by Harry Yeide
After surviving this unusually rigorous training regimen, the TD men tended to think of themselves as an elite force.
* * *
There were teething problems, of course. Before the training centers were established, units trained where and as they could. The 667th, 803d, and 899th Tank Destroyer battalions initially pooled their resources and in March 1942 established a joint training center at Fort Lewis, Washington.59 The 628th may have set a record for training on simulated guns—eleven months!—before having an opportunity to fire some borrowed 75mm guns in November 1942.60
Some of the first battalions received sparse instruction before they had to embark for operations in North Africa. The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, for example, was able to conduct its first real range firing with its 75mm SP gear at Fort Dix, New Jersey, on 15 May 1942. The battalion shipped out for the United Kingdom only fifteen days later to prepare for Operation Torch.61 Other battalions received only seven to eight weeks of training before boarding the transports.62
Thomas Sherman was one of more than two hundred mostly Nebraska men who reported to Camp Bowie, Texas, in February 1942 to join the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion. They arrived without having received any basic training. The new soldiers received a compressed course from battalion noncommissioned officers (NCOs) but quickly shifted to training on 37mm guns, small arms, and vehicles. Sherman recalled that he never got very good at close-order drill and was always out of step. He would nonetheless become a recon sergeant within a few short months.63
Even at the new training center, the force at first suffered from a severe shortage of ammunition for the main guns. Crews had to practice with sub-caliber firing using .22-cal rifles bolted to the big guns. The round had a similar trajectory to that of the big guns, but differences in the muzzle velocities caused crews some confusion as they tried to learn how to lead a moving target.64
Another problem revolved around TD battalion opportunities to train with other units. AGF took steps to organize joint training involving divisions and units that would be attached to divisions in late 1943 and early 1944, but the practice did not become well established until many tank destroyer outfits had already shipped out.65
Chapter 2
North Africa: Seeing the Elephant
The lessons learned from combat by American troops in North Africa have been manifold, and it has been repeatedly shown that maneuver mistakes in the past have become the Battlefield mistakes of the present.
— U.S. Army observer’s report, January 1943
On 2 and 3 October 1942, Companies B and C, the 2d Reconnaissance Platoon, and part of the medical detachment pulled out of the scattered encampments of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion in Northern Ireland.1 They had been in the United Kingdom since early June, training with the American 1st Armored Division and, for several days, the British 61st Infantry Division. One battalion gunner—Corporal Stema, who had no idea that he would soon be killed in action—had even fired an impressive demonstration for the King and Queen.
The departing men knew they were headed somewhere via Macclesfield, England, but no more than that. Captain Gilbert Ellmann led a party of sixty-five enlisted men onto a train. Lieutenant Robert Whitsit and other platoon leaders commanded columns of halftracks and wheeled vehicles, which wound through the countryside following British motorcycle guides who were unfamiliar with the route. “Thus,” recorded the Company B diary, “did [we] move from the Emerald Isle to new adventures.”
The 701st elements were attached to Combat Command B (CCB), 1st Armored Division. The command incorporated the 13th Armored Regiment (less 3d Battalion’s medium tanks); 1st Battalion (light), 1st Armored Regiment; 1st and 2d battalions, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment; 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment; 27th Armored Field Artillery Regiment; and an assortment of engineer, antiaircraft, signal, and maintenance units. The diversity reflected the sound theoretical grasp that the all but untried U.S. Army had of the requirements of combined-arms warfare. How that would work in practice remained to be seen.
During a brief stay at an English country estate, the men of the 701st waterproofed their vehicles and learned of the complexities of loading men and equipment onto ships. Only two halftracks from the 2d Reconnaissance Platoon had gone missing during the transfer, never to be seen again. It was clear to the tank destroyer men that the Americans and British had never before worked together on a project such as this, and many confusing and conflicting orders ensued. On the other hand, the men viewed the landscape and the women—in fact, just about everything but the British rations—as distinct improvements over Northern Ireland.
On 9 October, a last-minute payday was imposed on the 701st, with—as the unit diary records—“the inevitable aftermath.” The next day, the first elements—minus several men AWOL—traveled to Weymess Bay, Scotland, and Liverpool to board transport ships. A day later, the remainder embarked, including the missing men, who had been rounded up. The only major foul-up resulted in the assignment of all of the drivers from 2d Platoon, Company B, to the wrong transport; they would not rejoin the platoon until after it had already been committed to battle.
The troops were destined to spend twenty-five days aboard the HMS Misoa, HMS Derbyshire, and SS Batery with several thousand other American and British soldiers. The vessels formed part of a convoy that loitered off the Scottish coast for the first two weeks. Evacuation and landing drills filled the long days, the latter involving clambering down the ship’s side on ladders to the waterline in full gear, and back up again. Company C participated in landing exercises, but Company B did not. The men in “Baker,” however, somehow obtained from shore a violin, a guitar, and a ukulele, with which they were able to provide entertainment to themselves and those around them. Finally, on 26 October, the convoy of about sixty ships departed.
On the nearby SS Latita, Capt Michael Paulick commanded Reconnaissance Company of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion. His company had separated from the battalion at Tidworth Barracks, an old British cavalry facility that also hosted elements of the 1st Infantry Division, to join the assault force as an asset of II Corps.2 The remainder of the outfit was scheduled to follow in several weeks.
On 2 November, the men learned their fate: Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. Commanders received their first battle orders and sheaves of maps and aerial photographs. Morale was high.
The convoy passed the blacked-out mass of Gibraltar at about 2100 hours on 6 November.3 Unbeknownst to the men, LtGen Dwight Eisenhower, overall commander of the Allied invasion force, was inside a tunnel beneath the Rock. Further on, towns glimmered on the shores of Spain to port and Spanish Morocco to starboard—the first lighted towns the men had seen since leaving the United States five months earlier. Before dawn on 8 November, the darkness was broken by the flashes of naval gunfire off Oran, Algeria. The transports dropped anchor off St. Leu.
“At that time,” recorded the 701st’s Company B diary, “we were ready for combat.”
* * *
Perhaps.
Captain G. V. Nicholls, a British tank officer and combat veteran who visited the 2d Armored Division before Torch, noted a supreme overconfidence among American troops of all ranks—an observation that he probably could have offered regarding the men of the 601st and 701st Tank Destroyer battalions, as well. The Americans, he recorded, believed that continuous maneuvers had made them ready for active service and that their individual training was up to British and German standards. “In this opinion they were entirely wrong,” he concluded.4
Indeed, American confidence was high. The old warhorse Lesley McNair was one of the few to sound a cautious note. Responding after the Carolina maneuvers to the oft-asked question from reporters as to the battle readiness of the troops, McNair said, “It is my judgment that, given complete equipment, they certainly could fight effectively. But it is to be added with emphasis that the losses would be unduly heavy, and the results of action against an adversary such as the Ge
rmans might not be all that could be desired.”5
Fortunately, the first foe was not German.
* * *
Combat Command B, 1st Armored Division, formed part of Center Task Force, which had as its objective the capture of Oran and important nearby airfields. Second Corps, under the command of MajGen Lloyd Fredendall, controlled the ground element of the task force, which also included the 1st Infantry Division and parts of the 34th Infantry Division. This force was all that could be brought to bear from bases in the United Kingdom because of shipping constraints. Further east, an American-British task force landed at Algiers, while to the west, MajGen George Patton Jr. commanded American troops coming ashore in Morocco.6 The Allied objective was to push 350 miles and more eastward after the landings to seize Tunisia, thereby threatening Generalfeldmarshall Erwin Rommel’s rear and providing air bases from which to establish air superiority over the central Mediterranean. Some elements would remain behind in Morocco to encourage Spain to remain neutral, which was crucial to protecting Allied supply lines.
The Vichy French colonial forces defending Algeria and Morocco had some 125,000 men—including fourteen poorly equipped but trained and professionally led divisions—and five hundred combat aircraft at their disposal. French mechanized cavalry units in Algeria fielded 110 obsolete tanks and 60 armored cars.7 Eisenhower believed that these forces were sufficient to thwart the invasion if they offered more than token resistance, and he oversaw a clandestine diplomatic effort to ensure that this did not transpire. The outcome of that bid remained uncertain as of D-day, however, and seven weeks before the invasion Eisenhower informed Washington that “the chances of effecting initial landings are better than even”—hardly an assertion of confidence!8
Few of the American troops probably had any idea that they were embarking on an operation that senior American commanders had opposed. Chief of Staff George Marshall had objected that an invasion of North Africa would delay the planned landings in France. The British, however, were keen on the idea, in part to ease pressure on their forces in Libya and Egypt, which were suffering a drubbing at the hands of the Desert Fox, Erwin Rommel, and his Afrika Korps. President Roosevelt came down on the side of the British to ensure that American ground forces would engage Germany before the end of 1942 and meet his commitment to Josef Stalin to open a second front. In the event, British LtGen Bernard Montgomery launched his famous offensive at El Alamein on 23 October, two weeks before the Allied landings.
Operation Torch was a hurriedly organized affair. American and British political and military leaders did not reach agreement to pursue the project until late July 1942, and substantial differences between the Allies over where the landings should occur continued through August. Eisenhower was named overall commander on 26 July, leaving him a mere three months to pull together the until-then largest amphibious operation in American history.9 Torch required a complete reorientation for staffs that had been working on the plans for landings in France. Improvisation was the imperative as they scrambled to train troops and supply the necessary sea-lift capacity amidst heavy shipping losses to German U-boats.10 The tools of later amphibious operations, such as Landing Ships, Tanks (LSTs), were not yet at hand. Amphibious training for the naval and ground forces was inadequate, a fact recognized by commanders but deemed an acceptable risk.
* * *
Oran is situated in the middle of three bays that form a large bight between Cape Falcon on the west and Pointe de l’Aiguille to the east. Arzew, a secondary port, lies 20 miles farther east on the shore of a hilly and wide promontory. Hill masses behind the shoreline offered defenders advantageous terrain and channeled movement. The French defenses boasted forty-five fortified coastal guns at Oran and another six at Arzew. The Oran Division had nearly 17,000 men to defend the approaches to the city.11
The invasion plan called for simultaneous landings at three major beaches—labeled Beaches X, Y, and Z—and one minor beach. One armored task force, designated Green and including the men of Company C, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, would land at Mersa bou Zedjar. A second, designated Red and including Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, would land near Arzew, where the reconnaissance troops of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion would also come ashore. “Flying columns” from the assault force were to push inland in a double-envelopment maneuver and initially seize airfields and approaches to Oran while other units captured shore batteries. Airborne troops flying all the way from England were to drop at two crucial airstrips, La Sénia and Tafaraoui, and link up with armored columns advancing from the beaches. The French Army airfield at La Sénia lay about six miles south-southeast of Oran, while the Navy airfield at Tafaraoui was located twelve miles southeast of the city.12
* * *
The landings around Oran began as scheduled between 0100 and 0130 hours on 8 November and achieved complete surprise.13 The 1st Infantry Division cleared the way for Combat Command B to begin landing its men and tanks from Maracaibo transport ships (converted tankers).14 The Maracaibos required seven feet of draft, so pontoon bridges were constructed—a task requiring three hours—over which vehicles drove to shore. This was hardly a viable solution for any future assault landing under fire.15
Lieutenant Robert Whitsit and his 3d Platoon, Company B, 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Lt John Eggleton’s 2d Platoon from Company C disembarked at about 0600 hours in their respective landing areas. The remainder of both companies would unload at a frustratingly slow pace—one vehicle at a time ferried in landing craft—over the next two days. As corps assets began landing, Capt Michael Paulick and his recon men from the 601st clambered down rope nets from the deck of the SS Latita to small assault boats waiting below. Inexperienced and confronted with the slap-dash arrangement, many of them became entangled in the nets.16 Nevertheless, they were soon ashore.
The tankers of the 1st Armored Division de-waterproofed their vehicles. West of Oran, Task Force Green—built around one armored and one armored-infantry battalion from Combat Command B— deployed a small task force dubbed a flying column to spearhead the advance. The column set off from Merza bou Zedjar for Misshergin about 0900 hours.17 Lieutenant Eggleton’s tank destroyers took the point, an order completely at odds with tank destroyer doctrine. Racing down the highway between Oran and Sidi bel Abbes, the Americans came under fire from emplaced French 75mm guns. Sergeant Mitchell’s M3 crewmen replied with their own—a copy of the very guns firing on them—and destroyed two of the French weapons. The tank destroyer force’s first engagement had been a success but had nothing to do with fighting tanks. Doctrine was taking a beating, and it was not even noon yet.
On the other side of Oran, Task Force Red—built around two CCB armored and one armored-infantry battalions—advanced to Tafaraoui Airfield. Lieutenant Colonel John Waters, a son-in-law of Patton, commanded a second flying column that consisted of the platoon from the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, two light tank companies, and one company of armored infantry. As in Task Force Green, Lieutenant Whitsit’s M3 tank destroyers were put at the point.
About 1100 hours, the flying column reached the airfield. The arriving troops found no sign of the paratroopers from the 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment who were supposed to have landed there. The American forces quickly overcame light resistance and took three hundred prisoners.18
The missing airborne unit, it transpired, had been thoroughly dispersed during the long flight from England, and several of the aircraft had set down in a dry lake bed near Oran. American tanks found the paratroopers, and Waters requested by radio that they relieve his command so that he could pursue the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Edson Raff, commanding the airborne expedition, agreed. At 1400 hours the paratroopers and American-piloted Spitfire fighter aircraft that were to operate out of Tafaraoui were ordered to the airfield. As the C-47s carrying the paratroopers approached some fifteen miles from the landing strip, French fighters and bombers struck the American aircraft and the flying column. A 500-pound bomb demolis
hed one of Lieutenant Whitsit’s M3s, wounding three enlisted men. The C-47s were forced down, and the airborne had to walk the rest of the way to Tafaraoui.19
Shortly before sundown, Whitsit’s platoon engaged with long-range fire a mixed French battery of seven guns that had been shooting into the area of the airfield from the northeast. The French guns fell silent.
* * *
French aircraft and artillery again struck Tafaraoui the morning of 9 November. After Spitfires had driven off the enemy aircraft, Lt Whitsit’s platoon accompanied a company of light tanks southward to deal with a French tank concentration reportedly in the vicinity of St. Barbe du Tlelat. The American force engaged the French at a range in excess of two thousand yards. As the TDs laid down a base of fire, the American light tanks advanced in two V’s abreast, followed by a third V five hundred yards behind. The Americans destroyed fourteen Renault AMC35 light tanks armed with 47mm gun. Two were officially credited to the guns of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Waters later attributed all of the kills to the TDs, while one of the now bona fide tank killers suggested that an honest guess would be six. Waters commented, “It was a shame to shoot at these French tanks as we could almost see the shells go right through their thin armor. It gave our men lots of confidence.”20
