Russia's Dead End: An Insider's Testimony from Gorbachev to Putin
Page 30
In the summer of 2000 Putin changed the principle on which the Federation Council was based. Previously it comprised the heads of the constituent members of the federation; now it consisted of their appointed representatives. The upshot was that the Federation Council became wholly controlled by the Kremlin.
In September 2002 Putin administered a heavy blow to the very foundations of democracy. Changes were introduced into existing legislation that prohibited holding referenda in the last year of a presidential term or of the State Duma, as well as banning any initiative to hold a referendum during federal election campaigns. Thus, the prohibition covered the larger part of every election cycle, and the opportunity for citizens to initiate referenda was sharply constricted.
Beginning in December 2004, the highest officials (presidents and governors) of the constituent units of the Russian Federation began to be appointed by the respective regional parliaments on recommendations from the president of the federation. The people were deprived of the opportunity to elect the heads of the regions, who thus became wholly divorced from their constituents and completely dependent on the Kremlin. The governors had to please a single elector—namely, the president.
The year 2005 bade farewell to any hopes for fair parliamentary elections. New legislation stipulated that elections be conducted exclusively according to party lists, making it impossible to elect independent candidates, to create electoral blocs at every level of elections, and, for small parties, to unite and enter parliament through joint efforts. In addition, the threshold of unverified voters’ signatures that would disqualify a party or a candidate from registering to run in elections was lowered from 25 percent to 10 percent. Since the verification of signatures is conducted by electoral commissions and law enforcement organs appointed by the vertical of power, this provides an opportunity to disqualify any party it so desires. But even this was not enough for the authorities. They also placed restrictions on election observers. As a result of these restrictions, only parties that have registered their lists for the election are permitted to send observers. This provision sharply limits the opportunity for independent oversight of the elections.
The Kremlin deemed these amendments to the legislation insufficient, and in July 2006 new changes were introduced that prohibited political parties from nominating members of other parties to stand in the elections. Thus, minor parties lost any chance whatsoever of combining their efforts, not by formally creating already prohibited electoral blocs, but by nominating candidates on some sort of single “basic” list. Moreover, political sympathies and party loyalty became the basis for limiting the passive voting rights of voters and the active rights of candidates aspiring to become deputies. At the same time, in elections at every level the choice of “none of the above” was removed. Russian citizens were thereby robbed of the opportunity to vote against all candidates as a way of expressing both their lack of faith in the candidates and the parties allowed to take part in the elections and their desire for new elections. Previously, if a majority of voters voted for “none of the above,” the elections were considered invalid.
Finally, to avoid any election surprises, in November 2006 the requirement that a certain minimum number of voters must actually cast ballots to validate an election was abolished. Voters were thereby deprived of their final opportunity “to vote with their feet” as a way to force new elections with new candidates. It now became possible to conduct elections without voters.
By stretching the concept of “extremism” to the limit (more follows), the registration of candidates accused of “extremist activities” was forbidden. Thus, persons with uncleared convictions for various stipulated actions or those who had been handed administrative punishment for preparing and disseminating banned political symbols were excluded. This created supplementary mechanisms for barring the opposition from elections. It also introduced an extrajudicial limit on voting rights. Finally, electioneering through the media by certain candidates and parties against other candidates and parties was prohibited. Thus, the last elements of political competition were quashed, the opposition was unable to inform citizens of the mistakes committed by the authorities, and the citizens were deprived of the right to learn about them.
Not content with these legislative changes, Putin blatantly falsified election results on a broad scale. Technology was an important means for doing this.1 Up until December 2011 when short-lived protest demonstrations occurred in Moscow, although well aware of these deceptions, people did not react to the familiar practice of rigging the election results, the pressure to vote for candidates indicated from “on high,” the destruction of ballots, and the other forms of manipulating the elections. Thus, for the time being all future elections results were decided in advance. However, it cannot be denied that were honest elections held, their results would still tally with the Kremlin’s needs. Yet the democratic opposition would be able to stay active in politics, thereby keeping alive hope for the emergence of civil society.
The concept of extremism was adapted for use in the struggle against dissenters. The law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity,” adopted in 2002 and amended on July 27, 2006, includes the aforementioned vague notion of undermining the security of the Russian Federation. Moreover, it reenacts under a different name the notorious Article 11 of the Criminal Code, which replaced the explicitly political Articles 70 and 190 of the Soviet Criminal Code (referred to in chapter 1). In the same spirit, included in the definition of extremist activity is “the creation and/or dissemination of printed, audio, audio-visual or other materials (output) intended for public use and containing even one of the indicators stipulated in the present article.”
However, progress continues on this front, and the Putinist lawmakers have improved upon Soviet penal legislation. With adoption of the amendments in 2006, the definition of extremism was further expanded to include “financing of the stipulated activity or other assistance in planning, organizing, preparing, and implementing the stipulated activity, including by means of financial resources, real estate, instructional, polygraphic and material-technological, telephonic, fax or other means of communication, information services, or other material-technical means.” Moreover, any criticism of the authorities is defined as extremism. Anyone may be held responsible—for example, someone who rented out an apartment where extremist material was written, who lent money to an author, who allowed an author to use the telephone, fax, or email. One can hardly imagine all the possible interpretations of this notoriously illegitimate legislative norm.
So just what is this “extremist material”? It is “documents intended for publication or information for other bearers.” But how does one determine if the materials are intended for publication? And where is freedom of speech? But this has no meaning for the legislator. The “author of print, audio, audio-visual and other materials (output) intended for public use and containing even one of the indicators stipulated in Article 1 of the present Federal law is considered to be a person engaged in extremist activity and bears responsibility in accordance with procedures established by the legislation of the Russian Federation.” This responsibility is stipulated in Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on “Inciting Hatred or Enmity as well as Humiliation of Human Dignity.” The punishment is up to five years’ deprivation of freedom. No policies to encourage extremism exist in any civilized country, so this is a typical flourish of the current Russian hypocrites.
For the reader to develop a clearer picture of the goals and means of the vertical of power, we must again step outside the temporal limits of this book. Putin’s third official presidential term has been marked by genuine legislative madness. (It is really his fourth term, as it is clear that the stuffed teddy bear Dmitry Medvedev took virtually no decisions during his term as president [2008–12] and simply warmed the presidential chair for his boss.) There is a good reason why Russian wits call the State Duma, or Russia’s parliament, the State Dummy and the Runaway Print
er. With unusual speed this strange machine has adopted draconian laws reinstating criminal responsibility for slander, the definition of which is vague in the Soviet tradition; prohibiting Americans from adopting Russian orphans; prohibiting foul language, which a large part of the population employs to one degree or another and which the overwhelming majority use at least occasionally; blacklisting websites, or censoring the Internet; tightening the rules for conducting meetings; outlining punishment for insulting the feelings of believers (the sensitivities of nonbelievers are ignored); passing a homophobic law; and prohibiting adoptions by same-sex couples.
Particularly noteworthy is the law that forces nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) receiving financial or other aid from abroad and “participating in political activities” to register as foreign agents. This is a sinister formulation in the Soviet Russian tradition, suggesting something extremely hostile to the country. By this means, the NGOs are made to condemn themselves as representatives of the interests of other countries and not of Russia. Moreover, in print as well as on the Internet, they must indicate that their publications were prepared by these same “foreign agents.” Irrespective of their statutory goals and missions, any activity carried out on the territory of the Russian Federation—not only participation in political actions aimed at influencing policy but also in shaping public opinion—is considered political activity. Naturally, joint-stock companies with state participation and their branches are excluded from the scope of this law. This is a masterful trap. Many NGOs must either admit they are foreign agents and suffocate from lack of funds or immediately close up shop. Moreover, even after registering as foreign agents, the NGOs are subject to financial checks, supposedly aimed against money laundering of illegally obtained funds and against financing of terrorism. Their activities are scrutinized under a microscope. Further, the authorities can deny registration to any NGO on simple, unsubstantiated suspicions.
The overall result is the revival of repressive Soviet legislation but dressed up differently. In the absence of open persecution for political and religious convictions, even broader prohibitions—for example, of “extremism”—are required for the sake of appearances.
Toward this end Media-Most and NTV were destroyed, and then other independent mass media was as well. After suppressing freedom of speech, the guillotine for democracy was adjusted and perfected.
Pandora’s Box
The blackest legacy of Soviet times was restored even prior to the seizure of power by the special services. This real Pandora’s box was opened partly from mindlessness, partly from the incompetence of those in power and their inability to solve problems, and partly from a desire to deal with current issues. But there can be no doubt that from this Pandora’s box burst forth terrorism, violence against one’s own citizens, a spy scare, and heightened fears of both imagined and real dangers (which, of course, were sometimes specially concocted by the authorities). They were all deployed to create an atmosphere of general hysteria in the country to facilitate controlling the population. The reactionaries deliberately unleashed the genie of violence when they were still battling against Gorbachev’s reformation. Under Yeltsin violence became a daily occurrence in Russian politics. It would take hundreds of pages to fully analyze the violence of the Russian state. Here I shall address only the most prominent manifestations. First, let us consider the role of violence itself in Russian politics over the past century.
Violence inflicted upon its own citizens is a trademark of twentieth- and twenty-first-century Russia. The Red Terror. The legendary Solovki Islands—the site of the first Soviet concentration camps where, beginning in 1921, Lenin exiled the nation’s intellectual and spiritual elite—became the forerunner of the GULAG. The destruction of the nobility, the intelligentsia, the priesthood, the better-off peasantry, and other “enemies of the people” was the foundation of Bolshevik policy as were genocide and the forced internal deportation of people of various nationalities who were inhabiting the USSR. It is difficult even to enumerate the varieties of violence.
The USSR would not have survived long without violence against its own citizens. Mass repression was curtailed after the death of Stalin in 1953, but in 1962 the authorities decided to use the familiar methods “to restore order” in Novocherkassk.2 However, this was the lone example of force being applied within Russia. Naturally, even after the demise of the USSR and during investigations conducted in 1993–94, the names of those responsible for the deaths were not revealed.
During perestroika, the provocative and disproportionate use of force occurred with beatings and teargassing in several regional capitals. Each was a disaster. In most cases the violence was provoked by neo-Stalinists for whom force was a political weapon. The lives and well-being of fellow humans were small change in the struggle to achieve political and other ambitions. The stakes were power.
Once Yeltsin became the undisputed head of state, he frequently resorted to outright violence. He first unleashed violence in October 1993, when he ordered tanks to shell the rebellious parliament. The state of emergency declared at that time led to massive violations of human rights, including attacks against passengers on public transport who included women, children, and the elderly.
One cannot reproach Putin for neglecting the coercive agencies. He loves to play with toy soldiers, not miniature lead ones, but live ones as he has done in Chechnya, in Georgia, in Ukraine, and in Syria. He views the officials of the law enforcement organs as his toy soldiers and the oppositionists as enemy toy soldiers. The rest of the population, which he considers the “electorate,” are also toy soldiers. He would like them to be unthinking and submissive. Dressed in a flight suit he loves to pose in front of television cameras with his entourage in the cockpit of a jet fighter or a strategic missile bomber. He also loves to play with toy boats. As commander in chief he has this prerogative. This “leader of the nation” also does not hesitate to use force against his own people or against foreign countries.
This is not the place to attempt an exhaustive analysis, or even a full listing, of this phenomenon. Instead, I shall address a few of the more dangerous processes taking place in Russia.
Terrorism
Traditionally the Russian authorities required an enemy. In Soviet times prior to Gorbachev, “world imperialism” filled the bill. From the Kremlin’s perspective, it brought in its train regional and local conflicts and “national-liberation struggles” (that in many cases were actually inspired by Moscow) and spawned international crises, some of which threatened a global nuclear missile confrontation. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union’s “anti-imperialist struggle” was one of the sources of international terrorism.3 From the moment Russia began trying to “civilize” itself, the situation changed. Mikhail Gorbachev thought that having an enemy was not only unnecessary but even counterproductive. For Boris Yeltsin and his successors, however, an enemy was necessary. Why? To rationalize the breakdown of the country and its impoverishment. To hold onto power, to protect themselves.
Terror has a long history in Russia. Starting in the 1860s, terror was one of the basic means of revolutionary struggle. It was widely used to eliminate persons whom the revolutionaries deemed “harmful” and to destabilize society in order to obtain funding and other resources.4 After achieving power, the revolutionaries did not dispense with this familiar and effective instrument for eliminating adversaries. In this respect, the USSR and Russia attained the very pinnacle of success.5 De facto terror was the foundation of politics in the USSR. In twenty-three provinces of Russia from June 1918 through February 1919, 5,496 persons, of whom only 800 were ordinary criminals, were shot by Cheka organs.6 In 1920, 6,541 persons were sentenced to death by revolutionary military tribunals.7
Naturally, the USSR employed terrorism in one form or another in its “anti-imperialist struggle.” It is no coincidence that the bloodiest of pro-Soviet regimes, as well as leftist and extremist organizations, actively employed terrorism. Nor is it an accident that Ilyich
Ramirez Sanchez, famous as Carlos the Jackal, was enrolled in a terrorist school in Cuba, a state friendly to the USSR. He also attended Moscow’s former Patrice Lumumba Friendship University (since renamed), a school that trained revolutionaries and was known in the West as a global terrorist academy. Nor was it by chance that Abdullah Öcalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, hid out in Russia, which he entered quite legally, although he was being pursued by police from many countries.
The first really notorious terrorist act in contemporary Russian history took place on June 14, 1994, in Budyonnovsk, where Chechen fighters seized hostages, including staff, at a two-thousand-bed hospital. Nevertheless, on June 16, during the crisis, Yeltsin flew to Halifax for a meeting of the Group of Seven. On his orders, on June 17, an assault on the hospital began, during which 166 persons were killed and more than 400 wounded. According to numerous witnesses, all the victims were killed or wounded by federal troops. The attack failed; the terrorists fled. Meanwhile, the public was shocked that Yeltsin was enjoying himself in Halifax. Then he attained one of his “high points,” announcing, without any proof, that Turkey was prepared to provide sanctuary to the president of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudaev, and that Dudaev had accepted this proposal. The Russian president concluded his portentous announcement by asserting that Chechnya had become the center of global terrorism.
A series of meaningless, anonymous terrorist acts followed, without demands being made. Because of their specific characteristics, no historical analogies could be drawn with them. There was no answer to the question of why and by whom they were being committed, especially since the victims of the anonymous terrorists—terrorists who made no demands—were random persons, passengers on municipal transport, planes, trains. Right after each such crime a “Chechen footprint” was found but then quickly disappeared. People were terrified, especially in Moscow, where most of the terrorist acts occurred. Apparently the only goal of these terrorist acts was to create an atmosphere of fear, to incite hysteria. Strange as it may seem, one possible answer to the question of why lay right at hand: it is quite possible that the authorities were securing for themselves an ability to act freely against terrorists. One can also not discount that under Yeltsin the sharpest interclan struggles had developed.