INCREMENTAL BELIEFS, NEGATIVE TRAIT JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE OUT-GROUP, AND CONCILIATORY POLITICAL ACTION TENDENCIES: THE JUDGMENT DIMENSION
We have suggested that a general incremental theory of groups (the idea that groups in general are capable of change) should be associated with more positive judgments of one’s particular out-group and with greater willingness to compromise for peace compared to a general entity theory of groups (the idea that groups in general are incapable of change). A positive change in judgments about the out-group represents a direct application of beliefs about the malleability of groups in general to the particular out-group involved in the conflict. For example, the belief that violent groups can change their behavior because of changes in context or leadership can be easily transformed to the expectation that the adversary group would do the same. The first question, then, is whether implicit theories about groups do indeed relate to judgments of the out-groups and to support for conciliatory political action tendencies, such as compromises for peace.
In a correlational study based on a large sample of all subgroups within the Jewish society in Israel, we measured people’s beliefs about groups by asking them to agree or disagree with items such as, “Groups can do things differently but the important parts of who they are can’t really be changed.” We found that the more people held an incremental belief about groups, the less they agreed with extreme forms of negative trait judgments of Palestinians (Halperin et al., 2011). Specifically, when asked about their views of Palestinians, those who held incremental beliefs about groups were less accepting (than those holding entity beliefs) of statements portraying Palestinians as “evil by nature”, as all wanting “to annihilate the Jews”, and as a group that “should never be trusted.” Even more interesting, we found that negative judgments of Palestinians in turn were associated with less willingness to compromise or reconcile with the Palestinians (Halperin et al., 2011, study 1).
Can these beliefs be altered to change judgments about the out-group and support for conciliatory action? To address this question, in a second study (Halperin et al., 2011, study 2), we temporarily manipulated Jewish-Israelis’ beliefs about groups. Participants first read a Psychology Today–style article about a renowned researcher who ostensibly found that groups either did (entity belief) or did not (incremental belief) have a fixed nature (with no mention of Palestinians). Later in the session, participants gave their trait judgments of Palestinians and rated their support for major steps for resolving the conflict (e.g., Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, sharing Jerusalem as a capital). Our results showed that although no mention was made of Palestinians in the articles, participants in the malleable condition had significantly more positive judgments of Palestinians (M = 3.32, SD = 1.01) than those in the fixed condition (M = 2.83, SD = .75; t(74) = 2.43, d = .56, p < .05). These more positive judgments in turn predicted greater support for major compromises (r = .45, p < .001).
One important question is whether these findings apply only to the strong groups in a conflict (such as Jewish Israelis have been). It might be that only groups that have many resources can allow themselves to support compromises because they have learned that groups have the potential to change. To determine whether the same pattern of findings would hold for the traditionally less powerful sides of the dispute (Halperin et al., 2011), we used the same method in the next two studies to change the mind-sets of Palestinian citizens of Israel (study 3) and non-Israeli Palestinians (study 4) living in the West Bank, many whom were members of Fatah and Hamas, groups with militant wings. Each group was later (as part of a large questionnaire covering many issues) asked about support for key compromises that were relevant to them. In both studies, people in the incremental group showed significantly more positive judgments of Israeli Jews than those in the entity condition. Even more important, in both studies these positive judgments predicted greater support for major compromises.
To summarize, the studies we have reviewed provide evidence that (1) highlighting the fact that groups can potentially change leads people to become more supportive of concrete compromises for peace and (2) this greater willingness to compromise for peace is driven by a shift in their judgment of the nature and traits of the adversary group. The focused yet implicit message we developed managed to affect people’s judgments of a longstanding and hated out-group without ever mentioning that out-group—that is, without trying to create empathy for or understanding of the out-group and without creating actual or imagined interaction with that group.
INCREMENTAL BELIEFS, EXTREME INTERGROUP EMOTIONS, AND CONCILIATORY POLITICAL ACTION TENDENCIES: THE EMOTIONAL DIMENSION
Although most of our previous research has focused on negative judgments about the out-group as the key path from implicit theories to heightened support for conciliatory actions, we believe that intergroup emotions can also play an important role in that process. In our research, we hypothesized that changing people’s belief about the malleability of groups should help them to down-regulate or decrease the experience of two of the most destructive intergroup emotions: hatred and anxiety. Our assumption derives from findings that these emotions are strongly connected to the belief in a fixed negative nature of the out-group (Halperin, 2008).
Hatred is one of the most powerful emotional sentiments in the context of intergroup conflicts (Opotow and McClelland, 2007; Sternberg, 2003). It is an extreme and continuous affective phenomenon that is directed at a particular individual or group (Sternberg, 2003). A recent study, based on appraisal theories, shows that hatred is the affective phenomenon that corresponds to the idea of stable negative characteristics in the out-group and to a belief in the out-group’s inability to undergo positive change (see Halperin, 2008, study 2). As such, we presumed that hatred could be attenuated by reducing adherence to “entity” (or fixed) implicit theories about groups and by increasing acceptance of “incremental” (or malleable) implicit theories about groups (Levy et al., 1998; Rydell et al., 2007).
One of our previously reported studies in the Middle Eastern context (Halperin et al., 2011, study 1) was conducted as part of a much larger survey. In addition to our questions about judgments of the out-group, there were also, in another part of the survey, items about negative emotions toward the out-group. When we examined the relation between implicit theories and hatred toward Palestinians, we found that an incremental theory about groups was significantly associated with lower levels of hatred toward Palestinians among our Israeli Jewish participants (r = −.30, p < .001). Moreover, the effect of an incremental theory on hatred remained significant after controlling for key demographics, such as political orientation or levels of religiosity. Importantly, implicit theories did not predict other negative emotions, such as anger (r = .08, n.s.), thus demonstrating that hatred in particular (as opposed to negative affect more generally) is predicted by implicit theories about groups.
Another interesting, and preliminary, example of the emotional mechanism can be found in a study we recently conducted in Cyprus. The aim of this study was to increase the motivation of Turkish Cypriots to engage in contact with Greek Cypriots (Halperin Crisp, Husnu, Dweck, and Gross, 2013, N = 62). Evidence suggests that intergroup anxiety is the emotion that has the widest influence on people’s motivation for intergroup contact (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Here we asked whether teaching an incremental theory would lead people to down-regulate intergroup anxiety and increase their motivation to meet and communicate with out-group members. In thinking about the core appraisal themes of intergroup anxiety, we realized that intergroup anxiety in intractable conflicts is likely to be driven by a combination of two appraisals: (1) the out-group repeatedly threatens to hurt the in-group, and (2) the out-group will never change, and thus will always try to hurt the in-group. Accordingly, we proposed that the group malleability manipulation would be effective in promoting contact willingness through intergroup anxiety reduction. We speculated that such a belief change would reduce intergroup anxiety by creating
expectations for less threatening behavior by the out-group. Alternatively, the intervention might increase contact motivation because it would lead people to believe that by meeting out-group members in person, they can convince them to abandon the violent approach and replace it with constructive dialogue.
Indeed, the results show that Turkish Cypriot participants in the malleable condition had significantly less anxiety about Greek Cypriots (M = 2.50, SD = 1.40) than those in the fixed condition (M = 3.35, SD = 1.40; t (60) = 2.37, d = .61, p < .05). In addition, Turkish Cypriots in the malleable condition were more willing to have contact with Greek Cypriots than those in the fixed condition (Mmalleable = 0.16, SD = 1.48, Mfixed = −0.80, SD = 1.37; t (60) = 2.63, d = .67, p < .05). Furthermore, we found that intergroup anxiety was a significant mediator of the relation between the incremental intervention and willingness to have contact (anxiety indirect effect =.50, 95% CI = .09 to .94, p < .05).
To summarize, these results show that within the context of widely recognized, long-term intractable conflicts such as those in the Middle East and Cyprus, a simple manipulation of group malleability led to decreased feelings of intergroup hatred and anxiety and increased support for compromises and increased willingness to interact with out-group members. Interestingly, Yeager and his colleagues (Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, and Dweck, 2011) had very similar findings about the emotional impact of growth mind-set intervention on conflicts, which they obtained in a totally different context. In their studies, conducted among adolescents in Finland and the United States, students who held more of a growth mind-set or were primed with a growth mind-set responded to conflict or victimization in the schoolyard with less hatred, less shame, and a lower desire to wreak vengeance on others. Even more important, in a later study, a growth mind-set intervention yielded relatively enduring changes in adolescents’ propensity for aggressive behavior (see also Yeager, Trzesniewski, and Dweck, 2013).
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this chapter, we have argued that the belief that groups cannot change constitutes a powerful barrier to the resolution of prolonged intergroup conflicts. Altering this fundamental belief represents a significant challenge. We have proposed an implicit approach and have reported initial evidence that changing the belief that the out-group cannot meaningfully change leads to changes in willingness to take steps that would be conducive to peace.
We believe that integrating these ideas into the field of conflict resolution would improve our understanding of intergroup conflicts and their resolution and would enable the development of more focused interventions that could mobilize public opinion toward increased support for peace processes. These interventions may be optimal especially in cases where the conflict remains acute and the climate is not ripe for more direct interventions in which both sides confront the each other. In these cases, an indirect intervention aimed at changing mind-sets and only indirectly influencing attitudes and emotions toward the out-group could be ideal.
Although the ideas and findings we have presented are promising, there is still much to be done to transform them into effective conflict resolution interventions. In terms of research, these ideas should be examined outside the lab using extended educational workshops and longitudinal assessment. This work will also enable a more rigorous test of our model by applying it to more diverse populations and in a real-world situation when people are confronted by continuing conflict-related adverse events. We have already conducted some pilot studies along these lines, and although much work remains to be done, the results are very promising.
Efforts should also concentrate on how to disseminate the incremental message about groups’ capacity to change to larger populations. Media, and especially social media, have enormous potential for disseminating these ideas by focusing on stories presenting groups that went through meaningful changes. Some efforts have been made in recent years to use media channels to reduce prejudice and promote peace (Paluck, 2009; Singhal, Cody, Rogers, and Sabido, 2004), but they have not used the messages developed in our intervention. New technological developments and the huge popularity of social media create a fertile ground for improving intergroup relations by changing attitudes and intergroup emotions.
Given the nature of intractable conflicts, it may seem remarkable that the relatively modest implicit interventions described here would lead to meaningful change. However, following Yeager and Walton (2011), we believe that interventions such as this can potentially have constructive effects by setting into motion more positive recursive social and psychological processes when people repeatedly face conflict-related events. The growth mind-set about groups, internalized by those who take part in the proposed intervention, can serve as a more constructive filter through which group members analyze conflict-related events and evaluate new opportunities.
These interventions are not magic; we believe that they will be successful only under the right conditions and with powerful supporting mechanisms. One example of supporting mechanism might be the integration of the proposed approach with other conflict resolution interventions. For example, when combined with an existing intervention, we assume that messages regarding groups’ capability to change can make contact more effective or can help people overcome the almost natural resistance to empathize with the perspective of an adversarial out-group.
At this early stage, caution is clearly in order, and our indirect approach may have limitations that should be taken into account. Most important, our approach relies on the assumption that people will apply their growth beliefs regarding groups in general to their most hated out-group, with which they have been in conflict for so many years. It is well established that in the context of intergroup conflicts, people often delegitimize and sometimes even dehumanize out-group members (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub, 1989). The problematic implication might be that group members can acknowledge the fact that groups of people can potentially change but do not see their adversary out-group as a legitimate group of people due to the dehumanization process. In this case, levels of delegitimization or dehumanization of the out-group may block the positive effects of incremental mind-set manipulation on attitudes toward peace. Our aggregated findings show that even in the most intractable conflicts, our indirect approach proved to be efficient; nevertheless, much more remains to be done to understand the boundary conditions for this type of intervention.
Finally, although we and others have examined the role played by malleability beliefs regarding individuals and groups in conflict resolution processes, other potential targets should be considered. For example, less attention has been paid to people’s beliefs regarding the malleability of situations. In line with our prior discussion of the advantages of implicit approaches in conflict resolution, an important challenge might be to develop an implicit approach that deals with the dynamic nature of situations rather than groups. This is especially true in intractable conflicts where people do not see a way out and believe that the conflict itself is irresolvable. And indeed, we (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, and Gross, 2013) have recently begun exploring whether there is an existing concept based on implicit theories, which refers to people’s malleability beliefs regarding highly negative situations such as prolonged conflicts. We believe that in order for people to preserve hope for the resolution of a conflict, they must believe that conflicts are malleable and even resolvable. Our preliminary results, based on both correlational and experimental studies conducted among Israeli Jews, show that increased belief in the malleability of violent conflicts leads to increased levels of hope regarding the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in turn leads to more support for major concessions in order to promote conflict resolution (Cohen-Chen et al., 2013). We believe that these very preliminary indications pave the way to a new line of research and potentially the creation of new indirect interventions focusing on people’s beliefs about the general nature of conflicts.
In sum, our conceptualization and empirical studies represent
an innovative application of knowledge about basic psychological processes to the realm of conflict resolution research and practice. We were initially unsure what effects such an indirect intervention would have. We now have more confidence in this approach, given the consistent findings from our studies and interventions conducted in different societies and across different conflicts. We believe that we have managed to identify one of the centers of gravity of the psychology of intractable conflicts. The challenge is now to develop methods for durably altering the mind-set of large populations over long periods of time.
References
Agius, E., & Ambrosewicz, J. (2003). Towards a culture of tolerance and peace. Montreal: International Bureau for Children’s Rights.
Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus.
Bar-Tal, D. (1990). Causes and consequences of delegitimization: Models of conflict and ethnocentrism. Journal of Social Issues, 46, 65–81.
Bar-Tal, D., & Halperin, E. (2011). Socio-psychological barriers to conflict resolution. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective (pp. 217–240). New York: Psychology Press.
Bar-Tal, D., & Rosen, Y. (2009). Peace education in societies involved in intractable conflicts: Direct and indirect models. Review of Educational Research, 79, 557–575.
Bekerman, Z., & Maoz, I. (2005). Troubles with identity: Obstacles to coexistence education in conflict ridden societies. Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, 5, 341–357.
Blackwell, L. S., Trzesniewski, K. H., & Dweck, C. S. (2007). Implicit theories of intelligence predict achievement across an adolescent transition: A longitudinal study and an intervention. Child Development, 78, 246–263.
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed) Page 60
