1. The ordinariness of “out of Africa.” During the 1990's, popular articles on human evolution, at least in American media, focussed upon one issue above all others: the supposed dichotomy between two models for the origin of Homo sapiens. The press labelled these alternatives as, first, the “multiregional” hypothesis (also dubbed the “candelabra” or the “menorah” scheme to honor our religious pluralism in metaphorical choice) representing the claim that Homo erectus migrated from Africa about 1.5 to 2.0 million years ago and established populations on the three continents of Africa, Europe, and Asia. All three subunits then evolved in parallel (with enough gene flow to maintain cohesion) towards more gracile and substantially bigger-brained Homo sapiens. The second position, usually called “out of Africa” or “Noah's ark,” holds that Homo sapiens emerged in one coherent place (presumably Africa from genetic evidence of relative similarities among modern humans) as a small, speciating population geographically isolated from the ancestral Homo erectus stock. This new species, probably arising less than 200,000 years ago, then migrated out of Africa to spread throughout the habitable world, displacing, or perhaps partly amalgamating with, any surviving stocks of Homo erectus encountered along the way.
The dichotomous division, as presented by the media, may have been a bit stark and unsubtly formulated. But I can raise no major objection either to the basic categorization or to most press reports about details of explanation and evidence. Still, I became more and more puzzled, and eventually amused in a quizzical or sardonic way, by a remarkable fallacy in basic interpretation that pervaded virtually every article on the subject. Almost invariably, popular presentations labelled the multiregional view as the conventional expectation of evolutionary theory, and out-of-Africa as astonishingly iconoclastic, if not revolutionary.
But all professionals must recognize that the exactly opposite situation prevails. Out-of-Africa presents a particular account, “customized” for human evolution, of the most ordinary of all macroevolutionary events — the origin of a new species from an isolated, geographically restricted population branching off from an ancestral range, and then, if successful, spreading to other suitable and accessible regions of the globe. By contrast, multiregionalism should be labelled as iconoclastic, if not a bit bizarre. How could a new species evolve in lockstep parallelism from three ancestral populations spread [Page 912] over more than half the globe? Three groups, each moving in the same direction, and all still able to interbreed and constitute a single species after more than a million years of change? (I know that multiregionalists posit limited gene flow to circumvent this problem, but can such a claim represent more than necessary special pleading in the face of a disabling theoretical difficulty?) Do we advocate such a scenario for the evolution of any other global species? Do we ever suspect that rats evolved on several continents, with each subgroup moving in the same manner towards greater ratitude? Do pigeons trend globally towards increased pigeonosity? When we restate the thesis in terms of non-human species, the absurdity becomes apparent. Why, then, did our media not grasp the singular oddity of multiregionalism and recognize out-of-Africa — especially given the cascade of supporting evidence in its favor — as the most ordinary of evolutionary propositions?
I can only conclude that popular views of evolution conceptualize the process, in general to be sure but particularly as applied to humans, as a linear and gradual transformation of single entities. Most consumers would be willing to entertain the speciational alternative for lineages (like rats and pigeons) that impose no emotional weight upon our psyches. But when we ask the great Biblical question — “what is man that thou art mindful of him?” (Psalm 8) — we particularly yearn for explanations based on anticipated global progress, rather than contingent origins of small and isolated populations in limited local regions. We want to regard our origin as the necessary, or at least predictable, crest of a planetary flux, not as the chancy outcome of a single event unfolding in a unique time and place.
This example, I believe, best illustrates the deep-seated nature of prejudices that must be overcome if we wish to grasp the truly Darwinian character of macroevolution as change wrought by differential success of favored individuals (species) within variable populations (clades) — thus finally breaking the Platonic chain of defining evolution as improvement of an archetypal form. Eldredge (1979) has advocated this transition by contrasting “taxic” approaches to evolution with the older “transformational” view. In the particular context of human evolution (Gould, 1998b), I have labelled multiregionalism as a “tendency theory,” and out-of-Africa as an “entity theory.” However much we may yearn to regard ourselves as the apotheosis of an inherent tendency in the unfolding of evolution, we must someday come to terms with our actual status as a discrete and singular item in the contingent and unpredictable flow of history. If we could bring ourselves to view this prospect as exhilarating rather than frightening, we might attain the psychological prerequisite for intellectual reform.
2. The unsurprising stability of Homo sapiens over tens of thousands of years. In a second example of a subject generally reported by the press with factual accuracy accompanied by ludicrously backwards explanation, the supposedly astonishing stability of human bodily form from Cro-Magnon cave painters to now has provided notable fodder for science journalists during the past decade. Consider, for example, the lead article in the prestigious “Science Times” section of the New York Times for March 14,1995, entitled: [Page 913] “Evolution of Humans May at Last Be Faltering.” The opening sentence reads: “Natural evolutionary forces are losing much of their power to shape the human species, scientists say, and the realization is raising tantalizing questions about where humanity will go from here.” (Professionals should always become suspicious when we read the universal and anonymous justification, “scientists say.”)
These stories begin from the same foundational fallacy and then proceed in an identically erroneous way. They start with the most dangerous of mental traps: a hidden assumption, depicted as self-evident, if recognized at all — namely, a basic definition of evolution as continuous flux. Under this premise, the correct observation that Homo sapiens has experienced no directional trending for at least 40,000 years seems outstandingly anomalous. Reporters therefore assume that this unique feature of human evolutionary history requires a special explanation rooted in mental features that we share with no other species. They then generally assume, to complete the cycle of false argument, that human culture, by permitting the survival of marginal people who would perish in the unforgiving world of raw Darwinian competition, has so relaxed the power of natural selection that evolutionary change (popularly defined as “improvement”) can no longer occur in Homo sapiens. This situation supposedly raises a forest of ethical questions about double-edged swords in the cure of diseases arising from genetic predisposition, the spread of genes for poor vision in a world of cheap eyeglasses, et cetera ad infinitum. (Pardon my cynicism based on some knowledge of the history of such arguments, but the neo-eugenical implications of these claims, however unintended in modern versions, cannot be ignored or regarded as just benignly foolish.)
This entire line of fallacious reasoning, with all its burgeoning implications, immediately collapses under a speciational reformulation. Once people understand Homo sapiens as a biological species, not a transitory point of passage in the continuous evolutionary progression of nature's finest achievement, the apparent paradox disappears by conceptual transformation into an expectation of conventional theory. Most species — especially those with large, successful, highly mobile, globally spread, environmentally diverse, and effective panmictic populations — remain stable throughout their history, at least following their origin and initial spread, and especially under the model of punctuated equilibrium that seems to apply to most hominid taxa. Change occurs by punctuational speciation of isolated subgroups, not by geologically slow anagenetic transformation
of an entirety.
So if speciation usually requires isolated populations, how (barring science fiction scenarios about small groups of people spending generations in space ships hurtling towards distant stars) can a global species like Homo sapiens, endowed with both maximal mobility and an apparently unbreakable propensity for interbreeding wherever its members travel, ever expect to generate substantial and directional biological change in its current state? Most species should evoke predictions of stability, but Homo sapiens must lie at an extreme end of confidence for such an expectation. Thus, there is no solution to [Page 914] the supposed paradox of human stability because there is no problem. Homo sapiens has been stable for tens of thousands of years, and any proper understanding of macroevolution, as a speciational process must yield this very expectation.
The same resolution applies to the extensive, and almost preciously silly, literature on human biological futures. (I do not speak of the real issues surrounding genetic engineering as an interaction of culture and nature, but of the fallacious and conjectural scenarios that treat presumptive human futures under a continuing regime of natural selection.) We have all seen reconstructions of improved future humans with bigger brains and disappearing little toes (perhaps balanced by the calloused butts of perennial couch potatoes). We also note the same features in reconstructions of advanced extraterrestrial aliens like ET, and in conjectural restorations of the hyper-brainy bipedal dinosaurs that might now rule the world if a bolide hadn't struck the earth 65 million years ago.
Again, this entire theme is moonshine. The only sensible biological prediction about human futures envisions continued stability into any time close enough to warrant any meaningful speculation. In any case, cultural change, in its explosive Lamarckian mode, has now so trumped biological evolution, that any directional trend in any allelic frequency can only rank as risibly insignificant in the general scheme of things. For example, during the past ten thousand years, any distinctive alleles in the population of native Australians must have declined sharply in global frequency as relative numbers of this subgroup continue to shrink within the human population as a whole. At the same time, cultural change has brought most of us through hunting and gathering, past the explosive new world triggered by agriculture, and into the age of atomic weaponry, air transportation and the electronic revolution, not to mention our prospects for genetic engineering and our capacity for environmental destruction on a global scale.
We have done all this, for better or for worse, with a brain of unaltered structure and capacity — the same brain that enabled some of us to paint the caves of Chauvet and the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. What could purely biological and Darwinian change accomplish, even at a maximal rate (a mere thought experiment in any case, since we can only predict future stability for the short times that can justify any reasonable claims for insight), in the face of this explosive cultural transformation that our unchanging brains have unleashed and accomplished?
3. The conventional rate (and unconventional mode) of supposedly rapid trends traditionally cited as testaments to our uniqueness. When we recognize that human evolution occurred largely by differential success and replacement among species within a phyletic bush — and not by anagenetic transformation in measures of central tendency for a single, coherent entity in constant flux — then almost every standard claim about the tempo and mode of this process must be reformulated, and often substantially revised. My first two examples treated broad issues of maximal public attention. I now close this section with a smaller, but stubbornly persistent, error in order to clarify [Page 915] and exemplify the fractal reach of this speciational reformulation into the smallest nooks and crannies of conventional wisdom.
Throughout my professional life, I have read, over and over again, the almost catechistic claim that the increase in cranial capacity from Homo erectus to Homo sapiens (variously specified as a 50 percent growth from about 1000 cc to 1500 cc as a lower estimate, to a doubling from 750 to 1500 as an upper bound) represents a stunning example of evolution at maximal rate, something so unusual and unprecedented that we must seek a cause in the particular adaptive value, and potential for feedback, of human consciousness. (Again, I suspect that our mental predisposition to commit such errors arises from an overwhelming desire to find something unique not only in the result — a defensible proposition — but also in the biological mechanism of human consciousness.) This claim for a maximal rate presumes anagenetic transformation, with the high value then calculated by spreading the total increment over the short amount of available time (from 100,000 years as a lower bound to a million years as an upper limit).
Two major errors, one obvious and almost ludicrous, the other more subtle and speciational, promote this “urban legend” that would disappear immediately from the professional literature if people only stopped to think before they copied canonical lines into their textbook manuscripts. First, the claim isn't even true within its own assumption of anagenetic transformation. Such a rate should not be designated as rapid at all when we recognize the proper scaling between our estimates of selection's strength in ecological time and its effect in geological time. Williams (1992, p. 132), for example, cites a standard claim and then presents some calculations:
Even some widely recognized examples of rapid evolution are really extremely slow. Data on Pleistocene human evolution are interpretable in various ways, but it is possible that the cerebrum doubled in size in as little as 100,000 years, or perhaps 3000 generations (Rightmire, 1985). This, according to Whiten and Byrne (1988) is “a unique and staggering acceleration in brain size.” How rapid a change was it really? Even with conservative assumptions on coefficient of variation (e.g. 10%) and heritability (30%) in this character, it would take only rather weak selection (s = 0.03) to give a 1% change in a generation. This would permit a doubling in 70 generations. An early hominid brain could have increased to the modern size, and back again, about 21 times while the actual evolution took place. Indeed, it is plausible that a random walk of 1 % increases and decreases could double a quantitative character in less than 3000 generations.
If this first error of scaling has been identified before, the second and deeper fallacy of false assumptions about mode has generally escaped the notice of critics. The anagenetic assumption that trends represent the flux of a central tendency in a species's global transition to a better form must be replaced, in most cases, with a speciational account of trends as differential success of certain species within a clade. When we add the additional observation that [Page 916] punctuated equilibrium describes the history of most species, the absurdity of the conventional claim becomes immediately apparent.
The change from Homo erectus to Homo sapiens did not occur in a gradual and global flux throughout the range of Homo erectus, but as an event of speciation, geologically rapid under punctuated equilibrium and local in geography (probably in Africa). By Williams's argument above, the incorporation of the entire increase into the geological moment of speciation represents no surprise whatsoever. Why, then, do we misconstrue the rate as maximal over a much longer anagenetic transformation? We fall into this trap as a simple artifact of the happenstance that this particular event of speciation occurred very recently — 100,000 to 250,000 years ago by most current estimates. The full transition probably occurred during the geological moment of speciation, but we erroneously interpret the change as progressing in gradualist fashion, and at constant rate, from this time of origin until the present day. Since the moment of origin happened to occur only a short time ago, the false anagenetic rate becomes very high (for we integrate the full change over a small interval). But if the identical punctuational event had occurred, say, 2 million years ago — an entirely plausible, but actually unrealized, situation — then the same episode of speciation would be read as anagenetically slow because the identical amount of change would now be falsely spread over a much longer interval. In other words,
the claim for a maximal anagenetic rate in a trait marking the apotheosis of human success only records a false interpretation of global anagenesis for the recent cladogenetic origin of this trait in a punctuational event of speciation.
ECOLOGICAL AND HIGHER-LEVEL EXTENSIONS. The basic logic and formulation of punctuated equilibrium does not proceed beyond the level of species treated as independent individuals, or “atoms” of macroevolution. All biologists recognize, of course, that extensive ecological interactions bind each “atom” to others in complex ways. The “bare bones” structure of punctuated equilibrium does not include specific claims about ecological aggregations made of species as component parts. In this sense, punctuated equilibrium operates as a “null hypothesis” of sorts, by regarding each species as making its own way through geological time, with interactions treated as important components within the set of background conditions needed to explain the particulars of any history. In this sense, punctuated equilibrium treats time homogeneously, and species as independent agents; the theory therefore includes no inherent, or logically enjoined, predictions about the nature of temporal clumping in the ecological interactions among species.
But we know, as a basic fact and preeminent source of perennial controversy about the fossil record, that clumping occurs as a major pattern in the history of life — from minimal (and obvious) expression in joint disappearances during mass extinctions, to various theories that stress more pervasive and tighter clumping at several lower levels, all coordinated by the broad notion that ecosystems (or “communities,” or other terminological alternatives, each with different theoretical implications) operate coherently during normal [Page 917] times as well, keeping species together in “organic” ways that falsify the null hypothesis of independent status.
The Structure of Evolutionary Theory Page 145
