Complete Works of Frontinus

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Complete Works of Frontinus Page 49

by Frontinus


  XI. De Dubiorum Animis in Fide Retinendis

  XI. On Ensuring the Loyalty of Those Whom One Mistrusts

  [1] P. Valerius Epidauri timens oppidanorum perfidiam, quia parum praesidii habebat, gymnicos ludos procul ab urbe apparavit. Quo cum omnis fere multitudo spectandi causa exisset, clausit portas nec ante admisit Epidaurios, quam obsides a principibus acciperet.

  [1] When Publius Valerius had an insufficient garrison at Epidaurus and therefore feared perfidy on the part of the townspeople, he prepared to celebrate athletic contests at some distance from the city. When nearly all the population had gone there to see the show, he closed the gates and refused to admit the Epidaurians until he had taken hostages from their chief men.

  [2] Cn. Pompeius, cum suspectos haberet Chaucenses et vereretur, ne praesidium non reciperent, petit ab eis, ut aegros interim apud se refici paterentur; fortissimis deinde habitu languentium missis civitatem occupavit continuitque.

  [2] Gnaeus Pompey, suspecting the Chaucensians and fearing that they would not admit a garrison, asked that they would meanwhile permit his invalid soldiers to recover among them. Then, sending his strongest men in the guise of invalids, he seized the city and held it.

  [3] Alexander devicta perdomitaque Thracia petens Asiam, veritus, ne post ipsius discessum sumerent arma, reges eorum praefectosque et omnis, quibus videbatur inesse cura detractae libertatis, secum velut honoris causa traxit, ignobilis autem relictis plebeiosque praefecit, consecutus, uti principes beneficiis eius obstricti nihil novare vellent, plebs vero ne posset quidem, spoliata principibus.

  [3] When Alexander had conquered and subdued Thrace and was setting out for Asia, fearing that after his departure the Thracians would take up arms, he took with him, as though by way of conferring honour, their kings and officials — all in fact who seemed to take to heart the loss of freedom. In charge of those left behind he placed common and ordinary persons, thus preventing the officials from wishing to make any change, as being bound to him by favours, and the common people from even being able to do so, since they had been deprived of their leaders.

  [4] Antipater, conspecto Peloponesiorum exercitu, qui audita morte Alexandri ad infestandum imperium eius confluxerant, dissimulans scire se, qua mente venissent, gratias his egit, quod ad auxilium ferendum Alexandro adversus Lacedaemonios convenissent, adiecitque id se regi scripturum, ceterum ipsos, quia sibi opera eorum in praesentia non esset necessaria, abirent domos, hortatus est, et hac adseveratione periculum, quod ex novitate rerum imminebat, discussit.

  [4] When Antipater beheld the army of the Peloponnesians, who had assembled to assail his authority on hearing of the death of Alexander, he pretended not to understand with what purpose they had come, and thanked them for having gathered to aid Alexander against the Spartans adding that he would write to the king about this. But inasmuch as he did not need their assistance at present, he urged them to go home, and by this statement dispelled the danger which threatened him from the now order of affairs.

  [5] Scipio Africanus in Hispania, cum inter captivas eximiae formae virgo nubilis [alias et nobilis] ad eum perducta esset omniumque oculos in se converteret, summa custodia habitam sponso nomine Alicio reddidit insuperque aurum, quod parentes eius redempturi captivam donum Scipioni attulerant, eidem sponso pro nuptiali munere dedit. Qua multiplici magnificentia universa gens victa imperio populi Romani accessit.

  [5] When Scipio Africanus was warring in Spain, there was brought before him among the captive women a noble maiden of surpassing beauty who attracted the gaze of everyone. Scipio guarded her with the greatest pains and restored her to her betrothed, Alicius by name, presenting to him likewise, as a marriage gift, the gold which her parents had brought to Scipio as a ransom. Overcome by this manifold generosity, the whole tribe leagued itself with the government of Rome.

  [6] Alexandrum quoque Macedonem traditum est eximiae pulchritudinis virgini captivae, cum finitimae gentis principi fuisset desponsa, summa abstinentia ita pepercisse, ut illam ne aspexerit quidem. Qua mox ad sponsum remissa, universae gentis per hoc beneficium animos conciliavit sibi.

  [6] The story goes that Alexander of Macedon likewise, having taken captive a maiden of exceeding beauty betrothed to the chief of a neighbouring tribe, treated her with such extreme consideration that he refrained even from gazing at her. When the maiden was later returned to her lover, Alexander, as a result of this kindness, secured the attachment of the entire tribe.

  [7] Imperator Caesar Augustus Germanicus eo bello, quo victis hostibus cognomen Germanici meruit, cum in finibus Cubiorum castella poneret, pro fructibus locorum, quae vallo comprehendebat, pretium solvi iussit; atque ita iustitiae fama omnium fidem astrinxit.

  [7] When the Emperor Caesar Augustus Germanicus, in the war in which he earned his title by conquering the Germans, was building forts in the territory of the Cubii, he ordered compensation to be made for the crops which he had included within his fortifications. Thus the renown of his justice won the allegiance of all.

  XII. Quae Facienda Sint pro Castrorum Defensione, si Satis Fiduciae in Praesentibus Copiis non Habeamus

  XII. What to do for the Defence of the Camp, in case a Commander lacks Confidence in his Present Forces

  [1] T. Quintius consul, cum Volsci castra eius adgressuri forent, cohortem tantummodo in statione detinuit, reliquum exercitum ad quiescendum dimisit. Aeneatoribus praecepit, ut vallum insidentes equis circumirent concinerentque. Qua facie et simulatione cum et propulsasset et detinuisset per totam noctem hostes, ad lucis exortum fessos vigilia repente facta eruptione facile superavit.

  [1] The consul, Titus Quinctius, as the Volscians were about to attack his camp, kept only one cohort on duty, and dismissed the remainder of the army to take their rest, directing the trumpeters to mount their horses and make the round of the camp sounding their trumpets. By exhibiting this semblance of strength, he kept the enemy off and held them throughout the night. Then at daybreak, attacking them by a sudden sortie when they were exhausted with watching, he easily defeated them.

  [2] Q. Sertorius in Hispania hostium equitatui maxime impar, qui usque ad ipsas munitiones nimia fiducia succedebat, nocte scrobes aperuit et ante eos aciem direxit. Cum deinde turmales secundum consuetudinem adventarent, recepit aciem; persecuti aciem in fossas deciderunt et eo modo victi sunt.

  [2] Quintus Sertorius, when in Spain, was completely outmatched by the cavalry of the enemy, who in their excessive confidence advanced up to his very fortifications. Accordingly during the night he constructed trenches and drew up his line of battle in front of them. Then when the cavalry approached, as was their wont, he drew back his line. The enemy following close on his heels, fell into the trenches and thus were defeated.

  [3] Chares, dux Atheniensium, cum exspectaret auxilia et vereretur, ne interea contemptu praesentis paucitatis hostes castra eius oppugnarent, complures ex eis quos habebat per aversam partem nocte emissos iussit, qua praecipue conspicui forent hostibus, redire in castra et accedentium novarum virium speciem praebere; atque ita simulatis auxiliis tutus est, donec instrueretur exspectatis.

  [3] Chares, the Athenian commander, on one occasion was expecting reinforcements, but feared that meanwhile the enemy, despising his small force, would attack his camp. He therefore ordered that a number of the soldiers under his command should pass out at night by the rear of the camp, and should return by a route where they would be clearly observed by the enemy, thus creating the impression that fresh forces were arriving. In this way, he defended himself by pretended reinforcements, until he was equipped with those he was expecting.

  [4] Iphicrates Atheniensis, cum campestribus locis castra haberet explorassetque Thracas ex collibus, per quos unus erat descensus, nocte ad diripienda castra venturos, clam eduxit exercitum et in utraque viae latera, per quam transituri Thraces erant, distributum conlocavit; hostemque decurrentem in castra, in quibus multi ignes per paucorum curam instituti speciem manentis ibi multitudinis servabant, a lateribus adortus oppressit.

  [
4] Iphicrates, the Athenian, being encamped on one occasion on level ground, happened to learn that the Thracians were intending to come down from the hills, over which there was but a single line of descent, with the purpose of plundering his camp by night. He therefore secretly led forth his troops and posted them on both sides of the road over which the Thracians were to pass. Then when the enemy descended upon the camp, in which a large number of watch-fires, built by the hands of a few men, produced the impression that a mighty host was still there, Iphicrates was enabled to attack them on the flank and crush them.

  XIII. De Effugiendo

  XIII. On Retreating

  [1] Galli pugnaturi cum Attalo aurum omne et argentum certis custodibus tradiderunt, a quibus, si acie fusi essent, spargeretur, quo facilius colligenda praeda hostem impeditum effugerent.

  [1] When the Gauls were about to fight with Attalus, they handed over all their gold and silver to trusty guards, with instructions to scatter, in case their forces should be routed in battle, in order that thereby the enemy might be occupied in picking up the spoils and they themselves might more easily escape.

  [2] Tryphon Syriae rex victus per totum iter fugiens pecuniam sparsit et sectanda ea Antiochi equites moratus effugit.

  [2] Tryphon, king of Syria, when defeated, scattered money along the whole line of his retreat. While the cavalry of Antiochus delayed to pick this up, he effected his escape.

  [3] Q. Sertorius, pulsus acie a Q. Metello Pio, ne fugam quidem sibi tutam arbitratus, abire dispersos milites iussit, admonitos in quem locum vellet convenire.

  [3] Quintus Sertorius, when defeated in battle by Quintus Metellus Pius, being convinced that not even an organized retreat was safe, commanded his soldiers to disband and retire, informing them at what point he desired them to reassemble.

  [4] Viriathus, dux Lusitanorum, copias nostras locorumque iniquitatem evasit eadem qua Sertorius ratione, sparso exercitu, dein recollecto.

  [4] Viriathus, leader of the Lusitanians, extricated himself from an awkward position, and from the menace of our troops, by the same method as Sertorius, disbanding his forces and then reassembling.

  [5] Horatius Cocles,º urguente Porsennae exercitu, iussit suos per pontem redire in urbem eumque, ne eos insequeretur hostis, intercidere. Quod dum efficitur, in capite eius propugnator ipse insequentes detinuit. Audito deinde fragore pontis abrupti, deiecit se in alveum eumque et armis et vulneribus oneratus tranavit.

  [5] Horatius Cocles, when Porsenna’s army was pressing hard upon him, commanded his supporters to return over the bridge to the City, and then to destroy the bridge in order that the foe might not follow them. While this was being done, he himself, as defender of the bridgehead, held up the oncoming enemy. Then, when the crash told him that the bridge had been destroyed, he threw himself into the stream, and swam across it in his armour, exhausted though he was by wounds.

  [6] Afranius in Hispania ad Ilerdam, cum Caesarem fugeret, instante eo castra posuit; cum idem Caesar fecisset et pabulatum suos dimisisset, ille signum repente itineri dedit.

  [6] Afranius, when fleeing from Caesar near Ilerda in Spain, pitched camp, while Caesar was pressing close upon him. When Caesar did the same and sent his men off to gather forage, Afranius suddenly gave the signal to continue the retreat.

  [7] Antonius, cum ex Parthis instantibus reciperet exercitum et, quotiens prima luce moveret, totiens urguentibus barbarorum sagittis infestaretur abeuntium agmen, in quintam horam continuit suos fidemque stativorum fecit. Qua persuasione digressis inde Parthis, iustum iter reliquo die sine interpellatione confecit.

  [7] When Anthony was retreating, hard pressed by the Parthians, as often as he broke camp at daybreak, his retiring troops were assailed by volleys of arrows from the barbarians. Accordingly one day he kept his men back till nearly noon, thus producing the impression that he had made a permanent camp. As soon as the Parthians had become persuaded of this and had withdrawn, he accomplished his regular march for the remainder of the day without interference.

  [8] Philippus in Epiro victus, ne fugientem eum Romani premerent, indutias ad sepeliendos qui caesi erant impetravit et ob id remissioribus custodibus evasit.

  [8] When Philip had suffered defeat in Epirus, in order that the Romans might not overwhelm him in flight, he secured the grant of a truce to bury the dead. In consequence of this, the guards relaxed their vigilance, so that Philip slipped away.

  [9] P. Claudius, navali proelio superatus a Poenis, cum per hostium praesidia necesse haberet erumpere, reliquas viginti naves tamquam victrices iussit ornari; atque ita Poenis existimantibus superiores fuisse acie nostros terribilis excessit.

  [9] Publius Claudius, defeated by the Carthaginians in a naval engagement and thinking it necessary to break through the forces of the enemy, ordered his twenty remaining vessels to be dressed out as though victorious. The Carthaginians, therefore, thought our men had proved themselves superior in the encounter, so that Claudius became an object of fear to the enemy and thus made his escape.

  [10] Poeni classe superati, quia instantem avertere Romanum studebant, simulaverunt in vada naves suas incidisse haerentisque imitati effecerunt, ut victor eorum timens casum spatium ad evadendum daret.

  [10] The Carthaginians, on one occasion, when defeated in a naval battle, desiring to shake off the Romans who were close upon them, pretended that their vessels had caught on shoals and imitated the movement of stranded galleys. In this way they caused the victors, in fear of meeting a like disaster, to afford them an opportunity of escape.

  [11] Commius Atrabas, cum victus a Divo Iulio ex Gallia in Brittanniam fugeret et forte ad Oceanum vento quidem secundo, sed aestu recedente venisset, quamvis naves in siccis litoribus haererent, pandi nihilominus vela iussit. Quae cum persequens eum Caesar ex longinquo tumentia et flatu plena vidisset, ratus prospero sibi eripi cursu recessit.

  [11] Commius, the Atrebatian, when defeated by the deified Julius, fled from Gaul to Britain, and happened to reach the Channel at a time when the wind was fair, but the tide was out. Although the vessels were stranded on the flats, he nevertheless ordered the sails to be spread. Caesar, who was following them from a distance, seeing the sails swelling with the full breeze, and imagining Commius to be escaping from his hands and to be proceeding on a prosperous voyage, abandoned the pursuit.

  LIBER TERTIUS — BOOK III

  Si priores libri responderunt titulis suis et lectorem hucusque cum attentione perduxerunt, edam nunc circa oppugnationes urbium defensionesque στρατηγήματα. Nec morabor ulla praelocutione, prius traditurus quae oppugnandis urbibus usui sunt, tum quae obsessos instruere possint.

  Depositis autem operibus et machinamentis, quorum expleta iam pridem inventione nullam video ultra artium materiam, has circa expugnationem species στρατηγημάτων fecimus:

  If the preceding books have corresponded to their titles, and I have held the attention of the reader up to this point, I will now treat of ruses that deal with the siege and defence of towns. Waiving any preface, I will first submit those which are useful in the siege of cities, then those which offer suggestions to the besieged. Laying aside also all considerations of works and engines of war, the invention of which has long since reached its limit, and for the improvement of which I see no further hope in the applied arts, I shall recognize the following types of stratagems connected with siege operations:

  I.

  De repentino impetu.

  II.

  De fallendis his, qui obsidebuntur.

  III.

  De eliciendis ad proditionem.

  IV.

  Per quae hostes ad inopiam redigantur.

  V.

  Quemadmodum persuadeatur, obsidionem permansuram.

  VI.

  De districtione praesidiorum hostilium.

  VII.

  De fluminum derivatione et vitiatione aquarum.

  VIII.

  De iniciendo obsessis pavore.

  IX.

  De irruptione ex diversa parte, quam
exspectabimur.

  X.

  De insidiis, per quas eliciantur obsessi.

  XI.

  De simulatione regressus.

  Ex contrario circa tutelam obsessorum:

  XII.

  De excitanda cura suorum.

  XIII.

  De emittendo et recipiendo nuntio.

  XIV.

  De introducendis auxiliis et commeatibus suggerendis.

  XV.

  Quemadmodum efficiatur, ut abundare videantur, quae deerunt.

  XVI.

 

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