by Edwin Black
But for special measures Hitler had in mind, the Jews of Poland did need to be counted and their possessions inventoried. Moreover, the Nazis did need to identify the thousands of Jews who did not fit the physical and social stereotypes, had drifted away from the communal group or its neighborhoods, had become baptized, or who had simply assimilated successfully into overall society.
Once Germany invaded Poland, the vibrant Jewish existence there was quickly obliterated. First, as instructed by Heydrich, Nazi forces created Judenrate, that is, Jewish Councils, across the country. In Warsaw, where a third of the city’s million-plus residents were Jewish, a balding engineer named Adam Czerniakow was abruptly appointed chairman of the local Judenrat. Undoubtedly, he was chosen for his methodical, engineering mind. Czerniakow and his council of twenty-four handpicked elders were charged with managing all civic affairs of the trapped Jewish population. It was the Council’s responsibility to gain rigid compliance with the torrent of oppressive measures decreed by the Nazis as the Reich speedily dismantled the once-thriving community of some 375,000 Warsaw Jews. In their impossible task, the Judenrat’s every move was closely regulated by the Gestapo, SS, Einsatzgruppen, and other Nazi bodies. Nazi officers sometimes lurked just a few feet away at the window as Czerniakow worked in his office.63
Statistics, registrations, and census would be an all-consuming duty for Czerniakow and his council during the coming days.
On October 4, 1939, Czerniakow was called to the Einsatzgruppe offices on Szuch Avenue. As instructed, he immediately went to work on a statistical questionnaire. He continued to meet with Nazi officials daily. Each time he was summoned, he noted their escalating, almost non-negotiable demands and commands. October 7, the issue of statistics came up again. October 12, during a meeting with the SS, Czerniakow reviewed questions about the community’s finances, forced labor contingents, and the forms to be used to record data. October 13, in meetings with the SS, Czerniakow again conferred on statistics wanted by the Germans and the forms to be used.64
To swiftly transfer the Jews out of their homes and businesses across Warsaw and compress them into a small prison-like neighborhood was a major population transfer that required detailed planning. The Nazis were already gathering house-by-house lists of residents from German-appointed “courtyard commandants,” this ostensibly to qualify occupants for food in a city where nearly all water, electricity, and transportation had ceased. In addition, the Judenrat was required to compile lists of all Warsaw Jews between the ages of sixteen and sixty.65
None of it was fast enough or complete enough. On October 14, Einsatzgruppen officers ordered the Judenrat to conduct a full Jewish census broken down by city district. Somehow, the Judenrat would also have to identify the baptized Jews who were not part of the Jewish community.66
German statistical officials already possessed the published figures of the Jewish population from the 1931 general Polish census. That census routinely recorded citizens by religion and mother tongue. So the Nazis could easily estimate that about 350,000 Jews lived in Warsaw. But many had fled as the Blitzkrieg advanced into the Polish heartland and during the years of prewar anti-Jewish agitation. Berlin needed precise numbers. They didn’t care how. The Nazis demanded Czerniakow plan and execute the census taking.67
The next day, as Czerniakow prepared for his task, Einsatzgruppe officers and their Polish-born auxiliaries patrolling the Jewish quarters continued to sadistically terrorize Jews directly outside his office. Their favorite sport was pouncing on defenseless, pious Jews walking the streets and demonstratively cutting off their beards. Other times, they forced Jews down on all fours and then ordered neighbors to ride them like donkeys in a race. Brutality to Jews on holy days or just before the Sabbath was the most intense. Pork and butter were smeared across their lips to violate their kosher observance. Soldiers snapped endless photos of the merriment for keepsakes. As such outrages took place outside his window, Czerniakow struggled to outline the logistics of the census.68
On October 16, at 5 a.m., Czerniakow resumed working on census taking logistics and the questionnaire. On October 17, Czerniakow rose at dawn to begin a day of meetings to explain his duties, including a stop at the Polish Statistical Office to confer with its staff. On October 19, another meeting was held at the Polish Statistical Office.69
On October 20, an Einsatzgruppen officer came to the Jewish Community Center for a 3 p.m. meeting with Czerniakow, but the Judenrat chairman had already gone to the Security Police headquarters for the meeting. It was a mix-up. Czerniakow was threatened with retaliation unless he came back quickly. By 5 p.m., Czerniakow was summoned to yet another meeting, this one with the SS, again to review census plans. Of the several competing Nazi entities occupying Warsaw, the SS decided its group would issue the census proclamation.70
On October 21, Czerniakow met with officials from noon until 2 p.m. at the Polish Statistical Office. From 3 p.m. until 6 p.m. he was at the SS again, hammering out plans for the census. During the difficult conference, Czerniakow tried to explain that the operation should be postponed until early November 3—but the Nazis refused to wait that long. Czerniakow was sent to another official for a protracted, stressful conference and then ordered to conduct the census within one week, on October 28, and at Jewish expense. There was no time to deploy an army of census takers. Instead, Jews would be ordered to appear at local census sites to fill out their forms. Czerniakow was dispatched to the Currency Control Office where officials unblocked some frozen Jewish accounts to defray census costs, such as printing questionnaires. Czerniakow then rushed to meet a printer and together they hurried to the printing shop to discuss the final format of the questionnaires demanded by the Germans, as well as posters announcing the count. It was Czernaikow’s responsibility to drive throughout the city that night hanging the announcement posters so they were visible in the morning. Very late that day, fatigued and disconsolate, trying to reconcile with his God, Czerniakow finally returned home. He vomited.71
In the morning, Czerniakow continued preparations for the census, including naming twenty-six commissioners to oversee its thoroughness and reliability. The SS had a habit of taking hostages when compliance was required.72 These men would surely be held responsible if anything went amiss.
On October 23, SS officers came to the Jewish Community Center to monitor the Judenrat’s plans to execute the count. October 26, at 1 P.M., Czerniakow toured census stations all over the city. Czerniakow spent the next day making final preparations, conferring with the census commissioners and attending to last-minute details.73
Chaim Kaplan was one of Warsaw Jewry’s many eloquent men of letters. A teacher, poet, and journalist, Kaplan had traveled to America and Palestine during the pre-War years. In his diary, on October 21, he wrote, “Some time ago, I stated that our future is beclouded. I was wrong. Our future is becoming increasingly clear.” He added, “blessed be the righteous judge,” the traditional invocation chanted at funerals and upon hearing of a death.74
On October 25, Kaplan recorded, “Another sign that bodes ill: Today, notices informed the Jewish population of Warsaw that next Saturday there will be a census of the Jewish inhabitants…. Our hearts tell us of evil—some catastrophe for the Jews of Warsaw lies in this census. Otherwise there would be no need for it.”75
Kaplan had witnessed rabbis brutally beaten and their beards forcibly cut. He had seen elderly women yanked at the jaw with riding crops. Innocent people were compelled to dance atop tables for hours on end. On the day of the census, Kaplan wrote, “These people must be considered psychopaths and sadists, because normal people are incapable of such abominable acts….” He also wrote: “The order for a census stated that it is being held to gather data for administrative purposes. That’s a neat phrase, but it contains catastrophe…. We are certain that this census is being taken for the purpose of expelling ‘nonproductive elements.’ And there are a great many of us now…. We are all caught in a net, doomed to destruction.”
76
Kaplan was not alone in fearing the census. Czerniakow was besieged with questions about the purpose of this count.77 The deeply Talmudic community, which had little left except its faith and teachings, understood well that censuses were ominous in Jewish history. The Bible itself taught that unless specifically ordered by God, the census is evil because through it the enemy will know your strength:
I Chronicles 21: Satan rose up against Israel and incited David to take a census of Israel…. This command was also evil in the sight of God… Then David said to God, “I have sinned greatly by doing this. Now I beg you to take away the guilt of your servant. I have done a very foolish thing.” 78
On October 28, 1939, for the Jewish people of Warsaw, everything stopped. That day they were counted.
Throughout the day, thousands of census forms were brought to the Jewish Community Center, generally by the house superintendents in Jewish buildings.79
The results came with almost magical speed. In a little more than forty-eight hours, all the forms had been counted. By October 31, Czerniakow had been informed there were some 360,000 Jews in Warsaw. The exact number was 359,827, revealing the community’s precise dimensions: Jews infancy to age 15: … 46,172 men and 45,439 women; Jews aged 16-59 … 104,273 men and 131,784 women; Jews aged 60 and over … 13,325 men and 16,933 women; undetermined … only 537 men and 1,364 women. Employed … 155,825. Unemployed, including infants and invalids … 204,002. Artisans … 73,435. The Germans even knew that many Jewish artisans were practicing without a license by comparing the census results with the actual number of artisan licenses previously issued by the local authorities.80
The next day, Czerniakow was ordered to submit a complete report on the census within two weeks. On November 2, even as crews began burying masses of typhus and dysentery victims created by the squalid conditions, Czerniakow discovered he could not pay all of the collateral expenses of the census.81
By November 20, all census matters had been completed, although the Nazis were planning the ghetto to approximate the outlines of the already overcrowded Nalewki district. The signs at its boundary would read: Achtung! Seuchengefahr. Eintritt verboten ( Attention: Epidemics—Entry Prohibited). The seizure of all Jewish funds was being readied. But the Nazis still wanted the baptized Jews. It was Czerniakow’s problem. He solved it somehow by producing a list of Christian converts, which he handed over on December 6, 1939. By December 9, the authorities had revised their number of Jews in Warsaw to 366,000, the extra 6,000 apparently accounting for the so-called racial Jews.82
Now the Reich knew exactly how many Jews were under their jurisdiction, how much nutrition to allocate—as low as 184 calories per person per day. They could consolidate Jews from the mixed districts of Warsaw, and bring in Jews from other nearby villages. The transports began arriving. White armbands with Jewish stars were distributed. Everyone, young or old, was required to wear one on the arm. Not the forearm, but the arm—visible, above the elbow. The Warsaw-Malkinia railway line ran right through the proposed ghetto. It was all according to Heydrich’s September 21 Express Letter. Soon the demarcated ghetto would be surrounded by barbed wire. Eventually, a wall went up, sealing the residents of the ghetto from the outside world. Soon thereafter, the railway station would become the most feared location in the ghetto.83
The Nazi quantification and regimentation of Jewish demographics in War saw and indeed all of Poland was nothing less than spectacular—an almost unbelievable feat. Savage conditions, secrecy, and lack of knowledge by the victims would forever obscure the details of exactly how the Nazis managed to tabulate the cross-referenced information on 360,000 souls within forty-eight hours.
But this much is known: The Third Reich possessed only one method of tabulating censuses: Dehomag’s Hollerith system. Moreover, IBM was in Poland, headquartered in Warsaw. In fact, the punch card print shop was just yards from the Warsaw Ghetto at Rymarska Street 6. That’s where they produced more than 20 million cards.
* * *
WATSON DID NOT really want Poland until 1934. Why? Because that’s when Powers had encroached on IBM business in the Polish market. Watson would not tolerate that.
There were so few potential punch card customers in Poland, in the years before Hitler, that IBM didn’t even maintain a subsidiary there. Watson’s company was only represented by the independent Block-Brun agency. Since the struggling Powers Company sought its few customers wherever IBM didn’t dominate, Powers felt free to operate in Poland. Then, in a 1934 sales coup, Powers convinced the Polish Ministry of Posts to replace its Hollerith equipment with rival Powers’ machines.84
Just as Patterson believed all cash register business “belonged” to the NCR, Watson believed all punch card business innately “belonged” to IBM. When IBM lost the Polish postal service, Watson reacted at once. First, he replaced the Block-Brun agency with a full-fledged IBM subsidiary named Polski Hollerith.85 But who would run the new subsidiary? Watson wanted J. W. Schotte.
Jurriaan W. Schotte was born in Amsterdam in 1896, just about the time Herman Hollerith incorporated his original tabulating company. Schotte was eminently qualified for the international punch card business. His background included civil engineering and military service. He was fluent in Dutch, French, and German, and could speak some Romanian and Malay. He had traveled extensively throughout Europe, and enjoyed good commercial and governmental connections. After a stint at the Dutch Consulate in Munster, Germany, he was employed by Dutch import-export companies in New York, San Francisco, and the East Indies. He knew manufacturing, having managed a factory in Belgium. Schotte was perfect for another reason: He was Powers’ European sales manager. Schotte was the one who had sold the Powers machines to the Polish Post Office.86
Schotte had worked his way up through the Powers organization. Starting as a factory inspector at its U.S. affiliate, he had risen to maintenance supervisor and instructor throughout Europe. A fierce sales competitor, he had deftly operated out of Powers’ offices in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. Most valuable, Schotte knew all of Powers’ customers and prospects throughout the continent.87
By 1934, however, Dehomag had so thoroughly squeezed Powers in Germany, including its lawsuit for falsely claiming to be an Aryan concern, that Schotte admitted he had “nowhere to go but out.” He traveled to New York to meet with J.T. Wilson, the head of IBM NY’s Foreign Trade Department. Schotte hoped to salvage his career by becoming a European representative for IBM. Wilson was unsure. Schotte brought a great deal of insider knowledge, but he had been the bitter competition for some time. So Wilson only tentatively hired Schotte, and then cabled the various subsidiaries asking their opinion.88
The reports were not good. Heidinger curtly dismissed the suggestion, calling Schotte “an unscrupulous price-cutter.” IBM’s Geneva office was equally unenthusiastic. But Watson thought otherwise—Schotte was just what IBM needed in the new Europe. During a meeting in Watson’s office, Watson dramatically painted a tantalizing picture of the future of Europe, one that excited Schotte because he could play a central role in IBM’s plans. He could return to Europe as IBM’s Manager for Southeast Europe with a handsome compensation package. Schotte was later described as “in awe” and “walking over clouds” as the meeting ended and he stepped to the door of Watson’s office. But his euphoria was cut short when Watson abruptly declared, “Mr. Schotte, your employment in IBM depends on your getting IBM machines back into the Polish Postal Service.”89
Schotte sailed back to Europe and, as Watson had insisted, persuaded the Polish Postal Service to switch back to Hollerith machines.90 Watson would have Poland again.
Hitler also wanted Poland. Nazi doctrine had long called for the conquest of Polish territory, the subjugation of its people as inferiors, and the destruction of its more than three million Jewish citizens that comprised the largest Jewish community in Europe. Moreover, the Reich was determined to confiscate Poland’s significant natural resources and industry, including timber, coke
, coal, and steel making in Upper Silesia. Upper Silesia was adjacent to the Sudeten region and many Volksdeutsche lived in its cities. Hitler considered the area German.
By 1935, the year of the Nuremberg racial laws, Polski Hollerith had opened a card punching service bureau in Warsaw. The next year, IBM opened a second Polish office, this one in the Upper Silesian city of Katowice, and then a card printing facility in Warsaw serving a customer base requiring 36 million cards per year. In 1937, Polski Hollerith signed the Polish Ministry of Railroads. That year, IBM changed its name to Watson Business Machines sp. z. o.o. and appointed an IBM salesman of Polish extraction, Janusz Zaporski, as temporary manager. Ironically, although IBM owned and controlled 100 per cent of the company, as he had done so often before, Watson chose to register the stock not in the company’s name, but in the name of his Geneva managers. In this case, it was IBM Europe General Manager John Holt and IBM’s Geneva auditor J. C. Milner, as well as a token share—the equivalent of $200—in the name of a Polish national. By the time the company changed names to Watson Business Machines sp. z. o.o in 1937, IBM had garnered only twenty-five customers in Poland. But the list included some of the country’s most vital industry giants, such as the Baildon steelworks. More importantly, by this time, the subsidiary had organized the nation’s freight cars and locomotives, and through the Polish Postal Service could control access to every address in Poland.91
