In scientific research, definitions are of utmost importance to communicate clearly and understand precisely what is being said. Incongruity exists between casual usage of words and academic contexts. Some obvious examples include the common use of the terms “theory” and “energy” which have very specific meanings in scientific fields and very different connotations in general English usage. Before discussing how amateurs use science in their investigations and research, we must first establish the meaning of three basics concepts—science, the public and the scientific method.
What Is Science?
“Science” is a bit hard to define. The meaning, like with many other words and concepts in language, changes through time and is dependent upon personal values. If you are one who values science as a reliable way to understand the world, you likely have a different and more stringent definition of the term than someone who values it less. People project their own meanings onto science based on their life experiences. Non-scientists typically see science as monolithic, consisting of facts written in books. Science (with a capital S) represents orthodoxy, it is unchanging and authoritative. Science is perceived as being complicated and specialized, intrinsically difficult for a layperson to grasp (Toumey 1996). Admittedly, it is complicated. In today’s modern western culture, science is often connected to or interchanged with technology (Thurs 2007) as the American public connects the process of science with the useful outcomes, products, and processes that make our life better. Technology is a vehicle for dispersing science in our society but we view in in light of products we deem relevant.
“Science” is both a process that generates knowledge and a collection of systemized knowledge (Ziman 2000). Early use of the word “science” referred to this collection aspect rather than the process. In the 19th century, “science” was restricted to referencing academic work, mainly regarding nature (Pigliucci & Boudry 2013). But in modern culture, we talk about the “science of” something or about “doing science.” Therefore, when referring to science, we might mean the derived body of knowledge, or the specific approach taken to obtain that knowledge. Science is a process, a way of looking at a topic, a community, an infrastructure, a career, a set of results, an authority, a media category—we can use the word in so many various ways, which means it can be abused in just as many ways.
Does science belong to everyone or is it the domain of specialists, the scientists? This is a complicated question that does not have a simple answer. Real Science by Ziman (2000) is a readable reference that breaks down science into its components and describes why they are integral to each other. Ziman describes how almost all science is based on observation. Experiments are acts of observation designed to produce specific data that inform a question. Use of instruments in a situation can be an experiment. Therefore, the ghost/ARIGs using EMF meters or other devices are conducting an experiment. Rapping on a tree with a stick to test for a response (from Bigfoot) can also be considered an experiment. To be useful, the experiment must have context and a clear purpose. Experiments are desirable but not always required. Collecting observations as statements and facts such as in historical investigations is also part of the scientific process. Humans collect information by personal experience. Or, we can gain information indirectly by watching or reading about a subject. Evidence we gain directly via our senses is called empirical evidence, in contrast to evidence we gain from reasoning or intuition. Science is dominated by empirical evidence. A critical caveat to empirical evidence is the question of the credibility of that evidence. Was it accurate? Was it perceived and recorded correctly? Can it be reproduced reliably by others? Will the same results occur as expected the next time? Observations by witnesses, even trained witnesses like scientists, can be biased by various factors. Therefore, citing empirical evidence may not be as clear and direct as we assume (Dewitt 2004). Potentially confounding factors must be made explicit as part of the reporting on the experiment or observation to fully account for them. Examples of basic confounding factors include: it was dark, there were many people around, the weather was poor, there was no scale for size and distance measurements.
Inherent to an observation being scientific is that it is objective. Quantification of observations is one way of making the data objective. We measure precisely, then the next person who measures should come up with the same results, within a reasonable margin of error. Separate observations that result in the similar measurements strengthen the evidence. Observations are also heavily influenced by the observer’s preconceptions (such as a commitment to a certain explanation) and the behavior of people around the observer. When you are told to expect some force to be at play (an object to move), you are more likely to perceive it moving. If surprised and frightened (such as in a car crash or earthquake), reaction and observations can be skewed toward personal preservation. Scientists are trained to be better observers, to focus narrowly on what needs to be recorded and how exactly to record it to minimize errors. Since we are human, errors can’t be eliminated entirely. Error minimization is addressed via the scientific tenet of communalism (discussed ahead). From the setup, through findings, to the conclusions, the process must be transparent and available to others to attempt to reproduce. The biases of any individual investigator or researcher that affect objectivity of the observation is “neutralized in the collective outcome” of scientific debate (Ziman 2000: 159).
In Philosophy of Pseudoscience (Pigliucci & Boudry 2013) the contributors stress that science is a “collective enterprise”—its strength and privilege derived not from the individual theories or models but in the established properties of the community and the interaction of the members of that community. The scientific community is responsible for sorting the wheat from chaff, building upon others’ sound work, or to provide informed criticism expecting to be answered. Shortly after its formalization, science progressed to a level where one individual can’t do much, but the community can collectively solve vexing questions by cooperating and providing feedback (often corrective or critical) to gain progress. Coordinated efforts, collective sharing of research results, and reinforcing findings are essential to establishing reliable knowledge. Ziman (2000: 110) states emphatically that research results do not count as scientific unless they are “reported, disseminated, shared and eventually transformed into communal property by being formally published.”
As children, we likely obtained our first ideas about science from pop culture. Most of our exposure is based on stereotypes of scientists we saw on TV or in movies—un-emotional, serious, socially separate, intelligent men in white lab coats. Scientists spoke a complicated language, comfortably handling equipment and gadgets, taking notes and recording data. Scientists were often seen as having hidden knowledge in their labs and notebooks that only they understood. Application of scientific methods isn’t a typical way of thinking about life. It’s not common sense. Consider the observation we make daily—sunrise and sunset, which is most often depicted as the sun moving around the earth. This is incorrect but without being taught what really happens, we might not know or care about the distinction. Sometimes, the empirical truth wouldn’t matter in our day-to-day lives. We don’t live scientifically, testing our hypotheses in a controlled and formal way and then asking others to weigh in on it and point out our flaws. Science requires a degree of rigor we are not used to applying, but we do use a loose approximation of a scientific or rational method for some decision-making processes to determine what is the most likely true answer, especially when we know there already is a body of reliable of information we can check.
The key to science’s air of exclusivity and power in modern society is related to how well the borders of science can be defined and held tight. Borderlines that have been set up around the idea of science and scientists are revealed in the use of terms such as “the scientific method,” references to the “ivory tower” of science, and the distinction between genuine science and pseudoscience (Loxton & Prothero 2013) which will be
discussed in a Chapter 12.
What Is “the Public”?
“Science” was tough to define but the “public” is even more nebulous as there are multiple “publics” depending on the subject. Generally, we can say that “the public” consists of informed citizens who are participating in society (Gregory & Miller 1993). Some groups choose to pay attention to different parts of society or to ignore them, and different sections of the public come prepared differently to each subject area. Some members of the public have lay expertise that may be equal to but separate from professional expertise. For example, consider the farmer and the agricultural scientist: one knows practical applications and the other knows detailed formulas or conceptual models. Regarding ARIGs, consider the astronomer and the ufologist, the zoologist and the cryptozoologist, and the psychologist or physicist and the paranormal investigator. ARIGs may appear to have expertise in comparison with the general public but likely not have comparable expertise to scientists and professional experts who may also consider themselves part of the public sphere for discussion and decision-making. When it comes to areas like children’s education, community decisions, or national policy, various parties (academics, social scientists, religious officials, parents, business people) assert their opinions on the basis of their sphere of experience. Such pluralism is almost always a positive contribution for society.
Another view of the “public” is that of the “mass culture.” “Mass” suggests vast numbers, undifferentiated but heterogenous in make-up. “Mass media” is consumed by the majority instead of a specific group.
Science educators have often taken an approach to the public in terms of what is called the “top-down” or “deficit” model. The “public”—defined in the broadest, shallowest terms possible—consists of individuals who are empty vessels that need to be filled with scientific facts and ideas. Then, the assumption is that the public will use that information to make scientifically informed decisions and society will be more science-literate. Considering the diversity of the public in background knowledge, interests and values, this model is not realistic. The simplistic model of delivering facts doesn’t work. The approach to education must be contextual. Information must be delivered in a way that is useful and meaningful to the audience or it will likely be discarded or ignored. The many varieties of the “public” hear what it wants and needs to hear.
The Scientific Method—There Isn’t One
In school, we are taught the scientific method as a step-by-step action of hypothesis, testing by experiments, then theory formation. We are delivered an idealized process of how science works (Dolby 1975). This overly simplified procedure is not an accurate reflection of how science progresses in the real world. There are reasons behind the many stringent rules of scientific research. The execution of the process, in accordance with those rules, is often tricky, with nuances and complexities.
Once upon a time, “scientific method” was not part of the common vernacular. When the term began to be used in the mid–19th century, it was synonymous with “thorough” and “careful.” For many of us, our first introduction to science may have been in elementary school, when we were taught the “scientific method” to investigate nature that went something like this: observe and gather facts; derive the question you need answered about those facts; propose an explanation for the facts that answers that question; test that explanation. The scientific process is equated to the hypothetico-deductive method. Observations result in formation of a hypothesis, a prediction is deduced based on the hypothesis (or multiple working hypotheses), and these hypotheses are checked for accuracy, and then supported or rejected. Only natural explanations are assumed (Pigliucci & Boudry 2013). In an idealized lab setting to test a chemical or physical question in a controlled environment, this recipe for investigation would work. But when you move out of the lab, into the very messy and busy real world, it is impossible to control all the variables that can mess with the results. Think about all the possible factors at play in a situation where a witness experiences something strange outdoors. A smell or noise could be caused by countless things, some of which we don’t readily suspect. We misinterpret information relayed to us via our senses. Then there are the many and various environmental considerations that we are not measuring or do not know are operating. Investigating an open system is incredibly complicated and difficult (Pigliucci 2010). Certain types of investigations do not lend themselves to experiments but to observation and pattern-seeking. Some research is like detective work, putting the factual pieces together to form a reasonable conclusion. Good science can be done this way without a formulaic and idealized method (Pigliucci 2010).
There is no foolproof, formulaic recipe for inquiry that can be applied to all subject areas because the circumstances of the phenomena to be studied vary. Even when diligently using a prescriptive process in a laboratory setting with controlled variables, the results can be wrong. The scientific method is more of a mindset than a formal technique (Collins 1987; Pigliucci 2010). The formal training a scientist receives and practices in conducting research builds this science-oriented mindset.
The idealized scientific method assumes one person or a small group are working to solve a problem or answer a question and that there will be some “Eureka!” moment. That scenario is rare in today’s world of complicated problems where major research is conducted by large teams. Another larger set of scientists offer their questions, opinions, suggestions, and complaints about the research results. They will pick every nit and they will expect the results to be replicated. An oversimplified cookbook method ignores this critical social aspect of science (Lyons 2009) that makes it the most reliable means of knowledge-production humans have. A scientific effort takes time to accumulate close to true or probably true models of nature. These models, called “theories,” are strengthened through additional empirical evidence, observations, and by testing to determine if additional conclusions of research fit the model or not (Haack 2003). The idea of a single iconic “scientific method” can be scrapped. Yet, for purposes of this volume, the scientific method still functions as a trope, a useful rhetorical device that, in this case, represents being careful, systematic, and accurate.
Why Science Is Privileged
As stated, science is a process, a body of knowledge, but also a social institution—a complex system where the people doing research, their instruments, institutions, and journals all interact to produce knowledge. Science is not one action or experiment; it is made up of coordinated actions in support of a larger scheme (Ziman 2000). There are other ways of gaining understanding about the world but, in modern society, science is a privileged method of inquiry. Why is science inarguably the most reliable form of gaining knowledge? Let’s consider the alternatives. You can accept everything people tell you. That usually works out fine in everyday life but when dealing with complexities of nature such as figuring out physical interactions, if a medical treatment really works, or what exists out there in the universe beyond earth, testimony from your friends and family fails. Some people say they have personal revelations and that you should believe them. They maintain that these judgments are as valuable as scientifically gained conclusions. Revelations are interesting, but people can and do make up nonsense and say “they know.” Or they make mistakes and adopt a baseless philosophy. So personal epiphanies may be wonderful and gut feelings and intuition useful for the individual, but such ways of personal knowing are not reliable for the rest of us. Science is the most reliable because it addresses and attempts to eliminate all the ways errors can happen. There are countless ways that we can be fooled by our observations, calculations, and conclusions. Scientific claims are testable and scientific theories are reliable in that we can use them to predict what will happen next or where to go looking for the next discovery. The ability to predict is the strong backbone of science. If a theory can’t help others explain and predict how nature has worked in the past and will likely work in the future, we c
an’t gain useful knowledge and progress in our understanding.
ARIGs commonly exhibit an unusual love-hate relationship with science. They love its social prestige but resent that conventional science as a body rejects their non-materialistic ideas about magic and mystery in the world. They often express anger that they are excluded. In a bit of “sour grapes,” they berate science and even sow doubt about science in general and its role in society. Amateur investigators state they feel they are more true to the scientific endeavor of seeking the truth, and are proud of their lack of credentials, because an academic path is stifling (Regal 2011). This view is a way of rejecting official scientific expertise, but not the process of science itself (Blancke et al. 2016). They appear as underdogs, a socially useful position. Resentment against orthodox science is palpable in the words and deeds of paranormal seekers like Ivan Sanderson, Harry Price, and Rene Dahinden. A commonly-used retort against science by those who espouse a paranormal or unconventional conclusion is “science doesn’t know everything.” Of course, “it” doesn’t. Science is done by people, and people are limited in time and effort. That doesn’t mean science is a bad thing. Consider that we have a very safe and productive modern society based on scientific advancement. Those who degrade the value of science may be expressing frustration that they don’t have solid, accepted, credible backing for their own unorthodox ideas. Science can be scapegoated as the bad guy because scientific laws and conclusions undermine cherished belief and beloved ideas. The logical, objective scientist is framed as the buzzkill. Science as a process isn’t perfect but it’s the best method we have. Working within the purposeful constraints to develop valuable results provides rewards. A free-for-all method where anything goes will not work to progress human understanding of nature.
Scientifical Americans Page 14
