by Harry Yeide
Tank Killers
Harry Yeide
The Tank Killers is the story of the American Tank Destroyer Force in North Africa, Italy, and the European Theater during World War II. The tank destroyer (TD) was a bold—if some would say flawed—answer to the challenge posed by the seemingly unstoppable German blitzkrieg. The TD was conceived to be light and fast enough to outmaneuver panzer forces and go where tanks could not. At the same time, the TD would wield the firepower needed to kill any German tank on the battlefield. Indeed, American doctrine stipulated that TDs would fight tanks, while American tanks would concentrate on achieving and exploiting breakthroughs of enemy lines.
The Tank Killers follows the men who fought in the TDs from the formation of the force in 1941 through the victory over the Third Reich in 1945. It is a story of American flexibility and pragmatism in military affairs. Tankdestroyers were among the very first units to land in North Africa in 1942. Their first vehicles were ad hoc affairs: Halftracks and weapons carriers with guns no better than those on tanks and thin armor affording the crews considerably less protection. Almost immediately, the crews realized that their doctrine was incomplete. They began adapting to circumstances, along with their partners in the infantry and armored divisions. By the time that North Africa was in Allied hands, the TD had become a valued tank fighter, assault gun, and artillery piece. The reconnaissance teams in TD battalions, meanwhile, had established a record for daring operations that they would continue for the rest of the war.
The story continues with the invasion of Italy and finally that of Fortress Europe on 6 June 1944. By now, the brass had decreed that half the force would convert to towed guns, a decision that dogged the affected crews through the end of the war. The TD men encountered increasingly lethal enemies, ever more dangerous panzers that were often vulnerable only to their guns while American tank crews watched in frustration as their rounds bounced harmlessly off the thick German armor. They fought under incredibly diverse conditions that demanded constant modification of tactics. Their equipment became ever more deadly. By VE day, the tank destroyer battalions had achieved impressive records, generally with kill/loss rates heavily in their favor. Yet the Army after the war concluded that the concept of a separate TD arm was so fundamentally flawed that not a single battalion existed after November 1946.
The Tank Killers draws heavily on the records of the tank destroyer battalions and the units with which they fought. Veterans of the force add their personal stories.
Harry Yeide
THE TANK KILLERS
A History of America’s World War II Tank Destroyer Force
To those who fought
An M3 on maneuvers in 1942. A larger gun shield was added in response to combat reports from the Philippines. NA
Preface
Yoke (Company B commander) to Yoke 10 (probable platoon commander): “What is your situation now and did you get anything?”
Yoke to Sugar 6 (battalion headquarters): “They have approximately five enemy vehicles knocked out. Situation is pretty good….”
Sugar 6 to Yoke: “Did we get them?”
Yoke to Sugar 6: “The can-openers got some and we got some…. Five Mark IVs, two by our cans [and] three by TDs.”
— Tactical radio logs of the 743d Tank Battalion, 15 January 1945
It was tanks that led me to tank destroyers (TDs). While researching Steel Victory, The Heroic Story of America’s Independent Tank Battalions at War in Europe (Presidio Press, 2003), I frequently encountered this other presence: A doctrinal division between the tank and tank destroyer forces that left tankers poorly equipped to deal with heavy German panzers, references to tank destroyers in radio logs and after-action reports (AARs), a photograph of an M4 and an M10 fighting side by side in the streets of Aachen. Then a friend and colleague handed me a copy of Dr. Christopher R. Gabel’s short work on tank destroyer doctrine, part of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College’s Leavenworth Papers series. I was hooked.
The tank destroyer was a bold—if some would say flawed—answer to the new challenge posed by the seemingly unstoppable blitzkrieg. The tank killers were in on the fighting from the start in both American theaters, from the losing battle against Japan in the Philippines and the Allied landings in North Africa. The history of the TD battalions is woven into that of the American fighting formations in World War II. This work examines their battle against Hitler’s Germany, for it was the struggle against the panzers that determined the destiny of the Tank Destroyer Force. Other battalions fought in the Pacific under conditions bearing no relationship to those anticipated in tank destroyer doctrine.
The reader who would like to take a deeper dive into the experience of a tank destroyer outfit has but a few options. The Center for Northern Appalachian Studies of Saint Vincent College markets two fascinating oral histories of the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Men of the 704th and Reluctant Valor. Calvin C. Boykin’s history of the 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Gare La Bête (C&R Publications, 1995), and Harry Dunnagan’s story of Company B, 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion, A War to Win (Royall Dutton Books, 1992), were also still commercially available as of this writing. A few other battalion histories, such as Tom Sherman’s account of the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Seek, Strike, and Destroy, have been printed by small outlets in limited runs and are difficult to find. Many histories published by the battalions themselves at the end of the war are now only to be found buried in archives and perhaps a few libraries. Lonnie Gill’s Tank Destroyer Forces, WWII (Turner Publishing Company, 1992), published with the cooperation of the Tank Destroyer Association, pulls together a large number of stories and anecdotes from TD battalion veterans.
This account is intended to give the reader both a broad history of the Tank Destroyer Force and a representative look into the world of the men who fought in the TD battalions. It becomes increasingly selective as the story progresses from Oran to VE Day because of the rapidly expanding size of the conflict. Elements of only two tank destroyer battalions participated in the start of the North Africa campaign in November 1942. There were sixty-one in action in the European and Mediterranean theaters on 8 May 1945. I have selected material from each period that illustrates the experiences of the TD men in general or important unique events.
The selection of material also results in part from the quality of available records. This is the victory or revenge of the unheralded personnel who wrote the AARs and kept the operations journals during the war. Battalions that had good scribes are over-represented in this account. Peter Kopscak, former CO of the 602d Tank Destroyer Battalion, lamented in the outfit’s informal history, penned by Bertrand J. Oliver in 1990, “If I had to do it over again, I would put a top individual to be the battalion historian, who would contact each unit daily and record all actions in detail. Too many entries in our battalion history simply state that the battalion command post moved from here to there…. Details of our primary battles were omitted.”
I have taken some small liberties with texts drawn from the military records to correct grammatical errors and spelling mistakes, and to introduce some consistency in references to unit designators, equipment, dates, and numbers.
Harry Yeide
February 2004
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my wife Nancy, who is first in my book and makes me better in every endeavor, including this one. Mil gracias, danke schön, and hvala lepo to my editor, Eric Hammel, who has taught me a thing or two about the craft. I am indebted to the assistance offered by many tank destroyer veterans, including Bill Harper and Randolph Mojsl of the 601st; John Pilon of the 609th; Noble Midkiff, Arthur Edson, and John Hudson of the 701st; Edward McClelland of the 773d; and William Zierdt and John Spence of the 805th. I am p
articularly indebted to John Hudson and Calvin C. Boykin Jr. (814th Tank Destroyer Battalion), who reviewed the manuscript and offered many helpful observations. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Reardon, U.S. Army, provided helpful material and comments. This work would not be as good if it were not for their contributions. All remaining errors are mine.
I am grateful to Calvin C. Boykin Jr. and Thomas Sherman (636th Tank Destroyer Battalion), who granted permission for the use of material drawn from their battalion histories. I would also like to thank the cheerful and efficient public servants at the National Archives and Records Administration’s document, microfilm, still photo, and moving image reading rooms in College Park, Maryland. The taxpayer is getting a good deal.
Chapter 1
Seek, Strike, and Destroy
The TD’s motto, “Seek, Strike, Destroy,” won out in a close race with the laconic slogan, “Guns and Guts.”
— “The Tank Killers,” Fortune, November 1942.
The U.S. Army’s Tank Destroyer Force in World War II must rate as one of the most successful “failures” in American military history. The tank killers contributed immensely to the success of American arms under conditions ranging from North African desert to the Italian mountains to north European forests and cities. They performed a remarkably diverse range of jobs, with elements of the tank destroyer battalions fulfilling the roles of antitank weapons, assault guns, artillery, cavalry, and infantry. They often served at the very pointy end of the spear. Yet the Army at the end of the war judged the concept of a distinct Tank Destroyer Force to be so flawed that not a single tank destroyer battalion existed after November 1946. The Tank Destroyer Force existed one month short of five years.
Starved of resources by an isolationist and tight-fisted Congress, the U.S. Army had allowed its tank force to fade into irrelevance after World War I, and most serious thinking about fighting against tanks faded with it. The Germans were brewing blitzkrieg while the U.S. Army dozed. In 1936, the Army’s Command and General Staff School finally published—for instructional purposes—a manual entitled Antitank Defense (Tentative), which anticipated the establishment of antitank companies in the infantry regiments and an antitank battalion at the divisional level. In 1937, the 2d Infantry Division conducted field tests that resulted in a recommendation that all infantry divisions be reorganized into a triangular—or three-regiment—configuration and establish an eight-gun antitank company in each regiment.1 Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair was the chief of staff of the 2d Infantry Division and had been keenly interested in antitank defense for several years.2 He was to have more influence than any other American officer over the evolution of the tank destroyer concept, as well as the way in which the infantry interacted with armor and antitank forces in general.
By 1939, an updated version of the U.S. Army’s manual, now entitled Antimechanized Defense (Tentative), advocated an antitank defense in depth, with divisional antitank battalions that were to be both motorized and supplied with a reconnaissance element so that they could mass quickly against armored thrusts. Yet while thinking was beginning to respond to the demands of the looming modern battlefield, the Army’s organization and equipment were not. When the Germans overran Poland in 1939, the Army had neither antitank units nor an antitank gun in production. In 1940, a copy of the German 37mm antitank gun—already nearing obsolescence—was hurriedly produced.3 McNair recognized this deficiency and in June 1940 told the War Department General Staff that the greatest problem confronting it was to find a way to stop armored divisions, and that a flat-trajectory gun heavier than either the 37mm or 75mm guns in use would be necessary for that purpose.4
Stunned by the Wehrmacht’s romps through Poland and France, Congress found the money, and the Army recreated an Armored Force on 10 July 1940.5 Induction of the National Guard and Reserves followed, along with implementation of a peacetime draft. The rapid German victories, meanwhile, raised fundamental questions about the soundness of a tank defense based primarily on antitank guns, which the highly respected French Army had tried without success. The fact that most American field artillery officers charged with antitank defense had never even seen a tank in action did not help matters.6 Nor did the fact that antiaircraft artillery regiments had not yet practiced antitank fire.7
McNair, for one, kept the faith. In July 1940, he argued in a memo: “When the armored vehicle faces the antitank gun, the combat is essentially a fire action between a moving gun platform in plain view and a small, carefully concealed, stationary gun platform. The struggle is analogous to that between ships and shore guns, and there is no question that the shore guns are superior—so much so that ships do not accept such a contest…. If the gun outmatches the tank, then not only is the gun superior to the tank in antitank defense, but employing armored units against other armored units positively should be avoided whenever possible. The gun, supported properly by foot troops, should defeat hostile armored units by fire and free the friendly armored units for action against objectives which are vulnerable to them.”8
McNair’s arguments were to shape the Tank Destroyer and Armored Forces in fundamental ways. The U.S. Army was to enter the war believing that tanks should not fight tanks, and it selected its equipment on the basis of that doctrinal assumption.
In August 1940, McNair rejected passive antitank defense and first proposed the establishment of mobile antitank groups of three battalions each that would be able to rush to confront a mechanized attack. The next month, the War Department issued a training circular that directed that units concentrate their antitank guns in a mobile reserve and deploy a minimum in fixed initial positions.9 In April 1941, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall ordered his operations chief (G-3) to consider the creation of “highly mobile antitank-antiaircraft units as Corps and Army troops for use in meeting mechanized units.” These elements would be in addition to organic antitank weapons.10
The Army, meanwhile, had become mired in a debate over who should manage antitank matters—the infantry or the field artillery (the newly created quasi-branch of armor was uninterested and was being told it should not fight tanks in any event)—and how. The Army authorized antitank companies to the infantry divisions in autumn of 1940. Nonetheless, the next spring McNair—by now the chief of staff at General Headquarters (GHQ)—was moved to complain, “It is beyond belief that so little could be done on the [antitank] question, in view of all that is happening abroad.” He accused the Army of apathy.11
Marshall, in May 1941, moved to cut the Gordian knot; he ordered his G-3 to take charge of antitank development. The G-3, on Marshall’s instructions, immediately established a Planning Branch under LtCol Andrew D. Bruce. This staff, which was to form the core of the tank destroyer brain trust, reaffirmed the need for divisional antitank battalions.
The Army finally ordered the establishment of those units on 24 June—two days after Hitler’s panzer spearheads rolled into the Soviet Union! The first battalions were a heterogeneous lot, but they typically consisted of three to five batteries withdrawn from the field artillery and equipped with 75mm, 37mm, or simulated guns.12 As of the end that month, only a handful of antitank battalions existed: the 93d at Fort Meade, Maryland; the 94th at Fort Benning, Georgia; the 99th at Fort Lewis, Washington; and battalions 101 through 105, which had been inducted into Federal service during the mobilization of the National Guard in January and February of 1941.13
Also in June, GHQ launched the first of a series of large-scale maneuvers. In the first corps-versus-corps wargames, held in Tennessee, MajGen George Patton Jr. deployed his 2d Armored Division in highly successful cavalry-style slashing maneuver. The units opposing him, however, had virtually no antitank capability.14 Indeed, after 10 July, when the 28th Infantry Division Antitank Battalion (provisional) was formed, the men exercised using 3/4-ton weapons carriers as prime movers, with towed “guns” made out of miscellaneous pieces of pipe, wood, and other materials.15 And thousands of miles away in the real war, German antiaircra
ft and other artillery on the Egyptian-Libyan frontier that same month played a major role in the destruction of more than two hundred British tanks, which caught the attention of the War Department intelligence chief (G-2).16
The next round of maneuvers would be different. On 8 August, and in line with his proposal of one year earlier, McNair ordered Third Army to organize three regiment-sized provisional antitank groups. Each consisted of three antitank battalions (armed with 37mm and 75mm guns), a scout car reconnaissance platoon, three engineer platoons, and three rifle platoons. The groups were to be attached at the field-army level and were trained to execute an “offensive role,” including vigorous reconnaissance, preemptive contact with enemy armor, and destruction of enemy tanks with massed gunfire.17 This rough mix of components and doctrinal orientation would soon provide the foundation for the separate tank destroyer battalions.
The debates were not over, but the die was cast. McNair continued to champion a dramatic expansion of the antitank program.18 On 18 August, the War Department released a detailed memorandum calling for the formation of two hundred twenty antitank battalions, fifty-five of which were to be organic to the divisions, fifty-five pooled at the corps and army levels, and one hundred ten allocated as GHQ assets. McNair praised the boldness of the proposal but withheld his concurrence because he objected to the War Department’s plans to subordinate the antitank units to the Armored Force; to disperse some antitank battalions among divisions, corps, and armies; and to create two hundred twenty battalions, a number he judged excessive. McNair eventually had his way on almost every point.19
