19 Minutes to Live - Helicopter Combat in Vietnam

by Lew Jennings

  We continued to engage the enemy with ARA, airstrikes and Artillery whenever we could, when not endangering our own forces.

  The enemy was well entrenched and apparently being reinforced with fresh replacements from their sanctuaries just across the border in Laos. Many of the enemy dead had fresh uniforms, equipment and haircuts.

  The fighting was vicious and at the end of the day1/506th was forced to pull back, as intense enemy fires kept them from reaching their objective. The 3/187th had been continually attacked at their blocking position as well.

  The 3rd Brigade Commander, Colonel Conmy, decided that 1/506th was close enough to do a coordinated attack the following day. He felt they couldn’t let up the pressure to allow the NVA to send in fresh troops from Laos so ordered both Battalions to prepare for full on attacks in the morning.

  We had also received word late in the day that the 2nd Battalion, 1st ARVN Division just to the north of us near Tiger Mountain, had discovered enemy staging and supply areas. They had captured huge hauls of weapons, supplies and equipment including Russian-made trucks and bulldozers.

  Overall, American and ARVN forces were taking a heavy toll on the enemy. If only we could take Hill 937. Dong Ap Bia was its name on the map. Local Vietnamese tribesmen knew it as “The Mountain of the Crouching Beast”. Now it was becoming known by our soldiers and referred to by the press as “Hamburger Hill”.

  Thunder 44, Piloted by Eric Reardon lands the Commanding Officer of 3/187th Airborne Infantry Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Weldon Honeycutt, on Hamburger Hill.

  May 18 (Day 9)

  It was another max effort by our unit, Alpha Troop, 2/17th Air Cav, providing hunter-killer teams in support of the 3rd Brigade.

  Mike Talton, Assault 27 was partnered with “Uncle” Bob Larsen, Assault 14 in the Scout bird. Bob was a Hollywood-looking guy from Michigan with jet-black hair and an easy smile. For some unknown reason, I thought of him as family and got into the habit of calling him “Uncle Bob”, even on the radio. He and Talton were in the A Shau early, watching FAC Bilk 14 directing airstrikes on Hill 900, 916 and 937.

  Airstrikes were to continue until 0830 followed by Artillery registration (marking the targets) until 0900, CS gas Artillery until 0905, and regular Artillery bombardment until 0925.

  1/506th and 3/187th were to be in position to move out and begin attacking from the south and north precisely at 0926.

  But things weren’t going well, right from the start.

  The airstrikes were late and didn’t finish until 0914.

  The CS gas canisters weren’t fired by Artillery until 0940 then landed short, right in the middle of A Company, 3/187th location. Although not causing any casualties, the gas disrupted A Company’s preparation for the impending attack.

  “Hawkeye” General Jim Smith, the 101st ADC called off the CS gas bombardment himself and started the high-explosive Artillery prep at 1010 hours continuing until 1025.

  Honeycutt’s D and A Companies had donned their gas masks and assaulted the hill under cover by the Artillery. They had made it to within 200 meters of the hilltop when they started receiving heavy fire from their flank where 1/506th was supposed to be, but they had been slowed down and were still too far away, leaving that flank open.

  As the Artillery bombardment ended and D Company got within 100 meters of the hilltop, enemy fire became overwhelming with automatic weapons, Claymore mines, hand grenades and RPGs raining down on them and deadly sniper fire coming from the treetops. D Company was taking heavy casualties. At 1142 the Company Commander was hit and the 2nd Platoon Leader took over.

  Honeycutt’s A Company was also taking heavy casualties. C Company was busy hauling ammunition up the hill to D Company and taking the wounded back with them to the lower LZ, being guarded by the remaining elements of B Company.

  Bowers’ 1/506th Battalion was meeting heavy resistance on the other side of the hill as well and it was becoming increasingly difficult to bring in supporting fire from Artillery, TAC air, ARA and our own Gunships, as the enemy and friendly forces were battling within 20 meters of one another.

  Talton and Larsen’s team had been attacking the enemy whenever and whereever they could.

  Bilk 35 was also on station now trying to direct more bomb runs on the enemy locations while keeping our troops out of danger, which was becoming an impossible task.

  Once again, the unthinkable happened when a Gunship mistakenly attacked friendly solders of the Battalion, killing one soldier and injuring five more. Honeycutt, frustrated and furious, ordered all ARA Cobras to leave the area. He would direct any supporting fires himself.

  As if that wasn’t enough, one of our own became a casualty.

  “Uncle Bob” Larsen, Assault 14, was flying low and fast in his little bird trying to spot the enemy locations where the ground troops were receiving the most fire. He spotted them below the tall trees in their bunkers and spider holes and circled around to drop a white phosphorous grenade to mark their position. Enemy snipers took a bead on him and fired a shot right through the front Plexiglas bubble into his cockpit. The bullet hit his tail rotor pedal, went through his foot, hit the fire extinguisher under his seat which exploded, sending hot shards of shrapnel into his legs. Screaming in pain, he managed to set the helicopter on the ground in one piece near B Company. They were carrying their dead and wounded down the hill, however, stopped to help Bob and secure the helicopter. After being treated by combat medics, he flew the helicopter out and over to LZ Rendezvous where he was Medevaced.

  Geez, what more could go wrong?

  Mother Nature answered with a violent thunderstorm and torrential rain that brought the battle to a halt. With visibility in the driving rain down to a few meters and the ground turned to mud, friendly forces couldn’t make any headway. The Companies were ordered to pull back and recover their dead and wounded. Hamburger Hill would not be conquered on this day.

  General Zais, Commander of the 101st Division, now considered halting Apache Snow altogether, pulling out the troops and letting the Air Force take over to bombard the area. That would mean giving up the battle and letting the NVA achieve victory. He decided that was not an option and to continue the operation in earnest with the solid backing of General Stillwell and General Abrams.

  General Zais, his ADC General Smith, 3rd Brigade Commander Colonel Conmy and ARVN Division Commander General Truong planned for a four-Battalion coordinated attack in two days. That would be four times the number of troops attacking Hill 937 than back on Day 1.

  What Colonel Conmy didn’t reveal to Colonel Honeycutt was his decision to replace the beleaguered 3/187th with a fresh Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Gene Sherron’s 2/501st. He felt that Honeycutt and his soldiers, ever the warriors, had fought magnificently, however the Battalion was no longer an effective fighting force; 320 killed or wounded and two of its four Company Commanders now casualties, including eight of twelve Platoon Leaders.

  As the dead and wounded were being recovered and the troops consolidating at their defensive positions, the Division Commander, Lucky Eagle arrived at Honeycutt’s Command Post. He briefed the plans for the pending attack of four Battalions; 1/506th, 2/501st and two ARVN battalions.

  Honeycutt could not believe what he was hearing. After all the heroic efforts of his soldiers, they were to be left out of the final battle for Hamburger Hill.

  We don’t know exactly what was said between these two battle-seasoned soldiers however, we do know that Honeycutt forcefully made his case that his men had fought valiantly and should be allowed to continue the fight. He desperately wanted to be part of the action and emphasized to General Zais that he only needed one more Company for reinforcement to be combat ready again.

  General Zais relented and agreed to provide a Company from 2/501st to Honeycutt. Lieutenant Colonel Sherron coordinated the support to Honeycutt by providing his own A Company, 2/501st which was helicoptered into the lower LZ before nightfall.

  May 19 (Day 10)

&nb
sp; The two Battalions, 1/506th and 3/187th were back in their defensive positions on lower terrain to the south and north of the three-hill ridge. The dead and wounded had been recovered and evacuated. The soldiers were being fed and resupplied. Preparations were underway for the next assault.

  With the troops pulled back from the higher ground, we were free to attack at will with airstrikes, Artillery, ARA and our own Gunships. We spent the entire day cycling back and forth to rearm and refuel and hit the enemy locations again and again. Thousands of bombs, Artillery rounds, ARA and our own rockets, grenades and gunfire had pounded the enemy locations all day and into the night.

  Nearly all of us from A Troop were out there raising mayhem today!

  I was out there with Eddy Joiner as my Scout team member.

  Lenny Constantine, Assault 24 was out there with Tom Michel, Assault 12.

  Bruce McNeel, Assault 25 was flying a Cobra with Dick Dato in the front seat and Mike Ryan, Assault 18, flying the little Scout bird.

  Mike Talton, Assault 27 was out there again. I think he had Don McGurk as his front seat and Roger Barnard, Assault 17 flying Scout for him.

  Keith Finley was out there again too, flying front seat for Don McGillicuddy, Assault 29, and their Loach.

  Our first order of business that morning had been to evacuate Uncle Bob. His wounds had been attended to by B Company combat medics and, although still severely wounded, managed to fly the Scout bird out himself. He landed at a nearby firebase and was Medevaced by Eagle Dustoff to 18th Surgical at Camp Evans. He was later flown out for treatment and surgery in Japan. We wouldn’t see him again for months.

  The 2/501st Battalion was combat assaulted into a landing zone to the north west of Hill 937. They met little resistance and conducted a reconnaissance in force to their attack positions.

  General Truong’s 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment was helicoptered into Firebase Currahee by CH-47 Chinooks and then conducted a combat assault by Hueys into their attack positions to the south east.

  According to the official after-action report of the 101st Division, this is how the ground forces were organized for battle the night of 19 May:

  The 2/501st to the northeast still had a mile of rough uphill terrain to cover before reaching the top of Hill 937.

  The ARVN Battalions, a kilometer to the southeast had an easier approach with lighter resistance.

  The 1/506th was to the southwest and facing steep terrain and heavy resistance.

  The 3/187th to the northwest was closest to Hill 937 and facing the enemy’s heaviest defenses.

  Huge expanses of Hill 937 were now laid bare by the incessant bombing and with all units in position, H-hour was set for 1000 hours the following morning.

  May 20 (Day 11)

  We were up and at ‘em before dawn and on our way to the A Shau for the big day.

  Honeycutt’s Battalion already had their stand-to at 0530 and a Fireball to boot.

  FAC Speedy 11, a twin engine 0-2 Cessna Skymaster, was on station directing multiple airstrikes with high explosive bombs and napalm canisters.

  Ed Bobilya, Assault 21, who had been my mentor down south with C Troop, 7/1st Air Cav was first on station with Roger Barnard flying the little bird. They were reconning just to the west and at 0640 were already reporting enemy activity to the ground units.

  The rest of us set up our rotations so we could provide continuous cover and support throughout the area as the ground units prepared for H-hour.

  Newsmen started arriving at Honeycutt’s Command Post location at 0830.

  Massive Artillery barrages started at 0906 as we and the Air Force FAC pulled back off station to watch the show.

  Promptly at 1000 hours the Artillery barrage ceased and all four Battalions started attacking towards Hamburger Hill.

  3/187th, for the first time, was meeting light resistance and by 1020 were just 125 meters from reaching the crest. As they reached the top of the hill though, the enemy was waiting for them and opened up with automatic weapons, machine guns, RPGs and hand grenades. The fighting intensified all around them over the next hour with the enemy also firing 60mm mortars from distant areas.

  Honeycutt ordered that his soldiers keep their fires low as 2/3 ARVN forces were coming up to the hilltop from the opposite direction. He also ordered our Pink teams to find and engage the enemy’s attacking mortars on the distant ridgelines.

  2/3 ARVN coming from the opposite direction were also starting to meet with heavier enemy resistance as they neared the hilltop. Honeycutt had requested they keep marking their most forward positions with purple smoke to keep the friendly forces on either side and in front of them apprised of their location, to preclude friendly fire incidents. He had also requested the same with yellow smoke from the most forward elements of 1/506th.

  We were all over the place trying to identify and engage bad guys, while protecting our own Ground Forces and keeping the Ground Commanders informed as best we could regarding the constantly changing situation. And while the enemy was inflicting casualties on our friendly forces, especially 1/506th fighting near hills 900 and 916 towards hill 937, all were making headway.

  The first elements to reach the top of the mountain were Honeycutt’s C Company, 3/187th although they were still receiving heavy close-in fire from surrounding enemy fire positions. The fighting continued as the rest of the Battalion consolidated their efforts behind C Company and more ammo was being brought forward. Thunder 44, Honeycutt’s Loach zoomed in and kicked out loads of ammo right over the troops in another courageous act, for which he was noted.

  Fighting continued throughout the day with us providing close air support and our crews displaying exceptional expertise and courage. One act in particular bears repeating.

  Lenny Constantine, Assault 24 in his Cobra saw friendly lead elements at the edge of the hilltop hesitating to proceed any further or recover their wounded for fear they would be exposed to more enemy fire from a machine gun emplacement above them.

  They didn’t realize that Lenny had just busted a bunker wide open with close-in rocket fire, killing the guys manning the machine gun. In an act of enormous courage, he hovered down in front of the bunker, landed, and had his front seat train the Gatling gun and grenade launcher on the smoking ruins to show the grunts they were safe, while he opened his canopy and waved them forward. They recovered their wounded and seized the high ground as Lenny waved once again and took off to find and attack more enemy locations.

  The battle was a great success by military standards. It was estimated the enemy had lost well over a thousand soldiers and many more were wounded. One captured prisoner admitted his unit had been decimated with 80 percent casualties.

  The official after-action report stated: “This multi-Battalion combined operation was a classic campaign which found the enemy, fixed his location, and methodically and devastatingly destroyed him in place. The effect of this was to destroy the combat effectiveness of not only the Maneuver Battalions of the 29th NVA Regiment, but also its Central Headquarters.”

  The 101st Division Summary further stated, “Through intense close-in fighting the 101st Airborne troopers contributed another gallant victory to the Vietnamese War effort by almost completely eliminating one North Vietnamese Regiment and putting the (A Shau) Valley under Free World control for the first time since 1965.”

  Official enemy losses were reported as 1,038 killed. Friendly losses were 109 killed and 673 wounded. We had won the battle, however, unbeknownst to us, in the eye of public opinion, we had lost the war.

  On May 19, Associated Press reporter Jay Sharbutt had filed a story of Operation Apache Snow and the battle for Hill 937 calling it a “meat grinder” and questioned why soldiers had to attack the same hill so many times instead of the Air Force just bombing it. Sharbutt’s story was carried by newspapers throughout the USA.

  Sharbutt followed that up with another story of the capture of “Hamburger Hill” and the agonizing 11 assaults by Lieutenant Colonel Honeycu
tt and soldiers of the 1/387th, which prompted Senator Kennedy to denounce the battle as “senseless and irresponsible….madness.”

  Life Magazine in their June 27, 1969 issue published photos of 241 US servicemen who had been killed during a week in Vietnam. An accompanying article described the premonitions some had before their deaths including one written by a soldier on Hamburger Hill: “You may not be able to read this. I am writing in a hurry. I see death coming up the hill.”

  While only five out of the 241 pictured had been killed on Hamburger Hill, many Americans believed all those featured had died in that battle.

  By then Hamburger Hill had been abandoned and was already being reoccupied by the NVA. The American public was outraged. President Nixon informed General Abrams he didn’t want to see any more battles like that one. And, unbeknownst to us doing the fighting, the objective of the war apparently was not to win, it was to appease.

  President Nixon convinced South Vietnam’s President Thieu that they needed to take over the war effort calling it “Vietnamization” and announced the first US troop withdrawals from the war effort. Secret peace talks got underway while we continued the fight in the A Shau and elsewhere throughout Vietnam.

  I didn’t know about any of that and I probably wouldn’t have cared.

  Whether it was Iron Raven, Hawkeye, Blackjack or many others who called for support, we in the Air Cav were always there to answer the call.

  They didn’t care if the person answering the call was 19 or 90 years old, Warrant Officer or Colonel. They needed a cool, calm professional answering their call for help. And if they called us, they knew within seconds that they had the right guy:

  A guy who would help them find their way when they were lost and disoriented in ten-foot tall elephant grass.

  A guy who would help them define their fields of fire to provide overlapping cover for their night defensive positions.

  A guy who would adjust artillery on target when they couldn’t see more than a few feet.