As far as speed was concerned the British had, for some time, enjoyed the advantage of ‘coppering’. Following experiment to nullify the effects of galvanic action between copper and a ship’s iron fastenings, it became British policy from 1783 to clad the underwater sections of every warship with thin copper plate. This greatly reduced the activities of wood-boring marine worms and also the extent of fouling by weed and shellfish. Less encumbered, British ships, for a considerable period, enjoyed a definite speed advantage. This was noticeable particularly on distant, warm-water stations, where fouling was otherwise rapid and facilities for cleaning minimal.
Lord Barham, who instituted the measure, was so pleased with the results that, in his report to Melville, he was moved to a touch of rare humour: ‘So much was the activity of the fleet increased that Mr. Rigby, in his witty way, observed that unless the captains were coppered also, we should have none to serve …’
Ships, being armed principally on the broadside, were best fought in ‘line of battle’. For all its faults, this formation presented an opponent with a formidable problem in that, for as long as the line remained in close order, he was faced with a continuous line of guns. To maintain station, ships required speed in hand and also the ability to manoeuvre. Dull sailers and indifferent handling were thus an immediate problem but, as an action progressed, damage to tophamper increasingly reduced a ship’s ability to keep her position. If fought to a conclusion, a battle usually progressed to one of duels between individual ships.
Manoeuvrability and smart ship handling showed their true value in single ship-on-ship encounters, typically those between frigates. Jockeying for the best position from which to loose the opening broadside might well involve a close-quarter tacking duel in light weather, a situation in which, other factors being equal, the better-designed ship would have the advantage. An objective was to place one’s own ship ‘athwart the hawse’ of an opponent, at right angles across his bows or stern. Faced only with weak end-on fire, a ship could release a broadside which would sweep the enemy’s decks from one end to another, often leaving her crew in such a bloodied state of shock as to be unable to resist a rapid boarding.
Gun-decks were open from one end to the other, all partitioning being temporary and struck below before an action. This made them particularly vulnerable to end-on, or ‘raking’ fire. Although it might be thought that a stout transverse bulkhead at either end might defeat such tactics, the inclusion of these would have been at the cost of at least one pair of guns. It should also be remembered that actions such as these were conducted at point-blank range, where even the 18-pounder guns of a frigate could pierce a couple of feet of timber. In European waters, British success in this type of action was so marked that it bred complacency – a complacency brutally exposed when the service eventually embarked on the totally unnecessary war with the United States in 1812.
British gunnery of the time concentrated on rate of fire rather than accuracy. Although a 32-pounder was well capable of ranging a couple of miles, it was hopelessly inaccurate at such distance when fired from a heaving deck while, at the end of its flight, the ball would have lost much of its energy. Practice thus emphasized getting in so close that an opponent’s hull was vulnerable. Directions speak of battle to be conducted at a halfmusket, or pistol, shot, but the aggressive commander sought nothing less than to lay his ship alongside that of an enemy.
In such circumstances, the character and steadiness of gun crews were all-important. Incoming shot, particularly from the recently introduced carronade, smashed a ship’s timbers into swathes of lethal fragments. Loss of life and limb was such as to make many actions unsustainable for any length of time. The noise was brain-jarring, the smoke impenetrable, the air unbreathable. Working barefoot on sanded decks, the living could barely keep upright as they slithered on the remains of the dead. Where possible, bodies and body parts were heaved overboard without ceremony while the carnage continued. Discipline, rate of fire and the ability to withstand this particular brand of hell would win the day.
Crews were large, both for the labour-intensive task of sail handling and to serve the many guns. A 32-pounder required a crew of seven, an 18-pounder six. Full crews could be provided for only one side, allowing replacement for those cut down in action. This was a potential weakness which could be exploited by an admiral content to engage only part of an enemy line, usually the rear. He would have spare ships with which he could ‘double’ the enemy, working around the rearguard or breaking through a developing gap. Having to defend both sides resulted in the enemy fighting with under-strength gun crews. His rate of fire, initially slower, would be slowed further with increasing damage, laying him open to boarding and being taken. This could occur before the unengaged vanguard could wear ship and beat back upwind in order to assist.
It will be appreciated that the ability to dictate the course of a battle lay very much with winning and retaining what was known as the weather gage or upwind position. It enabled an admiral to marshal his line into its correct spacing more readily and at the desired angle of convergence. It also allowed him to dictate the range although, in doing so, he sacrificed some. This was because his engaged side was that to leeward, the side towards which the ship listed under the press of wind. At the same time, his opponent was being engaged on his windward, or higher, side. Not only was he better able to open and fight his heavier guns through the lower-deck ports, but his weapons were given greater elevation and thus potential range. Many heavy-laden two- and three-deckers of the time had the sill of their lower-deck gun ports only 5 feet above the waterline when floating upright.
The very considerable gunsmoke cleared the leeward line immediately but that from the windward line drifted down towards it, probably incommoding both admirals equally. Ships of the leeward line had the undoubted advantage of being able, if badly damaged, to drop out of line, which would endeavour to close up, affording them cover in withdrawing.
As with the application of science to ship design and, to a great extent, with signalling, the French were ahead in the study and development of tactical theory. As explained earlier, they were more concerned about the successful completion of a specific mission than the seizing of a fleeting opportunity to engage an enemy squadron. Reluctance on the part of the French to get embroiled in an engagement was, inevitably, ascribed by the British to an innate sense of inferiority, which was not necessarily the case.
BRITISH SHIPS WERE classed by ‘rate’, of which there were six. As these were based on the number of guns officially (if not exactly) carried, their definition varied over the years. From the point of view of personnel, their ship’s rate defined the number of each rank that could be entered on her books. Their officer’s pay also varied according to rate.
First rates were always few in number but, being very expensive to construct, tended to be kept in good repair and were, in consequence, comparatively long-lived. They were (almost invariably) termed ‘three-deckers’, meaning that they carried their armament on three continuous gun-decks. To qualify as a first rate, a ship had 100 or more guns; by 1793, this commonly meant 110. This was in keeping with the general tendency of all classes to increase in size slowly to the very limits imposed by then-current shipbuilding techniques.
Stability limitations obliged armaments to be of mixed calibre, with the heaviest weapons naturally on the lowest deck. Some first rates were still carrying 42-pounders on the lower gun-deck but, in practice, both gun and ball were too heavy to maintain a satisfactory rate of fire, and they were being phased out in favour of the very effective 32-pounder.
Ships of the time featured a marked ‘tumblehome’, their beam being at its maximum near the waterline but decreasing with height. As a feature it reduced topweight and the length of the many transverse deck beams. It was also thought that, if the higher guns were located farther inboard, it would improve a ship’s stability, a quality recognized as desirable but imperfectly understood.
On the middle dec
k were to be found 24-pounders and, on the upper, 18- or 12-pounders. On firing, the guns ran back inboard until restrained by their tackles. This required space, but the progressively narrower beam of the higher decks was compensated by the smaller weapons mounted on them.
Not counted in the official establishment of guns (and this was true of all six rates) were those mounted topside on the forecastle or quarterdeck. These might include a brace of long-barrelled chase guns and a number of carronades. These weapons had been in use with the navy since 1779 and represented a major shift in a science that had long remained almost static. Standard cannon were massively constructed, particularly at the chamber end, to allow for the enormous stresses induced by the almost instantaneous combustion of the powder charge on firing. Improved methods of corning powder had seen the process change from a virtual explosion to something like a controlled burn. The difference was measured in micro-seconds but reduced the stress sufficiently for a gun to be made lighter.
Long barrels improved accuracy and, particularly with slower-burning charges, increased muzzle velocity and range by allowing the ball to be accelerated along the bore for the full period of the burn. As the British preferred close-range engagements, however, such refinements were something of a luxury. At short range, a high-velocity ball would pass straight through an enemy vessel and, in carrying further, would waste much of its energy.
The carronade took all these factors into account, firing a heavy ball with a relatively small charge. The projectile was brought to a halt by the target’s hull, expending all its energy in a single, timber-shattering impact. Because the charge was smaller, the gun sections could be made much thinner and, as accuracy at close quarters was not a problem, the barrel could be much shorter. The resulting gun was so much lighter that it could be carried high in the ship and mounted on a new-style carriage. This usually dispensed with wheels (or ‘trucks’), absorbing recoil forces with a slide arrangement. The barrel was elevated by a stout screw and the whole could be traversed on a pivot. Being so compact and requiring less manhandling, carronades could be served by crews as small as two.
Such guns required precision in manufacture, possible only through the advances made in the industrial revolution. Metals were now of more consistent quality, casting techniques had improved and final machining carried out to greater dimensional accuracy. These benefits were fully exploited by the Carron company, which gave its name to the weapon.
Used as a short-range component of a more standard armament, the carronade (some of which fired 68-pound balls) was very effective. Inevitably, however, the commanders of some smaller warships became over-enthusiastic about its qualities, substituting it for the majority of their long guns. Several were thus badly worsted in duels with opponents armed with standard weapons, who simply lay beyond carronade range to pound the unwise into submission.
The French navy had adopted the carronade in both ships of the line and in frigates but to a smaller degree than the British. A contemporary French record mentions a total of 210 such pieces in service, forty-six of them aboard ships of the Toulon squadron. Carronades were carried in smaller numbers in French frigates than in British, but contemporary French analysis of actions concludes that the difference was not decisive.
Where the British carronade fired solid shot the French equivalent, the obusier de vaisseau introduced in 1787, used 36-pound explosive shells. These, like the ‘bombs’ long thrown from the mortars of ‘bomb ketches’, were hollow roundshot (literally, a ‘shell’) filled with powder and fitted with a rudimentary fuse. Both the British and the French had experimented with shells during the earlier American War of Independence, with the former reaching the conclusion that, at the current level of technology, the weapons were more danger to the user than to the target. The French, less conservative, persevered, their ships carrying a proportion of explosive shot, which were believed to have been the cause of accidents.
Second rates were classed in 1793 as three-deckers bearing between ninety and ninety-eight guns. In length, they were often no more than 10 feet shorter than first rates, but they were considerably cheaper to operate as flagships on account of their lighter armament. In place of 42-pounders on the lower tier a second rate invariably carried 32-pounders. On the middle deck she had 18-pounders rather than 24s and on the upper deck either similar 12-pounders or lighter 9-pounders. This resulted in 100 less crew members and a less cramped ship, while the increased rate of fire of the lighter armament went some way towards compensating for a lesser broadside weight.
Third rates were officially the smallest ships powerful enough to serve in a line of battle during a major action. Classed as carrying between sixty and eighty guns, they comprised the largest category in the navy. Until the middle of the eighteenth century, 80s had been constructed as three-deckers but by 1793 these had virtually disappeared in favour of the two-decked version. Remaining 60-gun two-deckers, together with their 64-gun derivatives were, by now, also thought to be too small to be considered ships of the line, their largest guns being 24-pounders. None had been built in the preceding decade.
The dominant third rate was the 74-gun two-decker, which represented a good balance of size and armament and could fairly be termed the workhorse of the fleet. Generally with good sailing qualities, 74s were not over-armed for their size carrying, as a rule, twenty-eight 32-pounders on the gun-deck and twenty-eight 18-pounders on the upper deck. Twelve or fourteen 9-pounders were sited on the quarterdeck, with a further four on the forecastle. By now, some of the 9-pounders would have been landed in favour of 32-pounder carronades.
Designers continued to push lengths to the practical limit, adding small proportional increases in beam. The usual objective was to provide further space and displacement for another pair of great guns or to substitute 24-pounders for the upper deck 18-pounders. Such experiment was rarely worth the effort, resulting in crank ships that were sluggish sailers or leaving the sills of the lower-deck gun ports too close to the waterline to be opened in boisterous conditions.
A 74 was a popular command, being too small to be blessed with the chore of flagship (except in minor circumstances) yet large enough to be of considerable consequence. As a rough yardstick, first, second and third rates were spoken of as ‘battle ships’, and lesser vessels as ‘cruising ships’ or, more simply, as ‘cruisers’.
With the virtual disappearance of the 60-gun ship, fourth rates were almost invariably 50-gun two-deckers. Too small to be included in a line of battle (although the Leander served at the Nile) a 50 was able to undertake aggressive patrolling or to act as leader, perhaps wearing a commodore’s broad pendant, to a group of frigates. In this role, she might act as a minor flagship.
The hull of a 50 was deep in comparison with its length, conferring strength but usually at the expense of sailing qualities. Her armament was suitably scaled, comprising 24-pounders on the gun-deck and 12-pounders on the upper. Topside, there was a mix of 6-pounders and carronades.
Until the 1780s the navy built two-decker 44s, carrying both 18- and 12-pounders. Classed as fifth rates they were, like the smallest three-deckers, over-ambitious and unlikely to be able to operate their lower gun tier in a blow. The design pre-dated that of the true frigate which, by 1793, formed by far the largest component of the fleet’s fifth rates. They were the smallest ships to be commanded by post captains.
British frigate design was heavily based on the French concept of a two-decker carrying no armament below the level of the upper deck. The lower deck (which, otherwise, would have been termed the gun-deck) could thus be located close to the waterline, allowing the upper deck, which supported the main battery, to be set about 8 feet above the standard waterline. For the size of ship, this was a good compromise between locating the gun ports high enough to be opened in heavy weather yet not so high as to cause stability problems.
With their dashing popular image, frigates were popular commands, particularly with the strong likelihood of independent operation. The la
tter was an important consideration as such duties promised not only the chance of prize money but also, in the event of a smartly fought action, the opportunity of attracting the attention of promotion review boards.
Based loosely on the design of the captured French Renommée, British frigate construction may be said to have begun in 1756 with the Southampton and Richmond classes. They were comparatively small, 32-gun vessels, their armament comprising twenty-six 12-pounders on the upper deck, with four 6-pounders on the quarterdeck and a further pair on the forecastle.
Heavier, 18-pounder batteries were, for some time, limited to the two-decker 44s but the shortcomings of these ships, together with reports of French interest in up-gunning their own ships, led to British interest. Rumours regarding the armament of vessels completing for the American Continental Navy, as it came to be known, probably decided the British to start building classes of 38- and 36-gun, 18-pounder frigates in 1778, actually pre-empting the French by about three years.
By 1793 the 12-pounder frigate had all but been abandoned. The capture of the French Pomone in the following year would provide the British with an exemplar, the reproduction of whose stable form would allow a further increase to include 24-pounders. Carrying a total of forty or more heavy cannon and carronades, these ships would be classed fourth rates.
Mainly under the impetus of foreign competition, frigate size increased at a rapid rate. Many of the larger examples on the British list were of French origin, but an alternative means of producing large and strong hulls fairly quickly was to cut down, or raze, two-deckers. Known as ‘razees’, most had been 64s of middling usefulness. Some were successful but most were judged to have their single remaining gun-deck too close to the waterline.
The smallest rated ships were sixth rates, under the captaincy of commanders. The difference between these and the numerous unrated ship-sloops was mainly one of scale, the sixth rate carrying between twenty-two and twenty-eight 9-pounders, typically augmented by eight 24-pounder carronades, while the sloops had up to eighteen 6-pounders, backed by 12-pounder carronades.
The Fall of Toulon Page 12
