The Russian 3rd Cavalry Corps arrived on the field and dispatched five of its six regiments into what quickly developed into a two-hour melee. The cavalry of both armies intermingled; dust rose obscuring all vision. Small groups of cavalry pulled into and out of the battle to rally, reorganize, and charge back into the fray. All control of the battle passed from the hands of the generals and into the tiny knots of soldiers.
By 5:00 P.M. the cavalry began to abate and the Russian generals began to fear that Napoleon would finally unleash his still fresh Imperial Guard to decide the battle. This was not, however, Napoleon's intention. He said, “I will not have my Guard destroyed. When you are eight hundred leagues from France you do not wreck your last reserve.”* Napoleon was already thinking of the long march home.
Activity to the South of the Battlefield
To the south of the battlefield, Poniatowski's Poles had advanced to their positions early in the morning. About the same moment that the 57th Line Regiment was making its first advance against the flèches, Poniatowski's forces became heavily involved around Utitza.
The first shots began about 8:00 A.M. when Poniatowski encountered Generallieutenant StrogonofP s 1st Grenadier Division about one mile south of the flèches. The Russians had been weakened by the detachment of the 3rd Division, which had been sent to help around the flèches. The Leib and Count Arakcheyev Grenadier Regiments of Geltoukhin's brigade were positioned to the right of the mound. Behind them, forming a reserve, was the Pavlov Grenadier Regiment, On the mound itself were four 12pdr cannons. To the left of the mound were the Ekaterinoslav and St. Petersburg Grenadier Regiments, and a twelve-gun battery was posted between them. The Tauride Grenadier Regiment was detached to the right, where it reinforced the six jager regiments of Prince Neverov-ski and Prince Chakoffskh These jagers were in the brush and formed the link between the Russians around the Heches and the Utitza mound. Behind Tuchkov and on either side of the mound were 4,000 Moscow opolochenie armed with pikes and thirty-six cannon.
At 10:30 A.M. Poniatowski renewed his advance. He moved twenty-two guns (another source says forty) forward and directed their fire on the Russians around the Utitza mound. Things were rapidly becoming dangerous for the Russians. Word was sent to Kutusov, and he ordered Baggovout to dispatch the 17th Division, and later the 4th Division, south to assist Tuchkov. Eventually, the entire 2nd Infantry Corps was shifted south, and only the six jager regiments remained in their original positions.
The 2nd Infantry Corps had not been engaged before this time, but it was now marching into one of the hottest battles on the field. Baggovout detached two regiments from the 17th Division to cover his flank as he moved south. He also left part of the 12pdrs of Position Battery #17 to support the badly outgunned artillery of the 4th Infantry Corps. At the request of Tuchkov, he detached a force to move ahead of the main body of his forces. The Bieloserk and Wilmanstrand Infantry Regiments as well as the remainder of Position Battery #17, under the command of Colonel Gluckhof, set out ahead of the main force to reinforce Tuchkov as quickly as possible.
Position Battery #17 was immediately directed to the Utitza mound, where it established itself the moment Poniatowski's twenty-two-gun battery opened fire. A combination of an uneven artillery duel and the rapid advance of the Poles forced Position Battery #17 to limber up and withdraw. The Polish advance was met by the Bieloserk Infantry Regiment, who held a position on the mound. A bloody fight began.
At noon the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Corps moved forward, advancing as far as the village of Utitza. During this advance Tuchkov was killed while leading the Pavlov Grenadier Regiment forward, and Baggovout assumed command of the southern flank.
Poniatowski's artillery engaged in a three-hour duel with the Russians, in an effort to prepare the way for the pending infantry assault. He planned a two-column attack against the mound. Once the attack was launched, two Polish columns advanced around the northern flank of the mound until they encountered the 2nd Infantry Corps: the Minsk, Riazan, Wilmanstrand, and Brest Infantry regiments, and 500 pike-armed opolochenie.
The Polish left column was a diversion, and it succeeded in that function very well. Poniatowski's main force advanced to the southern foot of the mound. Baggovout counterattacked with Karpov's cossacks, the 1st Grenadier Division, and the 17th Infantry Division. This force only barely succeeded in stopping the Polish advance. This stabilized the battle for the Russians momentarily. However, the situation to the north left Baggovout's position very exposed. He was obliged to fall back along the Old Smolensk Road, abandoning his positions to Poniatow-ski.
Poniatowski sent his divisions forward against the mound. The 13th Polish Hussar Regiment, supported by three other cavalry regiments of the V Corps, moved forward to strike Baggovout's left flank. Karpov's cossacks counterattacked and brought this attack to a halt. Prince Eugene of Wurttemberg took command of a rear guard consisting of four guns and the Krementchug Infantry Regiment. The Krementchug Infantry Regiment had barely 300 men and was soon joined by the Minsk Infantry Regiment which had only about 200 men. Supported by the four guns and eventually by the Brest and Riazan Infantry Regiments who came up behind them, this tiny force of 500 Russian infantry advanced against the Poles.
Condition of the French and Russian Forces
The Minsk Infantry Regiment was smothered with musketry and attacked by the 12th Polish Uhlan Regiment. The Russian regiment fell back, its numbers reduced to less than 350. This was the last Russian formation to withdraw from its original position. With the withdrawal of this last force, the Russians began to concede that the battle was lost. Barclay sent Wolzogen to Kutusov to inform him of the serious situation on the battlefield. Barclay asked Wolzogen to insure that he got any orders in writing, fearing that Kutusov might give orders that he might later deny having issued, causing Barclay to take the blame for any failure that might result.
Wolzogen reported that he duly embarked on my report concerning the position and the state of the Russian army, and I explained that apart from the right wing, which was on and to the left of the Smolensk Road, we had lost all our important positions and that every regiment was in a state of extreme exhaustion and disarray. I was still speaking when Kutusov cut me short with a cry: 'You must have been getting drunk with some flea-bitten sutler woman to give me a report like that! We have victoriously repulsed the French attacks along the whole length of our front, and tomorrow I shall place myself at the head of the army and drive the enemy without more ado from the soil of Russia!' With this he looked around challengingly at the members of his suite, who nodded enthusiastic approval.
Kutusov, who had spent the entire battle busily engaging in drinking champagne and eating sweetmeats, had no idea of the actual course of the battle. This response enraged Wolzogen, who then carried Kutusov's instructions to Barclay.
Kutusov conferred with Colonel Toll and then dictated an order telling Barclay to move the army about 1,000 paces to the rear and assume a new position aligned with the Gorki Hill on the right and the Utitza woods on the left. He felt that the French had suffered as much as the Russians and intended to continue the action. He hoped to restore the army's organization and replenish their ammunition during the night in order to renew the battle in the morning. He felt that to withdraw then would result in the loss of all the Russian artillery. He sent a similar set of orders to Docturov, the acting commander of the 2nd Army of the West.
Barclay was dismayed by the orders he received and knew that his troops were incapable of continuing the action the next day. They had undergone twelve hours without food or water, under continual heavy exertion. There was very little hope of feeding the army during the night either.
The Russian army was obliged to fall back to the position occupied by its reserve artillery. The 6th Infantry Corps touched the battery near Gorki and extended south towards Semenovskaya. The 4th Infantry Corps touched the 6th Infantry Corps on the north and extended south until it encountered the Guard infantry regiments of Finla
nd and Semenovski.
These two Guard infantry regiments capped the salient formed by the 2nd Army of the West. The 2nd Infantry Corps fell back from that position to the Old Smolensk Road and was joined by the 3rd Infantry Corps. Both corps were now commanded by Baggovout. The Russian cavalry withdrew to the newly formed second line. The 5th Corps, Preo-bragenski, and Semenovski Guard Infantry Regiments, as well as part of the Guard and Lithuanian Jager Infantry Regiment were held in reserve. Behind the right wing, following the course of the lower Kolocha, were the 4th, 30th, 34th, and 48th Jager Regiments. The jagers had not taken part in the battle and were fresh. The total reserves of the Russian army consisted of 5,000 men, while the French still retained 20,000 fresh Imperial Guardsmen.
At this point Kutusov reported that a massive artillery duel had occurred, causing immense damage on the advancing French, who were finally forced to withdraw. Kutusov had completely fabricated this and, believing he had won a great victory, sent a report to this effect to the czar. The courier was a light infantryman who had not been engaged in the battle. Therefore he only knew what he was told. There was much rejoicing in Moscow, and Kutusov was promoted to the rank of field marshal. Kutusov sent Colonel Toll and another aide to investigate the state of his army. They discovered that the artillery had shot off most of its ammunition and that the gun carriages and other equipment were in a terrible state. They discovered that the infantry was in an even worse condition. Colonel Toll encountered one unit and asked what regiment it was. The response was that “they are the 2nd Division!” The 7th Infantry Corps could barely muster 700 men, and both armies had no more than 50,000 fatigued and starving troops.
At 10:30 P.M. these conditions were reported to Kutusov, who then decided to retreat the following morning. His explanation to the czar was that he could more easily consolidate his forces by withdrawing them to the heights of Mozhaizk.
The French had also suffered severely during the battle, and they too withdrew from the battlefield to settle for the evening around fires made from broken carriages and musket stocks. Eventually the French sank into an exhausted slumber. The Russians sent some cossacks out on a reconnaissance and reported that the French had withdrawn behind the Kolocha. Shortly after, the cossacks swarmed over the battlefield. At daybreak, Barclay, seeing the French had abandoned the Raevsky Redoubt, sent General Miloradovitch and several battalions, accompanied by an artillery battery, to reoccupy the shattered redoubt.
By dawn the Russian baggage and artillery had moved some distance down the road to Mozhaizk. Kutusov discovered that the wagons he had ordered for the transport of the army's wounded had not been arranged,but he was still able to carry off many of the army's wounded in the mass of carts that followed his army. Slowly the ponderous column of retreating Russians drew away from the battlefield, and the French showed no inclination to pursue them.
The French spent the day after the battle counting the bodies and tending the wounded. Napoleon was in a state of extreme depression. Though he had finally gotten his battle, it had been a bloody meatgrinder, rather than the subtle strokes of a master. The Russians had survived to fight another day. Though bloodied, they were still capable of considerable resistance. They were in the middle of their own country, able to replenish and reinforce their army far more easily than the French, who were at the end of a very long, tenuous supply line. The battlefield yielded few trophies, only a handful of prisoners and some broken guns. The manner in which the Russians had stood, like machines, allowing themselves to be mown down by the massed French artillery amazed Napoleon, and he feared the prospect of meeting such an army again.
Murat began a tardy cavalry pursuit the afternoon of 8 September, but it was stopped by the Russian cavalry rear guard near Mozhaizk.
Various sources put the Russian losses at Borodino at between 38,500 and 44,000, but the official records show 43,924 dead, wounded, and missing. Among the Russian losses were twenty-three generals.
The true extent of the punishment absorbed by the Russian army is best illustrated by more graphic descriptions of individual formations. The 2nd Army of the West had been reduced from 20,000 to 14,000 men. Many battalions had fewer than 200 men remaining around the colors. The six grenadier battalions which had defended the Bagration flèches were reduced to a total of about 300 men. The Empress Cuirassier Regiment had entered the battle with 400 men and now had only 95.
The French losses were around 30,000, including fourteen generaux de division, thirty-three generaux de brigade, thirty-two staff officers, eighty-six aides-de-camp, and thirty-seven regimental colonels. Both armies were totally exhausted, both physically and mentally. This was accentuated by the indecisive nature of the battle. It is interesting to note that in salvaging what was left on the battlefield, the French collected 20,000 artillery balls with which to restock their supplies.
The Pursuit Resumes
The distance from Borodino to Moscow is only fifteen miles. The Russian army passed through Moscow on 14 September. Its rear guard,under General Miloradovitch, consisted of 10,000 infantry and about as many cavalry. It included the Guard Cavalry Corps under Generallieu-tenant Ouvarov. This was one of the few Russian forces that was not heavily engaged during the battle at Borodino.
It was this force that Murat had encountered near Mozhaizk. It was evening and, after some hours of skirmishing and cannonade, the Russians retired behind their positions, and both sides settled down for the evening. Both were still heavily infected by fatigue from the battle at Borodino.
On 10 September Miloradovitch found his rear guard only one mile from the main army when the French again made contact with him. It was an hour before sunset, and the French advanced with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. He was forced to give battle. His infantry occupied a low ridge and defended it vigorously. Though the French attacks were relatively serious, they lacked real motivation. This particular engagement continued until 11:00 P.M. Miloradovitch remained close behind the battlefield.
As the Russians retreated from Borodino they received every possible provision from the Russian people, whose support had risen to the demand. Only the Russian rear guard suffered, because the horses were seldom given the opportunity to be unsaddled and receive proper care.
According to Clausewitz, the original forces that had been under Barclay and Bagration, after the detachment of Wittgenstein and not including cossacks, had totaled 110,000 men. Approximately 30,000 reinforcements had joined them since the campaign began, but now the Russian main army consisted of no more than 70,000 men. This indicates a loss of 70,000 men to battle, disease, fatigue, and the other hazards of a military campaign.
As Napoleon followed the retreating Russians, he found himself facing supply difficulties. Normally he would have expected to gather supplies from the civilian population and military magazines. In contrast to the beginning of the campaign, the Russian people now made great efforts to deny the French any and all supplies. Magazines were burned, and in the process the entire village often burned. In order to escape the impact of the burning villages, permit his forces to maneuver more rapidly and spread their impact on what supplies existed, as well as to reassume his strategic maneuvering formation, the battalion carré, Napoleon marched his army in three columns: one central and two flanking. This reduced the number of men attempting to forage in any given terrain, and the flanking columns often found themselves in unravaged territory, well capable of meeting their needs. The infantry fared better than the cavalry. The horses suffered because most of the suitable forage had been removed or destroyed, and the cavalry had to fan out over a much greater distance to obtain the necessary forage.
The weather also conspired against both sides. It remained hot and dry. Wells and streams dried up, forcing the troops to scatter in search of water.
On 13 September Kutusov halted just west of Moscow and called a council of war. He probably hoped that this council would relieve him of his promise to defend Moscow, but to his surprise it voted to give batt
le once again. Barclay spoke out and contended that such an enterprise would result in both the destruction of the army and the capture of Moscow. He recommended that the army move north to defend against a possible move against St. Petersburg, but Colonel Toll urged they withdraw towards Kalouga and the rich territory around it. It would be capable of supporting and reanimating the Russian army as well as allowing a possible link with Admiral Tchichagov's army as he moved up from the south. This plan was accepted. However, Poniatowski's corps was moving to cut them off from Kalouga, so Kutusov was forced to move south towards Kolomna.
On 14 September the Russian army passed through Moscow. The rear guard followed it on the 15th. General Miloradovitch was entrusted to conclude an agreement with Murat that would allow a delay of several hours between the Russian evacuation of Moscow and its occupation by the French.
General Miloradovitch advanced a party under a flag of truce to the French pickets and requested an audience. After a few hours it was announced to him that General Sebastiani would see him. This did not please Miloradovitch, though he agreed to see him. After a long conference and repeated assurances from Sebastiani that the French would prevent disorder in the city, the conference ended.
General Sebastiani had promised that the leading elements of his advanced guard would not enter the city until two hours after the Russians had vacated it. However, Miloradovitch was surprised to see two light cavalry regiments deploy before Moscow prior to this. He once again sent out a flag of truce, but Murat refused to meet with him. General Miloradovitch met with Sebastiani again, and he protested this breach of faith and of the agreement. While this conference went on, a continual stream of carriages and civilians flowed out of the city.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 32
