by Harry Yeide
The men of Company C were shocked and demoralized, and it would take Redding four days to restore his command to even minimal mission readiness. As there were no replacement vehicles, Redding set his men to exhausting work to build as many functioning tank destroyers as possible out of the wrecks. When they were finished, all but one of the M6s and one of the M3s would move under their own power (although one more M3 eventually gave up the ghost).49
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While the tank destroyers were refitting, the Anglo-American advance ground to a halt following several sharp engagements. On 28 November, Captain Redding was ordered to rejoin British forces. As the company drove down the Beja–Medjez el Bab highway, enemy planes appeared in the sky. The now airwise soldiers quickly dispersed, a tactic, they had learned, that usually convinced a pilot that a strafing run was not worth the risk of being shot down.50
On 1 December, Company C was ordered to join CCB’s 6th Armored Infantry Regiment at Tebourba. The Allies were preparing another attempt to break through to Tunis, with local operations scheduled to begin at noon the next day. The TDs played virtually no direct role in the ensuing action, during which the tanks and armored doughs were badly mauled by the Germans. Inexperienced American tankers charged German antitank gun defenses and paid a steep price.
During two days of fighting, Redding’s 75mm TDs performed several indirect fire missions as artillery, the first such use of tank destroyers in combat. (The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion had used most of its guns as artillery during an exercise in August 1942, so the idea had been in circulation for some time even though it was not part of TD doctrine.51) Redding noted, “Although little good was accomplished because of unsuitable sighting equipment, we added in a highly satisfactory fashion to the general din of battle.”52
The Allies gave ground, and by 10 December they had established a defensive line back at Medjez el Bab.
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Company C was alerted the morning of 10 December while it was protecting the tank harbor of the 1/13th Armored Regiment in an olive grove near the Medjez–Tunis road. The company had been conducting daily reconnaissance missions in cooperation with the armored unit. Teams normally consisted of a two-gun TD section, a tank platoon of five M3 light tanks, a self-propelled mortar section with one halftrack-mounted 81mm mortar, and a detachment from the armored battalion reconnaissance section, probably equipped with jeeps and halftracks. The Germans patrolled the same area with similar equipment, and sharp clashes were frequent.
By now, the men had learned to meticulously camouflage their vehicles and to erase any tracks left by their passage. All movement into or out of positions took place after dark. These were the only ways available to defend effectively against the Luftwaffe.53
Reports indicated that a German armored column of fifty-five mixed vehicles was approaching. Indeed, the Germans had about thirty medium tanks and two of the massive new Mark VI Tigers in the column. A French battery brought the Germans to a halt only two miles short of Medjez el Bab. Rain had been pouring down for three days, and the panzers became temporarily bogged when they tried to maneuver around the guns. The 701st tank destroyers and Company A of the 13th Armored Regiment deployed to strike at the German flank. The light tanks of Company A also became mired, however, leaving the TDs on their own.54
Tanks to Destroy, and Guns to Do It
The German Wehrmacht fielded two medium tanks in large numbers in North Africa, the Panzerkampfwagen III and IV. American troops invariably referred to them as the Mark III and Mark IV. The Mark III carried a 37mm or 50mm main gun and was protected by 30mm (a bit more than one inch) of steel armor. The Mark IV was fitted with a range of guns from the 50mm to the long-barreled 75mm. The latter type was initially known in Allied ranks as the “Mark IV special.” Early models of the panzer carried 50mm (two inches) of armor on the front and 30mm to 40mm on the sides and rear. Beginning in June 1942, the Wehrmacht began to add armor to vehicles in the field that increased the frontal armor to 80mm (three inches). In March 1943, the model H entered production with the frontal armor thickened to 85mm.55 The blocky Marks III and IV resembled one another closely, which accounts for the uncertain enemy vehicle identification in many American after-action reports from this period.
The Mark VI heavy tank had 100mm (four inches) of frontal armor and 80mm on the sides and rear.56 In practice, no American antitank gun fielded in North Africa could achieve a penetration of the Tiger’s armor from the front. The main gun was the fearsome 88mm high-velocity cannon.
The main medium tank used by Italian forces encountered in Tunisia was the M13/40. The vehicle mounted a 47mm high-velocity gun and was protected by armor ranging between 30mm and 9mm in thickness.57
In theory, the American 37mm gun on the M6 could penetrate up to 2.4 inches of armor (depending on the type of round fired) out to five hundred yards, and the 75mm gun on the M3 tank destroyer could penetrate three inches of face-hardened plate at one thousand yards.58 The U.S. Army claimed that the 3-inch gun on the M10 tank destroyer could penetrate four inches of face-hardened armor plate at one thousand yards. But it was not until the introduction of tungsten-core rounds late in the war that the weapon could achieve kills against that much armor from even three hundred yards.
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As they had been taught, Capt Frank Redding’s crews displayed a boldly aggressive spirit and engaged the far more numerous German tanks. Redding sent his six available M3s toward the German armor and arrayed his M6s to cover his rear. The TDs remained on the road surface to avoid sinking in the muck, so to avoid bunching up, Redding sent three TDs down a side route toward Ksar Tyr.
The three crews still on the main highway soon had their hands full. A concealed 47mm gun opened fire from a patch of trees to the south of the road but missed. Staff Sergeant Matthew Dixon maneuvered his M3 into position, and his 75mm barked back. Immediately, the enemy gun and its ammunition caught fire.
Through the smoke, five or six Mark III and Mark IV tanks emerged at point-blank range. The thin armor on an M3 had no chance whatsoever of stopping a shell from the main gun on either panzer model. Staff Sergeant Louis Romani turned his halftrack toward the threat. His gunner, Pfc Herman Lenzini, fired, but the round went high. Lenzini hurriedly adjusted as German shells whistled by, and he began firing as fast as his cannoneer could load. Lenzini’s next four shots killed four Mark III tanks. The third M3 advanced to engage the remaining German tank or tanks, which had withdrawn under the murderous fire. A hidden armored car stitched the M3 with machine-gun fire, which killed the commander and two crewmen.59
A new threat emerged as a column of Mark IV tanks appeared at a bend in the road about a thousand yards distant. One of the remaining two guns drove the Germans back with hits on two of the lead tanks, while the crew of the second TD rounded up thirteen German prisoners. One gun of the second platoon on the nearby path was able to get into position to fire on the German column from the flank. It disabled three Mark III or IV tanks. Meanwhile, the light gun platoon drove off a probe to the company’s rear by two armored cars and one light tank.
During the entire action, Redding had to run from TD to TD to issue orders, the radios having been rendered useless by days of rain and little maintenance and Redding’s jeep having been sent to the rear on a supply mission.
German tanks had by now spotted the mired American light tanks and methodically shot them to pieces. The fire from the tank destroyers allowed many of the crews to dash to safety.
At 1630 hours, Redding received orders to disengage. All guns laid down heavy fire and backed down the highway.
The German column withdrew as well. The tank killers’ first encounter with German tanks had been a resounding tactical success.
Fate, however, would snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. As CCB—accompanied by the tank destroyers—attempted its own withdrawal under cover of darkness, the column was shelled at the bridge across the Madjerda River. The column was ordered to reverse course and proceed a
cross country more or less in the direction from whence it had come. One by one, the vehicles became stuck in the mud and were abandoned. Later in the campaign, the 701st would encounter one of the Company C guns lost here in German service. Eventually, the entire column was immobilized, and the Americans retreated to Medjez el Bab on foot. CCB was crippled. Redding’s men, having lost all of their equipment, were assigned military police duties, where they remained until ordered back to the 701st in late January 1943.60 The armored battalion officers responsible for the fiasco were relieved of command.61
The Southern Flank: The Tunisian Task Force
Company B of the 701st had parted ways with Company C on 21 November and proceeded southeast toward Tebessa, Algeria, a frontier town of twelve hundred inhabitants at the foot of the forested Atlas Mountains.62 Waiting for their arrival was the Tunisian Task Force, a small venture consisting of the 2d Battalion of the 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment and French troops from the 3d Regiment of the Chasseur D’Afrique, all under the command of LtCol Edson Raff. The American paratroopers had dropped at Youks-les-Bains airfield on 15 November in order to deny its use to the Germans and to protect the flank of British-led operations to the north. The French troops on the scene had proved friendly, much to the relief of the paratroopers, who thought they might be Germans.63
Raff obtained permission from headquarters in Algiers to occupy a smaller airfield at Gafsa, a lush oasis town of ten thousand people eighty miles to the south and roughly half the distance to the coastal road that was Rommel’s only link to the German forces in Tunisia. Raff sent forty men there on 17 November. The French, who were receiving intelligence reports from coastal towns by phone, reported that a combined German-Italian force, including tanks, was advancing toward the area from the east. The defenses at Gafsa as of 20 November—a scant one hundred fifty men—had no artillery or antitank guns. Raff called for help.64
On 21 November, Raff ordered the destruction of fuel at the Gafsa airfield and pulled the elements there back to the vicinity of Youks-les-Bains, where he at least now had the support of a squadron of P-38s that had recently flown in. That morning, Company I and the antitank platoon from the 26th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, arrived by air from Algiers. And just before midnight, the TDs of Company B pulled in, having completed a thousand-mile road march in seven days.65
Second Lieutenant Arthur Edson and the other tank destroyer men were tired, and their vehicles needed attention, but they were ordered to press on to Feriana, a village about halfway to Gafsa and just south of a place called Kasserine. Arriving in Feriana, the men were given one hour to sleep. At 0300 hours, Edson and the other company officers roused the men, and the company resumed its march toward Gafsa. Raff had ordered an attack at dawn on 22 November to evict a German parachute unit that had taken up residence.
At 0700 hours, P-38s strafed Gafsa and the Tunisian Task Force advanced. The tank destroyers were deployed as assault guns, and the infantry followed the halftracks—which were banging away with their 75s—into town. Lady Luck smiled, and the ‘tracks missed all of the mines that the Germans had laid at a roadblock north of town. After a bit of sniping, the German defenders slipped away.66
Raff now faced a dilemma. The French reported that enemy forces were advancing toward Feriana to his rear, and shortly thereafter a motorcycle rider roared into town to report that a French armored car was in contact with an enemy tank force at El Guettar, a dozen miles further to the southeast. Raff pulled together a tank destroyer-infantry force and rushed to El Guettar.67
Company B arrived at El Guettar about 1700 hours. The trees of the oasis were visible to the right, and the Americans reasoned that the enemy had probably placed guns there. Company CO Capt Gilbert Ellmann sent two TD platoons to cover the trees. The men of the reconnaissance platoon continued down the road, manning the .30-caliber machine guns mounted on pedestals in their jeeps, and Edson and 2d Platoon followed. Generally, reconnaissance men depended on their wits to avoid ever having to use their machine guns because practically everything else on the battlefield was better protected than they were.68
Recon found ten Italian M13/40 tanks rather suddenly after cresting a small hill.69 The lead jeep was lost as fire struck the American column, but the crew dashed to safety. Several Italian tanks advanced on the American column. The first M3 in Edson’s platoon smashed the lead tank as it clanked over a rise, but then its gun jammed. The second TD pulled by just in time to destroy the next enemy tank.
The Italians decided to withdraw. Edson’s crews spotted another tank in the distance and opened fire, but they could not hit the vehicle. Just before the tank disappeared from view, Edson climbed aboard one of the gun halftracks, straddled the 75mm, and dead-reckoned a last shot. The shell pierced the engine compartment at a distance later measured at 3,500 yards. Nightfall ended the battle, but the enemy column had been routed.70
After giving his men a few hours rest, Raff dashed back north to deal with the reported threat beyond Feriana. The task force arrived in Kasserine on 23 November and, having encountered no enemy troops, advanced east toward Sbeitla. Recon once again took the point, followed by Edson’s platoon. Edson by now had figured out that because he was the most junior officer in the company, his platoon would almost always be in the lead. Once again, recon’s jeeps ran into the enemy—a mixed group of German and Italian units—just short of Sbeitla. This time, the jeep drivers slammed into reverse and backed out as fast as they could, almost colliding, while the men on the machine guns fired at the enemy.71
A sharp fight ensued. Edson was riding in one of the gun halftracks instead of his command vehicle. When the firing started, he simply reacted rather than call the company CO on the radio. Edson led his platoon to the left, while Capt Robert Whitsit’s platoon, directly behind, deployed to the right. Edson’s M3 was struck by a 47mm round and disabled. The vehicle coasted to a stop in a dip with an excellent field of fire on the Italian and German tanks below. The lieutenant took over as gunner and opened fire, accounting for three light tanks. The remainder of the company destroyed five more light tanks—most from a range of only nine hundred yards—and captured seventy Italian soldiers and considerable equipment. Few Germans were taken because they withdrew when it became clear that the battle would go against the Axis forces. The tank killers suffered only one casualty, a man hit by mortar fragments.72
After clearing Sbeitla, the task force withdrew to Kasserine and then Feriana. Having raced one thousand miles and fought two decisive engagements that stopped the Axis push westward in southern Tunisia, the tank destroyer men were able to rest and enjoyed pancakes prepared by the kitchen crew. Raff received the French Legion of Honor for Company B’s destruction of enemy armor at Sbeitla and a promotion to full colonel (the tank killers claimed that he had not even been present at the Sbeitla fire fight). Captain Gilbert Ellmann and the company received the Croix de Guerre with palm, and Arthur Edson a promotion to first lieutenant. The tank killers recorded in their operations report, “Although we had been attached to Colonel Raff and a few of his paratroops, we had done all the fighting in the recent engagements and had won the victories. Ours was a proud company.”
On 1 December, during fitful action in the sector, Company B was strafed by American P-38s. Three men were killed and two wounded, a tragedy that demoralized the outfit.
Shadow Boxing
By early December, the Allied advance had come to a halt. An angry Eisenhower wrote Chief of Staff General George Marshall that American and British operations had thus far managed to violate every accepted tactical principle of warfare and would be condemned in the military school system for decades to come.73 Be that as it may, the buildup of Axis forces assured near parity on the ground at the front by mid-December, a factor that had much to do with the Allies’ difficulties. So, too, did the weather. Anderson launched a new offensive toward Tunis on 24 December, but Eisenhower realized the futility of the effort after examining the crippling mud at the front. He
took the bitter decision to postpone the attack indefinitely.74
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The men of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion considered the next month to have been perhaps the most miserable of their lives. Incessant cold rains turned the theater into a sea of mud. When the weather was clear, the air raids returned. Bivouacked near Sidi bou Zid, the men of Company B suffered German air attacks every day for a week beginning 3 December. The men spent Christmas Eve sitting around fires, singing songs and thinking of home until driven to bed by cold. It would be another week before they would see the first letters from home since the landings.
The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion arrived in Tunisia on 21 December. In its first few hours at Souk el Khemis, in the heart of what by then had been dubbed “Stuka Alley,” the men experienced their first German air attack. The strafing left soldier Michael Syrko dead on the sand. Ten minutes later, the enraged outfit shot down its first Spitfire.
* * *
During the last week of 1942 and the first six of 1943, the Allies and Axis sparred to gain any advantage in central Tunisia.75 As ground was lost and gained and then lost again, some of the veteran tank killers wondered whether the generals in charge knew what they were doing.
In early January, the TDs of Company B of the 701st acted as artillery for French troops fighting to capture Hill 354 near Sidi bou Zid. Lieutenant Arthur Edson was awarded the Croix de Guerre with star for the effectiveness of his platoon’s fire.
As had happened to the 701st, the companies of the 601st were widely dispersed. Company A was assigned to train and support troops belonging to the French XIX Corps near Ousseltia and engaged in its first fighting on Christmas Day. Company B deployed to support Colonel Raff’s paratroopers around Feriana, and Company C was shuttled to the British and thence to the French at Fondouk Pass.76
