by Richard Mead
When Sosabowski wrote with congratulations on the award from his government, Boy replied to thank him and to acknowledge the honour, but also to say: ‘I am going to be absolutely candid, and I say to you that the award of a Polish decoration, at the present time, to me is unfortunate. As you must be most fully aware, my relationship with you and your Brigade has not been of the happiest during the last few weeks.’2 He was, in fact, deeply embarrassed, as he was shortly to put in motion the process which, two months later, would see Sosabowski relieved of his command.
The Sosabowski affair was an unhappy one which reflected poorly on the main British participants, but there can be no doubt that there was genuine displeasure about aspects of his conduct during the final days before the evacuation from Oosterbeek. This is reflected in the history of 43 Division, whose author was Brigadier Hubert Essame,3 the commander of 214 Brigade during the battle. Essame had had no direct involvement with the Poles, as he was preoccupied with attacking Elst, but he was nevertheless close to the action, would have heard the views of Thomas and Essame’s fellow brigadier, Ben Walton of 130 Brigade, shortly after the events described and would have conveyed them from their perspective in the history. Essame wrote of the attempt to put the Poles across on the night of 23 September, ‘It must be recorded that General Sosabowski’s attitude was the reverse of co-operative’ and of the Valburg Conference, ‘General Sosabowski’s attitude at the conference cannot honestly be described as cordial.’4 He made a further allegation of lack of cooperation by the Poles during the crossing on the night of 24 September. Whilst there may be sympathy for Sosabowski’s stance on the crossings and some distaste at the way in which he was treated at the conference, it does appear that he caused considerable irritation at the time.
The reports which filtered back to the British military hierarchy were therefore certain to be unfavourable. As Sosabowski was serving under Boy’s command, it is not too far fetched to imagine that the latter was taken to task by his fellow generals for his subordinate’s behaviour. Whatever the case, he put in a report to Dempsey which was critical of Sosabowski and, by extension, the Polish Parachute Brigade. On his return to England Boy also mentioned this to the Director of Military Operations, Frank Simpson, who wrote to Montgomery asking for the C-in-C’s views on the brigade’s future.
Montgomery’s reply, written on 17 October not to Simpson but directly to Brooke, was astonishing: ‘Polish Para Brigade fought very badly and the men showed no keenness to fight if it meant risking their own lives. I do not want this brigade here and possibly you might like to send them to join other Poles in Italy.’ It is possible that Sosabowski’s lack of enthusiasm for the crossing at Heveadorp was misinterpreted as a lack of willingness to fight, whereas it was in fact a sensible appreciation of the dangers. It appears that there might have also been some criticisms of the Poles’ lack of discipline. Nevertheless, this was an unwarranted slur on a brigade many of whose members had, in an appallingly difficult situation, demonstrated great bravery. Montgomery was thought to be less than enamoured with the Poles generally and was rather grudging in his praise for the larger Polish formation in his army group, 1 Polish Armoured Division. He had also been personally exasperated by the earlier reluctance of the Poles to place the Polish Parachute Brigade at his disposal. However, the accusation levelled by him against the brigade cannot be supported in any way.
It was Boy, however, who was to wield the knife, in a letter (see Appendix 2) written on 24 November to Ronald Weeks, who as DCIGS was responsible at the War Office for relations with Allied formations. As Sosabowski’s immediate superior, Boy was entirely within his rights to report on him. It cannot be determined whether what he said reflected just his own views and those of Horrocks and Thomas,5 who are referred to in his letter, or whether it was also influenced in part by Montgomery’s earlier judgement, but he must have known of the C-in-C’s letter. Boy had met Brooke on 25 October and it is very likely that Montgomery’s letter was discussed.
The most difficult statement to justify in Boy’s letter is ‘This officer proved himself to be quite incapable of appreciating the urgent nature of the operation’, although by ‘operation’ Boy may have been referring specifically to the evacuation of 1 Airborne Division, which he felt would be put at risk by any further attempt to cross the Lower Rhine in force, as advocated by Sosabowski. The other criticisms, explicit or implied, cannot be so easily dismissed. Sosabowski was unquestionably difficult to deal with. He did not fall into line with decisions with which he disagreed, and whilst he may be admired for this in retrospect when he proved to be correct, his attitude at the time could be regarded as close to insubordination. He certainly had another agenda, the liberation of Poland, of which the British were highly suspicious, and he was keen to preserve his brigade as much as possible for this purpose. He had proved overall to be an awkward ally, and it did not matter, from this perspective, whether his views were right or wrong. Boy was perfectly entitled to deliver an adverse report on him in the knowledge that he would continue to be an impediment to Allied harmony. What Boy did not do was actually sack Sosabowski, as it was not in his power to do so. This could only be done by the Polish Government-in-Exile. Heavily leant on by the British they failed to stand up for him and their decision, delivered on 9 November, caused a near mutiny in the brigade, which was defused by Sosabowski himself.
There is no doubt that Sosabowski was shabbily treated by the British, Boy foremost among them, and that Montgomery’s view, at least, was grotesquely inaccurate. It has been claimed subsequently by the Poles, by a number of the British veterans of Arnhem and by certain historians, that Montgomery and Boy used Sosabowski as a scapegoat for their own failure – indeed the rehabilitation of his reputation has depended on this allegation to a significant extent. There is not a shred of evidence for it. The two letters constitute the only written opinions of either man on the subject and it was only many years after the event that they came to light. Montgomery, who was not backward in delivering judgements on the operation as a whole, never referred to it again and neither did Boy, publicly or privately. They have nevertheless ironically become scapegoats themselves, in a campaign which led to Sosabowski being honoured posthumously by the Dutch Government in 2006.
After the climax and tragedy of ‘Market Garden’ it was difficult for Boy to return to whatever passed for normality. He continued in his joint appointments at I Airborne Corps and FAAA, but no further airborne operation was being considered for the foreseeable future. Boy’s relationship with Brereton continued to improve and he accompanied him on a number of joint inspections, including of 38 Group RAF and 6 Airborne Division. The two men flew over together to France to inspect the 4th French Battalion SAS, to a number of whose soldiers Boy presented British decorations. He was also in demand to talk publicly about the recent operation, lecturing at both the Royal United Services Institute and at the Staff College.
Boy had not taken any leave since May. Daphne, in the meantime, had been busy with the continuing works at Menabilly and had little time for writing, although she had completed a play, The Years Between, which was in rehearsal at the time of Boy’s return and was to open in London not long afterwards. Rather than have him come down to Cornwall, the two of them decided to treat themselves to a fortnight of relative luxury at Claridges.6 He took only part of the time as leave, but she stayed there and he returned to the hotel each evening. On 14 November the two of them entertained Brereton, the other American generals and some of their staff to a cocktail party. The time in London was a success, but Daphne was already harbouring some doubts about how their relationship would fare once the war was over, whilst Boy remained determined to return to their ‘routes’ as quickly as possible. It was some time before this could be put to the test.
Boy’s reputation in the higher reaches of the Army had not been diminished by the failure of ‘Market Garden’ and he continued to be held in high regard by both Brooke and Montgomery. In a letter to the CIGS
of 28 September on the future employment of Urquhart and 1 Airborne Division, Montgomery wrote, ‘If by any chance you took O’Connor for Egypt then I would ask you to let me have Browning for 8 Corps.’7 In the event, O’Connor was to leave for India rather than Egypt,8 but by that time Boy’s future had been decided elsewhere. There is some evidence in any event, from the tenor of later letters to Daphne, that he was disillusioned with command in the field and was looking for something different. What he was to get was not, however, an appointment which he had either sought or was initially pleased with, the job of Chief of Staff to Mountbatten at South-East Asia Command (SEAC).
The genesis of this appointment lay in the ill health of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall, who had gone out to South-East Asia with Mountbatten as his Chief of Staff in late 1943. A much older man than the Supreme Commander, Pownall had nevertheless got on well with and served as a steadying influence on his hyperactive superior. He had undergone an operation for a kidney stone in August 1944 and was away for two months following some complications. It seemed that Pownall might have difficulty with continuing to hold down his demanding job and with some reluctance Mountbatten began to seek a successor. He raised the issue with Brooke at the Cairo Conference, asking initially for either Archie Nye, the VCIGS, or John Swayne, Chief of Staff to Auchinleck at India Command. Brooke was never likely to give up Nye, his most invaluable deputy and the man who effectively ran the War Office whilst Brooke himself concentrated on grand strategy. Swayne, an outstanding staff officer with all the right qualifications, had only been in his job for six months and the move would certainly have been contested by Auchinleck. Brooke thus turned down both proposals, suggesting instead that the position be given to Bill Slim, the commander of the newly victorious Fourteenth Army. This was rejected by Mountbatten, who believed quite correctly that it was vital to keep Slim where he was.
A somewhat testy correspondence ensued between Mountbatten and Brooke, the former accusing the Army of failing to support him and threatening to promote Major General Wildman-Lushington, his Assistant Chief of Staff, the latter denying any failure to help and insisting that Lushington would be wholly inappropriate. It was then that Brooke came up with Boy’s name, eagerly seized on by Mountbatten. Pownall reaction to the choice came in his diary: ‘He is excellently qualified for it, my only reservation is that I believe he is rather nervy and highly strung, and if there’s too much of that he’s not a good half section for Mountbatten. Although the latter is now more restrained than he was he still wants a lot of looking after – the brake has to still to be put on pretty frequently and he doesn’t want a Chief of Staff who eggs him on – very much the reverse.’9 Pownall had certainly identified one key requirement of any COS for Mountbatten, the ability to keep him under control. He did not know Boy very well, however. ‘Nervy and highly strung’ was not an accurate description of him at this time, although he was a great deal less measured than Pownall himself.
Pownall’s diary entry was made on 8 November, but it was not until 20 November that Boy was summoned to meet Brooke to be told of his appointment formally and it was some days later before it was made public. ‘He took it well,’ wrote the CIGS in his diary, ‘but I doubt whether in his heart of hearts he was thrilled!’10 In fact Boy had had wind of a new direction to his career some weeks earlier, writing to Daphne that he believed ‘me won’t be wearing the Red Beret very much longer but nothing definite yet and by the time ’ee comes up to London we will probably know more.’11 He met Oliver Leese, who had just been appointed as the C-in-C Allied Land Forces South-East Asia (ALFSEA), to talk about the Far East on 30 October, and he may have had some inkling by then of what was in store for him.
As Brooke had suspected Boy was less than thrilled by the news of his new appointment. ‘I’ve got a pretty awful job,’12 he wrote to Daphne, but he was determined from the start to make the most of it. He was under orders to report to Mountbatten by the evening of 14 December, so there was little time to hand over his job as Brereton’s deputy to Gale. On hearing the news Brereton himself noted in his diary, ‘General Browning is a fine soldier and, despite differences of opinion between military men, I like and admire him very much. I wish him luck.’13 There was one last occasion for Boy to share with the Airborne Forces before he left. On 6 December he and Urquhart led 320 survivors of Arnhem to Buckingham Palace. Major Robert Cain received the Victoria Cross from the King, the only one of four earned during the ground battle which was not posthumous, and seven DSOs and nineteen MCs were presented out of more than sixty decorations in all.14 Three days later Boy flew out from Northolt.
Chapter 23
Kandy (December 1944–May 1945)
Boy’s flight took him via Naples, Cairo and Karachi. Although the RAF failed to meet his deadline and eventually deposited him at Imphal on the morning of 15 December, Mountbatten was delighted to see him. Boy arrived just in time to witness a unique investiture, in which Field Marshal Wavell, the Viceroy of India, knighted Slim and his three corps commanders, Philip Christison of XV Indian Corps, Geoffrey Scoones of IV Corps and Monty Stopford of XXXIII Indian Corps, on the field of battle in recognition of their victories over the Japanese in the Arakan, at Imphal and at Kohima.
His appointments during 1943 and 1944 had left Boy very familiar with the theatres of war in the Mediterranean and North-West Europe and he was well acquainted with the leading personalities in both. Apart from his trip to India in September and October 1943, during which he had had no exposure to operations other than his unsatisfactory discussions with Wingate, SEAC was entirely new territory and he knew little about the ‘Forgotten Army’. Most of the senior officers including Slim and Scoones were from the Indian Army, an organization which was almost entirely foreign to him. There were two divisional commanders, Pete Rees of 19 Indian Division and Douglas Gracey of 20 Indian Division, with whom he had served at Sandhurst in the 1920s, but the rest were strangers. Apart from Mountbatten, the man he knew best was Leese, a very old friend but one who had himself only arrived in the theatre just over five weeks earlier.
The deficiency was quickly remedied, as Boy was now to accompany Mountbatten on a comprehensive tour of the ALFSEA formations. They flew first to Kalemyo to see 11 East African Division, which had just completed an exhausting campaign to clear the Kabaw Valley of Japanese, and 2 Division, which comprised the advance guard of Operation ‘Capital’, Slim’s pursuit of the Japanese into Central Burma with the objective of retaking Mandalay. The two men crossed the longest Bailey bridge in the world over the River Chindwin at Kalewa, which had been completed only three days earlier, before flying back to meet Stopford at his HQ. They then travelled up to Kohima, where they inspected 5 and 7 Indian Divisions and visited all the memorials to the battle. Boy particularly wanted to see the grave of a fellow Grenadier and friend, Willie Goschen, with whom he had served in the 1920s and who had been killed in action in command of 4 Brigade during the fierce fighting in May 1944.
On the next day, 18 December, Mountbatten and Boy had a half-hour lesson in close quarter combat from Lieutenant Colonel Grant Taylor, an expert in the subject who had learnt his trade with the FBI in Chicago. This nearly came in useful two days later, by which time the two were in the Arakan, first meeting Christison and inspecting 3 Special Service Brigade and 25 Indian Division, before moving on to the HQ of 82 West African Division. The GOC Major General George Bruce was a fiery character who sported ivory-handled pistols in the manner of Patton and insisted on driving the VIPs round his positions himself. Dispensing with the normal bodyguard, and with Boy and a staff officer suitably armed in the back seat of the jeep, Bruce took them not only up to but beyond his own forward posts, warning them to keep an eye out for Japanese snipers who had not been cleared from the area. After a hair-raising ride, during which it became clear that Bruce had little idea where the front line was situated, they managed to return intact but Mountbatten was not impressed. Following a similar incident some weeks later, in which Christis
on himself and Boy’s American deputy Major-General Horace Fuller were pinned down under Japanese fire, Bruce was replaced.
The tour continued with a conference at Leese’s HQ in Barrackpore, near Calcutta, which gave Boy the chance to meet some of the other senior officers of SEAC, including Admiral Sir Arthur Power, C-in-C of the East Indies Fleet, and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, the commander of Eastern Air Command, as well as Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, Churchill’s representative to Chiang Kai-shek. Finally Boy and Mountbatten went on to New Delhi, where they held meetings with Wavell and Auchinleck and where Boy saw George Chatterton, who was on a visit to discuss the allocation and training of glider pilots with Eric Down. After more than a week on the move, they reached Mountbatten’s HQ at Kandy on the evening of 23 December. ‘Browning got here safely…’ wrote Pownall, ‘to my great content.’1
HQ Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia (SACSEA) had been in Kandy, the former capital of Ceylon, since the previous April. It had been located before that in Delhi, but Mountbatten was keen to move away from the influence of India. Ceylon, as a separate Crown Colony, fitted the bill, even though it was five hundred miles further away from the front. Kandy was a pleasant town which, at 1,700 feet, lying round an artificial lake and surrounded by hills, had a much better climate than Colombo. Its various hotels were now occupied by senior members of the SEAC staff, as were a number of the houses around the lake, whilst the offices were in specially constructed buildings at the Botanical Gardens about three miles away. Mountbatten was occupying the Governor’s residence, known as the King’s Pavilion, and Boy was invited to stay there until he had secured appropriate accommodation for himself.
