William began by saying that, although they were there to discuss naval questions, it was clear that an agreement would benefit both nations and the world. Haldane declared again that for England, the fundamental issue was German shipbuilding. Before any political agreement could be reached, he said, a serious modification of the German building program had to occur; any general political agreement would be “bones without flesh”58 if the Reich increased its shipbuilding and forced Great Britain to follow at a rate of two keels to one; the British public “would laugh at the agreement59 and... think we had been befooled.” Tirpitz proposed a fixed 3:2 relationship of fleets (three British battleships for every two German battleships), declaring that Britain’s insistence on a Two Power Standard was “hard”60 for Germany. Politely, Haldane declined, reminding him that England, as an island state, had to be equal at sea to any possible combination of enemies.
Tirpitz pointed out that the 1912 Novelle already had been modified: originally he had planned to ask for three new ships a year and had reduced the program to a third ship every other year. These ships, he declared, were essential to creation of the third battle squadron, necessary for the defense of the Empire. “Admiral Tirpitz is a strong and difficult man61—a typical Prussian—and he and I fought stiffly,” Haldane reported later. “There was perfect politeness but neither of us would move from his position. Under pressure from the Emperor, I got a substantial concession.”
The Kaiser, according to Haldane, was “so disturbed”62 by the impasse and so eager for some agreement to come from the meeting that he applied Bethmann’s tactic of the previous day and asked Haldane what he would suggest. Haldane repeated: “Can we not spread out the tempo?,”63 putting off the first of the extra dreadnoughts from 1912 to 1913, and adding the other two in 1916 and 1919 rather than in 1914 and 1916. To this plan, the Kaiser and Tirpitz eventually agreed; this delay presumably was the “substantial concession” which Haldane later claimed. Even so, Haldane pointed out to the two Germans, no matter when the extra ships were laid down, Britain would lay two new keels for every German keel. The initiative for speeding up or slowing down thus lay with Germany. About five P.M., after almost three hours, the talk came to an end and the Kaiser asked Tirpitz to drive Haldane back to the Hotel Bristol. Once his guest had left, the Emperor sat down and wrote a cheerful note to Ballin: “The third squadron will be asked for64 and voted, but the building of the three additional units required to complete it will not be started until 1913 and one ship each will be demanded in 1916 and 1919 respectively. Haldane agreed to this and expressed satisfaction. I have made no end of concessions.... He [Haldane] was very nice and reasonable. Please remember me to Cassel.”
Haldane’s day was far from over. He left the Bristol for No. 76 Wilhelmstrasse to call on State Secretary Kiderlen, who had been thoroughly ignored. Haldane spoke to Kiderlen only generally, “for I had the strong impression65 that the Chancellor did not want him to have a part in the conversation.” Subsequently, Haldane went to the Chancellor’s house to dine with Bethmann, Kiderlen, and General Paul von Hindenburg. After dinner, the Chancellor took Haldane aside. Bethmann seemed depressed and said that he had heard “that I was disappointed66 at the slightness of the slackening in the German building program. I could see that this great, simple man was feeling that his difficulties with his own people were very great.” Perhaps, had the Chancellor known, or had Haldane told him then, that the Briton considered the concessions granted by Tirpitz and the Emperor to be “substantial,” it might have eased Bethmann’s sense of worry. Haldane did not tell him.
Before he slept that night, the British War Minister had one more appointment to keep. At ten P.M. he met the French Ambassador, Jules Cambon, at the British Embassy to brief him on the two days of discussions. Cambon was nervous; the most Germanophile Minister in the British Cabinet was negotiating outside normal diplomatic channels with the three highest figures in the Imperial government. Haldane reassured him: “I said emphatically67 that we were not going to be disloyal to France or Russia and that the Chancellor understood and agreed.” Cambon produced a diplomatic phrasing to describe Haldane’s effort: the Minister was trying to create “a détente, rather than an entente.”68
The following day, Saturday, Haldane heard again, this time from Baron von Stumm of the Foreign Office, that the Chancellor, whom the War Minister was meeting later in the day, was “depressed”69 by the thought that Haldane believed that no agreement could be made because of the limited German shipbuilding concessions. “The Chancellor,”70 Stumm confided, “was not going to let this agreement—which was the dream of his life—founder because of Tirpitz.” Stumm suggested that Bethmann’s chances of getting the Emperor to eliminate ships would be much improved if Haldane “took a very strong line to the effect that there must be further naval concessions.”
When Haldane met the Chancellor at five P.M., he expressed his doubt that the British Cabinet would be satisfied with a mere spreading out of the new building program. Bethmann declared that the German public expected the third squadron and he must produce it, but that as to the number of new ships and the timing he would do his best. He reiterated his hope that German naval concessions could be linked to a neutrality agreement. Haldane repeated that any political agreement would depend on a shipbuilding agreement. The two men spoke in the friendliest manner. “We sat down at a table71 with pencils and paper and went on a voyage of discovery,” Haldane said later. “At the end... he rose72 and took me by the hand and held it and said that the moment of his life that he had longed for seemed to have come. If we failed, it would be Destiny. But we had, he knew, done all that two men could.” “Whether success or failure73 crowned the effort... he would never forget that I had met him with an openness and sympathy for his difficulties.” “I got back to the hotel74 at eight... pretty well tired out.”
Whatever increased demands Haldane—prompted by Stumm—may have made of the Chancellor in their final meeting, and whatever promises Bethmann may have made to “do his best,” there was general agreement that Germany had offered to spread out the building of the new ships to one every third year. When Haldane left Berlin, the Emperor believed that he returned to London satisfied that the German proposal represented a “substantial concession.” Bethmann declared, “A promising beginning75 has been made. It was good to have a chance to speak openly to a member of the British Cabinet.”
The War Minister returned to London on Monday, February 12, and attended a meeting of the Cabinet that afternoon. Haldane made his report. The Emperor, he told the Ministers, “had been delightful to me.76... I am sure he wants peace most genuinely, but he has Germany to deal with.” Haldane had no doubt that the Chancellor, too, was sincere in his desire to improve relations. The problem, he said, was that Britons tended to overestimate the power of both the Emperor and the Chancellor. “My impression was77 that the really decisive influence was that of Admiral von Tirpitz. He has the strongest following throughout Germany.” Given Tirpitz’ strength and that of the nationalist parties in Germany, Haldane reported, the new Navy Law would be insisted upon. There was even a possibility, he said, that Tirpitz would replace Bethmann as Chancellor. The Cabinet’s first reaction was satisfaction and congratulation of Haldane on his conduct of a difficult mission. Grey told Metternich that he was pleased, and a few days later Asquith told the House of Commons that the talks had been “helpful.”
This harmony was soon to be broken. Before he left Berlin,78 Haldane later wrote, “the Emperor... handed me with friendly frankness an advance copy of the new [Navy] Bill with permission to show it to my colleagues.” The bill was an immensely elaborate technical document and Haldane, lacking expertise, did not read it. Instead, “I put it in my pocket and handed it to the First Lord” at the afternoon Cabinet meeting on the twelfth. At the Admiralty, Churchill and his staff subjected the document to intensive scrutiny, and at the next meeting of the Cabinet, on February 14, Churchill made his report. The new German Navy B
ill was much more wide-ranging and threatening than anyone in Britain had imagined. The creation of the third battle squadron and the building of three additional dreadnoughts—the issue on which Haldane had been negotiating—were not what worried the Admiralty. Their concern was focussed, rather, on a vast increase in the number of new destroyers and submarines and, most worrisome of all, a 20 percent increase in active-duty naval personnel, which would make possible “an extraordinary increase79 in the striking force of ships of all classes immediately available through the year.” Fifteen thousand new officers and men, instead of the three thousand to four thousand first estimated, would join the High Seas Fleet. Seventy-two new submarines were to be built; full crews would be provided for 99 of 144 destroyers. With this new manpower, the German Fleet, which had been in large part demobilized in harbor during the winter months, would now be kept at war strength throughout the year. Previously, the Admiralty had calculated that it might have to face seventeen German battleships and four battle cruisers. To meet this threat, the Royal Navy maintained sixteen battleships in home waters, another six in the Atlantic Fleet at Gibraltar three or four steaming days away, and still another six in the Mediterranean Fleet, usually at Malta, nine fast steaming days away. The margin had seemed safe. Now, if the new Navy Bill was enacted, England would face twenty-five battleships, eight battle cruisers, large destroyer flotillas, and packs of submarines, ready year-round to strike. The initial cost of meeting this challenge would be £3 million additional a year, Churchill estimated; the total for six years would be at least £18 million.
The following week, on the twenty-second, Grey and a chastened Haldane met Metternich. The War Minister explained that in Berlin he had understood the strong feeling about the need for a third squadron, but that the increased-personnel plans and the intention to build large numbers of smaller ships had not been mentioned. The Cabinet’s feeling, the Ambassador was told, was that German increases would mean bringing more British ships back to home waters, building new ships at ever greater British naval expenditure, and the consequent impossibility of working out any political agreement. Colonial agreements, such as the proposed cession of Zanzibar back to Germany, were clearly out of the question. Metternich, who had been briefed by the Wilhelmstrasse about the Haldane talks, replied that the German government had made substantial concessions regarding the dates of building the three new dreadnoughts and that increases in other ships and naval personnel were outside the scope of current Anglo-German negotiations. Grey said that they would have to be included. “In other words,” Metternich observed, “the Cabinet does not agree to the arrangements made by Haldane.” “You are quite right,”80 responded Grey.
When Metternich informed Berlin that the British Cabinet was disavowing the terms offered by Haldane, the Kaiser was outraged. Later, he and others in the German government insisted that the War Minister had come representing the Cabinet, armed with full powers, and that his suggestions had been firm offers. Haldane denied this, declaring that he had stated repeatedly in Berlin that his was an exploratory mission with no binding powers and that any tentative agreement he took back to London would be subject to Cabinet examination and approval. To the Kaiser’s charge of English bad faith in belatedly objecting to increases in personnel, submarines, and destroyers, Haldane replied that he had not known about them; he had not read the text of the Novelle; no one had until he returned to London. Now, quite properly, the Cabinet was reacting to complete knowledge, not the partial information presented to Haldane in Berlin. Bethmann, who understood that Haldane had been an explorer and who already had half expected that the concessions proposed to Haldane would not be enough, was less surprised and less indignant. Tirpitz was not surprised. Convinced from the beginning that the Haldane mission was a trap, intended to block or at least slow down the German building program, he recommended immediate publication of the new Navy Bill and its submission to the Reichstag. “The quicker we publish81 the Novelle, the more we limit the possibility of the English making greater demands on us.”
On March 1, Haldane saw Metternich again and repeated his earlier warning that Britain would lay two keels for each additional German capital ship. And, to meet the immediate threat posed by the increases in German naval personnel and fleet readiness, the Admiralty was considering bringing battleships home from the Mediterranean. This news, reported in Berlin, sent the Kaiser into a paroxysm of rage. Without consulting the Chancellor as he was constitutionally required to do, William telegraphed Metternich to warn the British that “I shall consider any transfer82 of the Mediterranean Squadron into the North Sea as a cause for war.” Germany would mobilize and—he added as a practical afterthought—the concessions made to Haldane on the shipbuilding tempo would be withdrawn. When Bethmann heard about William’s outburst, he wrote a letter of resignation. Not only was the Emperor ignoring the Chancellor’s constitutional right to conduct foreign policy and instruct ambassadors, he was abetting Tirpitz’ effort to thwart the entire purpose of his policy: agreement with England. William, caught between two ministers pursuing contradictory policies, had to give ground. Because William did not want Bethmann to go, he gave in temporarily to the Chancellor. Swallowing his anger, he postponed the publication of the Navy Bill and authorized continued negotiations with England.
Bethmann withdrew his resignation and used the reprieve to launch his own diplomatic offensive in London. The Chancellor’s goal was to obtain a guarantee of British neutrality should Germany become involved in war. If this could be achieved, he was certain that the Kaiser and even Admiral Tirpitz would pay a price in ships. The Navy Bill, now suspended, could be further modified; the third ship in the new Law, the dreadnought to be built in 1919, might be postponed indefinitely; there might be reductions in the increase in personnel: all this was possible if the British government could propose an acceptable neutrality agreement. The Minister chosen to receive this offer was, again, Haldane. Metternich came to see him on March 12, at Queen Anne’s Gate, and that night the War Minister wrote to his mother, “I believe our prayers have been answered83 and that the good Chancellor has got the better of Tirpitz and his admirals. It appears that after all my mission, which seemed to have been wrecked by a German torpedo, will have the results on which we had set our hopes.” Haldane reported the German approach in a memorandum to the Cabinet:
“[Metternich] had a communication from the Chancellor.84... He gathered from Berlin that if the British Government would offer a suitable political formula, the proposed Fleet Law as it stood would be withdrawn. Some Fleet Law there must be, but one of less magnitude would be introduced.... The reduction... would be considerable... he thought it extended to personnel. He wanted to say that time pressed, as a statement would have to be made almost at once in the Reichstag... and the Chancellor wished to be provided with the offer of a formula from us as a reason for not proceeding with his original proposals. I asked whether the formula need go beyond the disclaimer of aggressive intentions and combinations. He indicated that he thought it need not.... I said I would see Sir Edward Grey at once.”
Grey wrote the formula with Haldane sitting beside him. On March 14, it was approved by the Cabinet and handed to Count Metternich for transmission to Berlin. The statement read:
“England will make85 no unprovoked attack upon Germany and will pursue no aggressive policy towards her.
“Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.”
When Metternich read the formula, he was worried. He wrote to Grey the same day that unless the word “neutrality” appeared in the draft, he was afraid it would be rejected in Berlin. He suggested adding the sentence “England will therefore observe86 a benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany.” This sentence, with its dire implications for France, Russia, and the future of the Entente, Grey refused to supply. Bethmann read the Engli
sh formula with dismay, knowing that the English promise “didn’t go half far enough”;87 it could not possibly stand up against the weight of Admiral Tirpitz and the navy party. Metternich was instructed to tell the English that unless there was a guarantee of absolute, unconditional neutrality on Britain’s part, the Navy Bill would go before the Reichstag in its original form. On March 16, Metternich received two telegrams from Berlin, asking in the most urgent terms for a reply from the British government. In passing this request along to Grey, the Ambassador mentioned that one reason for the need for haste was the possibility of “a change of personnel88 in Berlin.” “Personnel” meant Bethmann; Grey was being informed that, if no agreement was reached, the Chancellor’s resignation was likely. Aware of Bethmann’s goodwill and anxious to help him retain power, Grey told Metternich that “as long as he [Bethmann] remained89 Chancellor, he might rely upon our cooperation with him to preserve the peace of Europe.... If this was likely to be of use in personal questions now pending in Berlin, Count Metternich might certainly report it.” Metternich transmitted the Foreign Secretary’s remark that Bethmann’s personality was regarded in England as the single best guarantee of peace. The Kaiser read Metteraich’s dispatch. Once again, the old fury at English patronizing erupted in William. “I have never in my life90 heard of an agreement being concluded with reference to one definite statesman and independently of the reigning sovereign,” he stormed. “It is clear that Grey has no idea who is master here, namely myself. He dictates to me in advance who is to be my Minister if I am to conclude an agreement with England.”
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