* Emphasis in the original.
† Emphasis in the original.
* Hitler’s understanding of the Battle of Jutland was obviously faulty.
* In giving these tonnages for German battleships, General Thomas was deceiving even the Foreign Office. An interesting German naval document51 dated more than a year before, February 18, 1938, notes that false figures on battleship tonnage had been furnished the British government under the Anglo–German naval agreement. It states that the actual tonnage of the 26,000-ton ships was 31,300 tons; that of the 35,000-ton battleships (the top level in the British and American navies) was actually 41,700 tons. It is a curious example of Nazi deceit.
* On May 27, the British ambassador and the French chargé d’affaires in Moscow presented Molotov with an Anglo–French draft of the proposed pact. To the surprise of the Western envoys, Molotov took a very cool view of it.52
† The affidavit was rejected as evidence by the tribunal and is not published in the Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression or Trial of the Major War Criminals volumes of the Nuremberg evidence. This does not detract from its authenticity. All material dealing with Nazi–Soviet collaboration during this period was handled gingerly by the tribunal, one of whose four judges was a Russian.
* In Nazi–Soviet Relations, a volume of German Foreign Office documents on that subject published by the U.S. State Department in 1949, the English translation of the telegram came out much stronger. The key sentence was given as: “We have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union.” This has led many historians, including Churchill, to conclude that this telegram of May 30 marked the decisive turning point in Hitler’s efforts to make a deal with Moscow. That turning point came later. As Weizsaecker pointed out in the May 30 postscript to his letter to Schulenburg, the German approach, which Hitler had approved, was to be “a very much modified one.”
* To try to forestall an Anglo–French-Russian guarantee of Latvia and Estonia, which bordered on the Soviet Union, Germany had hastily signed nonaggression pacts with these two Baltic States on June 7. Even before this, on May 31, Germany had pushed through a similar pact with Denmark, which, considering recent events, appears to have given the Danes an astonishing sense of security.
* According to the British Foreign Office papers, Halifax told Maisky on June 8 that he had thought of suggesting to the Prime Minister that he should go to Moscow, “but it was really impossible to get away.” Maisky, on June 12, after Strang had left, suggested to Halifax that it would be a good idea for the Foreign Secretary to go to Moscow “when things were quieter,” but Halifax again stressed the impossibility of his being absent from London “for the present.”65
* On June 19 the High Command of the Army had informed the Foreign Office that 168 German Army officers “have been granted permission to travel through the Free State of Danzig in civilian clothes on a tour for study purposes.” Early in July General Keitel inquired of the Foreign Office “whether it is politically advisable to show in public the twelve light and four heavy guns which are in Danzig and to let exercises be carried out with them, or whether it is better to conceal the presence of these guns.”72 How the Germans succeeded in smuggling in heavy artillery past the Polish inspectors is not revealed in the German papers.
* The British High Command, like the German later, grossly underestimated the potential strength of the Red Army. This may have been due in large part to the reports it received from its military attachés in Moscow. On March 6, for instance, Colonel Firebrace, the military attaché, and Wing Commander Hallawell, the air attaché, had filed long reports to London to the effect that while the defensive capabilities of the Red Army and Air Force were considerable they were incapable of mounting a serious offensive. Hallawell thought that the Russian Air Force, “like the Army, is likely to be brought to a standstill as much by the collapse of essential services as by enemy action.” Firebrace found that the purge of higher officers had severely weakened the Red Army. But he did point out to London that “the Red Army considers war inevitable and is undoubtedly being strenuously prepared for it.”83
* Strang, negotiating with Molotov in Moscow, was even cooler. “It is, indeed, extraordinary,” he wrote the Foreign Office on July 20, “that we should be expected to talk military secrets with the Soviet Government before we are sure that they will be our allies.”
The Russian view was just the opposite and was put by Molotov to the Anglo–French negotiators on July 27: “The important point was to see how many divisions each party would contribute to the common cause and where they would be located.”85 Before the Russians committed themselves politically they wanted to know how much military help they could expect from the West.
† The British mission consisted of Admiral Sir Reginald Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax, who had been Commander in Chief, Plymouth, 1935–1938, Air Marshal Sir Charles Burnett and Major General Heywood.
* A conclusion reached by Arnold Toynbee and his collaborators in their book, The Eve of War, 1939, based largely on the British Foreign Office documents.
† On August 16, Air Marshal Sir Charles Burnett wrote to London from Moscow: “I understand it is me Government’s policy to prolong negotiations as long as possible if we cannot get acceptance of a treaty.” Seeds, the British ambassador in Moscow, had wired London on July 24, the day after his government agreed to staff talks: “I am not optimistic as to the success of military conversations, nor do I think they can in any case be rapidly concluded, but to begin with them now would give a healthy shock to the Axis Powers and a fillip to our friends, while they might be prolonged sufficiently to tide over the next dangerous few months.”88 In view of what Anglo–French intelligence knew of the meetings of Molotov with the German ambassador, of German efforts to interest Russia in a new partition of Poland—which Coulondre had warned Paris of as early as May 7, of massive German troop concentrations on the Polish border, and of Hitler’s intentions, this British trust in stalling in Moscow is somewhat startling.
*Emphasis in the original document.
* Typical was a vivid report Attolico sent of a talk he had with Ribbentrop on July 6. If Poland dared to attack Danzig, the Nazi Foreign Minister told him, Germany would settle the Danzig question in forty-eight hours—at Warsaw! If France were to intervene over Danzig, and so precipitate a general war, let her; Germany would like nothing better. France would be “annihilated”; Britain, if she stirred, would be bringing destruction on the British Empire. Russia? There was going to be a Russian-German treaty, and Russia was not going to march. America? One speech of the Fuehrer’s had been enough to rout Roosevelt; and Americans would not stir anyway. Fear of Japan would keep America quiet.
I listened [Attolico reported] in wondering silence, while Ribbentrop drew this picture of the war ad usum Germaniae which his imagination has now established indelibly in his head … He can see nothing but his version—which is a really amazing one—of an assured German victory in every field and against all comers … At the end, I observed that, according to my understanding, there was complete agreement between the Duce and the Fuehrer that Italy and Germany were preparing for a war that was not to be immediate.96
But the astute Attolico did not believe that at all. All through July his dispatches warned of imminent German action in Poland.
* At one point, Ribbentrop, with obvious exasperation, told Ciano, “We don’t need you!”; to which Ciano replied, “The future will show.” (From General Halder’s unpublished diary, entry of August 14.102 Halder says he got it through Weizsaecker.)
* Though the German minutes explicitly state that Ciano agreed with Hitler “that no communiqué should be issued at the conclusion of the conversation,” the Germans immediately double-crossed their Italian ally. D.N.B., the official German news agency, issued a communiqué two hours after Ciano’s departure and without any consultation whatever with the Italians, that the talks had covered all the problems of the day—with particular attention to Danzi
g—and had resulted in a “hundred per cent” agreement. So much so, the communiqué added, that not a single problem had been left in suspense, and therefore there would be no further meetings, because there was no occasion for them. Attolico was furious. He protested to the Germans, accusing them of bad faith. He tipped off Henderson that war was imminent. And in an angry dispatch to Rome he described the German communique as “Machiavellian,” pointed out that it was deliberately done to bind Italy to Germany after the latter’s attack on Poland and pleaded that Mussolini should be firm with Hitler in demanding German fulfillment of the “consultation” provisions of the Pact of Steel and under these provisions insist on a month’s grace to settle the Danzig question through diplomatic channels.103
15
THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT
THE “TELEGRAM FROM Moscow” whose contents Hitler disclosed to Ciano at Obersalzberg on the afternoon of August 12 appears to have been, like certain previous “telegrams” which have figured in this narrative, of doubtful origin. No such wire from the Russian capital has been found in the German archives. Schulenburg did send a telegram to Berlin from Moscow on the twelfth, but it merely reported the arrival of the Franco–British military missions and the friendly toasts exchanged between the Russians and their guests.
Yet there was some basis for the “telegram” with which Hitler and Ribbentrop had so obviously tried to impress Ciano. On August 12 a teleprint was sent to Obersalzberg from the Wilhelmstrasse reporting the results of a call which the Russian chargé had made on Schnurre in Berlin on that day. Astakhov informed the Foreign Office official that Molotov was now ready to discuss the questions raised by the Germans, including Poland and other political matters. The Soviet government proposed Moscow as the place of these negotiations. But, Astakhov made it clear, they were not to be hurried. He stressed, Schnurre noted in his report, which apparently was rushed to Obersalzberg, “that the chief emphasis in his instructions from Molotov lay in the phrase ‘by degrees’ … The discussions could be undertaken only by degrees.”1
But Adolf Hitler could not wait for negotiations with Russia “by degrees.” As he had just revealed to a shocked Ciano, he had set the last possible date for the onslaught on Poland for September 1, and it was now almost the middle of August. If he were to successfully sabotage the Anglo–French parleys with the Russians and swing his own deal with Stalin, it had to be done quickly—not by stages but in one big leap.
Monday, August 14, was another crucial day. While Ambassador von der Schulenburg, who obviously had not yet been taken fully into the confidence of Hitler and Ribbentrop, was writing Weizsaecker from Moscow advising him that Molotov was “a strange man and a difficult character” and that “I am still of the opinion that any hasty measures in our relations with the Soviet Union should be avoided,” he was being sent a “most urgent” telegram from Berlin.2 It came from Ribbentrop and it was dispatched from the Wilhelmstrasse (the Foreign Minister was still at Fuschl) at 10:53 P.M. on August 14. It directed the German ambassador to call upon Molotov and read him a long communication “verbatim.”
This, finally, was Hitler’s great bid. German–Russian relations, said Ribbentrop, had “come to a historic turning point … There exist no real conflicts of interests between Germany and Russia … It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies.”
The crisis which has been produced in Polish–German relations by English policy [Ribbentrop continued] and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German–Russian relations necessary. Otherwise matters … might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German–Russian friendship and in due course clarifying jointly territorial questions in Eastern Europe. The leadership of both countries, therefore, should not allow the situation to drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual ignorance of views and intentions, the two peoples should finally drift apart.
The German Foreign Minister, “in the name of the Fuehrer,” was therefore prepared to act in proper time.
As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also feel the desire for a clarification of German–Russian relations. Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, I am prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the name of the Fuehrer, to set forth the Fuehrer’s views to M. Stalin. In my view, only through such a direct discussion can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German–Russian relations.
The British Foreign Secretary had not been willing to go to Moscow, but now the German Foreign Minister was not only willing but anxious to go—a contrast which the Nazis calculated quite correctly would make an impression on the suspicious Stalin.* The Germans saw that it was highly important to get their message through to the Russian dictator himself. Ribbentrop therefore added an “annex” to his urgent telegram.
I request [Ribbentrop advised Schulenburg] that you do not give M. Molotov these instructions in writing, but that they reach M. Stalin in as exact a form as possible and I authorize you, if the occasion arises, to request from M. Molotov on my behalf an audience with M. Stalin, so that you may be able to make this important communication directly to him also. In addition to a conference with Molotov, a detailed discussion with Stalin would be a condition for my making the trip.3
There was a scarcely disguised bait in the Foreign Minister’s proposal which the Germans, not without reason, must have thought the Kremlin would rise to. Reiterating that “there is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both counties,” Ribbentrop specified “the Baltic States, Poland, southeastern questions, etc.” And he spoke of the necessity of “clarifying jointly territorial questions of Eastern Europe.”
Germany was ready to divide up Eastern Europe, including Poland, with the Soviet Union. This was a bid which Britain and France could not—and, obviously, if they could, would not—match. And having made it, Hitler, apparently confident that it would not be turned down, once more—on the same day, August 14—called in the commanders in chief of his armed forces to listen to him lecture on the plans and prospects for war.
THE MILITARY CONFERENCE AT OBERSALZBERG: AUGUST 14*
“The great drama,” Hitler told his select listeners, “is now approaching its climax.” While political and military successes could not be had without taking risks, he was certain that Great Britain and France would not fight. For one thing, Britain “has no leaders of real caliber. The men I got to know at Munich are not the kind that start a new world war.” As at previous meetings with his military chiefs, the Fuehrer could not keep his mind off England and he spoke in considerable detail of her strengths and weaknesses, especially the latter.
England [Halder noted down the words], unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war lasting for years … Such is the fate of rich countries … Not even England has the money nowadays to fight a world war. What should England fight for? You don’t get yourself killed for an ally.
What military measures, Hitler asked, could Britain and France undertake?
Drive against the West Wall unlikely [he answered]. A northward swing through Belgium and Holland will not bring speedy victory. None of this would help the Poles.
All these factors argue against England and France entering the war … There is nothing to force them into it. The men of Munich will not take the risk … English and French general staffs take a very sober view of the prospects of an armed conflict and advise against it….
All this supports the conviction that while England may talk big, even recall her Ambassador, perhaps put a complete embargo on trade, she is sure not to resort to armed intervention in the conflict.
So Poland, probably, could be taken on alone, but s
he would have to be defeated “within a week or two,” Hitler explained, so that the world could be convinced of her collapse and not try to save her.
Hitler was not quite ready to tell his generals just how far he was going that very day to make a deal with Russia, though it would have immensely pleased them, convinced as they were that Germany could not fight a major war on two fronts. But he told them enough to whet their appetite for more.
“Russia,” he said, “is not in the least disposed to pull chestnuts out of the fire.” He explained the “loose contacts” with Moscow which had started with the trade negotiations. He was now considering whether “a negotiator should go to Moscow and whether this should be a prominent figure.” The Soviet Union, he declared, felt under no obligation to the West. The Russians understood the destruction of Poland. They were interested in a “delimitation of spheres of interest.” The Fuehrer was “inclined to meet them halfway.”
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Page 82
