by Harry Yeide
Clobbered at Kasserine
The headquarters group of the 1st Infantry Division’s 26th RCT arrived in Kasserine Pass about 0730 hours on 19 February to take charge of defenses that were already under attack. Fredendall had called Colonel Stark late on 18 February and told him to move to Kasserine Pass immediately and “pull a Stonewall Jackson.” Stark took command from Colonel Moore and found four companies of the 19th Engineer Combat Regiment deployed on the right side of the line while his own 1st Battalion held the left. About 1705 hours, the 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, along with an antitank company, began to move into the left sector in a more-or-less piecemeal fashion. Stark deployed a few tanks from Company I, 13th Armored Regiment, and what was left of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion after the Feriana engagement near the entrance to the pass on the right (Company A had rejoined the battalion minus four TDs lost near Sbeitla).46
Kampfgruppe Deutsches Afrika Korps launched a strong frontal attack during the day; casualties were heavy on both sides. Under heavy artillery fire and attacked by an estimated tank battalion, the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion wildly reported that it had destroyed between twenty-five and thirty armored vehicles while losing eight of its own TDs. The official U.S. Army history’s account suggests that the battalion destroyed no tanks, but Stars and Stripes credited the tank killers with sixteen panzers in the action.47 The tank destroyers had to pull back at about 1600 hours because German infantry had infiltrated its positions. During the night, the battalion’s last ten guns shifted to the left flank.
The following day, at about 0400 hours, a small British task force of eleven tanks, a company of motorized infantry, one battery of artillery, and some antitank guns arrived courtesy of the British 26th Armoured Brigade at Thala. During the afternoon, the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion pulled into the pass. Stark deployed two companies to strengthen the right flank and one company to help the men of the 805th on the left.48
Rommel, however, was pressing his attack with reinforcements of his own—the 10th and 21st Panzer divisions—and his usual determination. By noon, German tanks had penetrated the line held by the engineers. As the afternoon progressed, the American line crumbled. Men fled, abandoning prodigious quantities of equipment. Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Gore, who commanded the British detachment, fought on valiantly until his last tank was destroyed. He then withdrew, accompanied by the five remaining TDs of the 805th.49
On 20 February, BrigGen Paul Robinett, commanding general of Combat Command B, was ordered to take charge of all troops defending Kasserine Pass. He, in turn, would report to the commander of the British 26th Armored Brigade, which was operating just to the north. The command spent that night rounding up and feeding stragglers from retreating units, including the 805th and 894th Tank Destroyer battalions. Both were initially incorporated into the command, but the 805th was in such a poor state—it had over the course of seven days lost eleven men killed, fifty-five wounded, and one hundred and sixty-eight missing or captured—that it could not be made combat-ready for at least a day and was sent north to Thala.50
At 0335 hours on 21 February, II Corps reported that the Germans had taken the heights on both sides of Kasserine Pass. Tanks were beginning to probe the plain on which sat Tebessa, II Corps headquarters, many of the largest American supply dumps, and the critical airfield at Youks-les-Bains.51 Combat Command B advanced during the wee hours of 21 February to Djebel el Hamra in the Bahiret Foussana Valley to block the projected German advance. The Germans attacked the new line at about 1400 with forty tanks backed by motorized infantry and artillery. The tanks of CCB would not be budged and stayed in hull-defilade positions rather than charge into waiting antitank fire. Artillery fire poured into the German ranks. The 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion maneuvered its halftracks to the enemy’s south flank and pounded the advancing Germans. The Americans held. Combat Command B’s Brigadier General Robinett reported that he believed the Germans had begun to retreat back into Kasserine Pass.52
Major General Orlando Ward, CG of 1st Armored Division, on 22 February assumed command of all operations in Kasserine, Thala, and Haidra. That day, the Germans were reported to be burning some of their vehicles, but Rommel nevertheless threw one more jab at CCB; more tough fighting was required to restore the line.
The next day, 1st Armored Division elements advanced against little resistance. Rommel, worried about Monty’s Eighth Army at his back, had decided to end his offensive.53 By 25 February, German forces had withdrawn to the line Faid–Djebel Sidi Aich–Gafsa, and the following day the battered 1st Armored Division went into corps reserve.54 Eisenhower deemed the Kasserine line stabilized as of 26 February.55
The first major American battle with German forces had cost the U.S. Army more than six thousand casualties, including three hundred dead, and two-thirds of the tank strength of the 1st Armored Division.56 Some of the tank destroyer men realized for the first time why the British, saddled with inferior equipment, might feel proud of a successful evacuation.57
Ward concluded in a letter to Armored Force chief LtGen Jacob Devers written a few days later, “I now have a veteran division. Its losses have been great, but I hope before long to have it better than ever, based on past experiences.”58 His words doubtless applied to the tank destroyer units fighting as part of his command.
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The troops were quickly losing faith in their equipment. Tank killers nicknamed their M3 the “Purple Heart Box.”59 The vehicle had no more punch than a Sherman and offered much less protection. After the fighting at Feriana and Kasserine, SSgt John Spence, of the 805th, realized that one had to move quickly in the M3, because if the halftrack were hit by a German tank round, “it was like lighting a match.”60 Indeed, the halftrack in general was getting a very bad name. One soldier, when asked by an officer if German aircraft bullets would go through the halftrack, replied, “No, sir. They only come through one wall and then they rattle around.”61
Word had gotten all the way back to TD men training at Camp Hood. When the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion shipped out for North Africa in January 1943, the men all hoped that they would not have to fight in the M3. They were elated when they were issued the first M10s in North Africa upon their arrival at Casablanca.62
By March 1943, official U.S. Army observers concluded that the 37mm gun was ineffective against German Mark III and Mark IV tanks. Only a side or rear shot had much chance of achieving a kill, and effective German coordination of tanks and infantry made this difficult to do in battle.63 There were now enough M3s in North Africa to replace all of the M6s.64 Company B of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion gleefully got rid of its M6s, which it judged “utterly worthless.” Reconnaissance Company got stuck with some of them, however.
On to Victory
Eisenhower reacted to the debacle at Kasserine Pass by reorganizing his command. British General Sir Harold Alexander took control of all ground forces. The British—who viewed the American performance as incompetent—would play the lead role in the next phase of operations. Major General George Patton Jr. assumed command of II Corps and started to beat it into shape. Two fresh British divisions arrived, and the Americans and French rearmed. And the Allies finally deployed enough fighters to contest control of the air. With that, the Allies took the offensive.65
On 13 March, the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 1st Armored Division, paving the way for the detachment three days later of the 701st.66 A partnership that had seen the toughest times of the North Africa campaign came to an end until renewed in Italy. The newly arrived battalion, equipped with M10s, deployed near Maknassy, where the men almost immediately experienced their first German dive-bombing.
The first mission for the 776th was to act as lead element for the 1st Armored Division in II Corps’ mid-March advance through Gafsa. Doctrine remained firmly tucked away in the field manual. The battalion CO concluded, however, that TD battalions were actually a logical choice for such work. The
y had organic antiaircraft protection, scouts, de facto infantry in their security sections, and the ability to destroy any German tank on the battlefield. The only real downside, he judged, was that his men had never fired a shot in anger.67
American forces recaptured Gafsa on 17 March, five days later passed through Maknassy, and advanced into the hills beyond.
The Perfect Test: Action at El Guettar
On 23 March, the Germans threw one last major armored punch at the Americans. Von Arnim counterattacked II Corps’ 1st Infantry Division with the 10th Panzer Division just east of El Guettar. At about 0500 hours, the Germans advanced slowly in a hollow-square formation of tanks and self-propelled guns interspersed with infantry carriers. Additional infantry followed in trucks.
Sergeant Bill Harper, an M3 commander in Company C of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, watched the advancing force with concern from the crest of the ridge above the pass to El Guettar. Harper counted seventy-five German tanks, and one platoon leader thought he spotted at least one hundred. These guesses were not bad, as the 10th Panzer Division had fifty-seven tanks and about the same number of armored cars and halftracks. The outnumbered TD battalion—on that day fielding thirty-one M3s and five M6s—was filling a two-and-a-half mile gap in the American lines.
The tank killers had expected trouble. Recon, which had established a picket line across the valley early that morning, spotted the advancing steel storm. After a brief exchange of fire, the recon jeeps, accompanied by a few TDs, raced back ahead of the foe. The lieutenant in charge of one group kept repeating over his radio, “Let the first three [vehicles] through, and then give ‘em hell!”
The battalion’s TDs were arrayed on the reverse slopes of the ridgeline and nearby hills. Companies B and C held positions in front of the 1st Infantry Division artillery, while Company A guarded the pass to El Guettar. The German formation split into three prongs and overran some American positions. Lieutenant Fred Miner in Company A reminded his men that the Americans had fled from the panzers in Ousseltia Valley and at Sbeitla; he told them that this time they would stand and shoot it out no matter what the odds.
In the weak light of early morning, the TD crews engaged the Germans as they came into range. Sergeant Raymond, of Company B, spotted a giant Tiger moving past and maneuvered to put six shots (probably from the flank) into the panzer, four of which ricocheted but two of which did the job. Raymond next set a Mark IV alight. German rounds found Raymond’s M3, and three hits set the halftrack on fire.
Guided by forward observers, most of the TDs raced over the crests of the ridges and hills, fired, and backed out of sight, only to pop up and do the same again at another location. The German gunners never knew where a TD would appear next. Except, it seemed, for one crew, which found itself the object of heavy fire every time their M3 crested the rise. They finally realized that their radio antenna was standing proudly tall and revealed their approach every time. They lowered the aerial.
After Company A’s TDs had knocked out eight tanks, the German assault force withdrew and circled to reinforce the attack on the rest of the battalion’s line. The panzers penetrated to within one hundred yards of the Companies B and C TDs. Some of the M3s were no longer moving, and a few were burning. The Germans were so close that Sgt Bill Harper at one point thought the outfit was surrounded. Even as ammunition ran low, the battalion doggedly held its ground. At the height of the assault, some TDs were forced to abandon the duck-and-strike tactics; they stood and fired as fast as the guns could be loaded. The crews also had to beat back German infantry using small arms, machine guns, and 75mm HE shells.
The German tide receded about noon, leaving a litter of burning tanks on the slopes and approaches. The tanks withdrew into defilade positions among wadis and small hills on the northeast side of the valley.
The untested 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion was in mobile reserve near Gafsa when, at 0845, it received orders to move to El Guettar. German tanks had overrun a field artillery battalion, and the 601st had already lost most of its 75mm guns. Company B entered the valley to engage the Germans while Company C provided overwatch from the ridgeline to the west.
Second Lieutenant Gerald Coady’s platoon led the Company B charge through the gap into the valley. As the M10s rolled by to their first test against an enemy, LtCol Herschel Baker stood among his remaining Purple Heart boxes and shouted an unprintable but heartfelt welcome.
The Germans had skillfully selected their firing positions and—combined with an American minefield—they left Coady little room for maneuver. Coady tried to rush his force into covered positions to the north three times, and three times he fell back with losses. After two of his own TDs had been disabled, Coady saw that the platoon leader in the next platoon had been killed. He dismounted under heavy tank, antitank, artillery, and small-arms fire and organized the remnants of the two platoons to continue the battle.
Corporal Thomas Wilson commanded one of the Company B M10s. His destroyer received two direct hits and had two fires aboard. Wilson helped extinguish the fires while his gunner, T/5 Stephen Kurowski—who was wounded in both legs—continued firing his 3-inch gun at the Germans. Kurowski knocked out two emplacements, an artillery piece, and several machine guns before the M10 absorbed a third hit in the fuel tank, which started another fire. Wilson decided that he could not allow the Germans to capture their first M10 and directed his driver to a place where American forces would be able to recover the crippled vehicle.
At 1645 hours, the Germans struck again, supported by Stuka and fighter attacks. Infantry advanced first, overwatched by tanks and antitank guns. On the ridgeline, as the crews of C/899th watched the advance as if from an opera balcony seat, the gunners itched for something to come into range. The TDs of the 601st and 899th blazed away, and American artillery pounded the German troops. Thirty-eight panzers pressed the attack until almost 1900 hours but gave up after suffering further heavy losses.
The TDs and the artillery together had wreaked havoc during the day. Twenty-seven of the 601st’s thirty-six guns were knocked out and fourteen men had died, but its sharp-eyed gunners had destroyed thirty-seven German tanks and damaged an unknown number of others. The crews of the M10s claimed fifteen Mark IVs for a loss of five TDs and a halftrack.68
The battle at El Guettar had played out General Bruce’s dream scenario and doctrine to a tee. And, despite substantial American losses—concentrated among the antiquated M3s—the concept had worked. It would be nearly a year before the Tank Destroyer Force would have another opportunity to meet a large armored attack with a full TD battalion.
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Almost as if to show for the record just once that he had read the official doctrine, 1st Armored Division CG Orlando Ward on 30 March issued an order to the commander of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion that said, “You will place your battalion in a position of readiness in the vicinity of the high ground four miles northeast of Station de Sened…. You will reconnoiter positions and routes… and be prepared to move to these positions to block an enemy threat from the north and northeast…. Perform vigorous and continuous reconnaissance…. You will act aggressively against any enemy threat.”69
Nonetheless, as the Allies pressed relentlessly through tough opposition toward Tunis, experimentation produced another effective role for the tank destroyers. TDs were deployed before a tank attack to search out and destroy German antitank guns from long range. The results were little short of amazing. The tankers advanced without loss, and they later said that had they known how many guns had been there, they would have been scared stiff. The 1st Armored Division found the experience so compelling that it began to construct advances around the initial phase of TD suppressive fires. The TDs and tanks would then leapfrog from ridge to ridge, allowing the destroyers to work over the ground before the tanks advanced, and then to conduct overwatch in case they had missed any targets. The technique worked despite the fact that the two types of armor had incompatible radio equipment.70
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During the night of 29 March, Patton organized a task force under the command of Col Clarence Benson, CO of the 13th Armored Regiment, to cut through German lines in the hills east of El Guettar and link up with Monty’s Eighth Army north of Gabes. The 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion formed part of the task force, which spent six days trying unsuccessfully to overcome stiff German and Italian resistance. Reconnaissance Company had been issued several light tanks for the assault, a field modification of the TO&E that gave the men—always at the bleeding edge—considerably more punch. Finally, at 0930 on 7 April, the entire battalion was ordered forward after a renewed tank attack showed signs of progress. The Americans broke through and, now freed, raced into the flat desert beyond. At 1600 hours, elements of the 899th established contact with the Eighth Army near Sobkret Sidi Mansour.71 There was now only one front in North Africa.
Lieutenant General Omar Bradley replaced Patton at the head of II Corps on 15 April so that the latter could return to overseeing the planning for the invasion of Sicily. Pinched out of the line by the steady shrinkage of the Axis perimeter, II Corps shifted behind the British lines and took on responsibility for the left flank along the coast. The new objective was Bizerte.
The tank-destroying days were basically over for the TD battalions in North Africa. The terrain was broken and poorly suited to the use of armor. Instead, the TD battalions usually occupied antitank defense positions to fend off hypothetical attacks. At times, they performed the roles of assault guns and artillery.72
American forces captured Bizerte on 7 May—Recon Company of the 894th claims to have entered the city first—and pushed onward as British units pounded toward Tunis. Resistance collapsed on 9 May and ended completely three days later. The Allies bagged 270,000 prisoners of war, veterans who would not be waiting for them when they invaded the shores of Europe.
