by Dante
For the three entities “shot” by this “three-stringed bow,” see the note to vv. 31–36. [return to English / Italian]
25–30. Dante insists on the simultaneity of all parts of God’s instantaneous creation, heavenly and sublunar. The three elements of that creation (pure form, mixed form and matter, and pure matter) obviously are in hierarchical relation to one another; but their creation occurred in the same instant. [return to English / Italian]
26–27. According to Mellone (Mell.1974.1), p. 196, n. 1, this is the only time in all his works that Dante refers to the notion in medieval physics that light traveled at infinite velocity. [return to English / Italian]
31–36. The standard gloss is found in Bosco/Reggio (comm. to these verses), who say that the angels, “pure act” (i.e., pure form or substance, unmodified by accidents), were created in the Empyrean; that “pure matter” (unformed matter before God created the universe) was the condition of the earth before the event recorded in Genesis 1:1–2; that the nine heavens, between the Empyrean and earth, were created out of a mixture of form and matter (“act” [atto] and “potential” [potenza]). However, for a nuanced and more complex discussion of Dante’s unique integration of elements from many sources in this passage, orthodox (e.g., Thomas Aquinas) and unorthodox (e.g., Averroës), see Mellone (Mell.1974.1), pp. 198–200.
There is a persistent counterview, one that understands the second aspect of the Creation differently, as humankind. But see Poletto’s stern remonstrance (comm. to vv. 22–24). [return to English / Italian]
31–32. On these lines, see Kay (Kay.2003.1), p. 45: “Order and structure were created together in the substances [= angels].”
Singleton (comm. to vv. 8–9) makes the following observation: “For a reader unfamiliar with the standard procedure of a summa of theology, it should perhaps be pointed out that the poem is proceeding thematically in the opposite direction to that of a summa: the journey moves ever upwards, toward God, and here comes to a treatise on angels, in these two cantos so near the end, whereas a summa begins with God, in its first section of questions, and then passes to the creation or procession of creatures from God (cf. Summa theol. I of Thomas Aquinas as it passes from question 43 to question 44), beginning with the highest creatures, which are the angels.” [return to English / Italian]
37–45. As Scripture (e.g., Genesis 1:1, Ecclesiasticus 18:1, Psalm 101:26 [102:25]) and reason (for Dante’s own contribution under this heading, see vv. 43–45) attest, God created the angels, not as St. Jerome asseverated (in his commentary on Paul’s Epistle to Titus 1:2), many, many centuries before He created the heavens and the earth, but simultaneously with them. Dante’s disagreement with Jerome is confrontational and dismissive, all the more so since it issues from the mouth of Beatrice, and we cannot lay the blame on a somewhat intemperate protagonist. (For the text of Thomas’s far more conciliatory packaging of his own dissent [ST I, q. 61, a. 3], see Singleton [comm. to vv. 37–39]). [return to English / Italian]
43–45. Beatrice’s point is that, were Jerome to have been correct, the angels would have had nothing to do for all those centuries, since their only task is governing the heavens. [return to English / Italian]
46–63. Mellone (Mell.1974.1), p. 194, locates this part of Beatrice’s discourse in Peter Lombard’s discussion of the angels (Sententiae I.ii.2), where he sets out the problems to be resolved exactly as they are represented here: “Concerning the angelic nature the following must first be considered: when it was created, and where, and how; then what the result was of the defection of certain of them and of the adhesion of certain others.” Cf. Boitani (Boit.2002.2), p. 452, for the same citation. [return to English / Italian]
46–48. In good Scholastic style, Beatrice summarizes the first three elements in her exposition. See the note to vv. 46–63. [return to English / Italian]
49–51. No one seems to have found a reason or a source for this segment of time that Dante decides it took the angels to fall from the Empyrean into Hell. In fact, normal gravitational force, applied to normal objects, would have left them falling a far longer time. Their sin, self-loving rebellion against God, occurred the moment of/after their creation, for all intents and purposes instantaneously. Their fall, traversing the entire universe to its core, took less than half a minute. [return to English / Italian]
50. See Convivio II.v.12 for Dante’s previous handling of the question of the fallen angels: It was about one-tenth of the whole group who sinned and fell; God was moved to create humankind as a kind of replacement for these (“alla quale restaurare fue l’umana natura poi creata”).
For Augustine’s absolute unwillingness to consider that God created the eventually fallen angels anything less than completely good, see Cornish (Corn.1990.1), pp. 10–14. On the other hand, he clearly thought that angelic nature would have come into being making choices. And so Augustine, caught between two very strong theological imperatives (God never created evil; Satan never enjoyed the bliss of loving God), invented an amorphous mora (delay) between his creation and his fall. According to Cornish, for Augustine “the devil was not created sinful, yet his sin was not deferred even for a split-second. He makes the distinction that by nature the devil was good, by choice he became evil, so that the beginning of Lucifer’s being and the beginning of his sin occurred at two separate moments. Whether these are logical or chronological moments is not clear” (p. 11). Dante’s view, while never clearly stated, is probably not very different. [return to English / Italian]
51. For suggetto, see Bemrose (Bemr.1983.1), pp. 197–201, siding with the majority; the word refers to “terra” (earth). See, for instance, Lombardi’s gloss (comm. to vv. 49–51), saying that earth is subject to (i.e., lies beneath) the other three elements, water, air, and fire. But see Mazzoni (Mazz.1979.2 [Intro. to Questio], pp. 712–32) and Baranski (Bara.1984.1), p. 300, both of whom suggest that we are meant to realize that what is under discussion is “prime matter” (la materia prima). And see Cestaro (Cest.2003.1), p. 248, n. 87: “Dante alludes here to the common Scholastic notion of a subiectum elementorum, the primal elemental material prior to the definition of four distinct elements, akin to Plato’s silva [‘hyle’] ….” A hedged bet is found in Oelsner’s notes (comm. to vv. 49–51): “Il suggetto dei vostri elementi is usually (and perhaps rightly) taken to mean ‘that one of your elements that underlies the rest,’ i.e., earth. Compare Inf. XXXIV.121–126. But if we take this passage on its own merits, it seems better to understand the substrate of the elements to mean the prima materia (compare [Par.] II.106–108; VII.133–136, and lines 22–24 of this canto); the elaboration of the elements being the subsequent work of the Angels and the heavens.” The strongest case against this second interpretation was made by Porena (comm. to vv. 49–51), pointing out that Inferno XXXIV.122–126 reveals that Dante thought that, by the time Satan had penetrated our globe, water and earth had already been separated. However, Chimenz (comm. to vv. 49–51) countered that argument as follows: The words inscribed over the gate of Hell (Inf. III.7–8) would seem to suggest that before the creation of Hell (and, Chimenz insists, the contemporary creation of the angels), nothing existed except eternal things, and thus Satan fell into unformed matter. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible that we are meant to understand that earth was formed while Satan was falling and (at least in part) in order to receive him and his partners in rebellion. [return to English / Italian]
52–57. The verb circuir does not suggest that the remaining (loyal) angels are flying around the heavens freestyle, but that they form nine angelic circlings around God, as opposed to the fallen angels, who, along with their leader, Lucifer, are imprisoned in Hell. The text (vv. 56–57) specifically reminds readers of their vision of Satan at the center of the universe (Inferno XXXIV.110–111). [return to English / Italian]
58–60. The good angels, unlike the prideful members of their cohort, are portrayed as “modesti” (humble), possessing the virtue opposite to their brethren’s vice of pr
ide. [return to English / Italian]
61–63. See Singleton’s gloss (comm. to this tercet): “The angels who waited for the bestowal of the higher light, the light of glory, received that light (here termed ‘grazia illuminante’). Their merit (merto) was precisely that humility and their waiting upon the Lord to bestow that higher light. With that bestowal they were forever confirmed in this highest grace, and accordingly they are now bound thereby to the good and to do the good. They have fullness of vision and of will, and they cannot sin. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. I, q. 62, a. 8, resp.: ‘The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence. Now, God’s essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now, whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.’ ” [return to English / Italian]
64. Dante, Beatrice divines, may be wondering what the angels actually did in order to merit illuminating grace. [return to English / Italian]
65–66. See Singleton (comm. to these verses), citing Aquinas (ST I, q. 62, a. 5): “As the angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity.” [return to English / Italian]
70–126. Dante’s corrosive attack on bad preaching reveals heartfelt annoyance, probably reflecting extensive personal experience. Tasked with the representation of the Word, preachers should control their desires for recognition of their powers of speaking. [return to English / Italian]
70–81. Discussing the questions pertaining to the natures of angelic language (see De vulgari eloquentia I.ii.3) and memory, see Barbara Faes de Mottoni (Faes.2001.1). Her discussion of this passage, found on pp. 243–53, concludes (p. 253) with the assertion, difficult to fault, that the angels, knowing everything in God, have, at least in Dante’s possibly heterodox opinions (potentially opposed to those of Peter Lombard, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas), need of neither language nor memory. However, see the further distinction offered by Attilio Mellone (Mell.1974.1), pp. 205–8, who suggests that, while a passage in Monarchia (I.iii.7) clearly seems to require that we conceive that Dante there denies that the angels have memories, here the poet only seems to assert that they do not need to make use of them. [return to English / Italian]
70. See the observation of Hawkins (Hawk.1999.1), p. 192: With the exception of Purgatorio XXXII.79, “where ‘scuola’ describes the Old Testament precursors of Christ, … [the word] always denotes what is pagan or in some sense defective.…” [return to English / Italian]
75. Bosco/Reggio (comm. to this verse) allow that possibly Dante believes that, projecting human experience onto the terms “intellect,” “will,” and “memory” (see verse 72), some earthly judges distort the nature of the angelic versions of these capacities. That would “save” Dante from opposing some pretty potent authorities (see the note to vv. 70–81). [return to English / Italian]
79–80. See Imbach (Imba.1996.1), p. 147, averring that Dante embraces at least one heretical position of Siger de Brabant when, in these lines, he argues, against the authorities mentioned in the note to verses 70–81, that the angels have no memory. For discussion, see Curti (Curt.2002.1), pp. 161–62. It seems likely that Dante wants, as is often the case, to formulate his own position on an issue, one that accords with elements found in several other authorities. [return to English / Italian]
82–84. The explanation seems clear enough (and is found in many early commentaries): There are those on earth who are totally confused (i.e., they “dream” even while they are not sleeping) in believing that the angels have need of memory, while others, those who maintain such a view while knowing it to be false, are guilty not of ignorance but of fraud. These Christian sophists care more about making a splash than seeking the truth.
Boitani (Boit.2002.2), p. 451, is effective in joining two responses that are rarely seen together in the commentary tradition when he understands (1) that the focus of Beatrice’s anger is completely on the question of angelic memory (and does not spill over into the sins of bad preachers, which dominate the following verses [91–126], as so many allow their discussion to do) and (2) that the zeal behind her (Dante’s) insistence is passionate and fully conscious of the famous feathers that will be ruffled thereby, those of Saints Jerome, Augustine, and Thomas, for starters. However, he perhaps goes too far in asserting that Dante denies that angels have memory; the text only asserts (vv. 80–81) that they have no need of memory, which may imply either that they have or do not have this capacity. Dante is obviously outraged at the notion of angels requiring (and actually using) memory, since they live in the eternal present. However, whether he goes as far as Averroës (and Siger) in denying that they have this capacity, that question he leaves us to wonder about. He could not have left the issue more ambiguous, as he obviously desired to—which may imply that he did in fact buy into Siger’s argument. [return to English / Italian]
85–90. These two tercets form the pivot on which Beatrice’s argument turns from heavenly theology (involving the nature of angelic mind) to religious concerns of a lower intellectual order, from the disputes of theologians to the fables told by preachers—and Dante almost certainly has in mind itinerant friars. [return to English / Italian]
91–93. The “cost” of the benefits of Scripture in blood (of Jesus, the martyred apostles, and the other martyrs [see Pasquini/Quaglio, comm. to this tercet, for these three references]) is not taken into account.
Poletto (comm. to this tercet) at least reacts to the curious present tense of the verb costa (costs), and “translates” it as costò (cost). Grabher (comm. to this tercet) does take the present tense as meaningful, believing that Dante is not speaking literally of the blood of martyrs, but metaphorically—of the inner sacrifice made by all Christians. This does not seem a convincing gloss. And thus, while the constraints of rhyme may be all the explanation one requires for the presence of the form, the reader is forced to wonder. Did Dante think of the past sacrifices of the heroes of the Church as occurring in the vivid present tense, or is his point that such sacrifices are being made even now, in his day? His opinions on the current condition of the City of Man, expressed volubly throughout the poem (most recently at Par. XXVII.121–141), would seem to gainsay this second possible explanation. [return to English / Italian]
94–126. Pasquazi (Pasq.1968.1), p. 1031, begins his lectura with this invective against preachers, which is a frequent cause of complaint among less stern readers of the last canticle. His view is that it should be dealt with not as aberrant, but as of a piece with the texture and purpose of the canto. Mellone (Mell.1974.1), p. 209, is of a similar opinion. For discussion of a similar discomfort among the commentators with Beatrice’s last words in the poem in the following canto, see Hollander (Holl.1993.5), pp. 31–33. [return to English / Italian]
94–96. Preaching as preening now becomes Beatrice’s subject. Her insistence on the fictitious nature of this sort of public utterance is underlined by the word invenzioni (inventing new ideas) here and favole (tales) at verse 104, ciance (idle nonsense) at verse 110, motti and iscede (buffoonery and jokes) at verse 115. Cf. Giovanni Boccaccio’s portrait of a fiction-dealing friar, Fra Cipolla (Decameron VI.x), which probably owes more than a certain debt to this passage. (See Longfellow [comm. to verse 115] and Hollander [Holl.1997.2], pp. 41–45). [return to English / Italian]
97–102. For th
e “darkness at noon” that overspread the world during the Crucifixion of Jesus, see Luke 23:44: “It was now about the sixth hour, and there was darkness over the whole land until the ninth hour.” (See also Matthew 27:45 and Mark 15:33.) And see Grandgent (comm. to these verses): “To explain this darkness at the Crucifixion, some said that the moon left its course to make an eclipse, others that the sun hid its own rays. Dionysius (Par. XXVIII.130) favored the first explanation, St. Jerome the second. Both are recorded by St. Thomas in Summa Theologiae III, q. 44, a. 2. The second theory has the advantage of accounting for an obscuration ‘over all the land,’ whereas an ordinary eclipse would darken only a part of it.” [return to English / Italian]
100. This line has caused scandal. Does Dante really want to say that those who say that the Moon retroceded six constellations in the Zodiac in order to blot out the Sun (and, according to Scartazzini [comm. to this verse] and Bosco/Reggio [comm. to vv. 97–102], some fairly illustrious authorities, including Dionysius the Areopagite, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, took this explanation seriously) are liars? Those are strong words. Scartazzini was the first to point out that Dante had a precursor in such a harsh view, Petrus Comestor (PL CXCVIII.1631), who says that those who uphold such tales “have lied” (mentiti sunt). Eventually Nardi (Nard.1944.1), pp. 375–76, would also turn to this source and argue that, despite the commentators’ discomfort, both the manuscript tradition and Petrus’s harsh words underline the fact that Dante meant exactly what he said. We should remember the poet’s harsh treatment of Jerome, specifically mentioned as totally incorrect (Dante could have been less direct!) in this very canto (verses 37–45); on that occasion, concerning the dating of the creation of the angels, St. Thomas was right (if Dante doesn’t say so specifically). And now it is his turn to be told off, if indirectly. Bosco/Reggio try to diminish the force of the verb mentire in Dante’s day (i.e., rather than lying, it meant something more like “does not tell the truth”). Nonetheless, it is plain enough that Dante is belittling an opinion that is to be thought of as having the same merit as the idle tales told by not-very-well-educated friars. And if Dionysius, Albert, or Thomas chooses to align himself with such drivel, he gets only what he deserves—that seems to be the poet’s attitude.
