by Richard Mead
The first operation to be planned after the creation of FAAA was ‘Transfigure’, which envisaged 1 Airborne Division, 101 US Airborne Division and 1 Polish Parachute Brigade landing in two lifts to cut off the retreating Germans by closing the Paris-Orleans gap. They would be accompanied by 878 US Airborne Aviation Engineer Battalion and the newly formed Airborne Forward Delivery Airfield Group (‘AFDAG’), which would respectively construct and operate an airfield for the arrival of 52 Division. All the troops would be under the command of I Airborne Corps, which had carried out the planning, as HQ FAAA was still in the course of formation.
The employment of an airborne corps HQ in such operations was by this time a matter of policy at the highest level. When Eisenhower wrote to Marshall on 28 July justifying the creation of FAAA, he had said: ‘Assuming that an airborne attack by two or three divisions took place within a single area, a temporary corps commander would be designated to conduct the fighting on the ground. He would operate under directives issued by this headquarters until his forces could join up with the nearest army, whereupon he would be taken over by the army commander both operationally and logistically.’8
Boy flew to France to meet both Bradley and Montgomery on 9 August and, on his return, held a conference of all his subordinate commanders. Boy had decided to take with him an Advance HQ, consisting of 120 of the approximately 275 personnel at Moor Park, together with 78 British and 28 American signals personnel, who were allocated specifically for the operation. On 15 August Advance HQ relocated to the airfield at Harwell, where the gliders for the operation were all loaded, but by 17 August it was clear that Patton’s Third Army was moving so quickly9 that the operation would no longer be necessary and all the troops were stood down, Advance HQ returning to Moor Park on the following day.
More small abortive operations followed, including one to seize bridgeheads over the River Seine and another to capture Boulogne, but, like their predecessors, they were overtaken by events. Towards the end of August, an operation even larger than ‘Transfigure’ was planned, with a view to controlling the roads leading north through Tournai, Lille and Courtrai and thus cutting off the Germans retreating in front of Second Army. On 1 September Dempsey sent explicit instructions to Boy to ‘Facilitate in every way the move of 30 Corps to Brussels. This will include guarding all bridges in your area; policing all cross-roads in your area; and keeping all your own and civilian traffic off the roads which 30 Corps are using … Inform me by wireless of the location of your HQ directly it is established, together with the map reference of the nearest landing ground for light aircraft.’ It was quite clear from this that Dempsey expected the Corps HQ to be on the ground controlling operations.
Operation ‘Linnet’ called for the ‘Beneficiary’ force to be further augmented by 82 US Airborne Division and the troops from all the formations concerned were moved to their airfields on 30 August, with Advance HQ of I Airborne Corps going once again to Harwell. On this occasion it was not so much events as weather which caused the cancellation. By 2 September, D-1, it had turned to heavy rain and that evening it was cancelled. In the event XXX Corps had an almost unimpeded advance to Brussels, Guards Armoured Division making a triumphal entry into the city on the next day.
This time the troops remained at their airfields as Brereton had an alternative plan in mind, ‘Linnet II’. This involved landings by the same force in the Aachen-Maastricht area to block any retreat through the gap between the North Eiffel and the River Maas. It was conceived in haste and Boy protested to Brereton that maps of the area could not be distributed in time for an adequate briefing. On being told that the operation would only be cancelled on the orders of SHAEF or if the weather did not permit, he responded that he would submit a formal letter of protest on behalf of himself and his divisional commanders.
Once Boy had left the meeting Brereton summoned Ridgway and asked him if he thought the divisional commanders would join Boy’s protest. Ridgway replied that he was sure that Gavin and Maxwell Taylor of 101 US Airborne Division would do as they were ordered without question, a characteristic of American commanders generally. He was asked to stand by to assume command if Boy persisted with his threat. The letter from Boy duly arrived, which not only registered a protest but said that the difference of opinion made it difficult for him to continue as Deputy Commanding General of FAAA and that he was therefore tendering his resignation.
Whether or not this was a bluff on Boy’s part – and he was certainly right to raise questions about a totally inadequately planned operation – it was called by Brereton, who told him on the following day that the letter would be forwarded to Eisenhower and invited him to attach his comments.10 Boy, realizing that ‘Linnet II’ would go ahead under Ridgway, who would then be in a very strong position to command any future operations, withdrew his resignation. Brereton had completely outflanked him, leaving the threat of being replaced by Ridgway on the table and putting him in an exceptionally weak position to question further plans. Notwithstanding the cancellation of ‘Linnet II’, like all its predecessors, this was a turning point in the relationship between the two men and entirely to Brereton’s advantage.
Until the middle of July Boy had been pleased with the role in which he found himself. He was close to the centre of events and was in no doubt that the airborne forces were to see more action before long. He was unable to visit Daphne and the family, but she wrote to Tod: ‘Tommy backwards and forwards to France all the time, but seems in good spirits and when he is back he rings up quite cheerfully.’11 His later letters to her, however, began to expose his growing frustration. He was ‘in the throes of … plans and counter-plans. They change every 24 hours with the result that we don’t know whether we’m standing on we head or we heels.’12 The appointment of Brereton did not help and neither did the mood in his command.
Morale was becoming a serious issue among the British airborne forces, particularly at 52 Division, which had been part of Home Forces since 1940 and was highly trained for active service, and at 1 Airborne Division, which had been unemployed for nearly a year. Roy Urquhart wrote subsequently: ‘By September 1944 my division was battle-hungry to a degree which only those who have commanded large forces of trained soldiers can fully comprehend. In fact there were already signs of that dangerous mixture of boredom and cynicism creeping into our daily lives.’13 Some of Urquhart’s commanders, including Hackett, believed that, if it were not committed to action shortly, the division would lose battle-worthiness and require retraining.
Following the cancellation of ‘Transfigure’ Boy issued a message to the whole of 1 Airborne Division, saying that he realized their irritation and disappointment and continuing: ‘Hard though these periods of waiting are, we must appreciate that we may be used for the decisive plan only, and not frittered away on an approach which the Supreme Commander does not consider as vital and which can be achieved by other and less important means.’ The morale issue was so serious that Boy even wrote to 21st Army Group demanding that Montgomery should land both divisions and his own HQ on the Continent immediately for active operations. The lack of action was also causing concern at SHAEF where Eisenhower, since Sicily somewhat equivocal in his support for airborne operations, chafed at the thought of six-and-a-half divisions of the best troops in the Allied armies sitting unused in the United Kingdom. The pressing need from above and below to get them into action was about to lead to rash decisions.
The first manifestation of this was Operation ‘Comet’, which was entirely Montgomery’s creation. On 3 September, the day after the cancellation of ‘Linnet’, he sent a signal to Freddie de Guingand, his Chief of Staff: ‘require airborne operation of one British Division and Poles on evening 6 Sep or morning 7 Sep to secure bridges over RHINE between WESEL and ARNHEM.’ This operation would be the first embodiment of a strategy which Montgomery had been developing for some time, a concentrated thrust by the maximum available force across the Rhine, in order to envelop the Ruhr from the West and
to turn from there into the heart of Germany. Everything he had seen in the last few weeks, since the destruction of much of the German Army at Falaise, had convinced him that that the remnants were on the run and that a determined effort would slice through them and end the war.
In some respects Montgomery was right. For a few short days after the fall of Brussels and Antwerp, the Germans were indeed streaming back towards the Reich in disorganized and demoralized groups and a well-conceived and thoroughly supported plan to keep up the pressure might well have done what he envisaged. Time, however, was not on his side, and neither were the by now creaking logistics of the Allied armies, whose supplies were still coming from Cherbourg and the ‘Mulberry’ harbour at Arromanches. Boy was summoned to Montgomery’s Tac HQ for a meeting on 5 September and then sent on to Dempsey to plan the new operation.
For ‘Comet’, only 1 Airborne Division and 1 Polish Parachute Brigade were to be used for the initial landings, 1 Airborne Division at Arnhem, Divisional HQ, 1 Airlanding Brigade and the Poles at Nijmegen and 4 Parachute Brigade at Grave. There would be coup de main glider operations at the Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave bridges. I Airborne Corps HQ would land with the second lift, although this would still take place on D-Day, and 52 Division would be flown in as soon as an airfield was secured. XXX Corps, with Guards Armoured Division in the van, would race up the road and cross the Rhine. On 7 September Boy flew over to Brussels to receive his final orders. ‘At long last’ he wrote to Daphne, ‘will lead me drop into action. Alan Adair’s party (Guards Armoured Division) will be behind us which is good as we shall be sure of good support.’14
His extreme frustration over the cancelled operations, his concern over falling morale in his command, his desire to lead his troops into battle before the war was over and his optimism about the collapse of the German Army had now got the better of Boy. Whilst there is no doubt that ‘Comet’ was Montgomery’s idea, Boy had confirmed to him the ability of an augmented 1 Airborne Division to do the job alone, although in retrospect it would always have lacked the strength to hold the bridges, even against the broken German formations then retreating through Holland. Boy probably also influenced moving the axis of advance from Wesel, Montgomery’s original objective on the Rhine, to Arnhem. Wesel had the advantage of only two major water obstacles on the way, the Maas and the Rhine, and much greater proximity to the Ruhr, but it brought the landings perilously close to the heavily concentrated anti-aircraft defences around the latter area, which were anathema to the RAF. Nijmegen and Arnhem were also much closer to the airfields in England, whilst success would have the added benefit of cutting off the V2 rocket sites, whose activities were causing great concern.
Boy’s attitude towards the state of the German Army was by no means uncommon, indeed it was shared by many of those concerned. There were a number of doubters about ‘Comet’, however, and they included Hackett and Sosabowski. Hackett was privately appalled at the risk being taken. Both in North Africa and in Italy he had developed a healthy regard for the Germans’ ability to recover from apparent defeat and to conduct a stubborn defence out of very little. Sosabowski was of like mind. During a briefing on the operation by Urquhart he was moved to interrupt with the words ‘But the Germans, General … the Germans’. It seemed to him and to others that this operation was assuming an almost complete lack of opposition, which was hardly likely to be the case.
Sosabowski also asked Urquhart to confirm his orders in writing, not a request likely to endear him to a superior officer, with its implications not just of release from responsibility, but of disagreement with the plan in the event that the outcome turned out badly. He persuaded Urquhart to accompany him to see Boy, where he told the latter that the operation needed at least one more division. He was certainly right, but his intervention was equally certainly unpopular.
Montgomery, however, was also having second thoughts. His concerns centred on the supply situation, with significant shortages of ammunition and fuel caused by the restricted capacity of the available ports.15 Moreover the lack of transport was causing delays in bringing reinforcements up from Normandy, whilst resistance to Second Army was stiffening on the Albert Canal. This view was reinforced by Dempsey. In his diary on 9 September he wrote: ‘It is clear that the enemy is bringing up all the reinforcements he can lay his hands on, and that he appreciates the importance of the area Arnhem-Nijmegen. It looks as though he is going to do all he can to hold it. This being the case, any question of a rapid advance to the North-East looks unlikely. Owing to our maintenance situation, we will not be in a position to fight a real battle for perhaps ten days or a fortnight. Are we right to direct Second Army to Arnhem or would it be better to hold a left flank along the Albert Canal, and strike due East towards Cologne in conjunction with First (US) Army?’
With these sentiments prevailing, Montgomery cancelled ‘Comet’ on the evening of 9 September, much to the relief of many concerned, but at the same time he ordered Dempsey and Boy to meet him in Brussels on the following day to discuss another and much larger operation.
Map 1. The ‘Market Garden’ Battlefield
Chapter 17
Sixteen (10–16 September 1944)
Next to that of his first meeting with Daphne, 10 September 1944 was probably the most important day in Boy’s life, the day on which the events were set in train which were to fix his place in history. There have been doubts expressed as to whether or not he actually saw Montgomery that day, but there is conclusive evidence that he did from the C-in-C himself, who recorded in his personal war diary: ‘I had a conference with Dempsey and Browning and decided that we must use the whole Airborne Army on the air operations in the ARNHEM area; enemy resistance there is getting stronger.’1 This is corroborated by an entry in the I Airborne Corps war diary: ‘GOC to see C-in-C 21 Army Gp and Comd Second Army’.
The purpose of the meeting was for Montgomery to agree an outline plan for a scaled-up ‘Comet’, employing not only 1 Airborne Division, 52 Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade, but also both 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions. The new operation was as audacious as its predecessor, the laying of an airborne carpet which crossed a series of water obstacles and passed through Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem. XXX Corps would advance rapidly up this corridor and on to the Ijsselmeer, cutting off all the enemy forces to the west and providing a platform to launch the Allied Armies into the North German Plain.
There is some question as to whose plan it was. Brigadier Charles Richardson, Montgomery’s Brigadier (Plans), maintained subsequently that it was Boy’s, which ‘Monty enthusiastically adopted … as his own.’2 Richardson had been heavily involved with the earlier operations on behalf of 21st Army Group and had spent almost as much time at Moor Park as Boy had done in France, so was close to the decision making, even if he was not himself at the key meeting. David Belchem, Brigadier (Operations), who was acting as Montgomery’s Chief of Staff in place of Freddie de Guingand, then on sick leave in England, was clear that the plan was Montgomery’s.
It was at this meeting that Boy supposedly introduced a new expression to the English language. The first mention of it came in Roy Urquhart’s book Arnhem, published in 1958. According to Urquhart, Boy ‘asked how long we would be required to hold the Arnhem Bridge. “Two days,” said Monty briskly. “They’ll be up with you then.” “We can hold it for four,” Browning replied. “But I think we might be going a bridge too far.” ’3
Considerable scepticism has been voiced as to whether Boy said any such thing. There were probably only three people present, Dempsey, Boy and Montgomery, the first two of whom never subsequently wrote or spoke publicly about the episode, whilst the last was not going to admit that any concerns had been expressed about the operation. Urquhart, whilst not present, was one of the first people to see Boy on his return from Belgium and thus a good witness, but an even better one was Walch, who wrote later:
On being asked by General Montgomery for his general opinion of the proposed operatio
n, General Boy said he thought it was possible, but that perhaps they might be going a bridge too far with the air lift available [author’s italics]. His opinion was understood and appreciated; the operation was planned in detail by General Boy and he would be in command until the ground forces joined up.
There have been differences of opinion as to whether or not General Boy did express the above comments to General Montgomery. I have no doubt about it. I was his chief staff officer. I had served under him for about three years and I saw him immediately after his return to Corps HQ to put the plan into operation. He told me exactly what I have recorded above, though for obvious reasons I was bound to complete secrecy. No doubt could be allowed which might affect the morale of the troops taking part in an operation which had been ordered and which though perhaps less certain of success than General Montgomery’s former battles, was fully justified by the vital results which could reasonably be expected. Calculated risks have to be taken and the risks of this operation were fully calculated in the light of the information available. I have never previously broken my silence on this matter, but now, 45 years later, I think perhaps this statement may do more good than harm, if it gets any publicity.4
If Boy did say this, his reservations about stiffening resistance since the conception of ‘Comet’ were consistent with those of Dempsey, as expressed in the latter’s diary on the previous day, although Boy would certainly have favoured an airborne operation over Dempsey’s alternative of holding firm on the Albert Canal and driving eastwards towards Cologne with the Americans. Nevertheless, the operation only made strategic sense with the last bridge, an advance beyond which would cut off the enemy forces to the west and make available for the first time an excellent springboard into the Reich. Failure to get beyond Arnhem would leave the Allies in a dead end behind the Rivers Waal and Maas. However, it was no part of Boy’s role to determine strategy, but rather to construct and execute a plan to deliver it. If Montgomery was set on it, which he clearly was, then his subordinate could offer an opinion. If this failed to change the C-in-C’s mind, then he would have to make it work.
