While the comparison between the intellectually (or morally) superior individual and average people is the relevant one from the standpoint of the unconstrained vision, to those with the constrained vision even the most outstanding individuals-intellectually or morally-are inherently very limited in their grasp of the knowledge and of the innumerable interrelationships which make a society viable. Therefore, in the constrained vision, the historic and systemic wisdom expressed inarticulately in the culture of the many is more likely to be correct than the special insights of the few. Both processes mobilize human experience and understanding, but in very different ways. The very concept of "reason" is different in the two visions. In Hayek's words:
"Reason," which has included the capacity of the mind to distinguish between good and evil, that is between what was and was not in accordance with established rules, came to mean a capacity to construct such rules by deduction from explicit premises.61
In the constrained vision, society is often analogized to a living organism, which cannot be comprehensively disassembled and reconstructed in a different way without fatal results. Burke, for example, wrote of hacking a body into pieces and then throwing the pieces "into the kettle of magicians," in hopes of regeneration.62 In the constrained vision, the concept of "nationbuilding" is a fundamental misconception.63 Nations may grow and evolve but cannot be built.
The intertemporal commitment of loyalty, seen as an abandonment of impartiality in future behavior by those with the unconstrained vision, was viewed very differently by those with the constrained vision. If one's view of human nature is very constrained, then the alternative to loyalty is not impartiality but pure selfishness. The kinds of emotional attachments which lead to loyalty are thus seen as beneficial social ties, essential to the functioning of the whole society. According to Burke:
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards a love of our country, and to mankind.64
In a similar vein, Hamilton said:
We love our families, more than our neighbors: We love our neighbors more than our countrymen in general.65
By contrast, Godwin put his faith in the spread of reason, rather than "a brute and unintelligent sympathy."66 He distinguished undisciplined feelings from feelings that have "ripened into virtue"-the latter embracing "the whole human race" in their concern. From Godwin's perspective, "the love of our country" is "a deceitful principle" which would establish "a preference built upon accidental relations, and not upon reason."67
Neither vision regards the smaller units as intrinsically more important than the larger units. The unconstrained vision simply regards man as ultimately capable of understanding that principle and acting upon it. The constrained vision sees that as beyond human nature in practice, even if agreed to in theory, and that strong, naturally arising emotional attachments must therefore be socially utilized as a counter-weight to personal selfishness. Adam Smith, for example, rejected the rationalistic view which would attempt to establish directly the primacy of the species over the nation:
We do not love our country merely as part of the great society of mankind-we love it for its own sake, and independently of any such consideration. That wisdom which contrived the system of human affections, as well as that of every other part of nature, seems to have judged that the interest of the great society of mankind would be best promoted by directing the principal attention of each individual to that particular portion of it which was most within the sphere both of his abilities and his understanding.68
As in his economic theories, so in his moral theories, Smith focused on individual behavior precisely as it conduces indirectly to social benefits-not simply because it benefits the individual. This indirection in both cases was due to Smith's conception of man as lacking either the knowledge or sufficient will to produce consistent social benefits directly. Hamilton likewise considered selfishness as an unchangeable part of human nature, so that wise social policy could, at best, "gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good."69
Those without this constrained vision of human nature equally logically proceed in the opposite way, by demanding an end of nationalism, and an assumption of "social responsibility," by both individuals and institutions toward one's fellow human beings, whether at home or overseas. The greater the capabilities of man, the smaller the process costs, and the more directly the social good can be pursued.
Freedom and Justice
The two visions judge social processes by fundamentally different criteria. In the unconstrained vision, where individual intentions and individual justice are central, it is enormously important whether individual rewards are merited or merely reflect privilege and luck. Both individual leaders and social policies ought to be chosen with a view to their dedication to the goal of ending privilege and promoting either equality or merit. But in the constrained vision, social processes are to be judged by their ability to extract the most social benefit from man's limited potentialities at the lowest cost. This means rewarding scarce and valuable abilities, which include abilities which may be mere windfall gains to the individuals possessing them, being in many cases either natural endowments or skills cultivated at prosperous parents' expense, but too costly for most people's means. Sometimes the scarce and valuable traits to be rewarded may include skills and orientations picked up almost by osmosis from being raised in families where they exist.
In the unconstrained vision, the social benefits of individual skills can be elicited without individually unmerited rewards- if not immediately, then in some better society to develop over time. From this perspective, continuing to pay vastly different rewards retards the development of such a society. But in the constrained vision of human nature, no such development is likely to become general, so that the injustice of paying unmerited rewards to individuals must be traded off against the injustice of depriving society of available benefits by not paying enough to provide incentives to their production and full utilization.
The two visions differ not merely in moral judgment but, more fundamentally, in their sense of social causation. In the constrained vision, the crucial characteristic of any social system is the set of incentives confronting the individuals in it. This includes not only the explicit rewards and penalties of the marketplace and the law, for example, but also the internal psychic rewards and punishments evolved by the culture and its values. Given an underlying human nature that is not fundamentally changing, these systemic characteristics largely determine individual endeavors.
These endeavors are not, however, directly realized. Systemic interactions are not simply- or even mainlythe fruition of individual plans. Adam Smith's businessman is not alone in producing results "which were no part of his intention." While social incentives are more important than individual intentions in the constrained vision, the specific characteristics of systemic interactions- the elaborate principles and channels of causation in a competitive economy, for example- are also essential to actual outcomes.
In short, the constrained vision takes human nature as given, and sees social outcomes as a function of (1) the incentives presented to individuals and (2) the conditions under which they interact in response to those incentives. These interactions- both conflicting and cooperative- are too complex to lead simply to an average of the intentions of agents. The results may in fact reflect no one's intentions, nor even an average of most people's intentions, even if it is the best result achievable with the disparate values and conflicting claims made on inherently insufficient resources. More thriftiness can lead to lower savings, for example, as a result of the circuitous effects of that thriftiness on aggregate demand, production, employment, investment, and income.70 Similarly, in the legal system, more rights for particular groups can make those groups worse off.71
Such unexpected results are not "failures" o
f a given system, in the constrained vision. As limitations on man and nature are inherent, so disappointments are inherent. In this vision, the question is not whether "problems" are "solved"- they will not be- but whether the best trade-offs available have been made.
In the unconstrained vision, human nature itself is a variable, and in fact the central variable to be changed. The fact that particular individuals or groups have already exceeded the mass in intellect, morality, or dedication to the social good demonstrates what is possible. The great obstacles to its achievement are the opposition of those benefiting from the existing social order and the inertia and blindness of others. If these obstacles to progress are to be overcome, it must be by the commitment, intelligence, and imagination of those who have grasped the possibilities open to society.
In contrast to the constrained vision, which seeks to analyze, prescribe, or judge only processes, the unconstrained vision seeks to analyze, prescribe, or judge results- income distribution, social mobility, and equal or unequal treatment by a variety of institutions, for example. Processes are often condemned because their actual results are deemed unsatisfactory, whatever their abstract merits as processes. For example, the illusory nature of freedom or equality to the poor has been a recurrent theme of the unconstrained vision for centuries. The classic expression of this view was that of Anatole France:
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.72
Sometimes the inequality of results from apparently even-handed processes is deemed to be deliberate hypocrisy; at other times, merely a wrong result from an inadequate process. In a similar vein, one is not "really" free, in the unconstrained vision, merely because the political process does not legally confine one's actions. If the actual means of achieving one's goals are lacking, then there is no freedom in result, even if there is freedom in the process. In short, the very definition of freedom differs between the two visions. Regardless of the absence of legal restraints, one is not free by the definition of the unconstrained vision, "if one cannot achieve his goals ...... 73 For example, "Choosers are not free in the market if high costs prohibit a choice that could be made available to them by sharing the commodity through collective choice."74 More generally:
One's freedom finally depends on attaining important prime goals such as dignity, respect, love, affection, solidarity, friendship. To the extent that individuals lack these, they cannot be free.75
This results-definition of freedom in the unconstrained vision is anathema to those with the constrained vision, in which freedom is defined in terms of process characteristics. Given the constrained vision of man's wisdom and morality, he cannot successfully prescribe results but can only initiate processes, whose consequences are often the direct opposite of his intentions. Moreover, even where certain results may be causally attainable, they are not morally or intellectually justified independently of the process which brought them about. Equality of results for those who have contributed to production, abstained from production, and hampered production is offensive to an equality of process, in the constrained vision. Justice is likewise a process characteristic in the constrained vision: If a foot race is conducted under fair conditions, then the result is just, whether that result is the same person winning again and again or a different winner each time. Results do not define justice in the constrained vision.
To those with the unconstrained vision, the best results should be sought directly. To those with the constrained vision, the best processes should be used and protected, because the attempt to produce the best results directly is beyond human capacity. The two visions' original differences in their assumptions about human nature dog their footsteps as they go from issue to issue.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The two visions differ fundamentally as to the sources of human survival and progress. According to the unconstrained vision, the patterned behavior of society is successful, just, and progressive insofar as it reflects the articulated rationality of man in general and of the most intellectually and morally advanced people in particular. Orderand especially a just and progressive order- is the result of design, backed by the commitment of people dedicated to the general welfare. In broad outline, this is the vision of "the age of reason," which began in eighteenth-century France and has spread throughout the Western world and beyond.
In the constrained vision, where man-individually and collectively- lacks both the intellectual and moral prerequisites for such deliberate, comprehensive planning, order evolves historically without design, and more effectively than when it is designed. Language is one example of such order without design, and its complexity, subtlety, and effectiveness exemplify the power of systemic processes which tap the experience of all, instead of relying on the special wisdom or nobility of any individual or council. A prominent element within this tradition has applied the constrained vision to economics- beginning with the Physiocrats (also in eighteenth-century France), whose battle cry- laissezfaire!- was given its fullest expression by Adam Smith and is exemplified today in the writings of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek.
Social processes in general are judged quite differently by the two visions. The unconstrained vision tends to judge processes by their results- "Is it right? Is it good?" in the words of Chief Justice Earl Warren. The constrained vision judges rightness and goodness as process characteristics rather than as results: A foot race is fair if it is run under the proper conditions-regardless of who wins or loses, or how often the same person wins. Justice, in the constrained vision, thus means adherence to agreed-upon rules, while in the unconstrained vision, something is just or unjust according to what end results occur.
According to Hobbes, "he that fulfilleth the Law, is Just."76 But to Godwin justice is "a result, flowing from the contemplation of each individual case."77 Results define justice for Godwin, because "whatever is not attended with any beneficial purpose, is not just."78 Clearly, social processes ultimately exist for, or are justified by, beneficial results-in both visions. The two visions differ in their respective estimates of man's ability to directly produce those benefits. The following of rules instead- whether laws, contracts, customs, or constitutions- is an inferior substitute justifiable (if at all) only by the lower process costs involved. Even if it can be demonstrated in a given case that the result achieved by direct, ad hoc decision-making is more efficient, moral, or otherwise desirable, those with the constrained vision will assess its process costs in terms of how this violation of rules deranges the expectations of many others and adversely changes their future conduct, as they lose confidence in the general reliability of existing rules and agreements, and future rules and agreements. Whether the ad hoc benefits outweigh the systemic losses depends upon the capability of mannot only in law, but in economics, politics, and other areas.
Freedom, as well as justice, is defined differently by the two visions for this same reason. In the constrained vision, freedom is a process characteristic- the absence of externally imposed impediments. Hobbes applied this concept of freedom both to man and to inanimate things: A man was not free if chained or restricted by prison walls, and water was not free if hemmed in by river banks or by the walls of a container. But where the lack of movement was due to internal causes- a man "fastened to his bed by sicknesse" or a stone that "lyeth still"- that was not considered by Hobbes to be a lack of freedom.79 The same concept of freedom continues to characterize the constrained vision today. Freedom to Hayek means "freedom from coercion, freedom from the arbitrary power of other men," but not release from the restrictions or compulsions of "circumstances."80
In the unconstrained vision, however, freedom is defined to include both the absence of direct, externally imposed impediments and of the circumstantial limitations which reduce the range of choice:
Only when he can support himself and his family, choose his job and make a living wage can an individual and his family
exercise real freedom. Otherwise he is a servant to survival without the means to do what he wants.81
As already noted, freedom may be so broadly defined in the unconstrained vision as to include not only economic prerequisites but also psychic benefits derivable only from emotional ties to others.82 John Dewey perhaps best summarized this viewpoint when he defined liberty as "the effective power to do specific things."83 With this definition, whether the limits on that effective power were internal or external, deliberate or circumstantial, did not matter.
These radically different conceptions of freedom reflect radically different conceptions of human capability. In the constrained vision, where man can at best initiate processes, the most that he can do for freedom through social processes is to establish widely known rules which limit how much power is granted to one individual over another, and limit the specific conditions under which the power-holder is authorized to exercise it. But in the unconstrained vision, where man is capable of both shaping and judging end results, there is a corresponding right and duty to ensure that those results maximize the scope of choice of individuals, that they remove impediments, whether deliberate or circumstantial. This may in some cases mean providing compensatory advantages to those whose social backgrounds would handicap them in competition with others, whether for deliberate or circumstantial reasons. But to those with the constrained vision, this is not only beyond the competence of any individual or council, but also an effort likely to derange the social processes to the general disadvantage and danger of society.
A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles Page 8
