by Huss, John
The humans (especially Taylor) have a strong moral interest in being able to avoid all of the harms that befall them as a result of the current “ape” culture. At the same time, Dr. Zaius has an interest in preserving religious myths to keep the status quo, allowing him and others to use humans for slave labor and scientific research. But to me, it’s obvious that humans’ moral interest (especially Taylor’s) in living a good life free from suffering far outweighs the ape interest in maintaining myths about their history or treating humans inhumanely.
You might think that preserving the false, presumably comforting view of ape history outweighs the allegedly less intelligent humans’ interests. But there are three responses to that.
First, Taylor and his crew might have been the most intelligent humans on Earth, but other humans were likely more intelligent than most apes thought. Once the audience gets to know Nova, she seems rather smart and consequently, has more complex interests than most apes presumably believed.
Second, when Zira, Cornelius, and Lucius discover the truth in the Forbidden Zone they find they were lied to about ape origins and wish they had known the truth all along. Wouldn’t you prefer to know the truth if you were one of those apes?
Third, as the antagonist in the story, Dr. Zaius is designed to make choices that are intended to be met with strong disapproval by the audience. He appears to be intentionally sacrificing greater human interests to serve the less important interests of apes. His rationale? A prejudiced favoring of apes and distaste for humans. Pure speciesism.
Their Pain Counts Just as Much
I do not expect you to just take my word for it, of course. No, we need to ask “What is moral considerability?” and “What determines a being’s moral status?” The answer, according to the movie series, is the “interests” that a being has. “Interests” are tied up with what is good for some being, or what contributes to their well-being. Every sentient being—every creature that can feel pleasure or pain—is morally considerable and at least has an interest in not suffering. Now, every sentient being has interests, and these interests vary depending on its intellectual capacities and abilities.
For example, you might have an interest in reading this book because it would be fun and you may learn something about philosophy. A present-day ape of normal cognitive capacity does not have an interest in reading this book simply because it cannot read. Interests depend on capabilities. Thus, Zira and Cornelius, even though they are apes, would have an interest in reading this book because their cognitive capacities allow them to understand it and benefit from it. Zira, if you’re reading this, let me say, ”Don’t leave your stuff behind while you’re on the run. Hasslein will find it and be able to track you down, killing you and Cornelius and the baby ape. Don’t do it!” But I digress.
Beyond moral considerability, there’s a related concept known as moral status, which comes in degrees. It is commonly accepted that all sentient beings have moral status and all non-sentient things lack it. Different moral statuses exist within a range and depend on the intensity, type and number of interests a being has. Dr. Zira and Taylor have a higher moral status than, say, a normal present-day ape, since they have a greater number of interests than this ape, qualitatively superior interests and perhaps even more intense ones. These may include: setting long term goals for the future, doing science, forming friendships with deep emotional bonds, appreciating subtle ironies, and so on.
What about when the interests of different creatures conflict? For instance, if we have to choose between relieving a human from pain or an ape from pain, how do we compare the importance of preventing each of these animals from suffering? On this point, Singer, in Animal Liberation, echoes the position of Jeremy Bentham, who wrote in 1789:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. . . . The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?
Singer argues for a principle of equality that he calls equal consideration of interests. Equal consideration of interests requires that whenever two or more different morally considerable beings, regardless of their moral status, have the same interest in something, we ought to count each of their interests equally in our deliberation.
Suppose that Dr. Zaius has to perform an emergency operation on both Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius, but only has enough anesthesia for one of them. Both Zira and Cornelius have an interest in avoiding pain and the strength of that interest is the same. Dr. Zaius should count both of these interests equally when deciding who to give the anesthesia to. But the same rule applies even in cases where the cognitive capacities of individuals vary greatly. If Dr. Zaius had to perform surgery on either Nova (the “primitive” companion of Taylor) or Taylor, it’s not at all obvious who should get the anesthesia. Although Taylor is much more intelligent than Nova, both have an interest in avoiding pain. If the surgery would be equally painful for both of them, the pain that Taylor would feel should count for as much in our deliberation as the pain that Nova would feel.
Applying this rule consistently means giving equal consideration to the pain that Taylor would feel compared to the pain that any present-day, non-human animal would feel. If we had to perform surgery on Mark Wahlberg’s character Leo Davidson from the 2001 Planet of the Apes or the normal chimpanzee Pericles, the pain that Pericles would feel should count for just as much as the pain that Davidson would feel (assuming that it would be the same amount of pain).
Other considerations could also apply. For example, if Leo Davidson had to undergo an operation without anesthesia, he would be intelligent enough to understand why he was in pain and would know that the pain would come to an end relatively soon. On the other hand, Pericles would not be able to understand this, perhaps causing extra anxiety that would not be felt by Davidson. This extra consideration could actually count in favor of giving Pericles the anesthesia over Davidson, even though the pain that each feels would count equally.
But Humans Are Smarter!
At this point, you might be asking “Doesn’t human intelligence make human interests matter more than non-human interests?” Or maybe you’re just wondering how awkward it was for Nova and Taylor when they rode off into the sunset together immediately after Taylor has kissed Zira on the lips. Both are excellent questions, though I can only address the first.
Even if it were true that all humans were smarter than other animals, and that human interests should be given greater moral weight than non-human interests, this argument would not give priority to human interests because of their species membership. Instead, it would seek to find a morally relevant property, such as intelligence, that all humans happen to have (and all non-humans happen to lack). But this property can be possessed by non-humans in imaginary worlds like Planet of the Apes, and some imaginary non-humans (such as Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius) would (if they actually existed) be just as morally important as humans according to this view, despite the fact that they are members of a different species. So even if this argument worked, it would not justify the strong sense of speciesism that many people accept.
In reality, the thinking capacities of humans vary greatly. All severely cognitively disabled humans lack the rational capacities that one would appeal to in order to try to justify giving precedence to human interests. This line of argument would entail that normal human interests are more important than the interests of any severely cognitively disabled person, even when the conflicting interests are the same, as in the case of avoiding pain. That sounds morally repugnant. For these reasons, we should reject the crude version of this argument outright.
What’s that? You think that all cognitively disabled humans have the same moral status as humans of normal intelligence? If so, then you’re not alone. You might accept the more sophisticated version of the argument. In order to accommodate the moral importance of severely cognitively disabled humans, some philosophers, such as Martha N
ussbaum, argue that the moral weight of a group’s interests depends upon what the normal capabilities are for that group. This often translates into the more specific idea that, as Singer puts it, “we should treat beings according to what is ‘normal for the species’ rather than according to their actual characteristics.”
The movie series appears to expect the viewer to reject this. Consider how Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius were treated by humans in Escape from the Planet of the Apes. As soon as Dr. Branton and Dr. Dixon, the human scientists watching over them in the San Diego zoo, realize that Zira and Cornelius possess the ability to use language and are more intelligent than most humans, they immediately treat them differently. Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius are brought in front of the Presidential Commission, and upon the hearing of their case, are awarded their freedom. They become instant celebrities, get interviewed, go on expensive shopping sprees, eat at fancy restaurants, stay in a lavish hotel and the list goes on. Remember the extensive 1970s montage of Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius’s newfound fame and lifestyle? Any movie with apes dressed in 1970s-style clothing is an instant classic in my book.
Yet, nothing else really changes. The rest of the apes on Earth presumably continue to be treated in exactly the same manner as they were before. They’re kept in cages in zoos, experimented on in labs and some are killed to provide heart transplants for humans. But, and here’s the point, if the moral status of a being is determined by what is normal for its species, then there would be nothing morally wrong with treating Zira and Cornelius in exactly the same way that all of the other apes on Earth were treated. Surely it would be absurd to think that it would be morally permissible to keep Zira and Cornelius in a zoo or, even worse, keep them in a cage in a lab to experiment on them. But, if we accept the idea that the moral weight of interests depends on what is normal for the species, then there would be nothing wrong with treating Zira and Cornelius in this way. Since the sophisticated version of the argument leads to this absurdity, we should reject it in addition to the crude version.
The principle of equal consideration of interests, on the other hand, can explain why it would be morally wrong to treat Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius like other apes. These two are unlike any other member of their species (in the 1970s) and have the same interests as humans of normal cognitive capacity. Giving equal weight to all like interests requires treating Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius in the same way that we treat normal humans, not normal apes.
But We Don’t Live on the Planet of the Apes (Yet)
At this point you might be saying to yourself, “Of course I would treat apes who are as intelligent as humans as moral equals. That’s obviously the way it should be. But the fact of the matter is that apes (and any non-human animals) on Earth are all dumber than humans. That’s why all humans are more important than non-human animals and that’s why we’re justified in treating them the way we do.”
You’re right to say that no super-intelligent apes actually exist on Earth. Too bad too because it would be awesome if they did! Nevertheless, it does not follow that it is morally permissible to discount existing ape interests. There is a fair amount of overlap in the intellectual capabilities among humans and non-human animals. Humans with severe cognitive disabilities have a lower cognitive capacity than many non-human animals. In fact, there have been many cases of anencephalic babies, which are humans who lack the ability to be conscious. They have an IQ of 0. Baby Theresa is one example. She was born with only a brain stem (and no brain) and died after nine days of life. More commonly, humans are born with an IQ that falls below 70 (the threshold for being considered cognitively disabled) and many within that category have an IQ that falls below 20 (which is the threshold for being considered severely cognitively disabled). This means that for any non-human animal that ever existed, exists or will exist, there has been a human who was of equal or lower cognitive capacity than the non-human animal in question. If we grant that a super intelligent ape like Dr. Zira would be just as morally important as a human of the same cognitive capacity (such as Dr. Branton), then we should likewise grant that an ape of normal ape cognitive capacity is just as morally important as a cognitively disabled human of equal intelligence.
This may seem obvious, but here’s the problem. Most people would find it morally repugnant to treat any of these severely cognitively disabled humans in the same way that we treat the vast majority of non-human animals who have the same (if not a higher) cognitive capacity. It’s often said that the non-human animals’ lower cognitive capacity justifies humans bringing them into existence (through artificial insemination) to live a life of constant suffering in a factory farm before being slaughtered for food.
Since species membership is not a morally relevant factor, this justification for treating non-human animals the way we do implies that it would likewise be justified to treat cognitively disabled humans in the same way. But surely it’s absurd to think that it would be morally permissible to keep cognitively disabled humans confined in tiny cages for their entire lives and then kill them and eat them because we enjoy the taste of their flesh. It is sick. Likewise, the overwhelming majority of people think it would be morally impermissible to subject cognitively disabled humans to painful medical experiments. This would especially be true if the experiments were for a new cosmetic product or some other superfluous item with countless safe versions already on the market.
Holding that
1.It’s wrong to treat severely cognitively disabled humans like this
And that
2.Species membership is not a morally relevant factor
forces us to the conclusion that
3.It’s likewise morally wrong to treat non-human animals in this way.
I accept 1. as an obvious moral truth and do not feel the need to argue for it. I have argued for the truth of 2. Rejecting 2. leads to absurd conclusions and problems that I have been raising throughout this chapter. Anyone who, like me, accepts both 1. and 2., must, so as not to contradict themselves, accept the truth of 3. as well.
How Pervasive Is This Anti-Speciesist Message in the Movies?
You might be thinking to yourself something like the following. “Sure, there are a few interesting examples of anti-speciesist attitudes in the original Planet of the Apes film, but that’s an implicitly assumed and minor point in the overall movie series.” In reply, it’s worth noting how important and pervasive the anti-speciesist assumptions in the movie series really are. In pretty much every film, these anti-speciesist assumptions explain not only the characters’ actions, but also who we root for. Thus, speciesism actually plays a crucial role in the entire series.
Dr. Zira and Dr. Cornelius are repeat human defenders, not only in the original movie, but in the sequel, Beneath the Planet of the Apes, and in the short-lived animated series. Their motivation for breaking with the status quo seems to be triggered by discovering that humans can speak, as in the original movie. In the animated series, Zira and Cornelius help Bill, a human astronaut, but instead of thanking them, Bill asks why they are helping him. Their answer? “We’re not really sure, but somehow I felt that killing you would be wrong” (see the episode “Escape from Ape City”). Then, in Tim Burton’s film, the ape Ari seems always to have believed that humans were as intelligent (or as morally important) as apes. She zeroes in on Captain Leo Davidson, played by Mark Wahlberg, to make her case.
Is it possible that we’re just rooting for the anti-speciesist attitudes when we want an ape to care about some human? I don’t think so. In several movies of the series, super-intelligent apes are the minority among humans, and the humans come to fight for the apes’ cause. Take Armando, in Escape, who adopts baby Milo (later Caesar), and in Conquest treats him as a moral equal, even putting his own life on the line to save him. Mercifully, he never makes Caesar wear bell-bottoms. If that’s not an act of kindness, I don’t know what is.
In the latest (and dare I say best?) movie in the series, Rise of the Planet of the Apes, James Franco (a.k.a.
Dr. William Rodman) also employs inter-species adoption. Rodman comes to see Caesar not as a pet but as a member of his family, as Caesar’s intellectual capabilities increase and exceed those of humans his own age. In the San Bruno Primate Shelter, more appropriately understood as the San Bruno Hellhole for Primates, we find a villain, shelter owner John Landon, who doesn’t get the whole “equal consideration of interests” thing. Like Dr. Zaius, Landon wants to defend the status quo of species segregation because he benefits from being at the top of the hierarchy, one of whose perks is to subjugate and mistreat “lower” primates.
If we really thought there was nothing morally wrong with speciesism, then we could not rationally endorse Caesar’s uprising against human domination in either Conquest of the Planet of the Apes or Rise of the Planet of the Apes. We could think that there is nothing wrong with the way the apes were treated in the lab in Rise of the Planet of the Apes and should have no problem using the apes for slave labor in Conquest of the Planet of the Apes. Basically, rejecting speciesist attitudes would require rooting for the bad guys in the film series instead of the good guys.
Didn’t God Make Humans the Most Important Species?
