By the end of June, only two months after Beresford arrived at the Channel Fleet, his relations with the Admiralty were strained to the point of breaking. Tweedmouth suggested a personal talk to avoid further “improper”46 and “provocative” letters. On July 5, Lord Charles sat down at the Admiralty with the First Lord and the First Sea Lord. Unfortunately for Beresford, a transcript was kept. It shows the Commander-in-Chief uncertain as to what he wanted, unable to explain his views and—in Fisher’s presence—cowed and anxious to please. Fisher began by talking about numbers of ships:
SIR JOHN FISHER: “We simply want to know what you are driving at, because we seem to give you everything you require, and then, as I hardly like to use the word ‘compromise,’ or anything like that, because it is not a word that the Admiralty should use to anyone, we say, ‘Shall you be satisfied if we do with you as we did with Sir Arthur Wilson?’ which is the point you seem to be going on making. There cannot be any doubt about the battleships of the Channel Fleet being far superior to the German Fleet. Shall you be satisfied if we make your armoured cruisers up to six, the same as Sir Arthur Wilson had, and give you the whole of the two divisions of destroyers at Portland under Admiral Montgomerie, all to come under you? We think the present arrangement better. You say you would like these vessels permanently, so as to bring your squadron up to what you say were Admiral Wilson’s component parts. We do not agree, but we say, ‘This is our chief executive officer afloat; we do not agree, but we will give him the armoured cruisers, the destroyer flotillas, and the attendant vessels, as he presses for them.’”
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: “I cannot see the thing straight off. I will write to you.”
SIR JOHN FISHER: “You must have thought about it. You have been writing about it for months.”
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: “I am not sure that I have not asked for more cruisers than that in my plan.”
FIRST LORD: “I do not think the Board will agree to more than I have told you.”
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: “I see. It’s a fair offer on the part of the Admiralty to meet me, and it shows you see the danger I see.”
SIR JOHN FISHER: “We think it is very undesirable for the Admiralty to remain in a state of tension with you, and the First Lord said (I think with great propriety), ‘Let us have a talk with Lord Charles and see if we can arrange matters in this way and finish off the business without further irritating correspondence.’ Do not let us have any more letters about it. It was hoped you would say, ‘After meeting round this table this morning I can quite see that the Board of Admiralty are anxious to meet me in every way they can, as it is also my duty to meet the Board of Admiralty in every way I can; we have fixed up the matter and here is an end of it.’”
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: “I never come to a conclusion myself with anything without I think. On principle, being a public man, I never say a thing straight off. Have those ships you are going to give me nucleus crews?”
SIR JOHN FISHER: “No, they are fully manned. They are complete, the destroyers are at Portland, and they will remain at Portland under you. Simply as regards the cruisers, what we shall do is to knock two cruisers off the 5th Cruiser Squadron, and turn them over to you.”
LORD CHARLES BERESFORD: “That gives me the force I am halloing for. You may depend on it, the cordiality between us exists. There is no want of cordiality on my part.”
Tweedmouth47 then picked up this point, asking Beresford: “Why do you not try to cultivate good and cordial relations with the Admiralty?” and why he persisted in saying that “the Home Fleet is a fraud and danger to the Empire.”
BERESFORD: “You will allow me to smile for at least ten minutes over [the question about cordial relations]. Although my views are very drastic, there is not any question of want of cordial relations with the Admiralty. Not privately or publicly have I ever said anything against the Admiralty...”
TWEEDMOUTH: “If you say, in a letter to me, as First Lord, that our Home Fleet ‘is a fraud and a danger to the Empire,’ that is not very pleasant to the Admiralty, and you have repeated that again and again.... I must tell you that to tell the First Lord of the Admiralty that what is a very important part of his Board’s policy is absolutely useless and is a fraud and a danger to the Empire, I do not think that is very friendly to the Admiralty.”
BERESFORD: “It is a private letter. We have all written much stronger things than that on important questions of that sort.... It was only a ‘term.’ If we went to war suddenly you would find it is true. If I had said officially that the Admiralty had created that, or if I had pitched into the Admiralty about it, it would be different.... That I had any notion of insubordination I absolutely deny. That letter of mine to the First Lord has no right to go before the Board, a private letter like that...”
TWEEDMOUTH: “It is not marked private. Other letters have been marked private.”
BERESFORD: “...I ought to have put ‘private’ and ‘confidential’ on it.”
TWEEDMOUTH: “I cannot look on that as simply a private communication to me. I think that is a very important letter.”
FISHER: “I am quite sure you understand we are all equally interested, as you are, in having friendly and cordial relations, but it is absolutely impossible if the Chief Executive Officer of the Admiralty afloat is going to be ‘crabbing’ the Admiralty in everything the Admiralty is doing, and writing such letters to the First Lord....”
TWEEDMOUTH: “I think so serious a charge against the Home Fleet ought to be substantiated; you ought to say how it is a fraud, and how it is a danger to the State.”
BERESFORD: “It is a ‘term.’ I can write it all out to you in detail. The public think it is ready for instant action. What is your own term?—Without an hour’s delay: well, it is not.”
Before the interview was over, Lord Charles made another placatory statement, seeming to defer to the First Lord and the First Sea Lord: “I do not dictate to the Board of Admiralty. The Board has the right—it is the constituted authority, and so long as it is the constituted authority, it is responsible and no one else. It may do wrong things, but it is the responsible authority.”
Beresford got part of what he wanted—two additional armored cruisers and twenty-four destroyers were added to the Channel Fleet—and he declared himself satisfied: “I can now make out48 a plan of campaign on definite lines,” he wrote on July 18. In fact, a War Plan from the Channel Fleet arrived at the Admiralty only eleven months later.
Long before that, matters had grown worse. In November 1907, Beresford complained to the Admiralty about the forthcoming transfer of three officers under his command. “It has come to my notice49 that a feeling has arisen in the Service that it is prejudicial to an officer’s career to be personally connected with me on Service matters,” he wrote. “This may not be a fact, but the impression I know exists. It is certainly borne out by the late procedure.... The removal of three such important officers from my command at or about the same time will add enormously to my already exceptionally hard work.... It may not have been intended, but it most certainly has the appearance of a wish to handicap and hamper me in carrying out the responsibilities with by far the most important appointment within the Empire.” Patiently, the Admiralty rebutted these charges. Captain Frederick Sturdee, Beresford’s chief of staff, was being transferred to command a battleship, a necessity for promotion; Beresford himself had been urging this promotion. Explaining this and the other cases to Lord Charles, the Admiralty noted that “you continue to employ language50 which had no parallel within their experience as coming from a subordinate addressed to the Board of Admiralty.”
As relations continued to deteriorate, incidents involving Beresford began to multiply. Most famous was the ludicrous “Paint Work Affair,” also in November 1907, which coupled Lord Charles with Rear Admiral Sir Percy Scott.
Scott, the foremost gunnery expert in the Royal Navy, was a self-made man of no private means whose lifelong obsession was hitting the target
with naval gunfire. “Like most specialists51 who propound innovations,” declared a contemporary newspaper biography, “he has aroused bitter hostility alike to his schemes and himself personally.” He was entirely Fisher’s kind of naval officer and Fisher had always supported him. Initially, although their professional paths had never crossed, Beresford also endorsed Scott’s crusade, and in 1903 had declared that “I would rather go into action52 with 6 ships trained on Captain Scott’s principle than with 12 trained on any other.” Scott’s defect, from Beresford’s point of view, was that he was Fisher’s man. And when Scott was posted by the Admiralty to command the First Cruiser Division of the Channel Fleet, Lord Charles saw the assignment as another of Fisher’s attempts to place a spy in his nest.
In the presence of the Commander-in-Chief, the movements of all ships of the Channel Fleet were dictated by Beresford. But when the First Cruiser Division was operating independently, Scott was in command. On November 2, Scott’s cruisers had concluded maneuvers with the fleet in Scottish waters and been detached to return independently at high speed to Portland; Beresford and the battleships would follow later. By Monday, the fourth, Scott’s flagship, Good Hope, already was anchored inside the breakwater at Portland but one of his ships, Roxburgh, remained outside, practicing the independent gunnery exercises which Scott had enthusiastically encouraged. At some point during the morning, a message arrived from Beresford directing that all ships of his fleet terminate exercises at sea and come into harbor in time to clean and paint ship by the eighth, on which day they would be inspected and reviewed by the German Emperor. Scott was eating lunch on board Good Hope when he was handed a signal from Roxburgh’s captain, asking permission to remain outside the harbor a little longer to finish a round of gunnery exercises. Scott was sympathetic, but, bowing to Beresford’s command, ordered the cruiser to come in immediately. His signal, intended to be read solely by Roxburgh, had an irritated, sarcastic tone: “Paintwork appears53 to be more in demand than gunnery so you had better come in in time to make yourself look pretty by the 8th.” A few hours later, Beresford’s big ships appeared and entered the harbor, and Roxburgh followed them in.
For four days, nothing happened.fn1 Then an officer on Beresford’s staff visiting Good Hope heard about Scott’s signal and reported it to Lord Charles. Beresford erupted in rage. He summoned Scott aboard King Edward VII, where, in the presence of two other admirals and members of his staff, he bathed the diminutive Scott in a torrent of abuse. Scott opened his mouth to reply, but was silenced by another deluge of wrath. Finally, leaving Scott in no doubt that he was to be court-martialed and replaced, the Commander-in-Chief turned on his heel and walked away. White-faced and silent, Scott returned to Good Hope. A few minutes later, Beresford hoisted a general signal to all ships in his fleet. Repeating Scott’s offending signal to Roxburgh, Beresford declared that “this signal,54 made by the Rear Admiral commanding the First Cruiser Squadron, is contemptuous in tone and insubordinate in character.” Publicly, the Commander-in-Chief ordered Scott’s signal expunged from the signal logs of Good Hope and Roxburgh. Not satisfied with this public humiliation of his subordinate, Lord Charles then sat down and wrote to the Admiralty demanding Scott’s head. Scott’s signal, he complained, was “totally opposed to loyalty55 and discipline... pitiably vulgar, contemptuous in tone, insubordinate in character, and wanting in dignity.... It is impossible that the matter rest where it is.... I submit that Rear Admiral Sir Percy Scott be superceded from command of the First Cruiser Squadron.”
The Admiralty did not approve. Their Lordships replied that they did not approve of Scott’s signal, concurred in the Commander-in-Chief’s reprimand, to which they would add their own “grave disapprobation,”56 but did not wish either to remove the Rear Admiral or make any public announcement. Unmollified, Beresford complained that as Scott’s “act of insubordination57 to my command was of a public character,” his censure by the Admiralty should be public. The Admiralty declined. When Scott returned to King Edward VII, he began to say, “I should like to take58 the opportunity of apologizing to you for the incident—” He got no further. Red-faced, Beresford roared that he would accept no private apology for the public insult he had received. He ordered Scott off his flagship and commanded him not to speak to him in the future; all communications between them were to be in writing or by signal between ships. Scott thereafter was ostracized from all of Beresford’s social functions and, as much as possible, the First Cruiser Squadron was banished to regions distant from the Channel Fleet.
The press had a field day with the story. Conservative papers unanimously favored Beresford and demanded that Scott be stripped of his command. The Liberal press and many of the popular papers thought it odd that an admiral famous for trying to overthrow his superiors at the Admiralty should be protesting so loudly that one of his own subordinates was guilty of disloyalty. The Service journals, which recognized Scott’s value to the navy, deplored both Scott’s signal and Beresford’s overreaction.
Not surprisingly, Lord Charles detected Fisher’s hand in most of what had happened: Scott’s impudence in sending the original signal was the kind of insubordination to himself which Fisher encouraged; the Admiralty’s subsequent refusal to honor his request and rid him of Scott stemmed solely from Scott’s presence in the Fishpond. To his friend and fellow Irishman, Sir Edward Carson, Beresford wrote grimly: “There is no doubt”59 that the “determined, audacious, treacherous, and cowardly attacks on me” had been “inspired by the gentleman from Ceylon.”
By the beginning of 1908, the Fisher-Beresford vendetta had escalated into open civil war. Mere mention of Beresford’s name could drive Fisher into a rage; every officer in the Commander-in-Chief’s camp had become “a traitor.”60 Captain Edmund Slade, the Director of Naval Intelligence, kept a worried eye on the First Sea Lord. “Sir J[ohn] is in a most nervous state61 as regards Lord C[harles] and what he may do,” Slade wrote in his diary on January 7. “He is so bitter62 against Lord C. that anything he does or says is wrong,” Slade added on April 11. “Sir J. is not well63 and looks very old and worn today,” was the entry on April 24. Beresford also was not well and spent part of this period in bed at Claridge’s Hotel in London. Here Slade called on him, hoping somehow to mend relations between the two admirals. In the sitting room, he encountered Beresford’s wife, Lady Charles, whom Fisher already had dubbed “a poisonous woman.”64 Slade soon realized, more from talking to Lady Charles than to Beresford himself, that no closing of the breach was possible. “As long as they are65 in their respective positions, they will fight each other,” he noted gloomily. One reason was Lady Charles: “She is a terrible looking woman,”66 Slade wrote, “very stout, very much got up, rouged apparently, with fair hair and a sort of turban which she apparently always wears.” Having suffered substantial social disfavor in her life, she was determined that her husband would rise to the top of his profession and that no middle-class officer born in Ceylon would bar his path. According to Slade, whenever Lord Charles began to drift towards a resolution of his differences with Fisher, “the influence of Lady C.”67 would be employed to steer him back to hostility.
For a while, it seemed that Beresford might win. Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal Foreign Secretary, who believed in Fisher, sadly told the First Sea Lord that it had been represented to him “that Beresford had the whole Navy.”68 Lord Charles’ friends in the navy, in society, and in Parliament pressed hard for the inquiry into Admiralty policy for which they had been asking since 1906. Fisher adamantly refused and told the Cabinet in an Admiralty memorandum on January 25 that “the Admiralty fear no inquiry;69 but it would be simply impossible for the Members of the Board to retain office if such a blow to the authority of the Admiralty as the investigation of its fighting policy by its subordinates were to be sanctioned.” Campbell-Bannerman did not want the Sea Lords to resign en masse, and one of his last acts as Prime Minister was to promise Fisher in writing that no form of inquiry would be held. Asquith, succ
eeding to the Premiership on April 7, confirmed this pledge.
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