At 9:30 A.M. the next morning Ney abandoned the city and fired the bridges over the Niemen. He moved through the Polviski forest to elude his Russian pursuers, but he was obliged to abandon the last guns belonging to Loison's 31st Division because of the roughness of the terrain.
On 14 December the main body of the Grande Armée had recrossed the Niemen. The army that had once mustered thousands now amounted to 400 infantry and 600 cavalry. Of the over 800 guns that they had taken into Russia, with the exception of some Polish guns, only nine remained.
The withdrawal continued, and on 19 December Murat and the lead elements arrived in Koenigsberg. Murat ordered that the stragglers be collected from the Prussian countryside. The V Corps was directed to Warsaw, the VI Corps to Plock, the I and VIII Corps to Thorn, the II and III Corps to Marienwerder, the Guard to Insterburg, and the reinforcements were drawn together to form the new 30th Division under Heudelet. Heudelet commanded the largest body of organized French in Germany. It consisted of 12,000 men and twenty guns.
The main Russian forces under Tchichagov entered Vilna on 10 December around noon. Efforts were made to round up the French stragglers and to restore order.
Wittgenstein had arrived in Kamen on 4 December and reached Sviranki on the 10th. From there he moved on Koidany to intercept Macdonald.
Marshal Kutusov arrived in Vilna on 13 December. From there he dispatched the 4th, 6th, and 8th Corps with the cavalry of General VasiFchikov on Vologin. Ojarovski arrived in Vologin on 7 December and watched Schwarzenberg, who was in Slomin. Tuchkov replaced Ertel's division, which consisted of fifteen battalions, fourteen squadrons, two cossack regiments, and two artillery companies. ErteFs division was sent to join Ojarovski.
Kutusov joined Miloradovitch's advanced guard and accompanied them. General Wilson reported that 90,000 Russians perished in the march from Berezina to Vilna. Of a force of 10,000 recruits sent to Vilna to reinforce the Russian army, only 1,500 arrived, and the greater part of them were taken directly into the hospitals because of illness and frostbite.
MacdonakPs Withdrawal
Months earlier, while the main army was occupying Moscow, Macdonald had pushed his corps forward towards Riga. The greater portion of his forces were formed of the Prussian Hilfkorps commanded by General Grawert. However, on 13 August Grawert was replaced by General Yorck. The campaign had been very stagnant until General Essen, commander of the Russian garrison in Riga, began his own cam” paign to break the relationship between Macdonald and Yorck.
Essen urged Yorck to turn on Macdonald, arrest him, and throw him into the fortress of Riga. Yorck did not bother to reply. He had already made known his attitude towards this idea in his comments at the execution of Tiedemann, when he said, “It is a good thing that he is dead; now we shall have more peace. In the last days of his life he also made himself contemptible, not only by often inciting our troops to desertion—in vain, fortunately,—but shamefully proposing to Major Crammon on the 6th (of August) at Schlock that he and his battalion should capitulate.” When Paulucci succeeded Essen as governor, he attempted to persuade Yorck and failed as well.
With the withdrawal of the Grande Armée from Moscow and the disasters that had befallen it, coupled with the shaky relationship between Yorck and Macdonald, things began to change. With the Grande Armée moving back towards the Niemen, the Russians feared that Macdonald might move southward to support him. Wittgenstein was, as a result, ordered north to head off any such movement by Macdonald. Macdonald, in fact, never received such orders. Indeed, he received no orders to withdraw until Murat was in Vilna and Berthier took it upon himself to give orders. Even then, the orders did not reach him in Mitau until 18 December. The messenger, a Prussian, was so frightened of falling into Russians hands that he made a detour via Tilsit.
In the meantime, Macdonald became more and more uneasy about Yorck's loyalty. On 19 December he began to move south in four columns, three of which were formed from Prussian troops and commanded by Yorck, Massenbach, and Kleist. The roads were bad and snow lay thickly upon the ground. Yorck gradually became separated from Macdonald's lead column by a distance of about six miles.
At the same time the Russian 1st Infantry Corps, under Wittgenstein, advanced north to intercept him. Wittgenstein had rested his exhausted troops in Niemzim on 16 December and resumed his march on the 17th. Fearing to make contact with the French before he was ready to give battle, he sent forward two advanced reconnaissance units in addition to the usual advanced guard.
One of these reconnaissance forces was commanded by the Prussian General Diebitsch. Clausewitz was his chief of staff, and his force was formed principally of cossacks. On 20 December Diebitsch was in Kolti-niani. The Russians had no idea of Macdonald's whereabouts. They had thought that he would be moving towards Memel in order to use the Kurische Haff, a narrow strip of land between the lake at the Niemen estuary and the sea. General Diebitsch had advanced with that concept in mind, but he discovered that Macdonald had already passed them by. He turned about and marched on Verni. From there he hoped he could intercept Macdonald the next day near Koltiniani.
After an early start, Diebitsch's corps reached the town of Verni at about 10:00 A.M. and learned that Macdonald had already passed through it ahead of them. Diebitsch also learned that he had interposed himself between the French column and what Diebitsch thought was their rear guard under the command of General Kleist. Kleist commanded four infantry battalions, two cavalry squadrons, and an artillery battery. The Russians faced them with about 1,400 men.
Though outnumbered, Diebitsch decided to attempt a deception and asked Clausewitz to go forward to try to arrange a truce with Kleist. Diebitsch hoped to convince Kleist that he, and not the Russians, were in an inferior position.
The Prussian Defection
When negotiations began, Kleist inadvertently stated that he was unable to enter into such negotiations, but that his commander, General Yorck, was behind him, and that he could speak with Diebitsch. The Russians were shocked to learn that they were in the middle of the entire corps. Yorck and Kleist had about 10,000 men behind them, Macdonald had 4,000 men at Koltiniani, and Grandjean was in Tauroggen, four miles south of Koltiniani, with 6,000 more troops. Diebitsch was in a most precarious position.
Growing anxious about Yorck and the Russians, Macdonald slowed his southern advance. He sent scouts to try to contact the Prussians, but the cossacks intercepted them all. Both Yorck and Macdonald were kept ignorant of each other's actions. Kleist informed Yorck of his contact during a meeting early in the evening of Christmas day. Yorck agreed to talk to Diebitsch, and they met in the Prussian camp that night.
Diebitsch told Yorck the size of his small force and continued to tell him that, though he couldn't stop Yorck, if the Prussians resumed their advance, Diebitsch could cut their baggage and artillery off and destroy it. He went on to outline to Yorck the disaster that had befallen Napoleon's Grande Armée. He also told Yorck that the czar had ordered that the Prussians were not to be treated in the same fashion as the French. Diebitsch offered up any military advantages he might have if the Prussians would commit themselves to be neutral.
Yorck refused to commit himself, but hinted that he might come to an agreement if he could preserve the honor of his corps. However, this was something that he could not justify at the moment. The two generals agreed to a temporary armistice for the night. In the morning Yorck made a reconnaissance and marched towards Lavkove, as if attempting to turn the Russian flank. Diebitsch moved to Schelel and remained in front of the Prussian forces.
As they continued their contacts over the next few days only a light screen of cossacks separated Yorck from Macdonald. Eventually a courier from Macdonald pierced this screen. He removed all doubt. If Yorck's troops did not arrive the issue of Prussian loyalty would be settled. Yorck had been holding up this moment of decision in the hope that Wittgenstein would arrive in force and resolve the issue. With this hope, Yorck signed the Convention of Tauroggen, whic
h neutralized the Prussian corps in the struggle between Russia and France. Among the terms of this convention was the stipulation that the Prussian corps would not operate against the Russians for two months.
This convention had tremendous implications for the military, diplomatic, and internal political situation of Prussia. It was the first step towards the “Befreiungskrieg” or “War of Liberation” that was to rage across the face of Germany and France in 1813 and 1814. In addition to these long-range implications, it had the short-term effect of stripping Napoleon of 14,000 fresh troops that could have assisted Napoleon in his attempts to hold East Prussia and Silesia. That would have held the Russians away from his assembly areas while he reorganized his army and would have slowed the eventual Austrian defection.
The news of Yorck's defection reached Murat and caused him to lose his nerve. He abdicated his command to Eugene and fled to Naples. The remaining troops were moved into strong positions, and Eugene attempted to restore order. A crisis brewed over Eugene's assumption of command, as he was not initially inclined to accept command. However, Berthier persuaded him that no other marshal could command the obedience of the others and persuaded him to accept the task.
Schwarzenberg and Reynier had taken up winter quarters near Bialy-stok, but Schwarzenberg decided to retire into Galacia, an Austrian province, to be nearer his source of supply and his commanders. This retreat forced Reynier and his Saxons to withdraw to Glogau after a bloody clash with the Russians near Plock.
Macdonald's remaining forces withdrew into Danzig and joined Heudelet's division there. Eugene's main army totaled about 10,000 men of all nationalities formed into ad hoc provisional regiments.
Wittgenstein crossed the Vistula on 13 January with 30,000 men, but was forced to detach a major portion of his force to watch Danzig, where there were 20,000 French still capable of combat. Wittgenstein stopped his advance to await the arrival of Tchichagov and Kutusov. Admiral Tchichagov was advancing on Thorn with 20,000 men, and Kutusov with another 30,000 men was advancing into Pommerania.
Eugene Takes Command
Eugene initially organized his forces into four weak divisions and reorganized the 2,000 mounted cavalry that remained to him. Beyond these forces he had the 31st Division of XI Corps and Grenier's Italian division of 10,000 men. Grenier's Division had been called up from Italy and was divided into two smaller divisions. It was organized with the 31st Division to form the new XI Corps under the command of St. Cyr.
The main Russian forces stopped their advance and began to concentrate and reorganize. However, Wittgenstein detached three strong columns of cossacks, about 1,500 men, each armed with a few horse guns, and sent them forward under the commands of Tettenborn, Benkendorf, and Czernitchev. Their goal was to raid the countryside.
Eugene's advanced forces were eventually driven back to Frankfurt-am-Oder, and Wittgenstein's cossacks pushed nearly as far as Berlin. At this time Eugene had 30,000 men in Frankfurt, Reynier had 9,000 in Glogau, Augereau had 6,500 in Berlin, and Lauriston was in Magdeburg with two divisions of V Corps and awaiting the arrival of two more divisions. General Morand had 2,000 Saxons in Swedish Pommerania and the garrisons of Stettin, Kiistrin, and Glogau, which provided another 17,000 men. Poniatowski had 8,500 men in Galacia, but they were neutralized by Schwarzenberg when he signed his own armistice with the Russians.
The Russian forces were not very strong at the beginning of 1813. Wittgenstein had 19,000 men available on 18 February, 150 miles from the Oder in Pommerania. Kutusov had 40,000 men, and Sacken had 20,000 watching Schwarzenberg in Galacia. Though Prussia had not yet defected, Yorck was close behind Wittgenstein, and other forces under Blucher and Bulow were rapidly organizing in Breslau and Colburg. As long as the bulk of Prussian territory was occupied by the French it was unlikely these forces would defect. However, this did not last long. Eugene's position was relatively secure. Eugene, however, fell under the influences of Augereau, who feared the possibility of a revolt in Berlin, in the French rear. Augereau persuaded Eugene to withdraw behind the Oder, and this encouraged the anti-French Prussians. Frederick Wilhelm signed the Treaty of Kalisch on 28 February 1813, which allied Prussia with Russia against Napoleon. This treaty remained secret until 27 March. The announcement of this treaty brought 30,000 fresh and well-armed Prussians into the Russian camp under the commands of Yorck and Bulow.
The Russians were emboldened by this and by the continuous French retreats. They pushed forward again, and Eugene responded by withdrawing behind the Elbe.
These maneuvers, though they occurred in early 1813, were the last maneuvers of the 1812 campaign. They rapidly developed into a new campaign as the French halted their withdrawals and reformed their armies. Once this was done, the French armies advanced, as was their tradition. They pushed their enemies before them, beginning one of the hardest-fought campaigns of Napoleon's career.
With the return of the remains of the French armies to Germany and Poland, a lull in the campaign occurred. When hostilities finally resumed, the 1813 campaign in Germany began. However, before the 1813 campaign began, there was a series of developments that can be considered to belong to the 1812 campaign.
Of the 680,500 men that Napoleon had organized for his invasion of Russia, barely 93,000 remained. The main army had suffered the harshest casualties and had dwindled from 450,000 to 25,000 men. The flanking and rearguard forces under Schwarzenberg, Reynier, Macdonald, and Augereau had returned with a total of 68,000 men, but many of these men had not ventured very far into Russia, and those of Schwarzenberg, Reynier, and Macdonald had not been as heavily engaged as the main army.
Records suggest that 370,000 French and allied soldiers died either from battle or other causes, while 200,000 were taken prisoner by the Russians. Of those taken prisoner, nearly half died in captivity.
Napoleon had taken 176,850 horses with him into Russia, and barely any of them survived the campaign. The Russians reported burning the corpses of 123,382 horses as they cleaned up their countryside of the debris of war. So heavy were the horse losses that one of Napoleon's most serious handicaps in the 1813 campaign was his inability to reconstitute his once-powerful cavalry.
Of the 1,800 cannon taken into Russia, the Russians reported capturing 929 of them, and only 250 were brought out. The remainder were lost or thrown into swamps and lakes so that they might not be captured. Though the loss of cannons was serious, the loss of horses was more devastating to Napoleon. France's arsenals and industrial facilities would soon replace the lost weaponry.
Of the 66,345 men that had belonged to Davout's corps in June 1812, there remained only 2,281. The 50,000-man Imperial Guard had been reduced to 500 men under arms and a further 800 sick, of whom 200 would never return to arms. Similar casualties were suffered by the II, III, and IV Corps.
The French army of 1813 would be rebuilt around these few survivors, Augereau's XI Corps, the two Italian divisions, and the garrisons of various German cities.
The one hopeful spot in all this despair was that most of those who had survived the campaign were officers and noncommissioned officers. These men would be indispensable if Napoleon was to reconstitute his army. They would form the cadres of experience around which the new levies would be formed.
The French were not the only ones to suffer and incur heavy losses during this campaign. The Russians suffered 150,000 dead from all causes and probably suffered a further 300,000 more crippled and maimed from wounds and frostbite. Despite these heavy losses, they had not been shaken. They had driven the invaders from the soil of sacred mother Russia, and they had inflicted the first truly major defeat on Napoleon and his vaunted armies.
Napoleon had left the army for many reasons. He was greatly concerned about his political security, and his return quieted many of these dangers. He also returned so that he might begin the gigantic task of reorganizing his army.
While still in Russia, during September, Napoleon had already begun taking steps towards this end. The Draft Class
of 1812 had been nearly exhausted, and Napoleon obtained the Senatus Consultum calling for 120,000 drafts from the Class of 1813. This number was eventually raised to 137,000. This additional 17,000 was to fill out the National Guard. By the time Napoleon arrived in Paris, the greater portion of these draftees had already been received by their depots and had begun their training.
The most immediate reinforcements were the eighty-eight cohorts of the National Guard. Napoleon had had them raised in March of 1812 as a precaution. They were a force to protect France should a threat arise while Napoleon had a majority of the French army in Russia and Spain.
Initially 100 cohorts of National Guard were to have been raised, but it was reduced to 88. These cohorts were not to render service outside of metropolitan France and were raised by the various military divisions of France. Each cohort was to have a strength of 1,080 men, but this strength was seldom reached. The average strength was 850 men. The total National Guard totaled 78,000.
Initially these cohorts were pressured to volunteer for foreign service. Napoleon was unwilling to wait for volunteers and bodily transferred them to the regular army by the Senatus Consultum of 11 January 1813. Each cohort was organized into a regiment with four battalions. The artillery companies attached to each cohort were reduced to one per regiment, and the remainder were used to form three artillery regiments.
The Senatus Consultum of 11 January 1812 had authorized the drafting of an additional 100,000 men from the Classes of 1809-1812. In February, Napoleon took the surprising step of having 150,000 conscripts drawn from the Class of 1814.
Napoleon's Invasion of Russia Page 41
