The voltigeurs remained besieged until the Guard Jàger Battalion and the Jàger-Karabinier Battalion arrived. They advanced with the voi™ tigeur companies of the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Westphalian Line Regiments. Two batteries of Westphalian artillery covered their advance. The Russians were driven back.
It was not only on the left that the Russians had narrowly escaped. General Morand had led his 1st Division, I Corps, around the right flank of the Russians. If he continued his advance he would fall on the Russian rear much as Junot should have done. His appearance would have had the same impact as an aggressive attack by Junot should have had. However, Napoleon was unaware of the terrain and had ordered him recalled to the point where he and Count Lobau had started that morning. What could have been a double envelopment failed totally.
The next day, when the battle was reviewed, Napoleon realized that Junot had failed him and ordered him replaced by General Rapp. However, Rapp refused to supplant his old friend. His manner and words calmed Napoleon, whose anger always subsided after it had vented itself in words.
The French had fielded 50,000 men, of whom about 37,000 were seriously engaged. The Russians gradually fielded about 30,000 men. Losses on both sides were heavy. Gerard's 3rd Division, formerly Gudin's division, had lost 2,297 hors de combat. Ney is believed to have lost about 4,000. Junot's casualties are estimated to have been about 700. The total French losses were probably about 8,500. The Russians are estimated to have lost about 5,500 men.
The Advance on Smolensk Resumes
This action marked the end of the Smolensk maneuver and was Napoleon's second strategic failure. It had been thwarted by Barclay's dispatching of the 7th Corps to Smolensk. This action alone had kept
Ney and Murat from seizing the city undefended.
The decayed defenses of Smolensk had proven stronger than suspected, and Raevsky was able to hold the French off long enough to permit the main Russian army to arrive. The French had foolishly wasted August 15th by not advancing, and they had surrendered much of the surprise that might have been theirs. More than one opportunity was lost. Napoleon would have been better served if he had bypassed Smolensk and cut the Moscow road, but he further slowed his advance by engaging in an assault on a fortified position. Napoleon had hoped that Russian pride and religious fervor would force them into a full-scale battle, as urged by Barclay's generals, but the results were disappointing to both.
While the French army regrouped and licked its wounds from the action at Valoutina-Loubino, Barclay moved his troops as quickly as he could. His column was entangled in the crossroads and did not extricate itself until near midnight. Junot's failure was providential for the Russians. On the 20th the Russian column continued its retreat on Slobeneva, where it joined Docturov's column. The French had not engaged Docturov during his retreat from Smolensk.
The Russian Withdrawal Resumes
For two days the Russian army moved across the Dnieper, except for Platov. Platov remained behind, on the right bank, with a rearguard formed of the Soum, Mariuopol, and Elisabethgrad Hussar Regiments, the Polish Uhlan Regiment, and the cossacks of the 1st Army of the West. Supporting him on the left bank was General Rosen with six jager regiments and some horse artillery.
The same day, Bagration reached Dogoromunde and established communications with Moscow. Platov was under attack by the French advanced guard, but crossed his forces over the Dnieper under the support of General Rosen.
With the fall of Smolensk, Napoleon had a decision to make. He was faced with several alternatives. He was miles from his bases in Poland and eastern Prussia. His strength had been steadily drained by exhausting marches, battles, and detached garrisons, and he had still not brought the Russians to account in a decisive battle. His initial plan of a decisive battle within the first twenty days had long vanished. At first Napoleon allowed supply considerations to govern his moves, and, according to Caulaincourt, he intended to clear the position around Smolensk of Russian troops, dig his forces in, and prepare to winter his army at Smolensk. During the winter he could bring up supplies and reinforcements, reorganize Poland with the newly conquered Lithua-nian provinces, and make preparations for a renewed offensive in the spring. However, the idea of a two-year campaign was alien to Napoleon. In all of his previous campaigns Napoleon had been able to come to grips with his enemy and force the decisive battle within a single season. The lack of a decisive battle weighed heavily on his mind.
By unifying Poland he would have a very strong Polish army allied to his cause in the spring. He also knew that it was another 280 miles to Moscow from his position in Smolensk. To cover that distance would take most of the remaining season, and there was no certainty that the Russians would offer battle if he did advance. He did know that the Russians would ravage the countryside as they withdrew, further compounding his supply problems. Napoleon's supply system was already stretched to the limit and could not hope to handle such great distances. There were powerful reasons to remain in Smolensk.
In contrast, there were powerful political and military reasons to resume the advance. Napoleon's initial reasons for entering the war with Russia were economic. Napoleon still had the Continental System in his mind, and his war with Russia had increased the trickle of British goods into Russia to a flood of both goods and military aid. Napoleon had to stop it as quickly as possible. A long delay, six months or more, would allow the Russians to redeploy their Finnish and Danube armies, recently released because of treaties with Sweden and Turkey. A six-month delay would allow the raising and training of new troops to fill out the various reserve divisions and replace their campaign losses. Though Napoleon could raise a large Polish army, the combination of Russian manpower and British armaments more than offset that advantage.
Napoleon feared that a reinforced Russian army would be tempted to attack his overextended army if he were to surrender the offensive to them. Napoleon's lieutenants had shown themselves to be, for the most part, incapable of acting independently, and this had compounded his fears.
The recreation of ancient Poland also had its problems. It would not endear him to either Prussia or Austria, his nominal allies, because they had participated in the last partitioning of Poland and feared the retribution of a reestablished Poland.
By 4:00 P.M. on August 20th Napoleon had weighed all the alternatives and ordered Murat and Davout to advance. Latour-Maubourg was directed to fall in on the French army's right flank and pass through Roslavl. Dombrowski was sent back to cover Mobilev and Minsk, while Pino,
Pajol, and Guy on were ordered to clear out the last vestiges of the Russian army around Smolensk before they, too, joined the advance. There was a reorganization and shifting eastward of reserves and garrison troops. Victor was given command of the French rear areas, and Mac-donald was given authorization to take Riga.
The Grande Armée resumed its advance in three columns. The central column consisted of the Guard, Murat's cavalry, and the I and III Corps. Eugene was to command the left column and Poniatowski commanded the right. Napoleon's main army consisted of 124,000 infantry, 32,000 cavalry, and 587 guns.
The weather was dry as the French advanced. Wells and streams dried up or were spoiled by the retreating Russians, compounding the French army's problems. The countryside was stripped by the Russians, but Eugene and Poniatowski, advancing down the flanks, found sufficient supplies and intact villages to support them. Murat advanced down the main road, but by keeping his cavalry concentrated, he compounded their supply and forage problems. The French cavalry suffered cruelly from their privations. Murat and Davout soon had a serious disagreement, as Davout wished to conserve what remained of the army's strength, while Murat was always charging off every time a cossack showed his face. Murat's flamboyant actions continually whittled away at the cavalry's strength, Napoleon, however, took Murat's side in this argument, crossly accusing Davout of being “overcautious.”
Morale and discipline began to suffer, and the troops began to forage with greater de
speration. They began to encounter hostile peasants who, combined with the cossacks, began to take a heavy toll of the French forage parties. Despite these problems, couriers arrived daily from Paris, convoys followed the army and were seldom molested, supplies accumulated in the advanced supply depots, Napoleon's military governments were establishing their control and organizing their resources, and the Lithuanian army was beginning to take shape.
The Lithuanian Army Is Raised
This last organization lasted only a few short months, with few units surviving into the 1813 campaign. It was organized as an extension of the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The Poles had seventeen consecutively numbered infantry regiments and sixteen consecutively numbered cavalry regiments. The Lithuanians were to raise five infantry and four cavalry regiments which were numbered in sequence with those of the Grand Duchy. In addition, the Lithuanians raised the only light infantry to exist in the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.
The establishing and organizing of these units was directed by Governor Hogendorp. The infantry was under the direction of General Niezetow-ski and the cavalry under General Wawrecki. The colonels for the Lithuanian regiments were selected from the great landed families of Lithuania who had previous military experience.
There were limits on the monies provided by Napoleon for the formation of these regiments. He provided only 400,000 francs when 4 million were needed. As a result, each noble enrolled was expected to contribute towards the organization of his regiment. The actual field commander of the regiment was to be a major, while the colonel was the honorary commander. These units were organized identically to their Polish counter” parts.
The officers were selected from among the most distinguished Polish officers available. Most of them were veterans of the old legions of Italy and the 1807 campaign. Napoleon allowed other officers to be drawn from the Vistula Legion as well as from the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.
The Order of the Day, dated 13 July 1812 and originated in Vilna, nominated the officers for the regiments, directing the raising of the Lithuanian regiments. In addition to the regular troops it directed the organization of the Lithuanian national guard and the Lithuanian gendarmerie. The function of these units was to maintain internal order and security. They were more of a police force than a military formation.
These units were filled by a conscription which began in August. However, the lack of money, officers, supplies, equipment, and horses, coupled with the incessant raids of cossacks, slowed their organization.
The organization of the Lithuanian army was relatively complete by the time Napoleon began the withdrawal from Moscow. They were ordered to concentrate, and on 20 December three of them arrived in Augustovo. From there they were sent to Warsaw. The 19th Regiment, under Hogendorp, attempted to reach Vilna, but encountered the Russians and was severely handled. Only a fragment succeeded in reaching the XI Corps in Konigsberg, from whence they passed to Warsaw. The 22nd Regiment was engaged at Minsk and almost entirely captured. Only its officers escaped to Warsaw.
The cavalry was more fortunate. The 17th and 20th Regiments joined the XI Corps and were able to withdraw with it. They were untrained, but still committed to action. The survivors later reached Eugene's Corps d'Observation, where they were placed under the command of Gerard.
Evidence suggests that the 18th and 19th Regiments, the light infantry, and the gendarmes à cheval were at Berezina during the crossings.
The 3rd Chevauléger-lanciers de la Garde were ambushed and destroyed near Slonim in October, only a few survivors making it back to the French lines, where they were incorporated into the ler Chevauléger-lanciers de la Garde. The Lithuanian Tartars never exceeded a squadron and were also absorbed into the ler Chevauléger-lanciers de la Garde.
However, before all of this transpired, the campaign had much to undergo. As the French pursued the Russians after Smolensk, both suffered. The morale of the Russians fell, desertion and illness increased. The Russian generals protested that Barclay was mismanaging the retreat and began to accuse him of not being a true Russian because of his Scottish ancestry.
Russian Plans
The czar was pressured into abandoning Barclay's fabian tactics and on 24 July, while in Moscow, he made a public plea to every Russian capable of bearing arms, for assistance. His request for assistance was answered by all of Russia. Moscow alone offered 80,000 militia. He stirred up the Russian will to resist with a religious fervor. The Russian Orthodox Church joined in his efforts by stirring up the peasantry into a holy crusade, and the icon of the Black Virgin of Smolensk was given to the army for its protection.
In response to pressure by Bagration, Barclay offered to give battle with the French near Usvyatye. However, Bagration objected and the plan was dropped. On 27 August the Russians continued their retreat. The French advanced guard drove the Russians towards Viazma. The army, thirsty from the march, the heat, and the dust, was in want of water. The troops disputed the possession of a few muddy pools and fought near the springs which were soon rendered turbid and exhausted.
The French advance continued, and they encountered the Russians in positions on the Ozma, near the village of Rouibki, with an 8,000-man cavalry rear guard. Murat moved to turn their left and sent the 4th Chevauléger-lancier Regiment forward to attack them. The Russians turned and retreated on Viazma.
On 28 August the French found themselves on the banks of the Viazma River. During the night the Russians had destroyed all of the bridges over the Viazma, plundered the town, and set it afire. Murat and Davout advanced quickly in an effort to extinguish the flames. The Viazma was found to be fordable near the ruined bridges, and the French infantry crossed over, attacking the incendiaries. The flames were quickly extinguished.
A few chosen men were sent forward to the advanced guard with orders to watch the Russians closely and to ascertain if they indeed were the incendiaries. The reports of these men eradicated all doubt on that issue. It was indeed the Russians who had begun a scorched-earth policy. Despite the fires and pillaging, supplies were still found in the city.
Beyond the Viazma, behind a ravine in an advantageous position, the Russians had once again appeared and shown themselves ready for battle. The cavalry on both sides immediately engaged in battle, and as infantry became necessary, Murat placed himself at the head of one of Davout's divisions. He sought to send it forward against the Russians.
Davout hastened up, calling his men to halt, loudly censuring the maneuver and reproaching Murat for it. Davout forced his generals to obey him. Murat appealed to his dignity, his rank, and to the situation, but in vain. Murat finally set out to complain to the Emperor.
Napoleon was infuriated by Davout”s actions and placed the division in question, Compen's 5th Division, under Murat's control. However, the battle was over at that time. Murat was so incensed over the issue that he was ready to snatch up his sword and attack Davout. Belliard stopped him and persuaded him not to commit such a mistake.
After the Viazma incident the Russians were reinforced by 15,000 regular troops and 10,000 opolochenie, Russian militia.
Kutusov Takes Command
When Barclay reached Tsarevo Zaimische, he intended to make a stand against the French, but he discovered that the czar had replaced him with Kutusov. Kutusov's appointment had been forced on the czar by the frightened Russian aristocracy. He was sixty-seven years old and so corpulent that he was unable to mount a horse. Despite his greedy, lazy nature, he was popular with the troops. He was a Russian with a Russian-sounding name in contrast to Barclay's foreign extraction and name. It was felt that Kutusov 's “true Tartar character” would save the Russian national honor.
Kutusov was dispatched from St. Petersburg, and as he traveled through the villages between there and the Russian army, his carriage was constantly swamped by the peasants who crowded around him to receive his blessing and to show him their children. On 26 August he encountered the British military liaison officer, General Wilson, who was t
o become one of his harshest critics. On 27 August Kutusov arrived in Gzatsk, on the Smolensk-Moscow road, and watched the passage of the demoralized Russian army.
With his arrival, there appeared a rumor in the army that a huge eagle had been seen flying over his head, circling slowly above him as he reviewed the troops. This was interpreted as a strong omen and raised the confidence of the army.
Kutusov set about seeking a position for the battle he intended to have with the French. His first plans were for a battle near Gzatsk, and the Russian army began to concentrate there on 31 August. In a letter of that date, Kutusov ordered Tormassov and Admiral Tchichagov to renew their offensive against Napoleon's southern flank and announced his intention to offer battle at Mozhaizk.
The French occupied Gzatsk on 1 September, and the Russians resumed their withdrawal covered by a rear guard under General Konovnit-zin. Napoleon once again chose to halt his advance, giving his stragglers two days to catch up. The rest of his army was allowed to rest.
On 2 September, Napoleon ordered the complete mustering of his army, and the returns showed about 128,000 men, with an additional 6,000 able to return to the ranks in five days. On 4 September the French once again began their advance, but their progress was marked by constant skirmishes. None of these skirmishes developed into a serious action, and the Russians vanished as soon as Eugene's flanking column began to threaten an envelopment of the Russian rear guard. At about 2:00 P.M. on 5 September, Murat led the French advanced guard onto the plains around Borodino.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 27
