The most common firearm of the infantry during the English Civil Wars, and throughout Europe in the mid-seventeenth century was the matchlock musket. In England in 1630 the dimensions of a musket barrel had been set at a length of forty-eight inches and of 12 bore.2 Despite moves in 1639 to introduce a musket with a barrel length of forty-two inches, forty-eight inches was to remain the standard size of a musket barrel throughout the Civil Wars.3 The procedure for loading and firing a matchlock musket and how to organise and manage formed bodies of musketeers was described in a number of drill books. One of the most popular, running to a total of six editions between 1635 and 1661, was William Barriffe’s Military Discipline.4 The drill contained in Barriffe was based on that developed at the end of the sixteenth century in the Netherlands by Maurice of Nassau and which was to become the universal drill of the Thirty Years War. The full matchlock-musket drill as detailed by Barriffe consisted of sixty different movements, each with its own command, of which thirty dealt with the process of loading and firing. The gunpowder was carried in small, cylindrical wooden or tin boxes on a bandoleer, usually twelve in number, with each box containing powder for one shot. Part of the complexity of the drill was due to the need to keep separate the powder and the means of igniting it, a length of burning slowmatch. The musketeer in Barriffe’s drill was also hampered by a musket rest, used to take the weight of the musket and steady it when firing.
The drawbacks of the matchlock were itemised by the Earl of Orrery when he compared it to the fire-lock or flintlock musket that was in limited use at the time:
For with the Fire-lock musket you have only to Cock, and you are prepared to Shoot; but with your Match-lock, you have several motions [to fire it], the least of which is as long a performing, as but that one of the other, and oftentimes more hazardous; besides, if you Fire not the Match-lock Musket as soon as you have blown your Match, (which often, especially in Hedge Fights, and in Sieges, you cannot do) you must a second time blow your Match, or the Ashes it gathers, hinders it from Firing.5
Orrery was describing how the flintlock only required the cock, holding a flint, to be pulled back to full cock for it to be ready to fire. The matchlock, in comparison, required that the end of the burning slowmatch was blown to red hot and free of ash, it was then placed in the serpent or cock of the gun, the priming pan cover was opened by hand and only then could the trigger be pulled to fire the musket. He went on to enumerate the risks posed by the burning match, which could ignite the powder in the soldiers’ bandoleers or even in barrels of powder when they were refilling their bandoleers. Added to this the wooden boxes on the bandoleers clattered together noisily, giving away the presence of musketeers at night, and both the match and powder in an open pan were susceptible to the weather. Rain could dampen both causing a misfire and the wind could produce dangerous sparks from the match. With the flintlock, pulling the trigger caused the flint to strike sparks and opened the pan instantaneously. With the matchlock, there was an inevitable time delay while the priming pan was opened by hand and the trigger pulled to lower the burning end of the match into it. The match itself was a problem as considerable quantities were needed; it attracted moisture, thus reducing its viability, and it was difficult for soldiers to keep dry.6
The resultant rate of fire was slow as the musketeer juggled musket, rest, priming flask, match, powder and ball. Some measures were taken to speed things up from the very beginning. On the battlefield soldiers carried musket balls in their mouths and just spat them down the barrel to avoid fumbling for them in the small ball bag on the bandoleer, and in action the orders given for firing were reduced to just three: ‘make ready’, ‘present’ (that is, they levelled their muskets at the enemy) and ‘fire’.7 After firing, reloading was carried out without any further orders. However, in order for a body of musketeers to maintain a reasonable rate of fire as a unit it was necessary to organise them in a series of ranks that took turns to fire and then reload while the other ranks were firing; the number of ranks depended on the length of time taken to reload. According to Turner the requisite depth was initially ten ranks, Barriffe required eight and for most of the Civil Wars the usual number was six.8
In firing, the movements of the musketeers were carefully choreographed and fell into two main types, firing by files and firing by ranks. Barriffe described these and their numerous variations using a single infantry company for illustrative purposes. He showed two small blocks of musketeers in ranks of four with eight men in each file, separated by a central block of eight files of pikemen, each of eight men.9 Barriffe’s infantry company was equally divided into musketeers and pikemen, although during the Civil Wars the usual ratio was two musketeers to one pikeman.10
At the outbreak of the Civil War a large number of troops had to be raised and trained quickly by both sides and as a result a number of abbreviated drill manuals were produced that reduced drill down to a practical minimum. From these it is possible to identify which of the many firings detailed by Barriffe and others, such as Ward, were actually considered useful and practical.11 In Scotland, General Lesley produced a drill that was subsequently published in London in 1642.12 Like Barriffe he specified files eight deep. Another drill manual claimed to be A True Description of the Discipline of War used by the Earl of Newcastle and Prince Rupert.13 The drill described in this manual made use of files that were only five deep. Of all the various ways of firing, Lesley’s manual only contained one, firing by two ranks advanced, which Newcastle’s manual also contained, along with firing by files.
Figure 2.1: An infantry company drawn up for drill according to Barriffe.
Source: Barriffe, Military Discipline (1635), p. 184.
Firing by two ranks advanced was probably the commonest method of firing found in drill books generally and its selection for these two manuals further supports a case for it being the preferred way of firing at the start of the Civil Wars. In this manoeuvre the front two ranks of a body of musketeers marched forward ten or twenty paces under the command of a sergeant. The front rank then presented and fired, faced to the left or right and marched in single file to the rear of the body, each man falling in at the rear of his file and reloading. As soon as the first rank was out of the way the second rank fired and then marched to the rear to reload. Once the second rank had fired the third and fourth ranks began to march forward to where the first two had halted to fire, and then fired in their turn. This firing was also carried out without the musketeers advancing, in which case each rank in turn simply stepped forward to the front of the body before firing and filing off to the rear: this was known as firing maintaining ground. If the body advanced slowly while the musketeers fired then each pair of ranks advanced further than the previous pair.14
A second method of firing was that of forlorn files, which is found in Newcastle’s manual. In this case individual files marched forward as far as required, wheeled to march across the face of the unit and then, by halting and facing the enemy, the file became a rank. After firing each file marched back to its original place to reload. As a variation on this the file could stay as a file and each man in turn fired and marched to the back of the file to reload. Because of the time spent marching forwards and backwards both of these, particularly the latter, produced relatively low volumes of fire.15
When firing either by ranks or by files there was a three-foot gap between both the ranks and the files, which was judged to be the space required by a musketeer to be able to reload safely.16 A third method, firing by introduction, required the gap between files to be increased to six feet. The front rank fired and began to reload where it stood. Then the rear rank men marched up through the gaps between the files and placed themselves in front of the front rank to fire. They in turn were followed by the fifth rank and so on until the front rank was at the back and had reloaded. As an alternative the front rank fired and the whole body moved forward, the second rank placing themselves at the front, then the third and so on. As the amount of movement requi
red of each musketeer was less than in the other two methods, this method may have produced a higher rate of fire, but the fire produced was spread over a wider front. Barriffe, however, was critical of it: ‘I will not dispute how useful it is; but sure I am, it is over-balanced with danger.’17 Although he did not say why he considered it dangerous it is possible that he was concerned about accidents as musketeers with lit match moved between others reloading. The less dense formation was also more vulnerable to attack.
What was noticeably absent from the pre-war and early war drill manuals was almost any mention of firing in three ranks. This had been developed by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and famously and effectively employed at the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631. It was, however, just one of the ways of firing that the Swedes used.18 The other methods, by files, ranks and divisions, were the same as described by Barriffe. There was no lack of opportunity to know about it as a number of English and Scottish soldiers served in the Swedish army and details of the battle were widely available through such publications as The Swedish Intelligencer and The Swedish Discipline.19 These also contained information on Swedish tactical formations that found its way into the 1639 edition of Barriffe. Barriffe wrote that the Swedes fired by ‘salves, powring on showers of Lead, by firing two or three Ranks together’, but that is all he says.20 There was no explanation or any instructions on how to carry it out. It was, however, something that would become a trademark of British infantry.
An infantry regiment of the English Civil Wars usually consisted of ten companies, each of pikemen and musketeers, although these two different types of soldier did not fight together in their companies. When a regiment was drawn up for battle it was, depending on its strength, formed into one or two battalia. This was a linear formation first developed by Maurice of Nassau at the turn of the century in Holland. A battalia consisted of three divisions of approximately equal size, two of musketeers flanking a central division of pikemen. The divisions of musketeers were in turn organised into subdivisions of between four to six files, which was the same size as a subdivision of a company’s musketeers when drilling as a company. Between each subdivision a gap of six feet was kept for musketeers to march down to the rear of their subdivision.
The first major engagement of the English Civil Wars was Edgehill, fought on 23 October 1642. The Parliamentarian army formed in what would become the conventional manner, based on the Dutch linear form. The Royalist army formed up according to the far more complex Swedish form, further evidence of knowledge in England of Swedish tactics.21
However, there is no suggestion in any of the contemporary accounts that the Royalist musketeers employed the Swedish method of firing in three ranks, or salvee. This is not surprising as the decision to adopt Swedish tactics was taken on the morning of the battle, leaving no time for instruction and training in the Swedish salvee.
A number of eyewitness accounts provide evidence of the performance and effectiveness of musketeers in this battle. One was written by the future James II.22 He described how both sides opened fire as soon as they were in range, with the Royalists advancing firing while the Parliamentarians held their ground. Eventually they were so close that hand-to-hand fighting broke out; however, neither side was able to overcome and defeat the other and a stalemate ensued with both sides firing away at each other until night fell. James II commented that this was:
a thing so very extraordinary, that nothing less then so many witnesses as were there present, could make it credible; nor can any other reason be given for it, but the naturall courage of English men, which prompted them to maintain their ground, tho the rawness and unexperience of both partys had not furnished them with skill to make the best use of their advantages.23
Neither side had the skill or experience to overcome the resistance of the other, the firing was sustained, but not sufficiently effective as to bring about a conclusion to the combat.
Elsewhere at Edgehill the insufficiency of firepower left infantry vulnerable when cavalry acted in unison with infantry. A Parliamentarian account described the effect of a cavalry and infantry attack on Royalist infantry.
But their foot . . . came up all in Front . . . that part of it which was on their Left, and towards our Right Wing, came on very gallantly to the Charge, and were as gallantly received, and Charged by Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir William Balford’s Regiment of Horse, assisted with the Lord Robert’s, and Sir William Constable’s Regiments of Foot, who did it so home thrice together, that they forced all the Musqueteers, of two of their left Regiments, to run in and shrowd themselves within their Pikes, not daring to shoot a shot.24
The account of James II also recorded these events, claiming that the Royalist regiments ‘were not broken by this charge, yet they were put into some disorder’.25 However, it is further evidence that infantry alone were not able to overcome other infantry.
Both James II’s and the Parliamentarian accounts, written by a number of senior officers, described the battle petering out as night fell and ammunition ran out. ‘After this neither party press’d the other, but contented themselves to keep their ground, and continued fireing, till night put an end to the dispute.’26 ‘By this time it grew so late and dark, and to say the truth, our ammunition at this present was all spent.’27 The accounts of the battle make it clear that both sides had suffered problems with ammunition running out. Barriffe made no mention of any arrangements for the resupply of ammunition, or how it was to be managed except in his description of Swedish formations. Here he simply wrote that the musketeers to the rear of the formations were there ‘either to guard the Baggage or Cannon, to be Convoyes to bring ammunition or victuals to the rest; or to continue a reserve to waite upon all occasions’.28 Elton simply echoed Barriffe when he wrote that regiments should have ‘always in the Reer a sufficient number of Muskettiers for the guard of the Baggage, Cannon, or to be Convoys for to convey Ammunition and Victual to the rest of their fellows’.29 It is clear that there were attempts at Edgehill at resupply, a Royalist soldier ‘in fetching Powder (where a Magazin was) clapt his Hand carelessly into a Barrel of Powder, with his Match lighted betwixt his Fingers, whereby much Powder was blown up, and many kill’d’.30 The inability of either side effectively to resupply their infantry with ammunition during a battle further hampered attempts to achieve a decision through the use of firepower.
Whilst the precise details of the sequence of events at Edgehill continue to be debated there is no doubt that the outcome was inconclusive. This is due in no small part to the inability of the infantry of either side to achieve outright success on their own. The accounts of the battle suggest not only that there were prolonged firefights, to the extent that ammunition ran low or ran out on both sides, but also that these were conducted in such a manner that they failed to achieve a decision. There is little doubt that the Parliamentarian infantry attained a degree of superiority over the Royalists, but not sufficient to break them.31
The fire-delivery methods used at the beginning of the Civil Wars and at Edgehill – firing by ranks advancing and firing by forlorn files – were not capable of generating sufficient firepower to force a conclusion in a firefight or cause sufficient disruption to ensure success in hand-to-hand combat. In addition the ability to generate sufficient firepower to achieve victory was hampered by the amount of ammunition available, usually twelve rounds a man. In the aftermath of Edgehill there is an absence of any discussion of the methodology of delivering infantry firepower, or of any orders or instructions to change, by either side. It is in the accounts of the actions that followed Edgehill that evidence of change and increased effectiveness is found.
Just over two weeks after Edgehill, Charles I made an abortive advance on London that ended with the stand-off at Turnham Green, the closest he got to recovering the capital. During his advance there was a small but bloody skirmish at Brentford. The Royalist John Gwynne describes how the assault on the Parliamentarian forces in Brentford drove them ‘to the open field, with a r
esolute and expeditious fighting, that after once firing suddenly to advance up to push of pikes and the butt end of muskets, which proved so fatal to Holles and his butchers and dyers that day’.32 The key words here are ‘resolute and expeditious’, suggesting that the tactics used were intended to force a conclusion. Gwynne also recorded that at the second battle of Newbury in 1644 one Royalist regiment received orders ‘not to give fire upon the enemy until they came within a pikes length of him’.33 Whereas at Edgehill the infantry had begun to fire once within musket range, they now began to reserve their fire until the range was minimal, both on the offensive, as at Brentford, and on the defensive as at Newbury. At the battle of Cheriton in 1644 Slingsby recorded how Royalist infantry fought off a cavalry attack, ‘the foote keeping theire ground in a close body, not firing till within two pikes length, and then three rankes att a time, after turning up the butt end of theire muskets, charging theire pikes, and standing close, preserv’d themselves and slew many of the enemy.’34 This event not only demonstrates fire being held to a minimal range, but that musketeers were able see off cavalry, in contrast to events at Edgehill.
Precisely how this change in combat technique came about is uncertain. Using a Swedish formation for the Royalist army at Edgehill was a suggestion that had originated with Patrick Ruthven, Earl of Forth, who had fought under Gustavus Adolphus. It is possible that the impetus for the change came from Scottish officers in Charles’s army who had served in the Swedish army. The descriptions of subsequent combat are similar to the description of Swedish infantry attacking other infantry at Breitenfeld in 1631. A Scottish officer there described how he reserved his fire until within pistol shot, fired just two volleys, each of three ranks, and then immediately attacked with musket butt and sword, defeating the enemy.35
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 2
