Taken together with his comment about not firing at ‘two great distance’ this represented a clear statement of British doctrine for infantry combat as it had developed during the previous two decades. It amounted to getting in close, thirty paces or less, before one fired, fire quickly and accurately, hold one’s ground and keep firing. Stated thus it was a simple doctrine, albeit one that was complex in execution. That it worked is clear from the success of British infantry on the battlefield. Sustained fire won the day at Wynendael in the face of a numerically superior enemy and kept another numerically superior French force bottled up in Blenheim. The short, sharp bursts of fire delivered at Oudenarde quickly decided the firefights in favour of the British infantry. Confidence in its firepower also allowed British infantry to face and see off French cavalry without resorting to forming square, as at Blenheim and Malplaquet.
There is no doubt that Marlborough was one of the finest generals of his day and one of the best ever produced by Britain. All his skill and talent in planning and manoeuvre would, however, have counted for nothing if his infantry had not been able to win the firefights and drive off enemy cavalry. That they could do so, frequently in the face of a numerically superior enemy, was due to the adoption of and adherence to platoon firing. Employed at often brutally close range, it simply overwhelmed the opposition with its weight of fire. Combined with continuing ferocity in hand-to-hand combat, British infantry under Marlborough became arguably the finest in Europe.
Chapter 6
Humphrey Bland and the Duke of Cumberland, 1714 to 1749
Following the battle of Malplaquet in 1709 and the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1714 the British Army was not involved in another major battle until Dettingen in 1743. During the intervening three decades there were minor engagements and campaigns, most notably against the Jacobites in 1715 and 1719. Mostly, however, the army was engaged in peacetime soldiering and its levels of readiness and competency, its fitness for service, suffered accordingly.1 It was also a period during which little of any substance appeared to change in the way that the British infantry would fight, battalions would still form their companies into platoons organised in three firings. What changes there were, however, whilst subtle, would have both positive and negative effects on the effectiveness of the infantry in battle.
It was a time when professional British soldiers started to put pen to paper for the first time since Orrery and Turner were published in the 1670s.2 It was also when, in 1728, the first official drill regulations since the 1690s were published.3 Taken together with the regulations, the works of Bland and Kane gave a picture of how British infantry, indeed the whole army, intended to fight battles.4
Accounts of battles became more numerous, allowing analysis of the way the British infantry conducted themselves during the War of the Austrian Succession, 1740 to 1748, and that home affair of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 to 1746. The manuscript of Lieutenant Colonel John La Fausille, written after the war, was the first example of a retrospective analysis of combat by a British officer and offered the opportunity for deeper understanding of what happened at Dettingen and Laffeldt and the doctrinal approach of the infantry.5
When writing about the tactics and doctrine of the British Army in the mid-eighteenth century modern historians invariably turn to Humphrey Bland’s A Treatise of Military Discipline. Houlding describes it as being of ‘commanding influence in the army’.6 In the preface Humphrey Bland laid out his aims and his reasons for writing. He pointed out that there had been nothing written on the art of war by a British author for fifty years. He went on to say that as there were then so few old officers with experience of war he felt it necessary to write what he knew of military matters for those ‘who are yet to learn’.7 Bland’s Military Discipline was thus a statement of how things were at the time of writing. It contained nothing that would be considered innovative by his fellow officers; if anything it looked backwards. It was also very comprehensive, which probably explains its widespread appeal at the time and its endurance.8 For the historian it allows developments since the War of the Spanish Succession to be identified.
Prior to the publication of Bland the drill for handling, loading and firing the musket was simply referred to as the ‘exercise of the firelock and bayonet’. In Bland this was, for the first time, referred to as the ‘manual exercise’, in order to differentiate it from the platoon exercise that then appeared. Prior to the introduction of the platoon exercise, possibly sometime around 1720, that part of the exercise of the firelock and bayonet that was concerned with loading could be carried out either move by move, with a separate command for each move, or by each soldier in his own time when the orders for loading and firing were reduced to ‘make ready, present, fire’. The platoon exercise was intended specifically for the soldier loading in his own time. Most of the movements for these two exercises were the same, but there was one significant difference. In both exercises the soldier, having faced to the right of his unit, primed the pan of his musket with the musket pointed to the front of his unit and held level in the left hand at about waist height. With the manual exercise the soldier then faced to the front and brought the musket upright in a position known as ‘recover’. He then faced to the left and brought the musket down, holding it in his left hand with the butt down and the muzzle up near his right shoulder ready to insert the cartridge in the barrel. This was the movement known as ‘cast about to charge’. After loading his musket the soldier would face to the front and come to the recover position again. In the platoon exercise, after priming, the soldier stayed facing to the right and simply rotated his musket in his left hand to bring the muzzle up to near his right shoulder where he could load the musket. It was effectively the same position as that for loading after casting about, but without the 180° turn to the left with the recover in the middle of it. This simple expedient cut the loading time by several seconds and also required less effort on the part of the soldier.9 Curiously the official regulations issued in 1728, the year after the publication of Bland, made no mention of the platoon exercise. However, in the next official regulations, of 1756, the platoon exercise was the only way given of loading a musket.
In his instructions for the platoon exercise Bland also reintroduced locking, last seen in Mackay’s Rules.10 Bland observed that this avoided the awkward position of the middle-rank man having to stoop.
Bland goes into considerable detail on the organisation of platoons into firings. It is here that some difficulties begin to arise in identifying precisely how it was intended to organise a battalion for platoon firing in the 1720s. Lord Orkney’s orders of 1711 had laid down an organisation of fourteen platoons.11 At that time a battalion had one grenadier company and twelve hat companies, meaning that each hat platoon was made up of a single company while the grenadier company formed two platoons. Bland’s Military Discipline included a diagram of a battalion drawn up that clearly showed that structure.12 In 1717, however, the establishment of battalions in England had been reduced by one company. Despite this, an order book for Handasyde’s regiment showed a battalion in 1723 still divided into two grenadier platoons and twelve hat platoons, see Figure 6.1.13 This organisation was also shown in the 1728 regulations and meant that eleven hat companies had to form twelve platoons.14 In Ireland the establishment was reduced to just nine hat companies in a battalion and the order book for Handasyde’s, then serving in Ireland, also showed an eleven-platoon organisation, presumably in an endeavour to adhere to the more practical method of platoons and companies being the same, see Figure 6.2.
Early in his book Bland stated that the hat companies of a battalion should be divided into three grand divisions, each divided into three, four or five platoons. With the grenadiers, as usual, divided into two platoons, this left the eleven hat platoons to be divided into nine, twelve or fifteen platoons.15 Subsequently, however, Bland provided diagrams for battalions formed with two grenadier platoons and ten, thirteen or sixteen hat platoons.16 He the
n went on to write of his diagrams that they made everything clear and ‘I believe there will want no further Explication for the Comprehending of it.’17 Several pages later he adds that these plans are for battalions of four hundred, five hundred and six hundred men respectively, resulting in platoons of between thirty-three and forty-six men.18 All of the organisations that Bland gives, bar one, are at odds with the contemporary organisations in the order book of Handasyde’s and the 1728 regulations, both of which have twelve hat platoons.
Figure 6.1: : A Battalion in 12 Platoons Besides Grenadiers Divided into four Grand divisions three Platoons in each Grand Division
Source: National Army Museum, NAM6807.205.
Figure 6.2: The Method of Fireing a Battalion in 11 Platoons Including
Source: National Army Museum, NAM6807.205.
This organisational variety is thoroughly confusing and difficult to make any sense of. However, Bland did write: ‘The rule laid down in these Plans, for disposing the Platoons of the different Firings in the manner here mention’d, may be varied, if the Commanding Officer thinks proper.’19 What Bland was giving the reader were examples, and within his writing were the principles that guided how battalions were to be divided into platoons, according to circumstance. With regard to the size of platoons he wrote that they should not be fewer than thirty men, because less than that did not produce sufficient fire, or more than forty-eight because that was the most a single officer could manage.20 This is entirely in keeping with his statement about the numbers of platoons varying according to the size of battalions. In this remark on command considerations he was harking back to the first half of the seventeenth century.21 The 1728 regulations also suggested that other arrangements were possible when they stated: ‘supposing the Battalion to be told off in fourteen Platoons, including two of Granadiers’.22
If Bland was confusing in his description of the various permutations of the organisation of platoon firing, he was clearer when he discussed practical tactics and doctrine. Here he came down firmly in favour of the use of four grand divisions and the dividing of a battalion’s hat companies into twelve or sixteen platoons. As he wrote, if a battalion was divided into any other number of platoons it was necessary to reorganise the platoons before grand divisions and squares could be formed.23
Bland helpfully laid out the reasons why platoon firing, with the platoons of each firing distributed along the front of a battalion, was the best way to fire, giving four reasons. Firstly, it spread the fire of each firing across the enemy battalion. Secondly, if a battalion was attacked while some platoons were loading then the fire of no part of the battalion would be particularly weakened. His third reason is something of a reiteration of the second, which was that if the platoons of a firing were all together it would leave that section vulnerable while loading. Lastly he suggested that this way of firing ‘makes the Exercise the more beautiful’ and, rather more importantly, got the men used to having firing going on both sides of them without joining in themselves.24
In his descriptions of how to carry out platoon firing Bland wrote of the platoons both firing in turn within their particular firing and all the platoons of a firing firing together. As detailed in Mahoney’s drill book he also had the grenadier platoons wheeling slightly inwards before firing.25 After firing, the men were to reload without orders and, when finished, to bring their muskets to the shoulder, that is, held vertically against the left shoulder, the butt at about waist height. When advancing Bland had the whole battalion halt while each firing fired; likewise when retreating he had the whole battalion halt and face about while each firing fired. He also described an alternative way of firing advancing and retreating, which involved the battalion continuing to move while each firing fired and the men marching with their muskets at the recover position and at half cock. In this position the musket is held vertically in front of the body with the right hand at the trigger guard at about chest height. This was the position immediately before bringing the butt to the shoulder and levelling the musket to fire. Bland disliked this as it made it particularly difficult to stop the men firing out of turn. He wrote:
In Advancing towards the Enemy, it is with great Difficulty that the Officers can prevent the Men (but more particularly when they are Fired at) from taking their Arms without Orders, off from their Shoulders, and Firing at too great a Distance. How much more difficult must it be to prevent their Firing, when they have their Arms in their Hands ready Cock’d and their Fingers on the Trickers.26
When it came to dealing with cavalry Bland advised the same way of firing, whether a battalion was in line or square, which was to keep the front rank in reserve and fire the second and rear ranks by platoons.27 He went on to say, however, that because of the intervals in cavalry formations there was usually sufficient time for all a battalion to reload between individual cavalry attacks, in which case it was unnecessary to keep a reserve.28 As with earlier writers he stressed the importance of not firing until close range, twenty-five or thirty paces, and also of being able to present, but not actually fire.29 He also described how firing by ranks was executed, and dismissed it as old fashioned and a relic of the days when pikes were used, but made no mention of this still being the preferred method of the French Army.30 Bland was confident of the infantry’s ability to deal with cavalry and stated: ‘If Foot could be brought to know their own Strength, the Danger which they apprehend from Horse would soon vanish; since the Fire of one Platoon, given in due Time, is sufficient to break any Squadron.’ He continued in words that anticipated the battle of Minden: ‘one battalion of well-disciplined Foot may despise the Attacks of a whole Line of Horse.’31
When he wrote of how to engage enemy infantry Bland continued the long-held doctrine of reserving a battalion’s fire until close range and after the enemy had fired. Unlike earlier writers, however, he spelt out this doctrine, rather than leaving it to be extrapolated from the evidence. He advised that the sight of seeing troops with their fire reserved still advancing on troops that had fired would often cause those who had fired to run away.32 If the enemy also reserved their fire Bland advocated preventing them from firing by giving a battalion’s fire and immediately charging them, under the cover of the smoke, with the bayonet. His belief was that the shock of the fire and the immediate attack would result in victory with ‘a very inconsiderable Loss’.33 Bland also included in his work a description of how Dutch infantry conducted platoon firing. The Dutch fired their platoons from the flanks to the centre, alternating between the right and left flanks, thus giving it its name of alternate fire. Bland describes how the Dutch used alternate fire while advancing towards the enemy, but reloaded so that when close to the enemy they could give them the fire of the whole battalion, ‘as the English do’.34 What was absent from Bland’s work was any mention of sustained firefights. Within Bland’s work there was an expectation that a single round of close-range fire from a battalion followed by an immediate attack with the bayonet would be sufficient to bring victory.
Brigadier General Richard Kane’s book was not published until after his death. The writer of the preface says of Kane: ‘With great Contempt he read some Books, which pretended to Teach the whole Military Art; and often assured his Friends, that those mean Performances provoked him, to attempt something on the same Subject, which, if not perfect, might be free from those gross Errors and glaring Absurdities, which abound in them.’35 This may be a reference to Bland’s Military Discipline; indeed it is difficult to think that it could refer to anything else for the simple reason, as Bland himself said, that there were no other books. Kane himself is also scathing of the 1728 regulations. After quoting its title in full he called it a ‘poor performance’.36
Kane is particularly adamant concerning the division of a battalion into four grand divisions. This is, he wrote, ‘the Groundwork of all our Performances, of which our Martinet gives but a faint Idea’.37 Although Bland wrote initially of dividing a battalion into three grand divisions he also wro
te of four when it came to how to form a square. The 1728 regulations contain no mention at all of forming grand divisions, which makes it seem likely that Kane’s ‘Martinet’ is a reference to the official regulations. These were drawn up by a committee of very senior and distinguished officers and approved by the king, George II, who took a great interest in his army. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Kane’s ideas were not published until after his death.
Kane was also flexible in the number of platoons to be formed by a battalion. His preferred number was sixteen hat platoons in addition to the grenadiers, but he also wrote that twelve was possible for a weak battalion, particularly one on a reduced peacetime establishment. He divided the platoons into three firings but as he considered it ‘absolutely necessary’ to have a reserve he held the front rank as a reserve or fourth firing, leaving the second and rear ranks to carry out the firings.38 The front ranks of the two central platoons, however, were not reserved, but were to fire with the rest of their platoons. This was so that the battalion commander, out in front of the battalion, had somewhere safe to stand when the reserve fired.39
Kane insisted that all the platoons of a firing should fire together and not one at a time, according to their order in a firing, which he describes as normal practice at reviews: ‘they are not to keep popping by single Platoons.’40 He required the full weight of six platoons’ fire to be delivered together.41 Kane described how the simultaneous firing of six platoons scattered along a battalion frontage could be achieved by the battalion commander making use of drum beats to transmit commands. The platoon officers and sergeants were simply to ensure their men acted as ordered by the battalion commander. In particular he mentioned ensuring that the soldiers ‘level well their Arms, so that their Fire may have Effect on the Enemy’.42 Kane does seem to suggest that extended firefights might be necessary; describing the battalion going through its firings, he wrote: ‘And thus the Colonel continues his Firings standing, without Intermission between them.’ If the enemy were not broken by that fire he wrote that the battalion should be advanced closer by the commander who then ‘continues his Firings as fast as he can, until he obliges them to give Way’.43
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower 1642-1756 Page 12
