Negotiators have five strategic options in the face of terrorist actions such as hostage taking: no negotiation, manipulation of the terrorist group, secret negotiation, normal negotiation, and negotiation in order to prepare for an assault. The no negotiation doctrine aims to deter terrorists from taking more hostages. It makes sense in a long-term strategy in terms of risk management. It is, for instance, the official Israeli policy with regard to Palestinians. This is also British policy: the United Kingdom strictly bans any form of substantive concession such as a ransom or the release of prisoners. This option has the most painful consequences concerning the hostages, who may feel that they are being sacrificed to long-term national interests.
Manipulation of the terrorist group is a complex strategy that can yield high benefits but requires great skills, time, and an ability to deal with a high level of risk. The principle behind it is to use sophisticated ploys in order to get the hostages free. It is a smart game of deception that has been successfully used against the FARC of Colombia, for example. Detainees of this Marxist-Leninist movement were kept in several mountain areas and jungles controlled by the FARC, and communication between the camps was difficult. The Colombian military intelligence managed to infiltrate some of these local hideouts and spent months gaining the terrorists’ trust. At some point, a government mole was able to convince the FARC’s chiefs in charge of the hostages to accept a so-called request from FARC headquarters to transfer the hostages for safety. In fact, they were brought to a meeting place where they were taken care of by a very small number of Colombian government commandos dressed as guerrillas acting as a kind of medical help and put in a helicopter similar to those used by the Red Cross. All fifteen captives had been handcuffed before being placed aboard the helicopter, along with two of their FARC guards, who were disarmed and subdued after take-off. Then the hostages were taken to freedom when a government intelligence agent told them. “We are with the army; you are free.” The whole operation was performed without a single shot, and no one was wounded.
The secret negotiation strategy is more commonly used. No one mentions anything about what is really going on, not even that there are meetings or discussions. One of the major advantages of this option is that negotiators are removed from the influence of public opinion and media. It provides more flexibility for the authorities, who do not have to report to any outside audience and avoid the issue of looking weak if they make concessions. This was the case after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 by Islamic students supported by the Iranian government. Fifty-two US diplomats and employees of the embassy were kept as hostages during 444 days of terrible mistreatment under the slogan, “America can’t do a thing.” After a rescue mission that turned into a disaster, the US government, humiliated and helpless, had no other choice than to negotiate discretely to free the Americans.
The normal negotiation option is used when there is no way of hiding the hostage taking from the public. The authorities have to stand the pressure of the media, public opinion, and actions carried out by the families of the hostages. This is what happened with the French journalists taken as hostages in Iraq in 2004 and 2005. At that time, it was common practice in Iraq, almost a national sport, and there was even a base rate for the ransom to be paid for a Western hostage.
Some of these negotiations save lives as in the case with a Lufthansa flight in Mogadishu (1977). When the plane was still in Dubai, the four Arab terrorists started checking passengers’ papers to find out who was a Jew. They did not know that religion is not mentioned on German passports. Then they tried to find other clues to spot their first victims. One of the passengers had a Mont Blanc fountain pen with, at the tip, the white stylized six-pointed star with rounded edges, representative of the Mont Blanc snowcap from above. The hostage takers understood it as a Jewish symbol and decided to execute the owner of the fountain pen. After a long discussion, the pilot managed to convince them to delay the execution. Then the copilot was spotted wearing a Junghans wrist watch with an eight-pointed star. Suspecting that he was wearing a Jewish product, the terrorists’ leader decided to kill him. After another long and dramatic negotiation, the terrorist agreed to destroy only the watch and did it on the spot with an axe.
Negotiation in order to prepare for an assault is another way of resorting to the discussion process in order to collect information about the terrorists, such as the number of terrorists and details of their equipment and state of mind. It is also a means of exhausting them or altering their concentration levels before launching an attack. This is usually done when the environment is well controlled by the authorities. The storming of the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima, Peru, in 1996–1997 is one of many cases belonging to this category.
These options refer to distinct negotiation paradigms. The no negotiation policy can be framed as an anticipated “chicken game”: there is no option for cooperation. The priority is not to free the hostages but to deter terrorists from repeating this type of action. Considering the current situation, the setting is one with a win-lose outcome at best and a lose-lose outcome at worst. The manipulation of the terrorist group belongs to the no negotiation rationale and carries the idea that what is played is a win-lose game with the highest possible gains: total victory at no cost while saving the hostages’ lives. It can be a victory at several levels: human, political, strategic, and psychological. The negotiation in order to prepare for an assault can lead the negotiation process astray. It turns it into a simple means of achieving a different objective, one that does not involve any form of agreement. There is no real process of adjustment, with the negotiation simply setting the stage for the surrender, or potentially the death, of the terrorists and the hostages. The secret negotiation and normal negotiation options relate to the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm: they leave room for competition but also some kind of cooperation in which the two parties can achieve at least part of their goals.
KNOWING THE CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, VALUES AND GOALS OF THE TERRORIST GROUP
Fighting or negotiating with a terrorist group implies first understanding it, which means grasping its vision of the world; its representation of the others; and its goals, motivations, and values. It is information gathering, an essential condition for discussions. Some groups are well known, publish about themselves, have websites, have access to media, have been the object of research and reports on them. Some are not well documented, and negotiators may have to resort to infiltration to collect enough information to be effective with them or about them. Introducing moles in a secret organization is not a practice without risk, and the human cost may be dramatic. Debriefing former members of the terrorist group is another way to collect strategic data but runs the risk of getting misleading information. Furthermore, democracies put a number of limitations on the techniques that can be used during interrogations.
As soon as different cultures face each other, the reality lies very much in the eyes of the beholder. For instance, Western analysts believe that Egypt’s poverty stems from overpopulation, mismanagement of resources, and excessive defense expenditures, whereas its fundamentalist groups explain it by the spiritual failures of the population, its religious laxness, its secularist trends, and widespread corruption. In their view, the solution is a return to the simplicity, the hard work, and the self-reliance of true Muslim living.
Terrorist organizations have been thoroughly studied much beyond their structure and methods of action (Creenshaw, 2010; Sageman, 2008; Post, 2007; Hoffman, 2006; Horgan, 2005; Laqueur, 2004). For instance, we know that Al Qaeda members believe that the world is degenerate and unjust and that salvation lies in adopting Sharia, Islamic law. It sees the main enemies of Muslims as Jews, “heretics,” and the United States. It considers these forces as the main causes of Muslim suffering, and Shia Muslims are viewed as apostates. Members believe that the “Zionist entity,” meaning the state of Israel, should be eliminated, the United States should be expelled from the Middle East, and
new caliphate established on the ruins of this degenerated world, all of which can only be achieved through violent jihad. To serve this purpose, suicide bombers are ready to make the ultimate sacrifice for God. It is a path to sanctity, and the martyrdom of one of its members brings pride and respect to the family. The usual distinction between civilians and military people is abandoned. Both regard themselves as “soldiers of Allah” mobilized to fight “evil” and overthrow the “impure order.”
On personal and social behavior, radical Islamists consider “fornication,” homosexuality, gambling, intoxicants, and the practice of usury as absolute evils. Music and theater are not acceptable, and women should be fully covered, including their face. They want to impose their understanding of Islam through delegitimating other creeds. The overall strategy conceived by bin Laden was to lure the United States into a war of attrition against the Muslim world, where tribal law requires revenge, triggering an escalation process in the global jihad with the purpose of “bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy” (Al-Jazeera, 2004). Tactically, Al Qaeda finds some leverage by embedding itself in local insurgencies, especially in countries with a failing state, and spreading its ideology in a highly disturbed social fabric. Thus, at first sight, for Al Qaeda, there is no room for negotiation with the “infidels.”
NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS
Having lost the American Revolution, a British general tried first to surrender to a French commander, who politely directed him to George Washington. At stake was an issue of legitimacy. Similarly, negotiating with terrorists implies a kind of de facto recognition of their organization. Prior to entering the negotiation, terrorists usually raise this issue. Officially no government recognizes a terrorist group, an extortionist, or a hostage taker as a legitimate equal. Democracies must never give in to crime, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. In addition, there is a widely acknowledged principle of stipulating that one does not negotiate under threat even though threat is the most basic and most effective weapon that terrorists use. The principles are clear, but because the point is to save lives, negotiators have to be realistic.
The moral duty of intervening was formalized in a 1987 UN resolution that condemns hostage taking, whatever the motivations, but requires governments to take all necessary measures to put an immediate end to the confinement. Most often governments choose to intervene, either directly or with the help of a third party. This is done through what is conventionally called track 2 diplomacy. The no negotiation principle is more of a hard-line rhetoric than a reality, especially if the place where the hostages are kept is unknown or is in a country friendly to terrorists. History shows that democracies are more willing to negotiate and compromise with terrorism than they admit (Quinney and Coyne, 2011; Zartman and Faure, 2011). For instance, The British government sustained a back channel to the Irish Republican Army even after the IRA launched a spectacular mortar attack on 10 Downing Street during a cabinet meeting in 1991. In the case of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier abducted by Hamas in 2006, the Israeli government abandoned its no negotiation principle and finally decided to open discussion with the Hamas, a terrorist organization that does not recognize Israel’s right to exist.
Should a government negotiate with terrorists? Considering only the effectiveness criterion, that is, the freedom or life of the hostages, some researchers (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991) provide a positive answer on the ground that communication is a way to exert influence. Negotiation is a mechanism for influencing other parties’ decisions, and given adverse or suboptimal circumstances, it may be a measure of last resort for avoiding an undesirable outcome. The point is not whether to negotiate or not to negotiate but to negotiate properly. One should simply make clear that a decision to negotiate does not mean recognition of the legitimacy of the demand or the acceptance of the other side’s behavior. What one does accept when negotiating with terrorists is the humanitarian cause it serves through trying to save lives (Faure, 2006).
If the basic principle that applies to such a situation is at least not to make any concessions, the only resource left to authorities is persuasion. This is usually insufficient to free the hostages. Then, discrete concessions have to be made at some point. This was the case in Tehran with the storming of the US embassy. Usually the final deal is not made public because often the country involved has to make concessions that if known, would create problems with other countries or with its own public opinion (Faure and Shakun, 1988). Here the iceberg principle applies more than in any other situation: disclosing only a small portion of the information known. If one considers again, for instance, the actions of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines for over a decade, no government has acknowledged having paid a ransom to obtain the freedom of its own nationals. For its own part, the Filipino government formally opposes payment of ransom for hostages. In all cases, it is unlikely that persuasion alone has been sufficient to free hostages whose only function is to serve as exchange currency.
Faure and Zartman (2010) contend that negotiating with terrorist organizations is not supping with the devil. It is not soul selling or evil and does not imply that the state is abandoning its moral values. The point is to induce moderation and flexibility in the terrorists’ demands, reshaping their ends into attainable reforms, and forcing an end to their violent means of protest while at the same time opening the political process to broader participation. States should engage not because of terrorist violence but to end terrorist violence.
What Can Be Negotiated with Terrorists?
On the side of the authorities, what is traded off with terrorists is human lives. In return, the concessions made to hostage takers fall into the following categories:
Payment of a ransom
Providing weapons, food, equipment, technology, or information
Release of imprisoned terrorists, political prisoners, or dissidents
Release of imprisoned supporters or sympathizers of terrorism
Putting an end to a military intervention and withdrawing soldiers
Making a public apology
Providing access to the media to publicize their cause
Providing transport to another location
Providing political asylum or amnesty within a host country
The promise of a fair trial
Secret arrangement on a specific issue
As hostage taking spreads around the world, a sort of market price for hostages has been established. According to the place, conditions, number of hostages, and the financial resources of governments, the ransom may vary from $1 million to $10 million. Among the most generous governments stands Japan, then Western countries such as Germany. The world record for ransom was probably set by Li Ka-shing, a renowned Hong Kong real estate tycoon, who paid an estimated amount of HK$1.3 billion for his son who was abducted in 1966.
Types of Negotiation Situations
Two major generic types of situations created by terrorist actions call for negotiation: kidnapping and barricade hostage taking. Kidnapping usually refers to an action done in a context not controlled by the captors unless it is perpetrated in a rogue state, one without control over its territory. The authorities who have to solve the case do not know where the hostages are confined. The terrorists hide within the society by appearing as unnoticeable as possible. Contacts between the authorities and the captors are indirect and uneasy, with little interaction. The FARC of Colombia has illustrated this practice with a record four thousand people kidnapped over the last decade. The Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines also has an impressive record in this domain. Because there were not enough potential targets in their country, this group went to neighboring countries to kidnap people they thought would be good currency for exchange. The former GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat) in North Africa took Western tourists as hostages after having carefully selected those from countries that have been particularly generous in paying for the freedom of their nationals.
; The second type of situation, barricade hostage taking, corresponds to a situation of siege. Here the fishbowl theory applies: the fish is the perpetrator and the bowl his sphere of protection. Outside the bowl, he is highly vulnerable because he does not control anything in the immediate surroundings. He is under the constant threat of assault. Even electricity, food, and water depend on the goodwill of the forces that surround the terrorists. A number of cases illustrate such a situation in which the final purpose of the negotiation is not to seek an agreement but to prepare for what is usually called the “tactical solution,” a storming of the place. This is what happened with the Maalot School in Israel in 1974 when children were taken hostage by a Palestinian group. In Moscow in 2002, a group of Chechen militants took over a theater and held the entire audience, over 850 people, as hostages. In Lima, Peru, in 1996, the residence of the Japanese ambassador was occupied by a revolutionary group for more than four months. Fourteen rebels from the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement took seventy-two hostages during a traditional celebration. In the three cases, the place of detention was stormed and the terrorists killed. In addition, in the Maalot hostage taking, twenty-one children were killed, and in the Moscow theater case, at least ninety hostages died during the assault.
Hijacking a plane is a mixed situation, with characteristics of both barricade hostage taking and kidnapping. Terrorists try to maximize their chances of success by creating a situation in which they can move the situation of siege to a friendlier context such as a rogue state. If this is carried out successfully, the captors do not risk having their place stormed. Typical hijacking cases were the Lufthansa flight that was forced to land in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1977 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; a TWA flight hijacked from Athens by the Hezbollah and constrained to land at Beirut in 1985; and an Air France flight hijacked in 1986 first to Benghazi, Libya, then to Entebbe, Uganda, by a Palestinian terrorist group and a German leftist organization.
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (3rd ed) Page 113
