Parachute Bn, grand lot of men, and then representative groups from all the units. Was also shown method of loading gliders, ambulance and RE organization, etc. After tea was shown glider using parachute to allow of steeper descent. Also had a trip in a Wellesley aircraft fitted with ‘Rebecca’, a new homing system for finding objectives. I was then taken in a Horsa glider pulled by an Albemarle from Netheravon to Shrewton. A delightful and most inspiring trip. Came away more convinced than ever that there is a great future for airborne forces.’4
Without the strong support of Brooke, there is little doubt that the British airborne forces would have been reduced to a minor role by the end of 1942. Their future, as perceived by Portal and Ismay, was as raiders or supporters of conventional operations in brigade strength at most. To counter this, Boy was assiduous in ensuring that not only Brooke, but the other members of the Army Council and those who were backers elsewhere, such as Mountbatten and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, AOC-in-C of Army Cooperation Command, were kept fully in the picture on both progress and difficulties.
However, for the time being the argument was going Portal’s way, confirmed by the Prime Minister’s adjudication on 19 November, endorsing the CAS’s proposal. From the point of view of Brooke, Paget, Boy and Gale, this was a serious setback. Brooke persuaded Churchill not to break up the Airborne Division, but he was unable to prevent a slow-down in glider production. In the meantime the RAF had stopped any further issues of aircraft with effect from 19 October and 298 Squadron was disbanded, so further training and operations were forced to make do with what was already available until either the Air Ministry resumed the supply of aircraft or the Americans made alternatives available.
In spite of these problems, the airborne forces were about to see real action. On a very small scale another operation was conceived by Combined Operations HQ. This was the raid of 19 November on the German heavy water plant at Vermork in Norway, codenamed ‘Freshman’, carried out by a party of Royal Engineers. Because of the heavy equipment which was thought necessary, the party went in by gliders, two of which were towed across the North Sea by Halifax bombers. Radar direction failed and one aircraft and both gliders crash landed, their crews and passengers either dying as a result or being executed subsequently by the Germans. By any standards this was a complete disaster, quite different to the Bruneval Raid.5
Much more significant was the first deployment of airborne forces overseas in support of a conventional campaign. At the end of September Boy was informed that 2/503 Parachute Infantry Regiment was to be required for Operation ‘Torch’, the invasion of French North Africa. In addition to his existing duties, he had been appointed the British adviser on airborne forces to Commanders-in-Chiefs in all theatres of war and, in this capacity, he immediately made strong representations both to the War Office and to the ‘Torch’ planners that a larger airborne element should be employed, proposing 1 Parachute Brigade. The RAF was unable to supply the necessary aircraft, but the USAAF stepped enthusiastically into the breach and the brigade was hastily retrained on Dakotas.
Not for the last time, this resulted in Boy ceding operational control of part of his command, with Flavell being instructed to report directly to Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson, the commander of First Army, who would dispose of the formation as he thought fit. The brigade left by sea on 1 November and landed at Algiers eleven days later, in the wake of the successful seaborne landings. On 12 November the 3rd Parachute Battalion made the first operational drop at Bone, followed by the other two battalions elsewhere later in the month and from then until the end of April 1943 the brigade was almost constantly in action in Tunisia, fighting from the end of November as conventional infantry.
Boy saw this as an opportunity both to show off the capabilities of his men in action and to use their deployment as an excuse to create another brigade. The latter was duly authorized in early November and three more infantry battalions6 were converted to the 7th, 8th and 9th Battalions of the Parachute Regiment and formed into 3 Parachute Brigade, with Lathbury moving from the War Office to take command.
Boy also needed to see for himself what was happening on the ground, so on 17 December he and Norman flew to North Africa for a short visit, meeting not only Flavell, but also the relevant senior commanders, Eisenhower, Anderson and Lieutenant General Charles Allfrey of V Corps, under whom 1 Parachute Brigade was operating. In miserable weather, wet and cold, he also visited the three battalions over Christmas. The men of the 2nd Parachute Battalion, who had just come out of the line after heavy fighting around Medjez-el-Bab, during which they incurred severe losses, were less than impressed by the arrival of the immaculately uniformed general and a number of them showed their displeasure by melting away during his address.
The visit was useful, however, in that a number of lessons had been learnt. Neither Boy nor Flavell were happy with the dispersion of the brigade, indeed Flavell had been able to exercise only
limited control. Boy himself had recommended that the whole brigade be used in a major coup de main, but he had been ignored. The USAAF, whilst keen, had proved to be poorly trained. Most importantly the knowledge of airborne operations within the various superior HQs was poor and Boy’s proposal for liaison officers to be attached to them had been rejected. All these failings needed to be rectified.
Although he had missed Christmas in Cornwall, Boy was back in England before the end of the year and on New Year’s Day 1943 he went up to London to meet both Brooke and the Prime Minister, using the opportunity to vent his frustration. As both were preoccupied by the forthcoming Casablanca Conference, he prepared a report on the operational state of the airborne forces, which he sent to GHQ Home Forces on 10 January, copied to Brooke. In this he pointed out that 1 Parachute Brigade had suffered 443 casualties in North Africa and was still 150 men under strength, even after reinforcements from 2 Parachute Brigade. The latter was accordingly considerably depleted, whilst 3 Parachute Brigade was still forming. 1 Airlanding Brigade was well trained for ground operations and fit for war, but was seriously lacking in equipment, as were the divisional troops. The number of aircraft was totally deficient and, although there were sufficient Horsas, there were not enough tugs to ferry them to Africa.
Boy went on to say that, since July 1942, he had been urging the formation of an Airborne Forces HQ in addition to the Airborne Division HQ , to take some of the administrative and advisory responsibilities off the shoulders of the GOC, failing which a much larger divisional HQ would be necessary. He had received no backing for this or for the appointment of an airborne commander at First Army. His conclusion was bleak: ‘The Division is not ready for war even in a ground role and the air situation precludes even unit training in the air role.’
