by Richard Mead
Worse was to follow. One of Ridgway’s battalion commanders was informed that Boy was to arrive on the following day on an inspection. On making enquiry of Ridgway, he found that the latter knew nothing about it and was incensed when he heard. It was indeed at best discourteous of Boy not to have gone through the divisional commander and his action did nothing to improve a steadily deteriorating relationship. The situation was further exacerbated by Boy then informing Ridgway that he was coming to see his plans for ‘Husky’. Ridgway responded that no plans were available for scrutiny until they had been approved by Patton. The Seventh Army commander supported Ridgway and the matter was escalated to Eisenhower, whose Chief of Staff, Walter Bedell Smith, read Ridgway a stiff lecture on cooperation, causing him to back down. The damage, however, had been done and would affect relationships in the future, although Boy was in general a great admirer of the Americans.
Although Hopkinson was also unhappy about his allocation of aircraft, the main problem with him was of a different order. The newly appointed GOC of 1 Airborne Division was keen to demonstrate his independence from his former commander and, as they were now of the same rank, did not see that he should be dictated to. His tactic was to ignore Boy for as long as he could get away with it, even to the extent of disappearing from his HQ whenever the latter arrived. Without consulting Boy he went directly to Montgomery and sold him the concept of a glider-borne operation on the night before the beach landings on Sicily, its objective being the strategically important Ponte Grande, a bridge just inland from Syracuse. Montgomery, who had no concept of the limitations of such an operation or understanding of the difficulties of the airlanding brigade in its conversion to Hadrians or the total lack of experience of the American tug pilots, seized on the proposal with enthusiasm, as it solved a conundrum for him. Boy was horrified when he heard of it, as he could see major problems, particularly regarding the landing zones, which were composed of small fields divided by stone walls. He was also unhappy about the approach over the open sea. However, he was in no position to change Montgomery’s mind and was effectively ignored. Chatterton, who was to lead the glider force, thought that the plan was mad and duly pointed out all the obstacles, only to be told by Hopkinson that if he did not accept it he would be replaced.
There remained a huge task for Boy’s HQ to carry out, including the provision of all the necessary supplies for the forthcoming operations and liaison with the two air forces over reconnaissance and air to ground support. It was also responsible for coordinating the movement of both divisions to their final staging point at Kairouan in Tunisia, carried out in late June and early July. There was little time for relaxation, although Boy managed to visit 24 Guards Brigade, which had fought in the closing stages of the North African campaign and was now resting near Tunis. The composition of the brigade had changed since his departure in November 1941, with 5th Grenadiers replacing 2nd Warwicks. The former was now commanded by Geordie Gordon Lennox and the battalion’s chaplain was Boy’s cousin, Denys Browning8, who had followed his father Bertie into the church.9
Boy moved to Malta shortly before the invasion of Sicily and remained there until after the first phase, his main concern being to ensure that the AA batteries in the vicinity of the landing zones were neutralized by RAF Beaufighters. The glider operation on the night of 9/10 July, as he had predicted, was disastrous. Many of the gliders were cast off far too early by the inexperienced tug pilots and went down in the sea, including, ironically, the one in which Hopkinson was flying. Those which landed in Sicily were dispersed over a wide area, only one reaching the correct landing zone, its occupants seizing the Ponte Grande, where they were joined in due course by others, including Walch, who had accompanied the 1 Airlanding Brigade and who took command of the party. The Italians counter-attacked in strength and overran the positions, but the bridge was later recaptured intact by the seaborne forces.10 The total casualties of the brigade were 490, of whom 252 were drowned.
In the American sector, there was also initial chaos as the paratroops were dropped in widely separated parties far from their intended landing zones. In their case, however, they did manage to create considerable confusion among the German and Italian defenders by taking vigorous offensive action wherever they could and disrupting lines of communication. Although its execution was far from the original conception, this airborne operation nevertheless made a considerable contribution to the successful lodgement of Seventh Army. The 82 Airborne Division later formed part of the Provisional Corps, which carried out a wide flanking movement to Palermo.
1 Airborne Division mounted one further operation, the seizure of the Ponte di Primasole, another key bridge, this time over the Simeto River in the Plain of Catania. Carried out on the night of 13/14 July by Lathbury’s 1 Parachute Brigade, it was similarly blighted by the inaccuracy of the drops, due to the inexperience of the Dakotas’ pilots. A party from 1st Parachute Battalion did capture and hold the bridge, removing all the demolition charges, but was forced off on the following day. Nevertheless, by removing the charges and then dominating the bridge from the south, the paratroopers subsequently enabled it to be captured intact by ground forces.
The conclusion of the Sicily campaign in early August marked the effective end of Boy’s appointment as Adviser to Eisenhower and Alexander. He attended the Board of Enquiry into ‘Husky’, set up by Eisenhower in late July, at which he was sharply critical of the performance of the USAAF and RAF pilots and navigators. Alexander had written a report which was positive overall. ‘The recent operations’, it read ‘have proved the value of airborne troops, and given us a peep into their great possibilities if they are properly organized, equipped and employed.’ He pointed out that where the troops were accurately dropped the results had been excellent, was enthusiastic about the quality of the troops themselves, but was critical, just like Boy, of the pilots of the two air forces.
Alexander may have been supportive, but Boy was deeply frustrated. He had, in effect, been cut out of any real involvement in operations by the two army commanders, Patton and Montgomery. Following attempts by Boy to discuss aspects of the operations with Monty’s two immediate subordinates, Leese and Dempsey, the Eighth Army commander had gone as far as to write to Lieutenant General McCreery, Alexander’s Chief of Staff: ‘Browning must discuss the employment of airborne troops with me and not with my Corps commanders. The conduct of operations in Sicily is nothing to do with him and suggest you inform him accordingly.’ In the face of such an attitude and having in particular had his advice on the glider landings dismissed out of hand, it was little wonder that Boy questioned the value of his role.
In early August Boy returned to England, where he participated in some preliminary discussions being held on the employment of airborne forces in the invasion of North-West Europe. The RAF was by this time much more inclined to cooperate and a key meeting, attended by Boy, Gale and Crawford, was held on 10 August to consider the role of 6 Airborne Division in the invasion. It was chaired by Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory, then the AOC-in-C Fighter Command, but shortly to be designated the Air C-in-C of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and both its content and its tone demonstrated a significant improvement in inter-service relationships since the beginning of the year.
Boy’s time back in England was all too brief, although he managed to take a whole week in Fowey at the end of August. He was about to leave on a long odyssey, the main objective of which was to advise on the development of airborne forces in India. With a small party consisting of Walch, Major Bill Bradish, Boy’s DAQMG, and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony B. Harris, his American liaison officer, he departed again in early September, calling in on Allied Forces HQ in Algiers and 15th Army Group HQ in Bizerta, before flying on to visit 1 Airborne Division in Taranto just as the command had unexpectedly changed hands.
The division had landed in Italy on 9 September in an infantry role, transported to Taranto by Royal Navy cruisers. Though the Germans in the area were relativel
y few in number, they had put up a spirited defence. Hopkinson, eager to see what was happening in the front line, had been visiting 4 Parachute Brigade and, ignoring warnings from Hackett and others about snipers, had stuck his head over a protecting wall and been shot. Seriously wounded and unconscious, he had been taken back to the field hospital and in the meantime Eric Down had taken over command on 11 September with the approval of Montgomery. Hopkinson died of his wounds on the next day, just before Boy arrived.
The other two brigadiers, Hackett and Lathbury, were not entirely happy about the appointment of Down, who, whilst thoroughly competent, had a reputation as one of the most abrasive officers in the Army. Possibly because of this,11 Boy signalled to Eighth Army and the War Office to enquire if he should assume command instead, but was ordered to proceed to India in accordance with his instructions. He flew on to GHQ Middle East in Cairo and then to New Delhi, where he arrived on 17 September.
On 22 September Boy had the first of several meetings with Major General Orde Wingate, who had recently returned from accompanying Churchill to the Quadrant Conference in Quebec. Wingate had impressed Roosevelt with his account of the first Chindit expedition and the President ordered that he was to be offered every facility, including the use of American planes and gliders for his next operation, which was being planned for the spring of 1944. Boy’s task was to discuss with Wingate cooperation between the Chindits and 50 Indian Parachute Brigade and the use by the former of Hadrian gliders, but Walch remarked subsequently that Wingate was not a good listener and took little notice of what operational experience Boy’s team had to offer, although, by way of mitigation, he was suffering from malaria at the time.
Boy’s main priority was to visit the only airborne formation in the country, 50 Indian Parachute Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Michael Hope-Thompson, formerly CO of 4th Parachute Battalion in the early days of 1 Airborne Division. Already well trained and ready for action, it was based at Campbellpore in the Northern Punjab, and consisted of 152nd (Indian), 153rd (Gurkha) and 154th (Gurkha) Parachute Battalions, together with a parachute squadron of the Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners and its own signals section and machine gun and medical companies. The arrival of Boy’s party coincided with the end of the Hindu festival of Dussehra and they were entertained to singing and dancing by the Gurkhas. Boy gave a spontaneous demonstration of his Cossack dance, which was greatly admired.
Boy’s visit to the parachute brigade had been made in company with the C-in-C India, General Sir Claude Auchinleck and the AOC-in-C, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse, and when he returned to New Delhi, he had a number of meetings with both men and with General Sir George Giffard, the GOC-in-C Eastern Army. The outcome was a series of decisions, including the expansion of 50 Indian Parachute Brigade, which was still short of men, the formation of an airborne forces depot, the appointment of a Director of Air at GHQ India, the creation of an Indian Army Air Corps and, most significantly, the raising of an airborne division. In connection with the last of these, a signal was sent to the War Office London on 13 October requesting the despatch of a divisional commander designate, together with a GSO1, GSO2 and DAQMG.
Whilst Boy was in New Delhi, Mountbatten arrived to take up his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia and on 14 October Boy met him for a briefing on all matters airborne. This appointment was especially pleasing as Boy could leave India knowing that, with Auchinleck firmly on side as well, he had two strong supporters at the top of the military hierarchy there. He returned directly to the UK and to a new and much more promising job.
Chapter 15
Corps (December 1943–June 1944)
On 20 August 1943, before leaving for India, Boy sent a long letter to the War Office which was to be the catalyst for major changes to the organization and control of the airborne forces. It was born out of his extreme frustration at the impotence of his position as Major General Airborne Forces and his assessment that, with the invasion of North-West Europe likely to take place in the following year, a more efficient structure and chain of command was vital.
In the letter he pointed out that many of the difficulties encountered in Sicily had been the result of the British and American airborne divisions coming under the command of higher formations whose commanders and staff had no experience of their use. His own rank of major general and role as adviser had not allowed him to exercise command himself and his lack of authority had meant that his advice had on occasions been ignored. He went on to say that he believed that it would be desirable to use airborne formations in at least divisional strength, and possibly in corps strength, in the forthcoming campaign and that it would be necessary to set up an organization which could command more than one division on operations and to train them accordingly. He also recommended that there should be a single higher authority with whom the RAF could deal when it came to the allocation of aircraft and the training of glider pilots.
His conclusion was that there should be a major upgrading of the existing Airborne Forces HQ. In addition to the existing roles of Major General Airborne Forces, as adviser to the War Office and to supreme commanders and commanders-in-chief at home and abroad, and as commander of all airborne training, depot and experimental establishments, the HQ should be given the administrative and operational command of all airborne forces.
The letter was duly considered by the War Office during his visit to India, but no decision had been made by the time of his return and he raised the issue with Brooke when he met the CIGS on 28 October. On 12 November James Steele, the Director of Staff Duties, sent a minute to Ronald Weeks, the DCIGS: ‘When 1 Airborne Division returns to the UK, there will be in 21 Army Group two airborne divisions in addition to certain allied para units. C-in-C 21 Army Group asked for the appointment of a “Commander Airborne Troops” to command all formations and units in the Army Group as well as any SAS units, and to act as his airborne adviser. He considers that this commander should be entirely under his orders and have no dual responsibility. He has asked in addition that Major-General Browning should be appointed to this post.’ Importantly at this juncture, Steele went on to write: ‘There would…be no question of commanding all the airborne troops in operations.’
This was not quite what Boy had in mind. Indeed, he had specifically proposed that the organization should be constituted as an airborne corps to command both 1 and 6 Airborne Divisions and allied contingents other than the Poles. This had not been asked for by Paget, who had moved from Home Forces to be C-in-C 21st Army Group in the summer, and it was considered by Steele to be wrong in principle. Boy had made two further proposals, first that the Commander Airborne Corps should have direct access to the War Office through the Major General Airborne Forces and secondly that he should have the rank of lieutenant general. On the first, Steele thought that the position of MGAF was no longer justified and that access should be through the Director of Air. On the second he felt that there were arguments for and against, whilst Paget had an open mind.
Somehow, Boy managed to have his way on the major issues. On 4 December the new HQ Airborne Troops, formed on a nucleus of its predecessor, HQ Airborne Forces, opened at High House, Hammersmith, close to 21st Army Group, under whose command it was to come. It was to take under its own command 1 and 6 Airborne Divisions and the Special Air Service Brigade, which was about to be formed. The responsibility for the Airborne Forces Depot and Development Centre was passed to the War Office. Boy’s Directive No 1 was explicit about nomenclature: ‘The Title of the Force is officially Headquarters Airborne Troops (21 Army Group). All correspondence will bear the official title, but verbally it will be known as the Airborne Corps and I will be referred to as the Corps Commander.’ On 9 December he was promoted to acting lieutenant general.
Boy retained a presence at Brigmerston House and the first corps commander’s conference was held there on 8 December, chaired by Boy and attended by Down, Gale, Flavell, Walch and his chief administrative officer Bower. This w
as to be one of Down’s last appearances as GOC of 1 Airborne Division, as on 7 January 19441 he handed over command to an officer who was new to the Airborne Forces, Roy Urquhart.
There have been allegations that Boy dismissed Down because he was too abrasive, but there is no evidence to support this. Indeed, according to Urquhart himself, Boy contested the decision to remove Down but was overruled. Although Down was apparently disgruntled at the prospect, he was leaving with good reason, because he had been nominated to lead a new airborne division to be raised in India. 1 Airborne Division had only just returned from the Mediterranean and was unlikely to see action for some time, with 6 Airborne Division certain to be committed to battle next. He was therefore both available and admirably suited to the job, although it was to prove to be even more frustrating than Boy’s experience in 1942.2 The position of GOC 1 Airborne Division was not, in any event, in Boy’s gift, although he was consulted on the subject. On being asked if would accept someone from outside the airborne forces, he agreed as long as the individual was ‘hot from battle’.3
The first choice, as it happened, was not Urquhart at all, but Brigadier ‘Swifty’ Howlett, who had been commanding 36 Brigade throughout the Tunisian campaign and on into Italy. The day after he was told of his appointment, he was killed by shellfire on the River Sangro. Urquhart had the advantage of already being in the UK, where he was the BGS at XII Corps. Moreover, he met Boy’s criterion as he had seen plenty of action, as GSO1 of 51 (Highland) Division from El Alamein to the end of the North African campaign and then as commander of 231 (Malta) Brigade Group, earning a DSO and bar in the process. The latter formation had been involved in heavy fighting in Sicily and had gone on to land in Italy, where Urquhart had been slightly wounded. He was a favourite of Montgomery’s, who possibly suggested and was certainly consulted on his promotion.
