by Bob Woodward
Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions, I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken. That should involve exposure situations which underline the President’s attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and excessive campaign energy.
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is McGovern’s irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern’s strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing, aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counterbalance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to develop compensatory neutralization programs.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and how we should meet it.
In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the following:
(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc. The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront Hanoi’s intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will therefore become moot.
(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.
(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously try to exploit the President’s image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be counted as a strong continuing asset.
(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to international trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.
(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly strong popular base.
On the whole, the President’s performance and accomplishments in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHIGTON
September 7, 1972
Dear Al:
You and I know better than most people how important it is for civilians who come to high office in our country’s military establishment to keep their hot hands out of the grade selection processes. But when they don’t, it’s nice, I’m sure, to be one of those selected.
Actually, I’ve been on the speechless side since first hearing the news and have wondered to myself when you’re going to get off this “outstanding officer” kick. I seem to have spent the better part of the past three years writing you notes of congratulations on your ability to hoodwink superiors. (Not that I don’t enjoy it. I do . . . I do; but I’m running out of eloquence.)
You will recognize the attachments for what they are -- a copy of the gen-u-ine original document and a simple fact sheet. The latter I prepared with Brent Scowcroft’s assistance to help Ron Ziegler through the Q & A period which I felt certain would follow his announcement of your caper. I doubt that he even read it, but you may find it of interest. The little historical section puts you in very fine company, indeed -- and while showing that this kind of promotion is not entirely unprecedented, it makes clear to even the dumbest bastards that it doesn’t exactly happen every day.
In all seriousness, Al, I couldn’t be more pleased for you and Pat. The Vice Chief’s slot and the four beanies that go with it are nothing more than just rewards for your years of dedication and labor above and beyond, and for your maintaining through it all a really perfect balance. I feel good just knowing you.
Sincerely,
Alexander P. Butterfield
Deputy Assistant to the President
Enclosures
Major General Alexander M. Haig
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
June 10, 1969
PLEASE TREAT AS CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. EHRLICHMAN
The President read in a recent news summary that many of his critics complain about the Administration’s not being “as open as promised.” His only comment, addressed to you, appears below:
“John -- Tell Herb and Ron to ignore this kind of criticism. The fact of the matter is that we are far too open. If we treat the press with a little more contempt we’ll probably get better treatment.”
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
cc: Mr. Klein
Mr. Ziegler
PLEASE TREAT AS
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
SUBJECT:
Notification of Wallace Shooting
You asked for particulars concerning my delay in getting word to you about the attempt on Governor Wallace’s life yesterday afternoon. The answer, in a word, is that I had nothing but unconfirmed bits and pieces of information until 2-3 minutes before you called me on the telephone (4:19 or 4:20). Toni was at that moment typing a very short paragraph of alleged facts which you were to receive . . . before anyone else (so help me!).
The sequence of events was almost precisely as indicated below:
-- 4:00 p.m. - Taylor was in my office meeting with me on matters unrelated to Governor Wallace.
-- 4:06 p.m. - Ron Pontius stuck his head in my office doorway to tell Bob (and me) that the Secret Service radio net had just been informed by the Maryland State Police that “there had been a shooting in the Wallace detail, and that they thought the principal was involved”. Steve had just come to my office on other business and heard the report.
-- 4:07 p.m. - Taylor went to my phone and called the Secret Service command post to direct that all further news be relayed to him in my office . . . “as it was received”. I told Steve to go back to his office and to keep quiet until something was known about Wallace’s involvement -- and physical condition, if involved.
-- 4:11 p.m. - Steve called me on the IO to suggest his alerting Ray Price to the news and the possibility of the need rather quickly of a Presidential statement. I agreed, and Steve called Ray.
-- 4:12 p.m. - Taylor received his second report (Pontius’ statement being the first). It came from the Secret Service command post and confirmed that there was a shooting and that Wallace was hit and then en route to Leland Memorial Hospital in Riverdale, Maryland. We learned nothing at that time about the seriousness of the Governor’s condition.
-- 4:15 p.m. - Taylor’s third report came in: “Wallace has just arrived at the Holy Cross Hospital in Silver Spring. Three others were hit during the shooting. The assailant has been apprehended and is being held at the Hyattsville police station.”
-- 4:16 p.m. - I dictated to Toni what was fairly certain knowledge up to that point. Exactly 10 minutes had transpired since Pontius’ interruption of our meeting.
-- 4:19 p.m. (approx.) - You called me and I told you all that I knew, including the fact that Price had been alerted. I mentioned, too, that I was purposely withholding distribution of news items being given to me pending their confirmation -- and that I had no intention of notifying the President, at least until his meeting with Kendall and Flanigan concluded. You sounded as though you approved.
Again, your call preceded by only a few minutes -- as long as it was going to take Toni to type an 8-line paragraph -- my hand carrying a note to your office. Every action that I took was premeditated.
cc: Mr. Stephen B. Bull
[HANDWRITTEN NOTES]
[Under the 4:11 p.m. list item and hte hand-underlined words “called Ray,” written in Haldeman’s handwriting] “First mistake”
[Next to the 4:19 p.m. list item, near the words “You sounded as though you approved”] “Right”
[On the bottom of the second page of the memo written in Haldeman’s handwriting] “Would appreciate immediate notification in the future – even if unconfirmed. – and no notice to others until we decide on a procedure.”
April 10, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. EHRLICHMAN
Subject: Notes from the President (Action item)
The President would like for you to get together with the 5 o’clock group and come up with a way to put EMK “squarely on the spot”. (For example, he favors student demonstrations yet opposes actions intended to deal with them.)
Additionally, the President wants the 5 o’clock group to see to it that Teddy’s support of all-out integration and bussing is widely publicized.
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
cc: Mr. Keogh
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 12, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. EHRLICHMAN
Subject: Note from the President (Action Item)
An article in the latest issue of the “New Republic” discusses the recent hearings on the Office of Federal Contract Compliance and contrasts Senator Dirksen’s “clowning performance” with Ted Kennedy’s “cool and clever handling” of both himself and the situation. The article’s author, TRB (Dick Strout), goes so far as to say (about Kennedy), “If we had been political scouts, and had never heard of his brothers, we’d have made note of him.”
The President suggests that you and the 5 o’clock group get something out on how “very amateurish” Teddy was when he (the President) briefed the leaders on the Safeguard System.
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
cc: Mr. Keogh
Mr. Klein
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
24 March 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The President
Herewith are copies of two memoranda which I have sent to Secretary Rogers. I would not trouble you with this material if it were not for the fact that I have just learned the Secretary will not be back in Washington until late Monday. If this information is to be useful to you in your talk with King Husayn on Tuesday morning, I thought it should be in your hands well in advance.
You will recall that early in this Administration, you told me to deal solely with the Secretary on this issue of secret Isreal/Jordan contacts. This I have done on all reports originating with the Jordanian side. As for the brief, recent accounts of the secret meetings from the Israelis, these have been sent to you via Dr. Kissinger at their request.
For the foregoing reasons I am sending these two memoranda directly to you. No one on the White House staff has seen them or is familiar with their content.
Richard Helms
Director
Enclosures - 2
23 March 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
Secret Israel-Jordan Negotiations
1. Enclosed, as Attachment A, is an account of a secret meeting between King Husayn and Prime Minister Golda Meir held on 21 March 1972. Both parties were more specific in the presentation of their respective positions than in previous meetings. This served mainly to highlight the extremely wide gap between their positions.
2. In sum, Mrs. Meir rejected the Rogers’ plan, the Jarring mission, and the plan which the King presented. She declared Jerusalem non-negotiable and offered the Allon Plan as the maximum concession for the West Bank. The King declared these unacceptable. But both agreed to continue their contacts and the Israelis will prepare a written statement of “principles and designs” for a settlement at the next meeting.
3. In a personal post-mortem of this meeting with Mrs. Meir, the King said he was now convinced that basically Israel does not intend to give up one inch of the West Bank and that his UAK proposal has almost forced the Israelis to take a public stand on the retention of the West Bank as a matter of national policy. He said he was further convinced that although some of his remarks during the meeting evoked what appeared to be a favorable reaction from some of the other Israelis, as long as Mrs. Meir is in power no settlement is possible. Regarding Mrs. Meir’s claim that peace can only be achieved through direct negotiations, the King observed ironically that there have now been approximately fifty meetings between Israel and Jordan and the parties are still at “square one”.
4. The King said he intended to discuss his series of contacts with Mrs. Meir during his meeting with the President and would seriously welcome any views the
President might have to offer.
Richard Helms
Director
Attachments - 2
Attachment A
Subsequent to Prime Minister Golda Meir’s abrupt cancellation of the scheduled 16 March meeting between herself and King Husayn as a form of protest against the King’s announced plan for a United Arab Kingdom, and the King’s request that Mrs. Meir reconsider her position, Mrs. Meir sent a cordial reply requesting a rescheduled meeting on 21 March. This meeting took place, attended on the Jordan side by the King and his chief political advisor, Zayd Rafai, and on the Israeli side by Mrs. Meir, General Zamir, the Chief of Israeli External Intelligence Service, General Yariv, Director of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Eilot, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister, and Simcha Dinitz, political advisor to the Prime Minister. The following is a chronology of the highlights of their meeting:
King Husyan. Opened meeting by explaining his reasons for proposing a reconstitution of Jordan as the United Arab Kingdom (UAK). The King said that in making this proposal he had no intention of deceiving Mrs. Meir. He considered the UAK an internal plan affecting all of the people of Jordan which he viewed as a blueprint for the future. The King said he was sorry he had to announce the plan before he had discussed it with Mrs. Meir, but pointed out that he had advised her of it before he had informed the Arab chiefs of stato.
Mrs. Meir. Replied she was sorry this had happened and was shocked when she heard the content of the King’s announcement; her colleagues were even more shocked. She noted that Israel was not even mentioned in the proposal and that, by her interpretation, the plan would lead to the eventual liquidation of Israel. She added that it appeared to her the future border between the two states had already been decided unilaterally by Jordan.
