Percy expected that the pressure would be comparatively weak against the front of his column, but strong on his flanks, and strongest at his rear. He arranged his forces on that assumption. At the front of the formation he placed a small vanguard of fifty men whose task was to clear the road ahead. Behind them came the surviving light infantry of Smith’s command, then the grenadiers, a convoy of carriages bearing wounded officers, and ten or twelve prisoners “taken in arms,” several of whom would be killed by “friendly fire” on the march. 38
To protect his right flank, Percy ordered five companies of the King’s Own to march overland on high ground south of the road. On his exposed left flank, he sent a strong force of the 47th to the north side of the road. For his rear guard he selected the Royal Welch Fusiliers. Supporting the Fusiliers was the artillery. The Marines were his reserve, in a position to reinforce any side of the formation that might be threatened. Percy was prepared to fight in any direction, and could move his guns to the front or rear as need be. His deployment gave him the tactical advantage of interior lines. He could shift his reserves from one side to another more speedily than the Americans could move around the outside of the formation. 39
Percy also made a change in march discipline. Colonel Smith, despite his reputation for lethargy, had driven his column so rapidly from Concord to Lexington that the flankers could not keep up. Percy decided to march more deliberately, and carefully regulated his pace, so that his flanking parties could keep abreast of the central column as they picked their way over unfamiliar ground. He also gave his men a long rest in Lexington, and planned another stop at Cambridge, halfway home. 40
The terrain posed special problems, but also gave him an opportunity. In Menotomy a rocky ridge ran three miles along the south shoulder of the road, rising as high as 100 feet. Percy’s right flanking column was ordered to secure the ridge; if they could do so, the south side of the formation was protected. To the north of the road were open fields and pastures. Further east the country became more thickly settled, so much so that Lieutenant Evelyn called it “a continued village” from the Lexington line to Boston. The advance guard was ordered to clear the houses close by the highway. Percy’s deliberate pace was designed to leave time for that work.
While Percy reorganized his force, the American commanders were busy with their own arrangements. The regiments that had fought Smith’s column had reached Lexington in some disorder. One regiment had been broken by Percy’s artillery. The others had become somewhat intermingled after the morning’s long pursuit. More companies were arriving from every direction. So well had the midnight riders done their work that elements of twelve New England regiments were in the field by early afternoon. Four of them were the Middlesex regiments (commanded by Colonels Barrett, Bridge, Green, and Pierce) that had fought at Concord. These units were now at full strength, perhaps more than full strength, with their many volunteers. Four other regiments (Colonels Davis, Gardner, Greaton, and Prescott) were at half strength, but rapidly increasing as other companies appeared. Four more regiments were just beginning to arrive from Essex and Norfolk Counties (Colonels Fry, Johnson, Robinson, and Pickering). In addition to these twelve, another eight regiments were gathering in Worcester County to the west. Altogether, no fewer than forty-seven regiments would muster throughout New England that day, perhaps as many as fifty-five. So rapid was their mobilization that several British officers believed they must have assembled several days before.
At Lexington, a general of Massachusetts militia assumed command. He was Brigadier William Heath, a gentleman farmer from Roxbury, then a beautiful green country town next to Boston. General Heath did not make a martial appearance. He looked the image of the contented country squire that he was—thirty-eight years old, fat, bald, jolly, affable. Sometimes he could be a little pompous; in his autobiography he always referred to himself as “our general.” But he was much beloved by those who knew him well. 41
Most of Heath’s soldiering had been done on militia training days with Boston’s Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company. He had not been in battle before, and had never commanded a large force in the field. But behind his country manner was a Yankee brain of high acuity. As early as 1770, William Heath had become convinced that the people of New England might be forced to fight in defense of their ancestral ways. He began to write for the local gazettes, publishing essays signed “a military countryman,” which urged his neighbors to prepare for the test that lay ahead.
In Boston, William Heath haunted Henry Knox’s bookstore, with its large stock of works on military subjects. By day he studied the Regulars at their drill on the Common. By night he toiled over his books in his Roxbury farmhouse, and made a serious study of war as he thought it might develop in America. 42
In particular, William Heath became deeply interested in the tactics of the skirmish—the use of highly mobile light infantry in open order, trained to make full use of the terrain against a stronger force that stood against them in close formation. He believed that skirmishing was a method of war best adapted to the conditions in New England. Many American historians have believed that the inspiration for these tactics came from the Indians and the American wilderness. So it did, in large part. But William Heath and other New England leaders also looked to the old world for their military models, and found them in the campaigns of European irregulars. One of them described the Yankee militia as an organization of “colonist hussars.” 43
William Heath’s military scholarship was respected in New England—more so than it might have been in other cultures which believed that experience is the only teacher. In the American Revolution, New England produced a remarkable generation of self-taught military commanders who trained themselves by systematic study. They had virtually no military experience, but two of them, Nathaniel Greene and Henry Knox, would be among the most able generals on the American side. Another, the brilliant turncoat Benedict Arnold, would become arguably the most able general on both sides. William Heath was another of these intelligent citizen-soldiers. Later in the war he would have his military troubles, but on the day of Lexington and Concord he fully justified the confidence that others had placed in him.
General William Heath (1737-1814) was a Roxbury gentleman-farmer who commanded the New England militia in the afternoon of April 19. He had little military experience, but much native ability, and was held in high esteem by his men. The Marquis de Chastellux, who knew him well, wrote, “His countenance is noble and open; and his bald head, as well as his corpulence give him a striking resemblance to Lord Granby. He writes well and with ease, has great sensibility of mind, and a frank and amiable character.”
That morning, William Heath had been awakened at dawn in Roxbury. He dressed quickly and went to join the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, scheduled to meet at the Black Horse Tavern in Menotomy, directly on the British line of march. The committee adjourned to Watertown, and was meeting there by ten o’clock. On a crossroad in that town, General Heath ran into Doctor Joseph Warren, who had left Boston that morning. Together they found the Committee. Only a few members were present: El-bridge Gerry, Jeremiah Lee, and Azor Orne, who had spent part of the night hiding in a field from the British troops. Paul Revere’s friend Joseph Palmer functioned as secretary. 44
Paul Revere himself may have joined the committee sometime that day. No evidence has been found of his movements, after he and his friend John Lowell had carried Hancock’s trunk to a place of safety. Revere was dismounted and unarmed. He had not been to bed since the night of the 17th. One imagines him dozing for a few moments in a chimney corner at the Clarke house, or perhaps resting by the fire in the taproom of the Buckman Tavern. But soon he would have been stirring again. Sometime during the day he headed east, and by evening he was in the vicinity of Cambridge and Watertown. The next day he was meeting with the Committee of Safety, helping to organize the American effort. 45
Heath and Warren sat with the committee through the morning, then left
to join the troops at Lexington. They arrived about the same time as Percy’s brigade, and met with militia officers in the field. These discussions were followed by a change in American tactics for the afternoon.
Through the morning, the Yankee militia had many times offered battle in large formations in a manner that was far removed from the American myth of individual embattled farmers. At Concord Bridge, two New England regiments had boldly attacked the Regulars in close order. Later in the morning, a regiment of Middlesex minutemen had made a stand on the high ground east of Concord Bridge. Shortly after noon, elements of three Middlesex regiments stood in close formation at Meriam’s Corner. On both occasions Colonel Smith had wisely declined to engage, and hurried on his way to Boston. Beyond Meriam’s Corner, the Militia formed up once more in the line of battle that Lieutenant Sutherland called “battalia” order. From Concord to Lexington Green, the New England men fought from fixed ambush positions in more than company strength at least four times: Hardy’s Hill, the Bloody Curve, Pine Hill, and Fiske’s Hill. As Smith’s column retreated to Lexington Green, it was pursued by a body of militia in regimental order, until dispersed by Percy’s artillery.
Altogether, from Concord Bridge to Lexington Green, the New England militia stood against the British force in large formations at least eight times. Six of these confrontations led to fighting, four at close quarters. Twice the British infantry was broken, at Concord Bridge and again west of Lexington Green. Altogether, it was an extraordinary display of courage, resolve, and discipline by citizen-soldiers against regular troops.
Something even more remarkable happened in the afternoon. Now the New England men faced a different situation. They confronted a reinforced brigade of British infantry, nearly two thousand men with supporting artillery. The terrain east of Lexington was different too, and the New England men had a new commander who had studied the tactics of the skirmish.
General Heath and his officers did not attempt to stand against Percy in close formation or to fight from fixed positions in regimental strength, as had happened earlier that day. But neither did they dissolve into the military anarchy of myth and legend.
Instead, the New England men sought to surround Percy’s marching square with a moving ring of American skirmishers, “dispersed tho’ adhering,” in the descriptive phrase of one participant. The object was to fight a deadly battle of attrition that Britain’s “clever little army” could never hope to win. American officers minimized their own losses by using mobility and cover, and by open-order skirmishing at long range. The men who led the New England militia were experienced in this sort of war. Equally important, they were also practical politicians who understood that in an open society a bloody victory can be worse than a defeat. 46
This idea of a circle of skirmishers was a tactical plan well matched to opportunity and circumstance. But it was not easy to execute. The first task was to forge the ring firmly around Percy’s brigade, and to maintain some degree of command and control over these active and independent men. The second task, equally difficult, was to ensure that the New England militia and minutemen were at once “dispersed” and yet “adhering.” This was not an easy balance to maintain, especially with green troops. Yet it was maintained through a long afternoon—an artifact of active leadership in which General Heath and other American commanders played a vital role. 47 In the words of soldier-historian John Galvin, the American general proved to be “a genius of the minor plan… walking about the battlefield, helping regimental commanders to pull their people together, advising company commanders on the best use of terrain, moving units down on the flanks of the British… and above all simply by being present.” 48
When Heath reached Lexington he began by rallying the regiment that had been broken by Percy’s artillery, and helped to sort out the other units that had become intermingled in the pursuit from Concord. Heath also ordered some of his regimental officers to move against the flanks of Percy’s brigade. Major Francis Faulkner of Colonel Barrett’s 1st Middlesex Regiment remembered “organizing his regiment to work upon the flank of the enemy so soon as he should move again for Boston.” 49
Couriers were dispatched to units on the march from distant towns, informing them about the course of the battle, and redirecting them to points east of their original destination. A soldier in Fry’s Essex Regiment, marching from Andover far to the north, remembered that three couriers reached his regiment while they were on the road, urging them to move rapidly and turning them to the east. 50
There was also some resupply of the American militia in the field. The town of Maiden dispatched small boys on horseback with saddlebags full of supplies. Other towns sent wagons filled with food and ammunition to support their companies. 51
While Heath and other officers were attending to this business, Percy suddenly started to march. The time was 3:15. The cumbersome British columns took nearly half an hour to get on the road. Not until 3:45 by Adjutant Mackenzie’s pocket watch did the rear guard finally move out.
The American militia hurried to surround the British force. At first the ring was incomplete. As Percy had foreseen, the pursuit was closest in the rear, where the central Middlesex regiments occupied a broad arc behind the British troops. They engaged the rear guard so closely that the Royal Welch Fusiliers were compelled to march backwards, eight companies fighting in turn and leap-frogging over one another.
As the American attack was pressed home, the Fusiliers began to take casualties. The New England militia shot the colonel of this proud regiment and hit at least thirty-six of its 218 men in the course of the day. So many Fusiliers fell in this fighting that Percy relieved them, and was forced to commit his reserve of Royal Marines as their replacement early in the retreat. The Marines also began to lose heavily—more than seventy men that day. Later the Marines also had to be replaced as rear guard by companies of the King’s Own and the 47th Foot.
British officers were astounded by the volume of American fire, and by the persistence with which New England men attacked from the rear. Mackenzie later wrote, “In our rear they were most numerous and came on pretty close, frequently calling out, ‘King Hancock forever’.” Heath and Warren (who fought beside him as a volunteer) themselves joined the militia against Percy’s rear, urging the men forward but also keeping them dispersed. Throughout the afternoon, the two leaders were to be found where the action was hottest. One suspects that the action was hottest partly because they were there, rallying the militia forward in open order.
After the rear was engaged, the two American commanders moved to the left flank of Percy’s column, and led other militia regiments from Essex and Middlesex to attack from the north. Here again Heath was in the thick of the fighting. He wrote later, “I was several times greatly exposed; in particular, at the high grounds at the upper end of Menotomy.” Doctor Joseph Warren fought by his side, leading from the front with reckless courage. Heath remembered that Warren “kept constantly near me… a musket ball from the enemy came so near his head as to strike the pin out of the hair of his earlock [sic].” 52
Percy’s retreat had barely begun. And yet, while his column was still within the bounds of Lexington, the New England men were maintaining heavy pressure from the north as well as the west. Their fire drove Percy’s northern flankers back toward the road. The Americans maneuvered in units as large as regimental formations, but attacked in smaller groups of company strength. One British officer observed that the New England men were very “much scattered, and not above fifty of them to be seen in any one place.” Some complained that they rarely saw their enemies at all. Many Regulars expressed resentment and contempt of the Americans for fighting on their bellies and refusing to stand up. 53
The American officers were prominent in the fighting, keeping their men dispersed but engaged. This was dangerous work. Many company officers were killed or severely wounded in the course of the day: Bedford’s Captain Jonathan Wilson, Concord’s Captain Nathan Barrett and Captain Charles M
iles, Needham’s Captain Eleazer Kingsbury and Lieutenant John Bacon, and others. Casualties also occurred among town elders who attached themselves as volunteers, and became battlefield leaders by reason of their social standing. Sudbury’s Deacon Josiah Haynes was killed while leading his townsmen from the front. His example, and that of others like him, was remembered by men who fought that day. 54
The British brigade was closely invested on both its rear and its left flank. On its right, Percy’s large flanking column of the King’s Own was able to keep the southern hills clear through the town of Lexington. But in Menotomy a new American force joined the battle. Heath later wrote that “the right flank of the British was exposed to the fire of a body of militia, which had come in from Roxbury, Brookline and Dorchester, etc.” These were Heath’s own neighbors and kin. Behind them came the first companies from Dedham and other towns in what is now Norfolk County, south of Boston. With their arrival the British column was in action on its rear and both flanks. 55
Percy was astounded by the skill that American commanders showed in managing their forces on the field. Later he wrote, “During the whole affair, the rebels attacked us in a very scattered, irregular manner, but with perseverance and resolution, nor did they ever dare to form into any regular body. Indeed they knew too well what was proper, to do so. Whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob, will find himself very much mistaken. They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about, having been employed as rangers against the Indians and Canadians, and this country being much covered with wood, and hilly, is very advantageous for their method of fighting.” 56 Only a few days earlier, Percy himself had thought of these men as a mob. He told a friend when he got home, “For my part, I never believed, I confess, that they would have attacked the king’s troops, or have had the perseverance I found in them yesterday.” 57
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